A god that is omniscient would know all of its future decisions, therefore is severely limited by its own knowledge, i.e. has no freewill. This seems an absurdity, therefore, at best a god can only be omniscient about all things and decisions unrelated to itself.
How would you justify the lack of freewill as a bonafide "absurdity". Please, do put some effort into this one, 'kay?
But this means it is not truly omniscient, as it cannot know the future, since it does not know the actions it will take. If it is not omniscient, it follows that it cannot be omnipotent, as it is usually taken that one implies the other.
How does the supposed implication definitively rescind omnipotence?
What are the two concepts,
really?
fluffy said:
It is meaningless to say that it is possible to do the logically impossible because possibility is defined according to a limit and there is no limit outside of the logical for which such a range of acts can be placed in reference to.
I'm always confused about how regular "possibility" differs from "logical possibility".
Therefore, omnipotence and omniscience, the abilities to do and know everything, are meaningless (not logically incoherent but meaningless) when "everything" is understood to include the logically impossible. Therefore, "everything" should not be understood in this way. Problem solved.
I think there's a much simpler route than that.
My own dime-store etymology of omnipotence and omniscience shouldn't have to deal with "impossibilities" or paradox, or meaning in the slightest.
Firstly, much in the form of your first statement, i don't see how omnipotence necessarily attributes "limitlessness + infinity, etc."
Potential, being the key word for me, is described in totality with the concept of god, as i see it. No centralisation is needed, nor motive. What is outside of the total potential of the universe, existence, or whatever is not within the realm and influence of that which i describe, fondly, of course, as the "horder of potential".
Omniscience seems even more benign. Being needn't even get involved in this one, as it only seems to imply that:
a)knowledge exists distinctly
b)the total set of knowledge is finite
c)thus, there is
potential for everything to be known
Even having said this, omniscience doesn't denote a conscious agent. Here, i'm sure, many would disagree with my own flaky views on epistemology, where i may add
d)Everything that is knowable is, in some form, known.
What think you of that last one?