Ambiguity of Atheism

[Falvlun]

But all truth claims are not open-ended. For example it is true that the sun has risen in the morning, but it is not true that it must. An argument from the past is not an argument to the future. Yet the very thing you are saying is ‘better supported’ or ‘more likely to be true’ includes an eternally existing being that intervenes in the present and the future. I’m sorry but that surely is a special plea?

Your argument is still unclear to me. Do you not believe that some things are unable to be proven? (A while back I gave the example of the existence of a god who purposefully makes its existence unprovable.) And I still don't know why the inability to prove a thing to be true would somehow eliminate the possibility for it to be true.

There seems to me to be an evident partiality in the way you award credibility, where numbers overrule rational analysis, highlighted by the way you think it reasonable to ask unbelievers to ‘prove their case’.

Look, I am not arguing about whether the theist argument is more credible than the atheist. Obviously, I find the atheist argument more persuasive. I am only attempting to establish the reasonableness of the theist request for atheists to "prove their stance", in contrast to your contention that the request is made out of sophistry and a desire to cause mischief.

I find the request to be perfectly reasonable, and that is despite the fact that I also find the arguments for atheism to be much more rational.

Some folk have an innate disposition to believe in mystical beings and I do not accept that those people weigh up the pros and cons before coming to that conclusion, even subconsciously, since faith-based belief doesn’t require demonstration or even any degree of probability to be evident. The essence of faith is trust, not evidence. So what I’m saying is the disposition is prior to any rationalizing that may follow, which of course will always be in favour of the belief.

In other words, you do not believe that we have mental predispositions towards how we determine what we believe. There is no such thing as a confirmation bias. It is simply by chance that we are much more likely to give consideration to a group of people making the same claim, as we are to a single person making a claim.

Forgive me for finding your claim incredible.

But is that an argument that makes faith-based beliefs in supernatural beings credible?

No, it is an argument as to why it is reasonable for theists to desire atheists to make their case.

 

[Copernicus]

I have decided that there really isn't much to reply to in Cottage's latest post to me, because he just raises the same points that I think have already been addressed adequately by me. Obviously, we are not making headway in this discussion. I am very much in agreement with Falvlun here, so I have taken the lazy way out and let him do all the work.

I agree to the central question here: what makes us disinclined to believe a claim? After all, we normally assume (by Grice's Maxims) that speakers who make assertions believe in the truth of their assertions and that they have some basis for making the assertion. OTOH, we discriminate heavily on the basis of what we think about the person making the claim. If the claim is from a child, then we treat the claim more skeptically than from an adult. If it is a scientific claim, then we tend to rely on it more than if it is a religious claim (well-for atheists, anyway ).

Here is the thing about religious claims, though. It is not just that belief in gods permeates almost all human cultures. It is that those who are religious spend prodigious amounts of time trying to convince themselves not to be disinclined to believe. That is, they train themselves to ignore their natural skepticism. They engage in hours of prayer meetings and listening to sermons. They draw on the faith of others to sustain their own. They quite often attempt to suppress dissenting voices rather than reason with them. So their claim is not just floating on a sea of popularity. It is sustained by other influences.

I believe that the burden is squarely on theists to make a case for the existence of their deities. Nevertheless, I recognize that I cannot call on their natural skepticism to play a role in an existential debate. They have taken countermeasure to short-circuit burden-of-proof arguments. They typically will not accept the burden.

 

[Falvlun]

Disbelief in gods is not a new concept, nor is it one held by only a handful of people. But you are continuing to present the burden of proof in a spurious fashion, implying or alleging that I have stated it as means to avoid discussion with theists. That is completely false, and you know full well that my argument highlighted the very opposite situation, which is where a theist withdraws from the debate by passing the burden of proof to the sceptic. And it really is nonsense to suggest that asking the advocates of any proposition to give the grounds for its validity is somehow akin to insulting them or causing them ill will. .

I have been debating with you in good faith, and thrice you have accused me of being willfully misleading. Personally, I think the main problem is that you are frustrated I am not making the argument you are assuming I am.

My experience with the use of the Burden of Proof argument has inclined me to the point of view that it is not effective as an argument, and further, that it is often counter-productive. I felt your original post displayed that same sort of unproductive approach, and hoped that a better understanding of why it was an unproductive approach could be achieved.

Do you find it unreasonable for theists to ask atheists to show why they believe that god does not exist?

If no, then we have nothing to debate. We agree. If yes, then I don't think I can say anything else to persuade you.

 

[cottage]

Your argument is still unclear to me. Do you not believe that some things are unable to be proven? (A while back I gave the example of the existence of a god who purposefully makes its existence unprovable.) And I still don't know why the inability to prove a thing to be true would somehow eliminate the possibility for it to be true.

There are of course an infinite number of possible things that are unprovable and an infinite number of things that are merely probable. But theists aren’t just saying their beliefs are merely possible, or even probable, they are claiming them as certain. So if a god makes his existence unprovable then how is it believers supposedly know his existence to be true?

And if ‘God’ is necessary he cannot make his existence unprovable since he would then be not God, which is a contradiction. Even the Supreme Being cannot make a necessary truth necessarily false.

Look, I am not arguing about whether the theist argument is more credible than the atheist. Obviously, I find the atheist argument more persuasive. I am only attempting to establish the reasonableness of the theist request for atheists to "prove their stance", in contrast to your contention that the request is made out of sophistry and a desire to cause mischief.

I find the request to be perfectly reasonable, and that is despite the fact that I also find the arguments for atheism to be much more rational.

Atheists don’t have to ‘prove their case’ or ‘prove their stance’, since they cannot prove the non-being of a thing that is seen not to be existent; it is only believers who are making outright claims to the truth. There is, however, an obligation on the part of sceptics is to provide an argument in response to reasons given by theists for believing in gods or mystical beings. Over and over again you refer to the term ‘reasonableness’, as if I’ve stated somewhere that sceptics shouldn’t be reasonably expected to defend their arguments when I think you know very well I was referring to deliberate attempts by theists to disengage from a debate by trying to put the onus on an individual who questioned their faith.

In other words, you do not believe that we have mental predispositions towards how we determine what we believe. There is no such thing as a confirmation bias. It is simply by chance that we are much more likely to give consideration to a group of people making the same claim, as we are to a single person making a claim.

Forgive me for finding your claim incredible.

I said people do have mental dispositions, in this case a disposition to believe in mystical beings, a notion that they rationalize to find in favour of the belief, confirming what is believed. In other words there is no weighing up of the pros and cons as you suggested previously. They look to bolster a belief that is already established in their minds. I agree with much of what Copernicus writes in Post 342, third paragraph.

No, it is an argument as to why it is reasonable for theists to desire atheists to make their case.

You are saying those who believe in the existence of supernatural beings (claimed as a truth) should in the first instance be excused their reasons for believing as they do, while doubters are expected to justify their unbelief. And you allow reason to be stood on its head because you say a majority belief in the existence of supernatural beings is credible. With respect, I’m saying to you that an unproven truth is neither credible nor reasonable.

 

[cottage]

I have been debating with you in good faith, and thrice you have accused me of being willfully misleading. Personally, I think the main problem is that you are frustrated I am not making the argument you are assuming I am.

So here is the golden opportunity for you to state your argument unambiguously, explaining how it applies to me or to anything I’ve said. And please may we have an example or two?

My experience with the use of the Burden of Proof argument has inclined me to the point of view that it is not effective as an argument, and further, that it is often counter-productive. I felt your original post displayed that same sort of unproductive approach, and hoped that a better understanding of why it was an unproductive approach could be achieved.

There is no ‘Burden of Proof argument’. It is just the obligation to defend a claim – any claim. But what does this ‘unproductive approach’ and ‘better understanding’ mean, and more importantly how are these vague terms relevant to what I wrote?

Do you find it unreasonable for theists to ask atheists to show why they believe that god does not exist?

If no, then we have nothing to debate. We agree. If yes, then I don't think I can say anything else to persuade you.

I don’t find it ‘unreasonable’. I find it trivial and feigned, as in affecting surprise or incredulity. Even the most ardent and naive believer knows disbelief in god basically stems from this: ‘faith-based supernatural beings don’t have factual existence’, a statement that isn’t confuted. In the case of a genuine enquiry, theists would offer some additional argument or reasons to which the sceptic could reasonably respond (examples further down the page). And if genuine, but naïve, then asking ‘Why don’t you believe in god’ is akin to asking ‘Why don’t you have my disposition to believe in a supernatural being from faith?’ It doesn’t take a wizard to understand that some form of argument must be put forward before its merits or demerits can be discussed!! What is reasonable, then, is for the theist to make that argument and for the sceptic to respond with an argument of his own - unless there is some other way of conducting a debate that I should know about?
And actually, to ask: ‘Why don’t you believe in god’ invites a burden of proof response: ‘Why should I believe in god? - which, by the way, is a perfectly reasonable response to the question that was asked. Although I have to say that during my years on religious forums, and in my long e-mail exchanges with US religious website owners, I cannot remember seeing that trivial and unconnected question asked. But isn’t it more intelligent for the theist to begin with (for example): ‘Why don’t you believe in a creator God?’ or ‘Where, in the absence of wise and just deity, do you think our moral authority has its source?’