Shortest version -Ontological argument (again I know, I love this argument)

[Link]

It is very easy to imagine God as not existing. I do it every day. So, I am not sure what that does prove.

I have the impression your argument reduces to (I am just trying to put some structure):

1) God, if exists, is a necessary being
2) It is possible to conceive a possible world with God in it. Ergo, God exists in that possible world
3) But then God, by existing in that possible world, He is therefore necessary (because of 1)
4) Ergo, God inhabits all possible worlds, otherwise He would be contingent, by existing only in some of them, against 1)
5) Ergo, God inhabits also this actualised world (being one of the possible ones)

If that is a good representation of your argument, do you realise it has a fallacy as big as a house in it?

Ciao

- viole

You phrased it more like Plantiga's version but I'm curious what's the flaw.

 

[Link]

3 is flawed. There is no therefore he is Necessary. It should be stated, God by existing in that possible world, is proven to exist in all possible worlds (because of 1).

Also God by definition is a Necessary being. There is no need to say if he exists. It's just I used to emphasize if he Exists, this shouldn't be weird to see that he is a proof for himself.

That is you can assume God is fictional, and you get to the conclusion that he is Necessary by definition and hence exists.

 

[Link]

Should be phrased in your version.

1. God if a Necessary being, exists.
2. God is conceived to exist as a Necessary being in some possible world x.
3. Therefore God is conceived to exists in all possible worlds when conceived to exist in possible world x.
4. Therefore God exists in actual world (because our world is included in possible worlds).

This is a weird way to phrase it, but this would correct the flaws in your version.

 

[TagliatelliMonster]

One way to phrase the ontological argument is to say everything else can be conceived as possibly not existing and be in imagination (like a unicorn) while God cannot be in imagination due to his necessary absolute nature, only be seen in reality. We do conceive of God conceptually, therefore, are looking at the real thing, therefore he exists.

Comment: Why do I love this argument, well because it's God being a proof for himself to all people, mystics and non-mystics alike.

Assumed conclusion.

 

[viole]

3 is flawed. There is no therefore he is Necessary. It should be stated, God by existing in that possible world, is proven to exist in all possible worlds (because of 1).

Also God by definition is a Necessary being. There is no need to say if he exists. It's just I used to emphasize if he Exists, this shouldn't be weird to see that he is a proof for himself.

That is you can assume God is fictional, and you get to the conclusion that he is Necessary by definition and hence exists.

if that was true, then you do not need an argument. Just by saying it is necessary proves its existence. For only things that might not exist are not necessary.

But then you bootstrap its existence out of thin air. I could basically make up anything, define it as necessary, make sure it has no logical contradiction, and I could prove its existence.

Ciao

- viole

 

[Link]

if that was true, then you do not need an argument. Just by saying it is necessary proves its existence. For only things that might not exist are not necessary.

But then you bootstrap its existence out of thin air. I could basically make up anything, define it as necessary, make sure it has no logical contradiction, and I could prove its existence.

Ciao

- viole

Assertion of something being necessary won't prove it to be. It's not the assertion, but the perception of it here that makes it so.

 

[viole]

Assertion of something being necessary won't prove it to be. It's not the assertion, but the perception of it here that makes it so.

So, if I make up something that I define as necessary, and I have a perception thereof, then that thing exists.

right?

ciao

- viole

 

[Link]

So, if I make up something that I define as necessary, and I have a perception thereof, then that thing exists.

right?

ciao

- viole

Yes it would if you conceive properly why it's Necessary, then yes, you would know it exists. But it happens to be absolute existence in terms of life can only be one thing. That can prove also that God is One.

 

[viole]

Yes it would. But it happens to be absolute existence in terms of life can only be one thing. That can prove also that God is One.

Well, now you start using wishy washy language, which is the equivalent of smoking bombs to hide behind.

in order to have a chance to have a meaningless proof of anything, you need clear cut and unambiguous language.

For instance, what on earth is absolute existence in terms of life? Is there an absolute existence not in terms of life?

ciao

- viole

 

[Link]

You should read what Anselm talked about dependent type existence before that. He elaborated all this. He talked about degrees of existence. Or was it Descartes I forget. One of them went into detail.

 

[viole]

You should read what Anselm talked about dependent type existence before that. He elaborated all this. He talked about degrees of existence. Or was it Descartes I forget. One of them went into detail.

Well, I do not debate dead philosophers, otherwise I could simply delegate the rebuttal of the ontological argument to Kant, and be done with that.

So, in order to use some form of proof, we need to put some structure, like I tried before. Are you able to take my syllogism and change it/correct it in order to represent your case? I ask because arguments that cannot be divided into a set of small and clear cut statements are usually nonsense. And its nonsensical component is proportional to the "spiritual" of "pseudo deep" language used to lay them down. You know, things like "absolute existence in terms of life"

Here is my proposal, after your comments. Please, feel free to change it, so that we have something concrete to chew on afterwards. The goal, again, is to have something with structure that is equivalent to your case.

1) God is necessary, by its very nature and definition
2) There is a possible world with God in it (aka: we can imagine a possible, logical consistent world with God in it, aka: I can imagine the existence of God)
3) Because of 1) and 2) God must exist in all possible worlds (only contingent things exist in some possible worlds and not others)
4) Our world is a possible world (trivially)
5) God exists (in our world/state of affairs), because of 3) and 4)

Ciao

- viole

 

[Link]

Kant whole point was that it doesn't add to what a being is, if it exists or not. Existence is a predicate. Granted. This is true of all things except God. Absolute life would be a lot less in life if not a Necessary being.

Therefore, in case of God, it does add to his concept of being necessary. This what Anselm meant that a God in imagination take away existence, and it's no longer the Greatest being by virtue of it being necessary. It would lack being necessary is the key component.

But there is nothing incoherent about a Necessary being. In fact, Existence is the default state. There is no lack of existence. Nothingness is impossible and any non-existence is impossible, and absolute existence is necessary.

 

[Link]

1) God is necessary, by its very nature and definition
2) There is a possible world with God in it (aka: we can imagine a possible, logical consistent world with God in it, aka: I can imagine the existence of God)
3) Because of 1) and 2) God must exist in all possible worlds (only contingent things exist in some possible worlds and not others)
4) Our world is a possible world (trivially)
5) God exists (in our world/state of affairs), because of 3) and 4)

Ciao

- viole

Sure. I didn't phrase it like this, but it works.

 

[viole]

Sure. I didn't phrase it like this, but it works.

Well, I can see at least two ways to attack that argument. The first defeats the conclusion by equivalent means, the second shows how weak the argument is.

CASE 1: Based on symmetry
---------------------------------------
1) God is necessary, by its very nature and definition
2) There is a possible world with no God in it (aka: we can imagine a possible, logical consistent world without God in it, aka: I can imagine the not existence of God)
3) Because of 1) and 2) God cannot exist in any possible world (only contingent things exist in some possible worlds and not others)
4) Our world is a possible world (trivially)
5) God does not exist (in our world/state of affairs), because of 3) and 4)

CASE 2: Dubious existence of other necessary things
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
1)The statement of the Goldbach Conjecture (GC: an unsolved problem in math) is necessary, by its very nature and definition
2) There is a possible world where the GC is true (aka: we can imagine a possible, logical consistent world where the GC is true, aka: I can imagine that GC is true)
3) Because of 1) and 2) the GC must be true in all possible worlds (only contingent things exist in some possible worlds and not others)
4) Our world is a possible world (trivially)
5) GC is true (in our world/state of affairs), because of 3) and 4). --> Cool, there is a million for anyone proving that

Now, a good test is to defeat some of the premises and check why they do not defeat your version of the argument. Your call.

Ciao

- viole

 

[Polymath257]

Should be phrased in your version.

1. God if a Necessary being, exists.

This is the mistaken assumption. It is circular: if X exists, then X exists. You might as well just assume God exists and not need an argument at all.

2. God is conceived to exist as a Necessary being in some possible world x.

What does it mean to be 'necessary in a possible world'? Necessity is *defined* as being for *all* possible worlds, not just one. So the phrase itself is meaningless. This is a big flaw.

Also, symmetrically, God is conceived NOT to exist in some possible world.

3. Therefore God is conceived to exists in all possible worlds when conceived to exist in possible world x.

And, symmetrically, the conception that God does NOT exist in some possible world, shows God does not exist in *any* possible world. That should show there is a deep flaw in your argument.

4. Therefore God exists in actual world (because our world is included in possible worlds).

And, symmetrically, God does not exist in this possible world.

This is a weird way to phrase it, but this would correct the flaws in your version.

But it still has deep flaws.

 

[Polymath257]

OK, a few terms:

Possible world: a logically consistent set of facts.
Necessary: holds in all possible worlds.
Possible: holds in some possible world.
God: a being that is necessarily existent. In other words, that exists in all possible worlds.

We want to know whether such a being exists. In other words, we want to know if there is some being that exists in all possible worlds.

Can we agree to this much?

Now, there are a couple of starting issues about possible worlds:

1. How do we determine if some system that we imagine (probably vaguely)is actually logically consistent? In other words, how do we know that we have a possible world?

2. How do we define identity of a being in different possible worlds?
Remember that the physics of possible worlds can be quite different. In what sense can we even say that we have the same being in wildly different possible worlds (very close possible worlds is easier)?

And, relevant to the ontological argument:

We have no concept of 'possible in a possible world' or 'necessary in a possible world'. We only have 'possible' or 'necessary' as global claims about entities and these are global concepts, not in any particular possible world.

Are we good with this starting point? Any comments?

 

[Polymath257]

Well, I can see at least two ways to attack that argument. The first defeats the conclusion by equivalent means, the second shows how weak the argument is.

CASE 1: Based on symmetry
---------------------------------------
1) God is necessary, by its very nature and definition
2) There is a possible world with no God in it (aka: we can imagine a possible, logical consistent world without God in it, aka: I can imagine the not existence of God)
3) Because of 1) and 2) God cannot exist in any possible world (only contingent things exist in some possible worlds and not others)
4) Our world is a possible world (trivially)
5) God does not exist (in our world/state of affairs), because of 3) and 4)

CASE 2: Dubious existence of other necessary things
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
1)The statement of the Goldbach Conjecture (GC: an unsolved problem in math) is necessary, by its very nature and definition
2) There is a possible world where the GC is true (aka: we can imagine a possible, logical consistent world where the GC is true, aka: I can imagine that GC is true)
3) Because of 1) and 2) the GC must be true in all possible worlds (only contingent things exist in some possible worlds and not others)
4) Our world is a possible world (trivially)
5) GC is true (in our world/state of affairs), because of 3) and 4). --> Cool, there is a million for anyone proving that

Now, a good test is to defeat some of the premises and check why they do not defeat your version of the argument. Your call.

Ciao

- viole

I wouldn't go as much with GC, but maybe with a statement that is known to be independent of the other axioms, like the continuum hypothesis. This is a mathematical statement with the following property: it is equally consistent whether you add CH to your axioms system or if you add not(CH) to your axiom system.

Hence, there is a possible world (we even have models) where CH is true. AND, we have possible worlds (models) where CH is false.

But CH is a statement of mathematics (in fact, of set theory), and so should be necessary. This is a contradiction.

Now, all this does is show that at least some statements of mathematics are NOT necessary. Determining which ones *are* necessary is another BIG issue.

 

[viole]

I wouldn't go as much with GC, but maybe with a statement that is known to be independent of the other axioms, like the continuum hypothesis. This is a mathematical statement with the following property: it is equally consistent whether you add CH to your axioms system or if you add not(CH) to your axiom system.

Hence, there is a possible world (we even have models) where CH is true. AND, we have possible worlds (models) where CH is false.

But CH is a statement of mathematics (in fact, of set theory), and so should be necessary. This is a contradiction.

Now, all this does is show that at least some statements of mathematics are NOT necessary. Determining which ones *are* necessary is another BIG issue.

Well, it appears as if the dichotomy necessary/contingent is false. There is something that is neither. Good catch.

Ciao

- viole

 

[Link]

Well, I can see at least two ways to attack that argument. The first defeats the conclusion by equivalent means, the second shows how weak the argument is.

CASE 1: Based on symmetry
---------------------------------------
1) God is necessary, by its very nature and definition
2) There is a possible world with no God in it (aka: we can imagine a possible, logical consistent world without God in it, aka: I can imagine the not existence of God)
3) Because of 1) and 2) God cannot exist in any possible world (only contingent things exist in some possible worlds and not others)
4) Our world is a possible world (trivially)
5) God does not exist (in our world/state of affairs), because of 3) and 4)

CASE 2: Dubious existence of other necessary things
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
1)The statement of the Goldbach Conjecture (GC: an unsolved problem in math) is necessary, by its very nature and definition
2) There is a possible world where the GC is true (aka: we can imagine a possible, logical consistent world where the GC is true, aka: I can imagine that GC is true)
3) Because of 1) and 2) the GC must be true in all possible worlds (only contingent things exist in some possible worlds and not others)
4) Our world is a possible world (trivially)
5) GC is true (in our world/state of affairs), because of 3) and 4). --> Cool, there is a million for anyone proving that

Now, a good test is to defeat some of the premises and check why they do not defeat your version of the argument. Your call.

Ciao

- viole

If it's unsolved, then it isn't conceived to be necessary. Necessary would be something known to be true in all possible worlds for math wise. I don't enough of GC to comment on whether it's actually conceived to be necessary.

Remember there is a difference between assertion and conceiving. Conceiving would mean, you know precisely, that this thing is necessary. I can perceive for sure 1+1=2 is a necessary truth. Same with short distance between two points is a straight line. That is a Necessary truth about two points. It's not the case in some possible world x, this would be not true.

 

[Link]

There is something that is neither.
- viole

Contingency the opposite of it independent. Necessary is more then independency, but if anything was independent other than Necessary being, the Necessary being would not exist. In fact, even if independent existence is rationally possible logically coherent wise, then a Necessary being by definition is impossible, because in some possible world x a being can be independent and it would lack it's existence. The way to know that everything is sheer dependence, has two ways. One by contingency nature itself and apply to all things except God and you would have to think about why you need to break the chain of contingency. Or you can if you recognize a Necessary being exists, know everything else has to be contingency and dependent.