If people contradict themselves, just call them out on the contradiction. Personally, I find terms like SJW or TDS or some of the disparaging terms used to describe conservatives as a means to avoid meaningful conversations, or recognition that these discussions aren't binary, and don't have to be instances of 'defending your team'.
You're sophisticated enough on politics to know that the answers to all these questions are both complex and subjective. Not to mention that there can be clear distinctions between stated goals, actual goals, and secondary/tertiary considerations. In the interests of good faith, I'll provide basic answers on these, but have little interest in pursuing these to the level of complexity we could. It would be a derail (at best) and I'm unsure what the point would be. Your macro point (that the US is doing nothing other than pursuing US best interests) is understood.
The messaging has been mixed at times. Limiting the scope of the civil war was certainly part of the plan, but messaging from the White House has included anti-Assad dialogue at times (eg. when striking chemical weapons targets) and more broadly seemed to suggest a more stable region was ultimately a goal.
Then there is the whole question about how Russia, and broader foreign policy considerations (eg. influence in the area, leaving a power vaccum, etc) is considered, and that seems variable. Understandably so, I would say, given the volatility of the area, and the impact of a third party (Russia).
Hah! Were it me, planning objectives to determine success/failure, and having an exit plan would be the very first consideration prior to engagement. But even if such an exit plan is stated, it's unlikely we have the full story on what the US considers success. Suffice to say, pre-Presidency and again in the early days of his Presidency, Trump seemed to indicate US goals had nothing to do with removal of Assad, and that Assad's fighting against ISIL, plus Russian backing both played roles in this.
To be fair, he was handed an existing situation, and moved away from interventionist military policy in Syria. That was a pretty clear shift, and seemed consistent.
Strikes against chemical weapons facilities indicated the US was playing some sort of policing role, but muddied the waters on when and where this applied.
But US goals seemed to be;
- Removal of ISIS
- Stabilization of the region (with that occasionally seeming to include removal of Assad, sometimes not)
- Removal of Iranian forces from Syria (with that last being flagged at times)
If those sound laughably broad and unmeasureable, I'd agree, but US military intervention since Vietnam has largely suffered from that same issue. To be clear, I don't think clarity of objectives is simple AT ALL.
If you can do an ROI on military interventions in the Middle East, you're a better man than I am. Given the trillions spent by the US on foreign actions since 2000, it's simply not possible for me to judge cost/benefit. Nor, I suspect, for anyone.
Removal of ISIL, sure. The risk with that goal is not whether it's achievable, though, as I suspect you well know. It's always been the creation of power vacuums where the US has struggled in the Middle East (as has other foreign powers). Chop the head off the Hydra and more will grow.
Stabilization of the region, then seems impossible in any objective sense. Whether the region is more or less stable at any point in time has major economic and political impact though. So perhaps the true goals aren't really about stabilizing the region, and more about keeping things somewhat functional.
Political will is almost impossible to read. Just as foreign policy changed when Trump came to power, so will it change again in the future when there are changes in decision making. It's the nature of democracy. So too does the perception of events play a MAJOR role. Not just the actual events themselves.
For a complete exit?
That's the thing. It can't be a 'time' line. It must be an objective based exit. Otherwise it's more a function of political expediency and shorter term economic factors than one of military strategy or long term economics.
One of the issues with democracy is that long term economics are not effective in doing anything other than making your replacement look good. That's not a US issue, it's simply the nature of fixed term democracy.
ISIL is largely rendered powerless but not destroyed. Replacement of US forces with effective local forces is an obvious key to exiting, else you'll end up with the next head of the hydra to deal with in short order. However, if you have an idea of how to achieve stable government in the Middle East which will be able to manage this, please let the world know.
The US decided not to intervene, form a strong coalition, or flag removal of Assad as objectives.
When Assad used chemical weapons, the US decided to strike.
There was some confusion as to whether this would continue into regime replacement operations, or stop at a first strike.
Now, with the withdrawal of US troops, plus conversations between Turkey and the US having occurred at the highest levels, Trump's tweet seems to indicate something similar. Erdogan can pursue his policies without US interference or condemnation. If he cross 'the line' then there will be economic sanctions.
So...what's the line? If I suspect there is no clearly agreed line, and this will be somewhat driven by political expediency, do you see that as me being cynical, a TDS, or probably correct?
And this is where it gets harder for me to accept what you're saying. Like I said, I'm trying to answer your questions in good faith. But still, withdrawal of the troops is OBVIOUSLY something that is planned. There is the whole matter of logistics, for starters.
That is not the same as suggesting that this method of withdrawal wasn't sudden. Turkish and US military forces were actively engaged in planning border patrols to try and keep the peace, dissuade KPP cross border movement, etc.
The discussions between Erdogan and Trump caused a sudden shift in planning. I'd be surprised if you disagree with that.
It was a strange reference to a war that occurred 80 years ago. Whilst that has some semblance of relevance to US-Australian relations, it is meaningless in this context. Your comments about variety of alliances makes more sense. Bringing in irrelevant considerations strikes me as either political or stupid. Let's assume political. He's doing a sales job, in my mind.
Again, irrelevant to this issue, I was merely suggesting that the history of Turkey is hardly more compelling or relevant than Kurdish history. But, facetiously I might suggest that the current iteration of Turkey might not be too unfamiliar to any familiar with the history of the Ottoman Empire in the first quarter of the 20th century.
As an Australian, it warms my heart to think that all alliances are reduced to cost/benefit and are therefore disposable on short notice to expediency.
I'm obviously talking a little tongue in cheek, and I understand the rationale behind NATO inclusions of Turkey. Basically the juice has never been worth the squeeze, right up until the location of their airbases becomes important in one conflict or another.
Assad pegged it right from the beginning. The version of realpolitik America has been playing in the Middle East since at least CIA operations in Afghanistan has consistently backed a horse, then switched based on short term needs. That hasn't worked well. Whether you like it or not, US decisions provided Erdogan tacit approval to invade Syria. That is a horse I would be very wary of backing. Calling him both strong, and threatening destruction of the Turkish economy if he oversteps an invisible line left undefined and in the sole hands of the President seems like a school yard approach to relations and strategy in the most complicated region on Earth.
Meh...we can argue about whether the US should be in Syria at all, and that position was handed to Trump to deal with, which is tough.
But the nature of this withdrawal and the method of communicating it to the world is strictly amateur hour, and seems to fly in the face of long term military strategy.