Sheesh. One side of the interaction is the atom. The other side is whatever vou are testing as physical. And, again, it is an inductive definition. Anything that interacts with something that interacts with an atom is also physical, etc.
I say that testing the hypothesis of whether something is "physical" according to your definition of that adjective is impossible unless you can figure out what you mean by "interaction".
And, further, as far as I know, regardless of what you mean by "interaction," we will never observe a down quark interacting with an atom, therefore we will never be able to claim that the down quark is "physical" according to your definition.
In addition, it does not seem to me that your concept of information in #24, as our "interpretation of the physical state," indicates that information would be "physical" according to your definition of that adjective.
These conundrums merely highlight the issue of the unimportance of the term "physical". This adjective is used a lot (by some people) in a variety of ways, but it's difficult to pin down a consistent definition for purposes of metaphysics.
Then you have been reading more into my position than is there. I certainly consider it a possibility that it is 'objective', but I am not perfectly sure what the term 'objective' means. Are measurements of distance objective?
Yes, general relativity was the beginning of destruction of the idea that empirical reality is experienced the same for everyone regardless of conditions, even while the mathematical nature of empirical reality is unquestionable. Distance is relative to inertial frame of reference, which, in turn, is determined those quantities calculated as energy and momentum.