Free Will Revisted (Compatible with God?)

[Willamena]

Hell, you can't prove you're not a figment of my imagination.

I can. If I'm a figment of your imagination, and considering that what's real is what's real to me, then there is nothing real to you, so ...oh wait, I've proven that I'm a figment of your imagination.
(just kidding!)

 

[Sententia]

Of course you can't prove that we have free will. Hell, you can't prove you're not a figment of my imagination.

Now that matches up more with how I percieve perception... Frubals. (BTW I am a figment)

 

[BruceDLimber]

My pont holds, Falvlun: based on what we can know, we have free will. Anything external to that is irrelevant for our purposes.

(And BB, if you don't understand something, you need to be specific about what.)

Peace,

Bruce

 

[BucephalusBB]

(And BB, if you don't understand something, you need to be specific about what.)

Peace,

Bruce

In fact, the fallacy in the argument is that whether God knows the future or not, there is no way that WE can know it, and therefor ....

Your flaw here is that you base your conclusion on an earlier conclusion made.
You think there is free will. Thus we cannot know the future and therefor....

Now what if everything is set. What if there is no free will and all we are, are puppets in a huge game designed to think we havee free will. If everything is set on rules and nothing more, all we need is those rules to know the future.

I didn't understand as you cannot know if we'll ever discover the future.. We can only presume..
It was the "no way" that was in my way

 

[Falvlun]

My pont holds, Falvlun: based on what we can know, we have free will. Anything external to that is irrelevant for our purposes.

How does your point hold? You didn't even address my analogy. Does the rat have free will or not? (And yes, I know what I described was more like omnipotence than omniscience, but that's besides the point: the point is the rat "believes" he has free-will when he really doesn't.)

Does Santa Claus exist because to all extents and purposes, little children believe he does?

Was the world ever truly flat, because based on what the ancients knew, it was?

Yes, I agree, it feels like we have free-will, but claiming that we do, based upon that feeling alone, is a bit myopic.

 

[idea]

I don’t think animals have free will, I’m not sure most people do. Only those with willpower have a will… the rest do everything through obligation, or instinct, or convenience, not will.

 

[lunamoth]

Think of it this way. No free will means never resisting God's will. That is the state of animals and angels.

 

[Copernicus]

Regarding the rat-in-a-maze situation, I would say that the rat definitely has free will. Our circumstances manipulate all of our choices. What "free will" means at a gut level is that one can foresee options, calculate the effects of choosing each option, and then choose the option that we judge to be "best". Even when someone holds a gun to your head, you can choose to disobey. It's just that you must calculate the risks of disobedience. The rat can choose to take the path available to it, to go back the way it came, or to remain in place. If it chooses to go forward, that is the exercise of free will.

When Christians argue that God's constant presence would rob us of free will, they don't mean that kind of free will. What they mean is that knowledge of God's existence would put us in an even narrower maze with fewer options than if he didn't make himself so obviously omnipresent. At least, that is how I interpret their argument. Maybe someone can offer a clearer explanation. I've never really followed their reasoning on this point, because it seems to value the options of evildoers over those of their victims.

 

[Willamena]

How does your point hold? You didn't even address my analogy. Does the rat have free will or not?

I will! Yes, the rat in the maze analogy demonstrates free will as it choose at each turn, at each moment, the direction of its path. Every moment of existence is an opportunity to exercise free will. Regardless that someone opens and closes doors before you, you still determine your own path.

Does Santa Claus exist because to all extents and purposes, little children believe he does?

Yes, Santa exists to those who believe in him, simply because we believe in those things we regard to be true. If a thing isn't seen as true, then belief doesn't occur. Similarly, if a thing becomes no longer seen as true, belief is abandoned.

Was the world ever truly flat, because based on what the ancients knew, it was?

It still is! Just look around you, what do you see? Is what you see true, or a lie? Now that imaginary objective observer world see a different picture... And what he sees is the "truly" true picture, but then he has a whole new perspective for us that he didn't have for them, so even for him then it was "truly" true.

Yes, I agree, it feels like we have free-will, but claiming that we do, based upon that feeling alone, is a bit myopic.

There is a perspective from which everything in the world is appearances. The world is as it appears to be. Free will, whether seen as illusion or not, is as it appears to be (illusion, or not).

 

[Beaudreaux]

Greetings!

In fact, the fallacy in the argument is that whether God knows the future or not, there is no way that WE can know it, and therefore so far as we can tell our decisions aren't forced.

Exactly! It FEELS like we are making choices because we don't know the future. But the future IS KNOWN.

 

[Copernicus]

Yes, Santa exists to those who believe in him, simply because we believe in those things we regard to be true. If a thing isn't seen as true, then belief doesn't occur. Similarly, if a thing becomes no longer seen as true, belief is abandoned.

While we agree on some fundamental points in this discussion, I have to take issue with this claim. It makes no distinction between reality and imagination, but all of us have to make that distinction if we are to survive. Reality exists, whether we can know it directly or only infer it from our subjective experiences.

There is a perspective from which everything in the world is appearances. The world is as it appears to be. Free will, whether seen as illusion or not, is as it appears to be (illusion, or not).

I agree with you completely on this point, but that is not the same as saying that Santa Claus really exists because we believe him to exist. We build models of reality in our minds, but we use experiences to shape those models. To the extent that the model differs from reality, we are in peril of losing our own existences.

 

[Willamena]

It makes no distinction between reality and imagination...

That's because reality is true, I imagine.

Reality exists, whether we can know it directly or only infer it from our subjective experiences.

What things (that you know of) do we "know directly" and not infer from "our subjective experience"?

I agree with you completely on this point, but that is not the same as saying that Santa Claus really exists because we believe him to exist. We build models of reality in our minds, but we use experiences to shape those models. To the extent that the model differs from reality, we are in peril of losing our own existences.

The models of reality we build in our minds are reality (as we know it) to each of us. We cannot know anything apart from that what we know.

 

[Copernicus]

What things (that you know of) do we "know directly" and not infer from "our subjective experience"?

We know our experiences directly. We can only infer that those experiences accurately reflect reality. Sometimes, they don't. Sometimes the discovery of that fact is painful. Usually, the difference between what we believe to be true and what is true is inconsequential.

The models of reality we build in our minds are reality (as we know it) to each of us. We cannot know anything apart from that what we know.

This isn't about knowledge, but belief. We are all aware of the fact that we could be mistaken. There could be a difference between what we believe and what is real. This awareness is essential to our survival. That is why verification (corroboration) is so important to distinguishing between what is real and what is not.

 

[Willamena]

We know our experiences directly. We can only infer that those experiences accurately reflect reality.

Right. It's all subjective experience.

Sometimes, they don't.

How do you know?

Sometimes the discovery of that fact is painful. Usually, the difference between what we believe to be true and what is true is inconsequential.

Sometimes we realize we've taken things out of context; but it's no big catastrophe. We just correct the context in which we've taken our subjective experience (i.e. do a re-take) and all's well again.

This isn't about knowledge, but belief. We are all aware of the fact that we could be mistaken. There could be a difference between what we believe and what is real. This awareness is essential to our survival. That is why verification (corroboration) is so important to distinguishing between what is real and what is not.

Really? What do you know of that isn't about knowlege. What do you believe that you didn't already know of? The only difference between what we believe (being something we know is true) and what is real (being something we know is true) is imagined. Belief is dependent upon our certainty (truthfulness) in the validity of a thing we know ("fact").

 

[Copernicus]

How do you know?

It isn't about what I know, but what I believe. I infer that my beliefs are wrong when new experiences converge to contradict them. It's a judgment call.

Sometimes we realize we've taken things out of context; but it's no big catastrophe. We just correct the context and all's well again.

It is not the context that we correct, but our beliefs about the context. Corroboration from multiple sources of information is extremely important in informing us about what is real and what is not.

Really? What do you know of that isn't about knowlege. What do you believe that you didn't already know of? The only difference between what we believe (being something we know is true) and what is real (being something we know is true) is imagined. Belief is dependent upon our certainty (truthfulness) in the validity of a thing we know ("fact").

The problem with the concept of "knowledge" is that it presupposes truth, but we can only know analytic truth for certain, i.e. what is self-evident from the meanings of the words we use to describe it. So we know that someone who has been killed is "dead", because we know that "kill" entails "die". Synthetic truths--those that are contingent on experience--are always contingent on the best available information. Most of the time, what we claim to know is not what we believe with absolute certainty, but what we believe with reasonable certainty, given our experiences of the world. Again, corroborating evidence is of the utmost importance in reducing uncertainty.

 

[Paraprakrti]

Does free will have to be absolute in order to be free? Are we either absolutely free or absolutely bound? Are those our only options? If so, then the existence of an omniscient God would mean that we are absolutely bound. If not, then perhaps what is meant by "free will" has to do with our thoughts and actions according to our levels of knowledge. Even though God knows all choices to be made, our relative sense of free will does not require absolute freedom from God's knowledge.

 

[Willamena]

It isn't about what I know, but what I believe. I infer that my beliefs are wrong when new experiences converge to contradict them.

It is not the context that we correct, but our beliefs about the context. Corroboration from multiple sources of information is extremely important in informing us about what is real and what is not.

With new experiences/new information come new beliefs. We let go the old beliefs when the context in which they were true (the old information) has changed. Nothing can be true but that it is true in its (proper) context. Take away its context, and a thing cannot remain true; restore its context and it is true again. I see no "wrong" beliefs.

As an example of the context I mean: "I went to the store," was true yesterday. Today it is no longer true unless I restore the context in which it was true: "I went to the store yesterday." The belief that "the world is flat" was based on a set of information (including philosophy), a set that has since changed for most of us. Even the scope of "the world" has changed, and so very little about it can remain true for us.

"Accurate reality" at any given moment is what we each know it to be based on the information we have. Knowing, understanding and believing are interpresent. We understand reality to the extent that what we know is sublimated to a wholly imagined greater truth that we each believe in.
(Not that that's inherently a good or bad thing.)

The problem with the concept of "knowledge" is that it presupposes truth, but we can only know analytic truth for certain, i.e. what is self-evident from the meanings of the words we use to describe it. So we know that someone who has been killed is "dead", because we know that "kill" entails "die". Synthetic truths--those that are contingent on experience--are always contingent on the best available information. Most of the time, what we claim to know is not what we believe with absolute certainty, but what we believe with reasonable certainty, given our experiences of the world. Again, corroborating evidence is of the utmost importance in reducing uncertainty.

I'm confused by your intermingled terms, the distinctions of which mean little to me, but will just ask to clarify one: What distinguishes the "presupposed truth" of knowledge from the synthetic truth that we know for certain (provided knowing is the act that gives us "knowledge" and certainty is a measure of "belief")?

 

[Copernicus]

With new experiences/new information come new beliefs. We let go the old beliefs when the context in which they were true (the old information) has changed. Nothing can be true but that it is true in its (proper) context. Take away its context, and a thing cannot remain true; restore its context and it is true again. I see no "wrong" beliefs.

Think of a claim as a speech act. The context is the time, place, and circumstances of the act. Presupposition is that which must be true in order for the speech act to carry off. If you are unfamiliar with the philosopher John Austin, I recommend his seminal work on Speech Act Theory How to Do Things with Words. He described what I call "presupposition" as the felicity conditions or "happiness conditions" that must be true for a speech act to carry off. There has been an enormous amount of philosophical and linguistic work built on the foundation of that short monograph. (Apologies if you are considerably more knowledgeable about the philosophy of language than I am guessing.)

As an example of the context I mean: "I went to the store," was true yesterday. Today it is no longer true unless I restore the context in which it was true: "I went to the store yesterday." The belief that "the world is flat" was based on a set of information (including philosophy), a set that has since changed for most of us. Even the scope of "the world" has changed, and so very little about it can remain true for us.

I am assuming a non-solipsist philosophy--that something exists independently of myself and can be communicated to me (and filtered) through sensory experiences. Our minds impose models on our experiences. Different beliefs are competing models, none of which can be fully isomorphic with reality in the sense that it makes accurate predictions of events in the external world. The best model is that which predicts future sensory experiences the most accurately. Hence, we can only get closer to empirical truth but never fully attain it. That is agnosticism in the sense that Aldous Huxley originally defined it--a denial of knowledge of the absolute. Knowledge is experiential and cannot be quantified in any conventional sense (i.e. omniscience is impossible) since it is based on ephemeral experiences.

"Accurate reality" at any given moment is what we each know it to be based on the information we have. Knowing, understanding and believing are interpresent. We understand reality to the extent that what we know is sublimated to a wholly imagined greater truth that we each believe in. (Not that that's inherently a good or bad thing.)

I would define knowledge as truth that is presupposed by the maker of the speech act to be true. So, if John says "Jack believes that Mary is pregnant", you cannot infer that John believes in her pregnancy. If he says "Jack knows that Mary is pregnant", you can infer that he is convinced of it. If I say "John believes Mary is pregnant", you cannot infer that I believe her pregnant. If I say "John knows Mary is pregnant", you can infer my belief in her pregnancy. Presuppositions remain constant under negation. So, if I say "John does not know that Mary is pregnant", you can still infer I believe in her pregnancy. This may all be a bit pedantic and tedious, but I am trying to show you how I construe presuppositions and that I am working with a clear concept of them and a set of linguistic tests for examining them.

I'm confused by your intermingled terms, the distinctions of which mean little to me, but will just ask to clarify one: What distinguishes the "presupposed truth" of knowledge from the synthetic truth that we know for certain (provided knowing is the act that gives us "knowledge" and certainty is a measure of "belief")?

The distinction is that presupposition is grounded in the speech act. It bears on the beliefs and intentions of the speaker of an utterance. Synthetic truth refers to truth that can only be understood as an accurate model of reality. Analytic truth is self-evident from the meanings of the words. It is an interesting fact about logic that it conventionally consists only of assertions. It pays no attention to presuppositions or speech act theory, nor do logicians have a clear method for talking about presuppositions. It comes with no formal way of translating natural language expressions into logic, just the logician's intuitive grasp of how that translation process ought to work.

 

[Willamena]

Accurate reality" at any given moment is what we each know it to be based on the information we have.

So, if John says "Jack believes that Mary is pregnant", you cannot infer that John believes in her pregnancy. If he says "Jack knows that Mary is pregnant", you can infer that he is convinced of it. If I say "John believes Mary is pregnant", you cannot infer that I believe her pregnant. If I say "John knows Mary is pregnant", you can infer my belief in her pregnancy. Presuppositions remain constant under negation. So, if I say "John does not know that Mary is pregnant", you can still infer I believe in her pregnancy. This may all be a bit pedantic and tedious, but I am trying to show you how I construe presuppositions and that I am working with a clear concept of them and a set of linguistic tests for examining them.

If John says, "Jack believes that Mary is pregnant," that John said that is the information I have (accurate reality). If he says, "Jack knows that Mary is pregnant," that John said this is the information I have (accurate reality). If you say, "John knows Mary is pregnant," that you said that is the information I have (accurate reality). But if I want to know if Mary's pregnant, I'll just go and ask her.

 

[Copernicus]

If John says, "Jack believes that Mary is pregnant," that John said that is the information I have (accurate reality)...

Insofar as you are not hallucinating. Remember that we can only possess models of reality, not absolute knowledge of it.

If he says, "Jack knows that Mary is pregnant," that John said this is the information I have (accurate reality).

True, but you can also infer that John believes Mary is pregnant, assuming that he is not lying.

If you say, "John knows Mary is pregnant," that you said that is the information I have (accurate reality).

True, but you can also infer something about my beliefs--that I believe her to be pregnant. Nothing you say here contradicts my point about the semantics of "know". The verb "know" belongs to the class of verbs called factive verbs. I'm not making this up. It is a well-studied phenomenon.

...But if I want to know if Mary's pregnant, I'll just go and ask her.

Forget it, Willamena. She doesn't want to talk to you about it.