Ambiguity of Atheism

[Falvlun]

I don't, but Plantinga thinks that he does. And there are lots of people who believe in miracles as evidence of the supernatural. You are missing the point (and it does not look like you are receptive to it after pages of debate): believers argue all the time that widespread belief in God is evidence that there must be something to the belief. It isn't logical, but there you have it. You are correct that they haven't met their burden of proof, but pointing that out to them does little good if they believe that they have met their burden of proof. Even so, many simply do not accept that they have a burden of proof, because they think that popularity of belief somehow puts the burden on the denier of the popular belief. So what else have you got? There are actually evidential reasons to reject belief in gods that do not depend on disputes over who owns the burden of proof.

So many pages when all that is required is one perfect paragraph!

Cottage, that paragraph sums up everything. I doubt we will ever agree on this subject, but I hope at least you can understand this position. There isn't much point in continuing this discussion, but I'll probably respond to a couple of points in your latest post.

 

[cottage]

You are still arguing the wrong thing. Majority belief is a reason we find certain beliefs credible. We do find things more credible when a majority of people believe them. This is different from saying that we should find it credible, or that this criteria results in a true belief, which is the argument you still seem to think I'm making.

What I am arguing is that humans have built-in mechanisms that allow us to make quick decisions about whether something is credible-- likely to be true-- and therefore something we should believe. These built-in mechanisms, while evolutionarily useful, are often what give rise to logical fallacies. (I mean, why do you think logical fallacies are so prevalent?) They are called cognitive biases, of which appeal to majority is one. I am sure you can think of reasons why this might be a useful bias to have, even though it can result in a person holding an untrue belief. Our brains think these arguments lend credibility to a belief, hence our propensity for falling for them.

Let’s keep in sight of our fundamental disagreement? Your argument was that unbelievers must show why they disbelieve in mystical beings because a majority happen to have mystical or supernatural beliefs. My argument is that those who make the claim must demonstrate the truth and not expect the unconvinced to provide it for themselves, majority views notwithstanding.
Regardless of any human quirks, or cognitive biases, or any other reason why a person might hold to an untrue belief, the undeniable fact remains that believers are adamantly claiming their beliefs to be true. You began by arguing that the theist majority have credibility, but now you appear to be saying it is a dubious credibility, which has been my argument all along. It hardly needs saying that theists themselves believe their faith-based notions are credible, it would be an absurd if they didn’t. But, if, as you’ve said before, theists are unable to understand why some doubt that credibility then perhaps they should look harder at their own beliefs first?
Finally, majority arguments may carry a lot of weight such as in ballots or voting systems, as well as in many everyday matters, and the beliefs behind them may or may not be subject to what is objectively true. But subjective doctrinal beliefs in mystical notions, necessarily held from faith alone, can never amount to more than a statistical truth, quite regardless of the number of people that subscribe to them. And the word ‘credibility’ is misused if it makes no reference to truth or soundness.

 

[cottage]

Indeed, that is exactly what I said you were going for. I pointed out where and why it failed. You seem to think that a reductio ad absurdum argument is just assuming two premises that lead to a contradiction, but it isn't. It is showing that two premises accepted as true by your opponent lead to a contradiction. You did not do that. I do not accept both premises that Santa exists and is a fictional character.

I am not stating Santa’s existence (is true), and it is not part of my argument, which is this: if it a thing’s non-existence is denied then the thing’s existence is being assumed, ie ‘Santa exists’ is true. I reject that proposition. For if ‘Santa exists’ is true then ‘Santa does not exist’ is false, but Santa does not exist, since ‘Santa does exist’ (not p) > contradiction. Thus not p must be false. So (ref law of excluded middle) p is true. (Basically reductio ad impossibile)

You start with the gratuitous assumption that God exists. Then you assert a contradictory assumption that he does not exist. I do not accept both of those premises as true in the same argument. In other words, I don't buy your contradiction.

The argument is presented dialectically on the basis that if Santa’s existence is being questioned then it is assumed that Santa exists. I don’t accept the proposition, and my argument proceeds to demonstrate its falsehood.

If you are constructing an argument, you need to use 'assume' to introduce premises.

Actually we don’t! (Can’t see where you got that idea.) I can validly make any argument without using the term.

There is a problem with your "existing assertions". You asked me to accept the proposition that "Santa Claus exists." For the sake of argument, no problem. Then you asserted: "If there is no contradiction in denying ‘Santa Claus exists’ then ‘Santa Claus exists’ isn’t true." Big problem. There is a contradiction in denying 'Santa Claus exists' in the context where you have just asserted he exists. Do you honestly not see that? It is pretty glaringly obvious.

The existing assertion: yours, that ‘people believe in Santa’, isn’t mine. Of the two arguments, the former is stated for the purpose of refuting it.

Your "test of non-contradiction" fails the moment you start the argument out that way. You don't get the contradiction for free. Look at your very last sentence in the above paragraph. That is where you introduce the circularity. If you assume he exists, you cannot then say that his existence needs to be demonstrated. You are arguing in circles.

The example you give is not an instance of circular reasoning. It said: ‘But if a thing exists then [self-evidently] it exists, and we have only to produce Santa to prove the conclusion [that he does not exist] false’(an if-then statement). And with no contradiction evident, the conclusion ‘Santa does not exist’ is true, but the test of non-contradiction not being arbitrary, if Santa does happen to appear out of the vapours then the conclusion is proved false.

I see that you have been trying too hard to make sense of Plantinga's neo-Anselmian nonsense about "necessary beings". Anselm made the mistake of taking existence to be a property that could be "perfected". Plantinga just swapped in the concept of "necessity" to add an extra dollop of fudge. You cannot define God in such a way that he necessarily exists, especially if your conclusion is going to be that he exists. You just end up asserting a gratuitous assumption and declaring in your conclusion that your assumption was not gratuitous. I now can sort of understand where you were coming from.

Actually nothing in my analysis referred to Plantinga’s attempt to re-state, ie prop-up, the Ontological Argument. But while we’re digressing I see you are uncritical of the Kant doctrine (‘existence is not a property’)? That to my mind was the worst of his two arguments, to which I have my own objections (existence can be thought of as a unique property). In fact Kant acknowledges the concept of necessary existence himself when explaining the impossibility of a Cosmological Proof, of which the argument from contingency (as set out by Leibniz) is a form: ‘If we admit the existence of one thing, whatever it may be, we must also admit there is something that exists necessarily’. It clearly troubled Kant that we can deny as thing and yet the thing still is! But he satisfied himself in the end by describing necessary existence as a ‘regulative principle of reason’. And that despite of his perfectly good, though less lauded objection (mainly as an answer to Descartes’ version of the OA) that if both subject and predicate are annihilated in thought then no contradiction arises. That's my view exactly in the case of God and any of his supposed attributes. And in the case of both God and Santa, there is no contradiction in annihilating the concept in thought and nor is there a contradiction in experience.

No. Go back to your original argument and read your first assumption: "Santa Claus exists". You did not assume "Santa Claus may exist". Do you understand the difference in meaning when you include the modal "may" (= "is possible")? The statement "Santa Claus may or may not exist" is true. It is a tautology, not a contradiction. You cannot conclude that he does or does not exist from that kind of a premise.

In my brief analysis (‘Now we can legitimately conceive…’), I made the distinction between two possibilities, concept and object, things that exist but need not exist (President Obama), and things that may exist and yet do not exist (use your imagination here), and that there is nothing self-contradictory in the notion of Santa Clause, only in the statement that he exists. In the case of my argument, ‘Santa Clause exists’ was the proposition (thesis). ‘Santa Clause does not exist’ is the demonstration (anti-thesis). [/quote]

If you want to argue that the existence of Santa Claus is not "plausible", as opposed to not "possible", then you will be making the kind of argument I was looking for.

But I am not arguing that Santa is ‘not possible’! I’ve explained very clearly in my analysis that Santa is possible; I’m saying Santa is not actual.

 

[cottage]

Let's analyze your statement, which I merely paraphrased in simpler language. First of all, it is false. People do present Santa Claus as real all the time to children. Not everyone approves of the practice, but that is what they do. So, if you tell a child that Santa does not exist, you had better come up with a different argument. But I get the point you are trying to make--that such claims by adults are not made in good faith. However, what you said is still an argument from popularity. Just who is the agent of the passive verb "isn't presented anywhere"? It is "by any person". In other words, you are referring to what people "popularly" believe about Santa Claus--that he is a fictional character.

I don’t accept that a parent telling a white lie to a small child and the child’s subsequent belief makes a case for magical beings. I’m asking where is it presented, intelligibly and intelligently, that Santa’s existence is true? We don’t need an argument from popularity, I’ll settle for a minority – just one instance will do.

I don't, but Plantinga thinks that he does. And there are lots of people who believe in miracles as evidence of the supernatural. You are missing the point (and it does not look like you are receptive to it after pages of debate): believers argue all the time that widespread belief in God is evidence that there must be something to the belief. It isn't logical, but there you have it. You are correct that they haven't met their burden of proof, but pointing that out to them does little good if they believe that they have met their burden of proof. Even so, many simply do not accept that they have a burden of proof, because they think that popularity of belief somehow puts the burden on the denier of the popular belief. So what else have you got? There are actually evidential reasons to reject belief in gods that do not depend on disputes over who owns the burden of proof.

I’m not receptive to it because I do not accept that explanation as proof or evidence of anything. Yes indeed there are lots of people who believe in miracles as evidence of the supernatural – as a doctrinal belief. I’m constantly being told by theists that there is documented evidence ‘of miracles occurring all over the world’, but none of those theists were witnesses to the alleged miracles. And of course we can have a debate over what a miracle is, exactly. And do believers enter into a profound emotional commitment on the basis of faith alone, merely because others do? Forgive me but that argument stinks. And I’m sorry for repeating this, but a widespread belief in a mystical being, held from faith, is not an argument for its credibility – and certainly not for its truth. I apply that to God as I do to Santa.

You are mixing logical arguments, which have to do with the definition of Santa, and empirical arguments, which have to do with facts about the world. It is not logical to argue that Santa does not exist because he does not appear, especially if one can come up with "logical" explanations for that--e.g. that he uses his magical powers to erase memories of his visits.

But I’m not mixing arguments, I was replying to your question: ‘unless you can come up with an argument that Santa Claus is a logically impossible being’. The logical argument I’m making is necessarily to do with facts and Santa’s non-appearance in the world, that he exists or he does not. I’m not asserting he must or cannot exist, except as explained in the passage ‘As to the question of logical possibility’.

It is not logical to argue that Santa does not exist because he does not appear, especially if one can come up with "logical" explanations for that--e.g. that he uses his magical powers to erase memories of his visits.

Anthony Flew's Magic Gardener parable showed there is no difference between a thing never appearing and a thing not existing (John Wisdom Logic and Language). And if Santa erases memories of his visits then it cannot be argued by believers that he has visited!

 

[cottage]

So many pages when all that is required is one perfect paragraph!

Cottage, that paragraph sums up everything. I doubt we will ever agree on this subject, but I hope at least you can understand this position. There isn't much point in continuing this discussion, but I'll probably respond to a couple of points in your latest post.

Theists may argue all the time that widespread belief in God is evidence of God. They also argue that belief in supernatural beings is certain. But the former statement is true only if the latter is also true. The quoted passage seems to be saying that because people believe a thing is the case they are therefore justified in their belief that it is the case. If that is so then those people should be disabused of that belief because it is false. I do not agree that special terms should be granted to an advocate who begins from a fallacious premise. Arguments from a majority are only valid if they are true. Advocates need to establish the truth of a majority claim instead of claiming the majority itself to be proof of what is claimed. It is important to note that none of this prevents or obstructs any evidential arguments from taking place.

But I’m sure you’re correct. <sigh> I can see no way of resolving this matter to the complete satisfaction of the parties involved. That is not to say all discussion on the matter should be ended, as I think there is more mileage to be had from it. So I hope we can continue, albeit through gritted teeth.

Regards
Cottage

 

[Willamena]

Theists may argue all the time that widespread belief in God is evidence of God. They also argue that belief in supernatural beings is certain. But the former statement is true only if the latter is also true. The quoted passage seems to be saying that because people believe a thing is the case they are therefore justified in their belief that it is the case. If that is so then those people should be disabused of that belief because it is false.

Probably. But that goes beyond the argument that others are making. They are simply saying, "This is the case, and as this is the case, this an argument I'm making..." The validity of the case isn't in dispute; rather, the case is assumed.

I do not agree that special terms should be granted to an advocate who begins from a fallacious premise.

No one's suggesting that. They're not saying, "Hey, look, assume they're right..." They're just saying, "Hey, look, assume this, which is the case..." Your argument here goes a step beyond to argue something else, something they're not arguing.

Hope that helps.

 

[Willamena]

Anthony Flew's Magic Gardener parable showed there is no difference between a thing never appearing and a thing not existing (John Wisdom Logic and Language). And if Santa erases memories of his visits then it cannot be argued by believers that he has visited!

That is a logical argument that justifies why one might disbelieve in Santa.

On the strength of something like that, one could even claim to be athiest...

 

[Copernicus]

Once more into the breach...

I am not stating Santa&#8217;s existence (is true), and it is not part of my argument, which is this: if it a thing&#8217;s non-existence is denied then the thing&#8217;s existence is being assumed, ie &#8216;Santa exists&#8217; is true. I reject that proposition. For if &#8216;Santa exists&#8217; is true then &#8216;Santa does not exist&#8217; is false, but Santa does not exist, since &#8216;Santa does exist&#8217; (not p) > contradiction. Thus not p must be false. So (ref law of excluded middle) p is true. (Basically reductio ad impossibile)

I don't know if RF contemplates awarding a medal for sophistry, but I would surely nominate you for the above paragraph. All you seem to be saying is that it is a contradiction to come to the conclusion that Santa exists when you reject the idea that he exists. I can't argue with that logic.

The argument is presented dialectically on the basis that if Santa&#8217;s existence is being questioned then it is assumed that Santa exists. I don&#8217;t accept the proposition, and my argument proceeds to demonstrate its falsehood.

It does not demonstrate that to me. I'll grant that it does to you.

Actually we don&#8217;t! (Can&#8217;t see where you got that idea.) I can validly make any argument without using the term.

I agree, but I wasn't really claiming that you had to use the term. You were assuming things about the existence of Santa as premises in your argument, were you not? Whether or not you used the verb "assume", that was the speech act that you were carrying off.

The existing assertion: yours, that &#8216;people believe in Santa&#8217;, isn&#8217;t mine. Of the two arguments, the former is stated for the purpose of refuting it.

Where did I assert that 'people believe in Santa'? Either Santa exists or he does not. I agree with you that to assume both is a contradiction. That still doesn't get you to a place where you can conclude his existence or nonexistence.

The example you give is not an instance of circular reasoning. It said: &#8216;But if a thing exists then [self-evidently] it exists, and we have only to produce Santa to prove the conclusion [that he does not exist] false&#8217;(an if-then statement). And with no contradiction evident, the conclusion &#8216;Santa does not exist&#8217; is true, but the test of non-contradiction not being arbitrary, if Santa does happen to appear out of the vapours then the conclusion is proved false.

I would really like to make sense out of your argument, but it makes no sense at all. Santa's existence does not depend on my ability to prove his existence any more than your existence depends on my ability to prove your existence. I can produce a fake Santa Claus for you, and you would never be able to prove he was a fake. (Don't ask him to perform magic tricks, because he refuses to stoop to that level, just as God refuses to perform miracles just to prove he is God.)

Actually nothing in my analysis referred to Plantinga&#8217;s attempt to re-state, ie prop-up, the Ontological Argument. But while we&#8217;re digressing I see you are uncritical of the Kant doctrine (&#8216;existence is not a property&#8217? That to my mind was the worst of his two arguments, to which I have my own objections (existence can be thought of as a unique property). In fact Kant acknowledges the concept of necessary existence himself when explaining the impossibility of a Cosmological Proof, of which the argument from contingency (as set out by Leibniz) is a form: &#8216;If we admit the existence of one thing, whatever it may be, we must also admit there is something that exists necessarily&#8217;. It clearly troubled Kant that we can deny as thing and yet the thing still is! But he satisfied himself in the end by describing necessary existence as a &#8216;regulative principle of reason&#8217;. And that despite of his perfectly good, though less lauded objection (mainly as an answer to Descartes&#8217; version of the OA) that if both subject and predicate are annihilated in thought then no contradiction arises. That's my view exactly in the case of God and any of his supposed attributes. And in the case of both God and Santa, there is no contradiction in annihilating the concept in thought and nor is there a contradiction in experience.

I'm not really interested in discussing what Kant and other philosophers said or believed here. Existence can be thought of as a binary predicate that is true if what it is predicated of 'exists' and false if it does not. The scare quotes around 'exists' indicate that it is a term to be defined metalinguistically. One of the problems with the arguments those philosophers came up with was that they had trouble distinguishing object language from metalanguage, and that gave rise to all sorts of paradoxes. What I said about 'existence' was that it was not "perfectible". That is, it was not a scalar concept.

In my brief analysis (&#8216;Now we can legitimately conceive&#8230;&#8217, I made the distinction between two possibilities, concept and object, things that exist but need not exist (President Obama), and things that may exist and yet do not exist (use your imagination here), and that there is nothing self-contradictory in the notion of Santa Clause, only in the statement that he exists. In the case of my argument, &#8216;Santa Clause exists&#8217; was the proposition (thesis). &#8216;Santa Clause does not exist&#8217; is the demonstration (anti-thesis).

There is no self-contradiction inherent in the assertion that Santa Claus exists. I'm sorry to contradict you, but there it is. The statement may be false, but it is not self-contradictory. Both Obama and Santa Claus may or may not exist.

But I am not arguing that Santa is &#8216;not possible&#8217;! I&#8217;ve explained very clearly in my analysis that Santa is possible; I&#8217;m saying Santa is not actual.

But you have not presented a credible argument that he is "not actual". That is what this is about. You could present such an argument, but you prefer to chase your logical tail around in circles.

 

[Falvlun]

Let&#8217;s keep in sight of our fundamental disagreement? Your argument was that unbelievers must show why they disbelieve in mystical beings because a majority happen to have mystical or supernatural beliefs. My argument is that those who make the claim must demonstrate the truth and not expect the unconvinced to provide it for themselves, majority views notwithstanding.

To clarify, my argument is that it is reasonable for unbelievers to show why they disbelieve in mystical beings, etc. Do you see the difference between how you worded it?

Also, my personal position is that everyone has a responsibility to support their active beliefs, regardless of what they may be.

Regardless of any human quirks, or cognitive biases, or any other reason why a person might hold to an untrue belief, the undeniable fact remains that believers are adamantly claiming their beliefs to be true. You began by arguing that the theist majority have credibility, but now you appear to be saying it is a dubious credibility, which has been my argument all along. It hardly needs saying that theists themselves believe their faith-based notions are credible, it would be an absurd if they didn&#8217;t. But, if, as you&#8217;ve said before, theists are unable to understand why some doubt that credibility then perhaps they should look harder at their own beliefs first?
Finally, majority arguments may carry a lot of weight such as in ballots or voting systems, as well as in many everyday matters, and the beliefs behind them may or may not be subject to what is objectively true. But subjective doctrinal beliefs in mystical notions, necessarily held from faith alone, can never amount to more than a statistical truth, quite regardless of the number of people that subscribe to them. And the word &#8216;credibility&#8217; is misused if it makes no reference to truth or soundness.

I understand your criticism here, and I have been struggling to find a way to adequately explain myself. Here goes:

When I use the word "credibility", I am speaking essentially of "believability"-- pieces of information that makes things more believable. These are things that effect our probability rating of whether something is likely to be true or not; it is only indirectly related to whether something is actually true or not.

The number of people accepting a belief effects our likelihood rating: we rate things more likely to be true if more people believe it, and we rate things less likely to be true if not many people believe it.

It makes sense to do this. If many people believe there's a lion in a bush over there, then it's likely there's a lion in the bush and you shouldn't go over there.

Think of how you process whether something is likely to be true or not: Say one person in your neighborhood claims that he was abducted by aliens on Oct 12. You'll probably just dismiss him as a nutjob and not think twice about it.

Now say that 10 people in your neighborhood claim that they were abducted by aliens on Oct 12. This will make you pause and consider whether they could be telling the truth. At the very least, you'd probably believe that they all experienced some sort of phenomenon that should be investigated.
What is the difference between these two scenarios? The claim is exactly the same. The only difference is the number of people who are making it.

This is what I am talking about when I say credibility. The claim of the 10 people is more credible than the claim of the 1 person. It is more likely that the claim is true when more people are making the claim.

 

[cottage]

[/font]
Probably. But that goes beyond the argument that others are making. They are simply saying, "This is the case, and as this is the case, this an argument I'm making..." The validity of the case isn't in dispute; rather, the case is assumed.


No one's suggesting that. They're not saying, "Hey, look, assume they're right..." They're just saying, "Hey, look, assume this, which is the case..." Your argument here goes a step beyond to argue something else, something they're not arguing.

Hope that helps.

Thank you for that, Willamena

That is a perfect summary you've given there, and I can't make head nor tail of it either.

 

[Willamena]

Thank you for that, Willamena

That is a perfect summary you've given there, and I can't make head nor tail of it either.

So... not helpful.

In post #302, you said, "Let's keep in mind our fundamental disagreement." Your version of the fundamental disagreement isn't as fundamental to others. People are arguing at tangents. It makes for difficult reading.


On another note, I sympathize. I've been the one arguing the tangent a few times.

 

[cottage]

Once more into the breach...

I don't know if RF contemplates awarding a medal for sophistry, but I would surely nominate you for the above paragraph. All you seem to be saying is that it is a contradiction to come to the conclusion that Santa exists when you reject the idea that he exists. I can't argue with that logic.

My argument in very simple terms is this: Whatever we can conceive as existent (Santa assumed for example), we can conceive as non-existent. But there is no Santa whose non-existence implies a contradiction. There is therefore no Santa.

Where did I assert that 'people believe in Santa'? Either Santa exists or he does not. I agree with you that to assume both is a contradiction. That still doesn't get you to a place where you can conclude his existence or nonexistence.

“You can dismiss Santa Claus and God on the very weak grounds that there is no evidence for either entity. I call that "weak", because people who believe in such beings tend to believe that they can produce satisfactory evidence of their existence, even if you do accept their evidence.” #276

I would really like to make sense out of your argument, but it makes no sense at all. Santa's existence does not depend on my ability to prove his existence any more than your existence depends on my ability to prove your existence. I can produce a fake Santa Claus for you, and you would never be able to prove he was a fake. (Don't ask him to perform magic tricks, because he refuses to stoop to that level, just as God refuses to perform miracles just to prove he is God.)

You only have to prove Santa’s existence if you’re arguing the proposition ‘Santa exists’ is true (burden of proof). My argument is that the proposition is false.

Santa is a magical character that brings presents to children all over the world on Christmas Eve, riding through the air on a sleigh drawn by reindeer etc, a conception that is not logically impossible. But to ask Santa not to perform those magic tricks is to ask him to not be Santa. If Santa doesn’t ride through the air and doesn’t deliver gifts to children all over the world then he cannot be what he is, which leads to an absurdity and in which case there is no Santa.

I'm not really interested in discussing what Kant and other philosophers said or believed here. Existence can be thought of as a binary predicate that is true if what it is predicated of 'exists' and false if it does not. The scare quotes around 'exists' indicate that it is a term to be defined metalinguistically. One of the problems with the arguments those philosophers came up with was that they had trouble distinguishing object language from metalanguage, and that gave rise to all sorts of paradoxes. What I said about 'existence' was that it was not "perfectible". That is, it was not a scalar concept.

Back to the argument. God is the Absolutely Necessary Being, a concept that does not require to be analysed in terms of physics, magnitude, direction or time – or any other definition or description we can think of, other than to acknowledge that pure actuality, unlike contingent matter, is a thing with no potential for being; it is what it is necessarily. It is an exquisitely clever concept, and a thing that we cannot think not to exist (which of course is not to say a necessary being necessarily exists). And while a Necessary Being’s non-existence is as impossible as a two-sided triangle, we have no such conceptual vagaries with Santa. Santa is thus possible or impossible, but unlike the Necessary Being we can conceive of Santa not existing without having to first address whether he is possible.

There is no self-contradiction inherent in the assertion that Santa Claus exists. I'm sorry to contradict you, but there it is. The statement may be false, but it is not self-contradictory. Both Obama and Santa Claus may or may not exist.
But you have not presented a credible argument that he is "not actual". That is what this is about. You could present such an argument, but you prefer to chase your logical tail around in circles.

I do my best to ignore flippant and unnecessary remarks but suffice to say I am very clear about the argument I’m making. There is no contradiction in denying the proposition that Santa exists is true, and the conclusion that follows is that he doesn’t exist. My argument is twofold: 1) Santa is not demonstrable. 2) Santa’s non-appearance confirms his non-existence. #1 is logically certain. #2 is inferential. Both inform us that there both cannot be and not be a Santa and hence the contradiction and conclusion.

 

[cottage]

So... not helpful.

In post #302, you said, "Let's keep in mind our fundamental disagreement." Your version of the fundamental disagreement isn't as fundamental to others. People are arguing at tangents. It makes for difficult reading.

Would you please explain why you think that?

On another note, I sympathize. I've been the one arguing the tangent a few times.

I think some or the problem with forums is the rather juvenile practice, we all share, of answering with retorts (if that make sense), and one-line responses, instead giving proper arguments. But you are right, it does make for difficult reading. I try my best to keep things on the boil by constantly re-summarising my overall argument, and by bringing the discussion back on track. I am quite aware that in these protracted discussions it is generally only the main contributors who are actually following the debate. But I mustn't complain. It's all good fun.

 

[cottage]

To clarify, my argument is that it is reasonable for unbelievers to show why they disbelieve in mystical beings, etc. Do you see the difference between how you worded it?

Also, my personal position is that everyone has a responsibility to support their active beliefs, regardless of what they may be.


I understand your criticism here, and I have been struggling to find a way to adequately explain myself. Here goes:

When I use the word "credibility", I am speaking essentially of "believability"-- pieces of information that makes things more believable. These are things that effect our probability rating of whether something is likely to be true or not; it is only indirectly related to whether something is actually true or not.

The number of people accepting a belief effects our likelihood rating: we rate things more likely to be true if more people believe it, and we rate things less likely to be true if not many people believe it.

It makes sense to do this. If many people believe there's a lion in a bush over there, then it's likely there's a lion in the bush and you shouldn't go over there.

Think of how you process whether something is likely to be true or not: Say one person in your neighborhood claims that he was abducted by aliens on Oct 12. You'll probably just dismiss him as a nutjob and not think twice about it.

Now say that 10 people in your neighborhood claim that they were abducted by aliens on Oct 12. This will make you pause and consider whether they could be telling the truth. At the very least, you'd probably believe that they all experienced some sort of phenomenon that should be investigated.
What is the difference between these two scenarios? The claim is exactly the same. The only difference is the number of people who are making it.

This is what I am talking about when I say credibility. The claim of the 10 people is more credible than the claim of the 1 person. It is more likely that the claim is true when more people are making the claim.

I have to give you credit for your explanation, which you’ve expressed very well, and I see what it is you mean by credibility - in relation to likelihood. I will, though, make the following comments:

You say that mystics believe that their being in a majority gives credibility to their beliefs. I have questioned the nature of those beliefs in other posts and argued that a majority belief in mystical beings is vague and essentially non-specific, whereas affiliated beliefs are defined in the particular, and in consequent there are inconsistencies and outright contradictions in the sum of the beliefs. It has also been argued that mystics come to their beliefs through being influenced by the majority. I accept that peer, family or genetic dispositions may influence belief, but I do not accept, as a general statement, that people come to faith solely on account of others, since faith is an emotional investment and not simply a means to be one of the crowd. A delusion (or illusion) is not made probable or true by increasing the numbers of those who are seduced by it.

I acknowledge the truth of what you say concerning ‘believability’ and what you describe as the ‘probability rating’, which again is hard to disagree with, but I maintain it is used improperly in the case of mysticism. I grant you the argument you are making for the twelve alien abductions rather than the single alleged abduction. But you answer the problem yourself when you say: “At the very least, you'd probably believe that they all experienced some sort of phenomenon that should be investigated.” The point here being that people of faith, by the very definition of the term, are not looking for an explanation of phenomena. Even if we accept that a majority view may be reasonably linked to probability there is plainly a further link missing between probability and truth, since mystics won’t allow anything to count against their beliefs. Any claim, be it for lions, aliens, Santa or God, must always be subject to the truth.

If it were said there was a lion in a bush then I wouldn’t go over there. Why? Well, discretion is the better part of valour. I’d take it on trust even out of the mouth of a single individual.

 

[Willamena]

Would you please explain why you think that?

It's just an observation based on the last few pages of...

I am not saying that...

You really are trying to read more into this than there is... I AM just saying...

I am NOT saying that...

And the Cliff Notes version:
My argument is NOT . . .

You are still arguing the wrong thing.

It's all good fun.

That's the spirit.

 

[cottage]

It's just an observation based on the last few pages of...



That's the spirit.

Now really, Willamena! <chuckles>

A rather partisan viewpoint, and not exactly brimming with substance is it?

 

[cottage]

What sort of substance were you looking for? My observation was the substance I offered.

That it wasn't helpful should have been the end of it.

That's not the way it works. You say something, you make a point, you support it.

The substance I'm looking for is both the arguments that are relevant to the quotes. Or shall I hook them out and post them myself?

 

[Willamena]

That's not the way it works. You say something, you make a point, you support it.

When you're making an argument, sure. I wasn't.

The substance I'm looking for is both the arguments that are relevant to the quotes. Or shall I hook them out and post them myself?

I have no interest in rehashing everything Falvlun said. It was said well enough the first go around (post #84).

 

[cottage]

When you're making an argument, sure. I wasn't.

I'm sorry but you were: "Your version of the fundamental disagreement isn't as fundamental to others." It is not unreasonable to expect you say why you disagree. You have a right to your opinion and I would be glad to hear it.

I have no interest in rehashing everything Falvlun said. It was said well enough the first go around (post #84).

But you can't expect to act as a surrogate, and you do have a history of sniping.

 

[Willamena]

But you can't expect to act as a surrogate, and you do have a history of sniping.

Only at myself.