Shortest version -Ontological argument (again I know, I love this argument)

[Polymath257]

An independent existence of God would mean there is a possible world x in which x which is independent of God just exists on it's own.

No, what it means is that there is a possible world and a y in that world whose existence is not dependent on the existence of that necessary being.

When you think of the Absolute Necessary being, you know it it's unique, through it's comprehensive vastness.

Looks like you added a condition to 'necessary': that is also be absolute. And you have no defined what it means to be absolute.

You don't count. God's Oneness is not known through counting, it's known through realization of his immense greatness and absoluteness.

And that depends on the possible world. I can imagine a possible world in which no absolutely great entity exists, so an absolute entity is not necessary. Hence, by your definition, it cannot be God.

 

[Polymath257]

It would be. But with respect to everything else, duplications are possible. That is if you duplicate a rock, it's a rock. A necessary existence has to be that existence, in all possible worlds.

Which, of course, gets us back to the issue of identity of objects between possible worlds, which you also did not address.

A rock has duplications and a rock is not sheer absolute life, and a rock is not something all things depend upon.

So? That wasn't the definition you proposed: that it be a necessary being.

 

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So? We were talking necessary being, not maximal being. The issue of maximal being is a separate one.

And how do you know they are not maximal 'in existence' (and what does THAT even mean)? Just because there are two? Each could be maximal--sort of my point about the possibility of two maximal things that are not largest.



How does that follow? Remember, necessary only means that it exists in all possible worlds. Why does having something independent negate that as a possibility.

So, for example, we could have two necessary beings, each dependent on the other and both existing in all possible worlds, right?

I tried to explain this. That which has to exist, has to be eternal. That which has to exist, exists no matter what and hence can't depend on anything else, for existence.

All possible worlds sum up to all possible life/existence. If any existence is independent of a Necessary being, than the existence can be said to in possible world x without the Necessary being. So in this case, if any independent existence is possible, then Necessary by definition is impossible.

The inverse is true as well, if a Necessary being by definition is possible, then independent existence is impossible (You can contra-positive the first statement it's exactly the same).

 

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Which, of course, gets us back to the issue of identity of objects between possible worlds, which you also did not address.

It has to be the same identity. Abstract numbers are the same identity in all possible words. 1+1=2 is not a different fact, it's abstract feature of logic and math universal in all possible worlds.

The Necessary being existence has to be the exact same identity. I should've clarified that.

 

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Otherwise if not same identity, you infinite clones of God possible, but we saw how that was not possible.

 

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So? That wasn't the definition you proposed: that it be a necessary being.

If a rock would exist in all possible worlds, it would be a Necessary being.
But it's easy to see this not possible, as nothing depends on it, and hence, and we can create infinite worlds with it, but infinite worlds without it as logically coherent worlds. And it's also impossible because duplications of it are possible which leads to contradictions as shown already.

The Necessary being can't have duplciates, it has to be that being in all possible worlds, not clones.

 

[Link]

The reason why absolute life and necessary being imply one another, is because, if any life is not derived from it's own life, it ceases to be absolute, and hence not necessary, while if every possible life is found it, then no possible world can exist without it and hence proven necessary.

The other way is simple as well, Necessary being includes (1) absolute life + no creation, (2) absolute life + possible creation, (3) absolute life + possible creation (absolute infinity number) absolute life + actual creation.

In the case, absolute life is the same amount in all these possibilities, so the identity is one and the same.

That is you add all of them up, you don't get more. Absolute life means no life can increase it.

If however you assume not absolute life with respect to Necessary being, then you exclude all those which is known to be possible that I mentioned.

Not only that, but you get duplications, and hence, not the same existence is necessary in all possible worlds and hence infinite worlds are logically coherent without it.

So if a Necessary being exists, it definitely is God lol.

And if God exists, it definitely is a Necessary being.

 

[Polymath257]

I tried to explain this. That which has to exist, has to be eternal. That which has to exist, exists no matter what and hence can't depend on anything else, for existence.

Has to exist in every possible world. That is different than having to exist at all times in all possible worlds. And exactly what do you mean by the term 'depends on' in this context?

For example, if some dinosaur exists in every possible world, then it is a necessary being that depends on other beings (and maybe has different parents in different possible worlds).

All possible worlds sum up to all possible life/existence.

Well, the life is redundant. So, yes, all possible ways of having existing things.

If any existence is independent of a Necessary being, than the existence can be said to in possible world x without the Necessary being.

Details? Why can you say that?

So in this case, if any independent existence is possible, then Necessary by definition is impossible.

Which is my claim, by the way. So you have proved what I was claiming.

The inverse is true as well, if a Necessary being by definition is possible, then independent existence is impossible (You can contra-positive the first statement it's exactly the same).

Which means that since independent existence *is* possible (it exists in some possible world), a necessarily existing thing can't exist.

 

[Polymath257]

If a rock would exist in all possible worlds, it would be a Necessary being.

OK, good.

But it's easy to see this not possible, as nothing depends on it, and hence, and we can create infinite worlds with it, but infinite worlds without it as logically coherent worlds.

How do you know you can create logically consistent worlds without it?

And it's also impossible because duplications of it are possible which leads to contradictions as shown already.

You claimed a contradiction, but didn't show one.

The Necessary being can't have duplciates, it has to be that being in all possible worlds, not clones.

yes, that particular being has to be the same in all possible worlds (whatever THAT means), but that doesn't mean that can't be a clone that is a different thing that also exists in all possible worlds.

It also doesn't mean that there can't be two different things that are in all possible worlds, and thereby both necessary.

 

[Polymath257]

It has to be the same identity. Abstract numbers are the same identity in all possible words. 1+1=2 is not a different fact, it's abstract feature of logic and math universal in all possible worlds.

The Necessary being existence has to be the exact same identity. I should've clarified that.

But it can't be, because it is in different possible worlds.

And, yes, in fact, 1+1=2 means different things in different possible worlds because the mathematical objects 1, 2, =, and + all are different in different models.

 

[viole]

Assertion is different then conceiving.

So, it should be easy to find the defeater in my (anti)-symmetric version of your argument (the original having been confirmed by you to represent your case). Let's repeat it here:

1) God is necessary, by its very nature and definition
2) There is a possible world with no God in it (aka: we can imagine a possible, logical consistent world without God in it, aka: I can imagine the non existence of God)
3) Because of 1) and 2) God cannot exist in any possible world (only contingent things exist in some possible worlds and not others)
4) Our world is a possible world (trivially)
5) God does not exist (in our world/state of affairs), because of 3) and 4)

I think it is important you defeat this without applying special pleading, question begging or other fallacies. Ergo, by means that do not also defeat your preferred version of it.

Because if you don't succeed, while insisting that the substance of the argument is valid, then you can only infer that a necessary being is logically incoherent, since it leads to mutually contradicting results. In other words: it would be easy to create a meta-argument, based on the ontological argument, to prove that God, whose definition includes necessity, really cannot exist. Which probably you do not want, especially with your favorite argument .

So, since the conclusions seem to follow from the premises, there must be a premise that you would like to challenge. Which one? I am still waiting.

Ciao

- viole