Ambiguity of Atheism

[Copernicus]

My argument in very simple terms is this: Whatever we can conceive as existent (Santa assumed for example), we can conceive as non-existent. But there is no Santa whose non-existence implies a contradiction. There is therefore no Santa.

OK. Thank you for that simplification. It seems to me that you could even simplify it further: "Santa does not exist if Santa does not exist". My wording is not as erudite as yours, but the argument is equally compelling. You should try it on a kid who really believes in Santa sometime and let us know the response.

“You can dismiss Santa Claus and God on the very weak grounds that there is no evidence for either entity. I call that "weak", because people who believe in such beings tend to believe that they can produce satisfactory evidence of their existence, even if you do accept their evidence.” #276

We seem to be talking at cross purposes again, because I was speaking hypothetically about people believing in Santa there. As I've stated before, the main difference between God and Santa is that belief in the former is ubiquitous, and belief in the latter is almost nonexistent among adults. You and I agree about burden of proof. Where we seem to have a disagreement is that you think burden of proof is a compelling argument with respect to God, and I think that you need to move past that in order to have a reasonable debate with theists. It only convinces the already-convinced.

You only have to prove Santa’s existence if you’re arguing the proposition ‘Santa exists’ is true (burden of proof). My argument is that the proposition is false.

That misses the point. No reasonable person is going to make you defend the idea that Santa exists, so it is not such a bad strategy to bring up "burden of proof on Santa believers", dust your hands off, and walk away. Everyone will nod their heads in agreement. That doesn't work with theists precisely because they quite often find the credibility of gods to be unassailable. So you are just wasting your breath.

Santa is a magical character that brings presents to children all over the world on Christmas Eve, riding through the air on a sleigh drawn by reindeer etc, a conception that is not logically impossible. But to ask Santa not to perform those magic tricks is to ask him to not be Santa. If Santa doesn’t ride through the air and doesn’t deliver gifts to children all over the world then he cannot be what he is, which leads to an absurdity and in which case there is no Santa.

Yes. Well, you seem to have gone a little off the rails there in interpreting what I said, but we can declare violent agreement on the idea that Santa is an absurd character. Explaining why it is absurd to believe in Santa Claus is much more effective than going around with a "burden of proof" chip on your shoulder. All I meant by my remark was that a deceptive parent might use that kind of ploy to explain why the local department store Santa won't perform any magic. It is the same kind of excuse that you get for the Divine Silence of God.

Back to the argument. God is the Absolutely Necessary Being, a concept that does not require to be analysed in terms of physics, magnitude, direction or time – or any other definition or description we can think of, other than to acknowledge that pure actuality, unlike contingent matter, is a thing with no potential for being; it is what it is necessarily. It is an exquisitely clever concept, and a thing that we cannot think not to exist (which of course is not to say a necessary being necessarily exists). And while a Necessary Being’s non-existence is as impossible as a two-sided triangle, we have no such conceptual vagaries with Santa. Santa is thus possible or impossible, but unlike the Necessary Being we can conceive of Santa not existing without having to first address whether he is possible.

No, God is not the Absolutely Necessary Being. That there is such a thing as a Necessary Being is gratuitous. It begs the question of God's existence by defining God as a being that exists (and necessarily so for modal logic fanatics). This kind of neoscholastic nonsense works for Plantinga's minions, but I still harbor the hope that you don't fall for it.

I do my best to ignore flippant and unnecessary remarks but suffice to say I am very clear about the argument I’m making. There is no contradiction in denying the proposition that Santa exists is true, and the conclusion that follows is that he doesn’t exist. My argument is twofold: 1) Santa is not demonstrable. 2) Santa’s non-appearance confirms his non-existence. #1 is logically certain. #2 is inferential. Both inform us that there both cannot be and not be a Santa and hence the contradiction and conclusion.

And you think that this is a compelling argument to make to a theist? Not even I believe point #2, and I'm as strong an atheist as you are. I don't believe in God, because God can be shown to be an implausible being, not because he doesn't show up when I go looking for him.

 

[Falvlun]

You say that mystics believe that their being in a majority gives credibility to their beliefs. I have questioned the nature of those beliefs in other posts and argued that a majority belief in mystical beings is vague and essentially non-specific, whereas affiliated beliefs are defined in the particular, and in consequent there are inconsistencies and outright contradictions in the sum of the beliefs.

And I have argued that the particulars of belief don't really matter, since the dividing line in question is between those who believe in the existence of god-- any god-- and those who do not.

Say we have a group of sports lovers arguing with a group of sports haters. Just because some of those in the sport lover group may watch baseball but not football, and others might adore figure skating but not care much for hockey doesn't mean that they still don't all belong to the same group.

It has also been argued that mystics come to their beliefs through being influenced by the majority. I accept that peer, family or genetic dispositions may influence belief, but I do not accept, as a general statement, that people come to faith solely on account of others, since faith is an emotional investment and not simply a means to be one of the crowd. A delusion (or illusion) is not made probable or true by increasing the numbers of those who are seduced by it.

No one has argued that people come to belief in the existence of god based solely upon the numerical superiority of that group. It is merely a factor among many that may lead a person to find the existence of gods plausible, and therefore, worthy of belief.

I acknowledge the truth of what you say concerning ‘believability’ and what you describe as the ‘probability rating’, which again is hard to disagree with, but I maintain it is used improperly in the case of mysticism. I grant you the argument you are making for the twelve alien abductions rather than the single alleged abduction. But you answer the problem yourself when you say: “At the very least, you'd probably believe that they all experienced some sort of phenomenon that should be investigated.”

The impetus of numerically strong beliefs is still apparent, even when it only causes you to wonder what caused so many people to believe such a thing. After all, you were able to dismiss the single believer without a second thought, but you are compelled to consider the belief when it was presented by a group.

The point here being that people of faith, by the very definition of the term, are not looking for an explanation of phenomena. Even if we accept that a majority view may be reasonably linked to probability there is plainly a further link missing between probability and truth, since mystics won’t allow anything to count against their beliefs. Any claim, be it for lions, aliens, Santa or God, must always be subject to the truth.

That stance only works if you know the truth, no? If you don't know the truth, then you can only work through things the best you can, via plausibility and probability.

 

[Willamena]

I'd just like to add that "mystic" doesn't mean "holding a belief in mystical beings." /carryon

(Well, not usually.)

 

[cottage]

I'd just like to add that "mystic" doesn't mean "holding a belief in mystical beings." /carryon

(Well, not usually.)

It does in the sense used by philosophers, as stuff supposedly spiritual and not apparent to the senses.

Anyway, :birthday:

Many Happy Returns Willamena (belatedly)

 

[cottage]

OK. Thank you for that simplification. It seems to me that you could even simplify it further: "Santa does not exist if Santa does not exist". My wording is not as erudite as yours, but the argument is equally compelling. You should try it on a kid who really believes in Santa sometime and let us know the response.

While ‘If Santa doesn’t exist then he doesn’t exist’ is a statement that shows the logical consequence of two possibilities, there is, of course, no ‘if’ in the demonstration. But anyway, I’m in that camp that sees no harm in keeping the Santa legend alive for children. There is no evidence that it harms kids or affects them in adulthood, I mean, look at me?

We seem to be talking at cross purposes again, because I was speaking hypothetically about people believing in Santa there. As I've stated before, the main difference between God and Santa is that belief in the former is ubiquitous, and belief in the latter is almost nonexistent among adults. You and I agree about burden of proof. Where we seem to have a disagreement is that you think burden of proof is a compelling argument with respect to God, and I think that you need to move past that in order to have a reasonable debate with theists. It only convinces the already-convinced.

It is almost as if you think I’m saying if theists can’t demonstrate God then none of their arguments supporting the existence of God are valid? That’s complete nonsense! But while I welcome any and every argument from theists, who, as the advocates, must carry the burden of proof, it isn’t for me to justify my lack of disbelief. I seem to be constantly repeating this.

That misses the point. No reasonable person is going to make you defend the idea that Santa exists, so it is not such a bad strategy to bring up "burden of proof on Santa believers", dust your hands off, and walk away. Everyone will nod their heads in agreement. That doesn't work with theists precisely because they quite often find the credibility of gods to be unassailable. So you are just wasting your breath.

Given the nature of faith I would be more surprised if theists didn’t think that; it would also mean I’d have no argument with them. I guess I’ll keep ‘wasting my breath’, though, because the credibility of gods certainly is not unassailable. But I just don’t understand your objection, or what you even mean by ‘bring up the burden of proof’? As I explained in my very first post in this discussion I identified the distracting ploy of theists failing to make a proper argument or defence for their claim, demanding of the doubters that they make theirs instead. In response to that I gave my river jump analogy to demonstrate that it is those who make a claim who are obligated to prove it. Incidentally the ‘burden of proof’ is a concept, not an argument.

Yes. Well, you seem to have gone a little off the rails there in interpreting what I said, but we can declare violent agreement on the idea that Santa is an absurd character. Explaining why it is absurd to believe in Santa Claus is much more effective than going around with a "burden of proof" chip on your shoulder. All I meant by my remark was that a deceptive parent might use that kind of ploy to explain why the local department store Santa won't perform any magic. It is the same kind of excuse that you get for the Divine Silence of God.

But Santa exists or he doesn’t exist, does things or doesn’t do them, and deceitful parents or suggestible children are really of no relevance. The basic proposition is that God (and Santa in this case) is to be treated the same: a supernatural concept has/has not real being.

No, God is not the Absolutely Necessary Being. That there is such a thing as a Necessary Being is gratuitous. It begs the question of God's existence by defining God as a being that exists (and necessarily so for modal logic fanatics). This kind of neoscholastic nonsense works for Plantinga's minions, but I still harbor the hope that you don't fall for it.

I’m not arguing for God or classical theism. In fact I treat Santa and God in exactly the same way: ‘Santa does not exist’ and ‘God does not exist’ imply no contradiction, but ‘A necessary being exists’ is a logically necessary statement and denial results in a contradiction. And with respect to your remarks about Plantinga, if anything he was a ‘minion’ of Muslim philosophers (and others before them) who advanced the argument in the tenth century. And I don’t ‘fall’ for ‘scholastic nonsense’ (are such comments really helpful in a discussion?), but assess all arguments, including those of the schoolmen, on their individual merit.

And you think that this is a compelling argument to make to a theist? Not even I believe point #2, and I'm as strong an atheist as you are. I don't believe in God, because God can be shown to be an implausible being, not because he doesn't show up when I go looking for him.

2# An inductive argument expressed deductively (abbreviated) is that Santa doesn’t appear to children all over the world on Christmas Eve, and therefore there is no Santa. The only difference between Santa and God is that Santa isn’t presented anywhere as a real being, therefore Santa isn’t a being that is real. Of course someone might make a persuasive argument that Santa is a real being, in which case the premise is false but it doesn’t mean the conclusion is also false. However, on the basis of that purely inductive argument, ‘Santa doesn’t exist’ is only contingently true of the present and therefore Santa’s existence cannot be ruled out for the future. But God is presented as real, the Supreme Being, infinite, eternal, immutable and omnipotent. And yet no matter how many attributes are awarded to the concept, it can, just like Santa, be annihilated in thought, even perhaps if his existence is necessary, for as Hume said: the mind cannot lie under the necessity of supposing any [concept] to remain always in being. And in the case of God, but unlike Santa, we can’t even allow for his appearance in the future since it is argued that he’s always existed. But we do not absurdly have to go looking for the thing we believe not to exist: on the contrary, we believe this thing not to exist, a thing that supposedly cannot not exist, not because it cannot exist but because it doesn’t exist, for there is nothing to contradict or disprove the statement that the existence of a Supreme Being isn’t logically certain or that beliefs from faith aren’t factually true.

 

[cottage]

And I have argued that the particulars of belief don't really matter, since the dividing line in question is between those who believe in the existence of god-- any god-- and those who do not.
Say we have a group of sports lovers arguing with a group of sports haters. Just because some of those in the sport lover group may watch baseball but not football, and others might adore figure skating but not care much for hockey doesn't mean that they still don't all belong to the same group.

The argument from a majority is supposed to lead us to some essential aspect that gives credence to their beliefs, justifying (according to you) the statement that a minority has the greater responsibility to explain their unbelief. (Tyranny of the majority!) But this essential aspect appears to be nothing more than a shared superstition as a faith-based belief in the supernatural. To be credible, there must be a central conduit of truth from which believers draw the substance of their faith. But there is none. If fact there is evident inconsistency and contradiction in what is believed. Your argument is that because of a large majority the claims warrant ‘believability’. But what is the difference between believability and probability? If it is more probable that the sun will rise in the morning than it will not, then that is to say it is more believable that the sun will rise than not. So you are saying that the existence of (a discordant and arbitrary notion) of gods is more probable than any argument made by the minority. Not only does that cancel any previous sceptical arguments concerning questions of implausibility, but also the conclusion is fundamentally at odds with theists themselves, who argue their gods exist from certainty not probability.

No one has argued that people come to belief in the existence of god based solely upon the numerical superiority of that group. It is merely a factor among many that may lead a person to find the existence of gods plausible, and therefore, worthy of belief.

With respect I suspect you’ve got that very wrong. The nature of religion belief requires the suspension of plausibility in favour of faith. The old adage of ‘I believe in order to understand, not I understand in order to believe’ (St Augustine, St Anselm, and also in Hebrews although I forget the chapter and verse), is surely is the very essence of most religious beliefs? While natural theology, so called, has always been used to confirm and rationalize what is believed, or as apologia to answer sceptical objections, faith is never relegated to a lower place behind facts or metaphysics, at least in the case of the three main religions. If it were otherwise we would be having a very different discussion. Do believers really examine a religious belief on the numerical strength of its supporters, before deciding that gods are plausible and worthy of their belief? That is not the nature of religious faith. I’m aware of the opposite, where believers are humbled and doubt their own worthiness before an Almighty God.

The impetus of numerically strong beliefs is still apparent, even when it only causes you to wonder what caused so many people to believe such a thing. After all, you were able to dismiss the single believer without a second thought, but you are compelled to consider the belief when it was presented by a group.

Certainly! I’ve made it perfectly clear that any majority is entitled to a fair hearing. Nobody, least of all me, is saying that mystics should be denied the chance to make their case: I’ve been imploring them to do just that!

That stance only works if you know the truth, no? If you don't know the truth, then you can only work through things the best you can, via plausibility and probability.

For some reason (that is never made clear) you are making a special plea on behalf of mystics, which is that, unlike any other claim to the truth, one particular proposition is to be allowed to remain open-ended. Any other argument from a majority that makes long-term claims to the truth is subject to the question of its truth being settled. Mystics have had millennia to establish their truth claims but have not done so. Why do you think mystics should be the exception and granted special status? A majority view isn’t to be made an exception because it is the majority view, and nor is it to be made an exception because that is the view of the majority. Let’s keep in mind your argument: “Both sides have a responsibility to support their position, but in practice, any minority position tends to have a greater responsibility to demonstrate why they do not hold the majority view.” That simply is not so, as majority decisions may be purely subjective opinion and the matter may be settled without any reference to what is true or what is false. But a majority that believes a thing to be true has to justify the truth of what is believed to the minority; a thing isn’t true simply by virtue of being a majority belief. And can it really be said without uttering an absurdity that I have a greater responsibility to justify my non-belief in a thing that others hold to be true from faith, a thing they cannot demonstrate even to themselves?
.

 

[Willamena]

It does in the sense used by philosophers, as stuff supposedly spiritual and not apparent to the senses.

Anyway, :birthday:

Many Happy Returns Willamena (belatedly)

Armchair philosophers, yeah.

Thank you.

 

[cottage]

Armchair philosophers, yeah.

Hardly! I was thinking of Freddie Ayer, off the top of my head:

Language, Truth and Logic

Critique of Ethics and Theology, Chapter 4, Page 124: “But if one allows that it is impossible to define God in intelligible terms, then one is allowing that it is impossible for a sentence both to be significant and about God. If a mystic admits that the object of his vision is something which cannot be described, then he must admit that he is bound to talk nonsense when he describes it.” “So in describing his vision the mystic doesn’t give us any information about the external world’; he merely gives us indirect information about the condition of his own mind. These considerations dispose of the argument from religious experience, which many philosophers still regard as a valid argument in favour of the existence of a god.”

Thank you.

My pleasure.

 

[Falvlun]

The argument from a majority is supposed to lead us to some essential aspect that gives credence to their beliefs, justifying (according to you) the statement that a minority has the greater responsibility to explain their unbelief. (Tyranny of the majority!)

I am not arguing about who has a greater responsibility to present their case. If push comes to shove, I do believe believers have a greater responsibility.

This whole debate has been about whether unbelievers have any responsibility whatsoever to present their argument. I believe the "Burden of Proof" argument demonstrates a belief that unbelievers do not have any responsibility of their own. I emphatically disagree with that stance. Unbelievers do have a responsibility to support their unbelief, and it is reasonable for believers to request it.

....Just like believers have a responsibility to support their belief and it is reasonable for unbelievers to request it.

 

[Willamena]

Hardly! I was thinking of Freddie Ayer, off the top of my head:

Language, Truth and Logic

Critique of Ethics and Theology, Chapter 4, Page 124: “But if one allows that it is impossible to define God in intelligible terms, then one is allowing that it is impossible for a sentence both to be significant and about God. If a mystic admits that the object of his vision is something which cannot be described, then he must admit that he is bound to talk nonsense when he describes it.” “So in describing his vision the mystic doesn’t give us any information about the external world’; he merely gives us indirect information about the condition of his own mind. These considerations dispose of the argument from religious experience, which many philosophers still regard as a valid argument in favour of the existence of a god.”




My pleasure.

But this says nothing about belief in mystical beings. By the bye, I agree with Mr. Ayer's assessment.

Edit: The mystic's vision is of something beyond words, concepts, ideas, hence no words can describe it, no concept embody it, and no idea express it. Trying to talk about it says nothing about an 'exterior' world; it's inevitable that his words reflect his own mind and state --hence, many mystics use poetry and metaphor to get their ideas across. Some express it in crude dualistic barking, some just speak the nonsense, but they're all saying essentially the same thing: a realization of a new paradigm for reality. Their words don't prove God --and that's the very message of the 'mystic'.

Mysticism is the consideration that disposes of the argument from religious experience.

 

[Falvlun]

For some reason (that is never made clear) you are making a special plea on behalf of mystics, which is that, unlike any other claim to the truth, one particular proposition is to be allowed to remain open-ended. Any other argument from a majority that makes long-term claims to the truth is subject to the question of its truth being settled.

I'm a soft-core agnostic. I don't believe that we currently can know the "truth". Even science-- which I support as the greatest method yet developed to aid in our discovery of reality-- is not represented as a method which produces absolute truth. It is all about probability. What is likely to be true?

So yes, I find that all claims to truth are ultimately "open-ended". Some are just better supported, more likely, than others. No special pleading here.

 

[Falvlun]

Your argument is that because of a large majority the claims warrant ‘believability’. But what is the difference between believability and probability? /snip/ So you are saying that the existence of (a discordant and arbitrary notion) of gods is more probable than any argument made by the minority.

I have argued that first sentence, but not the bolded portion. The simple fact that a heck of a lot of people believe in the existence of gods lends that belief credibility. (And please note that that is a perfectly acceptable usage of the word "credible" despite your protests to the contrary. "Credible" simply means "capable of being believed" or the "quality of being believable or worthy of trust", which is precisely what I mean when I am using it.)

It says nothing of whether this makes theism more or less probable than atheism. The majority belief argument is only about why it is reasonable for a theist (in a majority belief position) to request an atheist (in a minority belief position) to prove their case.

Do believers really examine a religious belief on the numerical strength of its supporters, before deciding that gods are plausible and worthy of their belief? That is not the nature of religious faith.

It is, however, the nature of belief. We don't conciously make these assessments; it is an innate reflex.

There are indirect ramifications, too, of the fact that the majority of people believe in the existence of gods. That means more children are being raised to believe in gods than not. It means we tend to live in cultures that take the existence of god to be a foregone conclusion. It means we have things like "In God we trust" on our money. All this feeds into the feeling that belief in the existence of god is normal, correct, and reasonable.

 

[idav]

It is, however, the nature of belief. We don't conciously make these assessments; it is an innate reflex.

There are indirect ramifications, too, of the fact that the majority of people believe in the existence of gods. That means more children are being raised to believe in gods than not. It means we tend to live in cultures that take the existence of god to be a foregone conclusion. It means we have things like "In God we trust" on our money. All this feeds into the feeling that belief in the existence of god is normal, correct, and reasonable.

Really the nature of belief can go either way as humans we tend to be just as innately skeptical.

Majority of people are theist, I won't argue that. I'd like to point out that the belief isn't as instilled in us like it was in the past. The belief being ambiguous is losing a foothold on the core of theism and the younger generations are clinging more to skepticism. True faith is becoming a rare commodity.

Still when I drive I do see all the jesus symbols hanging on the rear view mirror and all the bumper stickers. Christianity is a majority where I live and most likely not the atheist kind. Doesn't matter I see more Rock and Metal bumper stickers.

 

[cottage]

Really the nature of belief can go either way as humans we tend to be just as innately skeptical.

Majority of people are theist, I won't argue that. I'd like to point out that the belief isn't as instilled in us like it was in the past. The belief being ambiguous is losing a foothold on the core of theism and the younger generations are clinging more to skepticism. True faith is becoming a rare commodity.

Still when I drive I do see all the jesus symbols hanging on the rear view mirror and all the bumper stickers. Christianity is a majority where I live and most likely not the atheist kind. Doesn't matter I see more Rock and Metal bumper stickers.

All true. The majority belief is ambiguous in other ways, too. Not everyone believes in exactly the same thing or in exactly the same way. Some folk have very specific and profound beliefs, while others merely nod their assent to the existence of some higher authority. The difference can be as far apart as a devout and pious commitment and something bordering on the speculative or merely wishful. The ranks of those who 'believe in God' are swollen to include those who only believe that there is, or might be, a God. The latter, it is important to note, may be wrong in their beliefs, whereas the former (belief-in) can allow no such admission.

 

[cottage]

I'm a soft-core agnostic. I don't believe that we currently can know the "truth". Even science-- which I support as the greatest method yet developed to aid in our discovery of reality-- is not represented as a method which produces absolute truth. It is all about probability. What is likely to be true?

So yes, I find that all claims to truth are ultimately "open-ended". Some are just better supported, more likely, than others. No special pleading here.

But all truth claims are not open-ended. For example it is true that the sun has risen in the morning, but it is not true that it must. An argument from the past is not an argument to the future. Yet the very thing you are saying is ‘better supported’ or ‘more likely to be true’ includes an eternally existing being that intervenes in the present and the future. I’m sorry but that surely is a special plea?

I have argued that first sentence, but not the bolded portion. The simple fact that a heck of a lot of people believe in the existence of gods lends that belief credibility. (And please note that that is a perfectly acceptable usage of the word "credible" despite your protests to the contrary. "Credible" simply means "capable of being believed" or the "quality of being believable or worthy of trust", which is precisely what I mean when I am using it.)


It says nothing of whether this makes theism more or less probable than atheism. The majority belief argument is only about why it is reasonable for a theist (in a majority belief position) to request an atheist (in a minority belief position) to prove their case.

I’m not arguing with you about the meaning of ‘credibility’; in fact I entirely agree with how you’ve defined the term: ‘what is capable of being believed or the quality of being believable’. Which, then, is the more credible, a belief as faith in the certainty of mystical beings intervening in the past and future, or the view that the absence of any factual or logically necessary truth for such a notion makes the claim impossible or implausible? There seems to me to be an evident partiality in the way you award credibility, where numbers overrule rational analysis, highlighted by the way you think it reasonable to ask unbelievers to ‘prove their case’. What is it that theists are asking unbelievers to ‘prove’: The non-existence of god perhaps? That is the classic Argument from Ignorance. I think it is far more reasonable to ask how a faith-based belief in other worlds can be certain and true when it is from this uncertain world that the claims are made.

It is, however, the nature of belief. We don't conciously make these assessments; it is an innate reflex.

Some folk have an innate disposition to believe in mystical beings and I do not accept that those people weigh up the pros and cons before coming to that conclusion, even subconsciously, since faith-based belief doesn’t require demonstration or even any degree of probability to be evident. The essence of faith is trust, not evidence. So what I’m saying is the disposition is prior to any rationalizing that may follow, which of course will always be in favour of the belief.

There are indirect ramifications, too, of the fact that the majority of people believe in the existence of gods. That means more children are being raised to believe in gods than not. It means we tend to live in cultures that take the existence of god to be a foregone conclusion. It means we have things like "In God we trust" on our money. All this feeds into the feeling that belief in the existence of god is normal, correct, and reasonable.

But is that an argument that makes faith-based beliefs in supernatural beings credible?

 

[cottage]

I am not arguing about who has a greater responsibility to present their case. If push comes to shove, I do believe believers have a greater responsibility.

You said (post 147) that ‘any majority position tends to have a greater responsibility to demonstrate why they do not hold the majority view’.

This whole debate has been about whether unbelievers have any responsibility whatsoever to present their argument. I believe the "Burden of Proof" argument demonstrates a belief that unbelievers do not have any responsibility of their own. I emphatically disagree with that stance. Unbelievers do have a responsibility to support their unbelief, and it is reasonable for believers to request it.
....Just like believers have a responsibility to support their belief and it is reasonable for unbelievers to request it.

I have just carefully read through every single post concerning this debate, and what you’ve written above is artfully misleading. Nowhere has it been said or implied by me that sceptics have no responsibility to present cogent arguments – quite the opposite! However, sceptics do not have to justify their unbelief (as if the truth of the theists’ claim must first be assumed) only the case they are making in response to theist arguments. The burden of proof means the advocate has the obligation to prove the truth of what is stated, but the truth isn’t established by its not being disproved. And it is on that point my original post referred to, i.e. instances where that obligation is being passed to the doubters as a means to avoid making a proper argument. It is frankly absurd, and disingenuous, to take that to mean sceptics have no argument to make.

 

[Falvlun]

You said (post 147) that ‘any majority position tends to have a greater responsibility to demonstrate why they do not hold the majority view’.

Here is the full quote:

Both sides have a responsibility to support their position, but in practice, any minority position tends to have a greater responsibility to demonstrate why they do not hold the majority view.

The part I bolded is the operative point, and the crucial difference between where we are coming from. You are making an academic, philosophical argument. In contrast, I am making a practical, common sense, welcome to the real world assessment. Burden of proof arguments are simply not effective.

They are not effective because they ignore the social psychology behind how we determine whether something is credible or not and they ignore how minority beliefs are addressed in the arena of real life.

New concepts held only by a handful of people face an uphill battle against entrenched, conventional wisdom. They gain traction by challenging the old belief, and importantly! by showing why their stance is more reasonable and better substantiated, and therefore, more attractive to hold. In my opinion, the burden of proof argument fails abysmally at this, and worse, engenders feelings of ill will between the two camps.

So yes, while academically, theists have a greater responsibility to support their argument, in real life, the ball is in the atheist's court. He can choose to slam dunk it... or pass it back to the theist.

 

[cottage]

Here is the full quote:


The part I bolded is the operative point, and the crucial difference between where we are coming from. You are making an academic, philosophical argument. In contrast, I am making a practical, common sense, welcome to the real world assessment. Burden of proof arguments are simply not effective.

They are not effective because they ignore the social psychology behind how we determine whether something is credible or not and they ignore how minority beliefs are addressed in the arena of real life.

Throughout this debate there has been a deliberately misleading undercurrent. The reaction to my original post was as if I’d said something outrageous or made some ill-considered sweeping statement. I’m constantly looking back at my original post to see whether your remarks and arguments are relevant to anything at all that I’ve said, and each time I find they are not.
Once again the burden of proof is a statement that means the advocate has the obligation to prove the truth of what is stated, but the truth isn’t established by its not being disproved.

Example:

Theist states ‘God is Love’. That is the proposition. Religious belief is propositional and, as with any argument, having made the claim the theist must now defend it (the burden of proof).

So the sceptic asks:

‘But how can God be “‘love’” when there is so much pain and suffering in the world?’

Theist: ‘God gave us free will; we have the choice to receive his love or reject it.

Sceptic: ‘In that case he cannot be a “’God of Love’” but only a God who sometimes loves, sometimes not.’

Theist: ‘God is always loving even when we sin and turn against him’

Sceptic: ‘But he punishes man with pain and suffering’

Theist: ‘Man punishes himself’

Sceptic: ‘But God allows man to suffer. How can he be All Loving?

Theist: ‘Trust in God. You must open your heart and believe in order to understand

Sceptic: ‘But I don’t believe God exists!’

Theist: ‘And yet you cannot prove that he does not!

The theist has now passed the burden of proof to the sceptic with an argument from ignorance.

 

[cottage]

New concepts held only by a handful of people face an uphill battle against entrenched, conventional wisdom. They gain traction by challenging the old belief, and importantly! by showing why their stance is more reasonable and better substantiated, and therefore, more attractive to hold. In my opinion, the burden of proof argument fails abysmally at this, and worse, engenders feelings of ill will between the two camps.

Disbelief in gods is not a new concept, nor is it one held by only a handful of people. But you are continuing to present the burden of proof in a spurious fashion, implying or alleging that I have stated it as means to avoid discussion with theists. That is completely false, and you know full well that my argument highlighted the very opposite situation, which is where a theist withdraws from the debate by passing the burden of proof to the sceptic. And it really is nonsense to suggest that asking the advocates of any proposition to give the grounds for its validity is somehow akin to insulting them or causing them ill will.

So yes, while academically, theists have a greater responsibility to support their argument, in real life, the ball is in the atheist's court. He can choose to slam dunk it... or pass it back to the theist.

Pass what back to the theist? I’d be grateful for some examples of this argument you’re alluding to, with an explanation of how it applies to me or to anything I’ve said.

 

[Falvlun]

Really the nature of belief can go either way as humans we tend to be just as innately skeptical.

Good point. I am not necessarily making the argument that humans are innately gullible or skeptical. I am more talking about factors which make us more inclined to believe something. In other words, what pushes us from skepticism into belief? What makes us inclined to believe something? And what makes us disinclined to believe something?