Nagarjuna's Mula madhyamaka karika

[crossfire]

For the new year, I'm going to try to go through Nagarjuna's Madhayamaka verses. Anyone is welcome to follow along and add commentary. Happy mind-twisting headaches, everyone!

Here is a literal translation of the Tibetan text:

Verses from the Center

27 chapters means just over 6 months if one chapter is digested per week, or just over a year if one chapter is digested every two weeks.

I'll just post the link and the translation of the introductory remarks for now, without the Tibetan original, which is alongside the English Translation. . :run:

Herein lie the Root Verses of the Center called “Intelligence”. In the language of India: Prajnanamamulamadhyamakakarika. In the language of Tibet: dBu ma rtsa ba'i tshig le'ur byas pa shes rab ces bya ba. I prostrate to the youthful Manjushri.


I bow down to the most sublime of speakers, the completely awakened one who taught contingency (no cessation, no birth, no annihilation, no permanence, no coming, no going, no difference, no identity) to ease fixations.​

 

[Deva758]

Thanks Crossfire, I will try to follow along. I have the book, but I haven't been able to get very far with it because of the terms used.

 

[Ablaze]

Wonderful idea. I remember first reading the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā when I was 16 and finding that everything about it intuitively clicked with me. It all just made sense despite being so philosophically dense. I have since worked on translating it from the Sanskrit and finding all the countless parallels between Nagarjuna's verses, the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras, and the Pali Canon. It has truly revolutionized my practice of Buddhism.

Looking forward to the unfolding of this thread.

:namaste

 

[crossfire]

Wonderful idea. I remember first reading the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā when I was 16 and finding that everything about it intuitively clicked with me. It all just made sense despite being so philosophically dense. I have since worked on translating it from the Sanskrit and finding all the countless parallels between Nagarjuna's verses, the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras, and the Pali Canon. It has truly revolutionized my practice of Buddhism.

Looking forward to the unfolding of this thread.

:namaste

Excellent! This is the Tibetan version. You can hold all of our hands though all of this!

 

[crossfire]

Take your aspirin: here's chapter 1:

1. Investigation of Conditions​

1. No thing anywhere is ever born from itself, from something else, from both or without a cause.

2. There are four conditions:Causes, objects, immediate and dominant. There is no fifth.

3. The essence of things does not exist in conditions and so on. If an own thing does not exist, an other thing does not exist.

4. There is no activity which has conditions. There is no activity which does not have conditions. There are no conditions which do not have activity, and none which do have activity.

5. Since something is born in dependence upon them, then they are known as “conditions”. As long as it is not born, why are they not non-conditions?

6. It is impossible for something that either exists or not to have conditions. If it were non-existent, of what would they be the conditions? If it were existent, why would it need conditions?

7. When things cannot be established as either existent, non-existent or both, how can one speak of an “establishing cause.” Such would be impossible.

8. An existent phenomenon is clearly said to have no object at all. If the phenomenon has no object, where can the object exist?

9. If phenomena are not born, it is invalid for there to be cessation. Therefore, an immediate [condition] is unreasonable. What, having ceased, can also be a condition?

10. Because the existence of essence-less things does not exist, it is incorrect to say:“When this exists, that arises.”

11. There is no effect at all in the conditions individually or together. How can that which is not in the conditions itself be born from conditions?

12. If, although the effect is not there, it is born from those conditions, why is an effect not born from what are not its conditions?

13. Effects [are of] the nature of conditions. Conditions do not have own nature. How can those effects of what does not have own nature [be of] the nature of conditions?

14. Therefore, [it does] not have the nature of conditions, nor is there an effect with the nature of non-conditions. Since there is no effect, what could [be its] non-conditions or conditions?

 

[Ablaze]

I've always found it striking how many parallels exist between Nagarjuna's work and the suttas, demonstrating that Nagarjuna was intimately familiar with these teachings. For instance, the opening lines of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā on conditionality can be traced back to the Buddha's and arahants' words in the Nidana Samyutta (SN 12) of the Samyutta Nikaya.

In particular, Nagarjuna's first verse parallels the teachings contained in the Acela Sutta (SN 12.17), where the Buddha identifies five positions as misleading, namely that stress is:

1. self-made
2. other-made
3. both self-made and other-made
4. neither self-made nor other-made and arises spontaneously
5. does not exist

All of these positions are refuted, as stress arises in accordance with dependent origination - not based on a "maker" or "birther" of any sort.

This formula is repeated in the Bhumija Sutta (SN 12.25) in which the Buddha identifies another four positions as misleading, namely that pleasure and pain are:

1. self-made
2. other-made
3. self-made and other-made
4. neither self-made nor other-made

These positions are mistaken because pleasure and pain arise out of contact in accordance with dependent origination.

Likewise, in the Nalakalapiyo Sutta (SN 12.67), Venerable Sariputta identifies four positions as misleading, namely that aging and death are:

1. self-made
2. other-made
3. both self-made and other-made
4. without self-making or other-making, arise spontaneously

As with the above categories, these views are misleading on account of the fact that aging and death arise with birth as a requisite condition in accordance with dependent origination.

The same is said for the remaining links (nidanas) in the 12-fold chain.

"Now, when asked, 'Is stress self-made?' you say, 'Don't say that, Kassapa.' When asked, 'Then is it other-made?' you say, 'Don't say that, Kassapa.' When asked, 'Then is it both self-made and other-made?' you say, 'Don't say that, Kassapa.' When asked, 'Then is it the case that stress, being neither self-made nor other-made, arises spontaneously?' you say, 'Don't say that, Kassapa.' When asked, 'Then does stress not exist?' you say, 'It's not the case, Kassapa, that stress does not exist. Stress does exist.' When asked, 'Well, in that case, does Master Gotama not know or see stress?' you say, 'Kassapa, it's not the case that I don't know or see stress. I know stress. I see stress.' Then explain stress to me, lord Blessed One. Teach me about stress, lord Blessed One!"

"'The one who acts is the one who experiences [the result of the act]' amounts to the eternalist statement, 'Existing from the very beginning, stress is self-made.' 'The one who acts is someone other than the one who experiences'[2] amounts to the annihilationist statement, 'For one existing harassed by feeling, stress is other-made.' Avoiding these two extremes, the Tathagata teaches the Dhamma via the middle.”

Acela Sutta (SN 12.17)

"I have said, Ananda, that pleasure & pain are dependently co-arisen. Dependent on what? Dependent on contact. One speaking in this way would be speaking in line with what I have said, would not be misrepresenting me with what is unfactual, and would be answering in line with the Dhamma so that no one whose thinking is in line with the Dhamma would have grounds for criticism.

"Whatever brahmans & contemplatives, teachers of kamma, who declare that pleasure & pain are self-made, even that is dependent on contact. Whatever brahmans & contemplatives, teachers of kamma, who declare that pleasure & pain are other-made... self-made & other-made... neither self-made nor other-made, but arise spontaneously, even that is dependent on contact.

"That any brahmans & contemplatives — teachers of kamma who declare that pleasure & pain are self-made — would be sensitive to pleasure & pain otherwise than through contact: that isn't possible. That any brahmans & contemplatives — teachers of kamma who declare that pleasure & pain are other-made... self-made & other-made... neither self-made nor other-made, but arise spontaneously — would be sensitive to pleasure & pain otherwise than through contact: that isn't possible."

Bhumija Sutta (SN 12.25)

"Now tell me, Sariputta my friend: Are aging & death self-made or other-made or both self-made & other-made, or — without self-making or other-making — do they arise spontaneously?"

"It's not the case, Kotthita my friend, that aging & death are self-made, that they are other-made, that they are both self-made & other-made, or that — without self-making or other-making — they arise spontaneously. However, from birth as a requisite condition comes aging & death."

Nalakalapiyo Sutta (SN 12.67)

The overlaps abound, but these three suttas should hopefully help clarify the nature of Nagarjuna's first chapter on conditionality.

 

[dyanaprajna2011]

Alot of people, Buddhist or not, would be surprised to find out just how much of Mahayana and Vajrayana comes from the Pali Canon.

 

[DreadFish]

Im pretty sure I've read some of this or some of another one of Nagarjuna's works. I am a fan. Though, for all I know, the words written could just be gibberish, and they sometimes might as well be, there seems to be a profound sense to them that I simply can't intellectually grasp.

 

[crossfire]

Time for the weekly aspirin again. Welcome to week 2--Chapter 2

Many thanks to Ablaze for bringing out the suttas that probably brought Nagarjuna to this treatise. Please, continue to do so! It is very much appreciated! :yes:

Chapter 2

Verses from the Center

2. Investigation of Coming and Going
(Walking)

1. Then there is no going in what has gone; there is no going also in what has not [yet] gone. Motion is unknowable apart from what has gone and not [yet] gone.

2. Where there is moving, there there is going. Furthermore, because moving is within motion -- and is neither gone nor not [yet] gone, therefore, there is going within motion.

3. How can going be possible within motion? Because motion that is not going is impossible.

4. For whomever there is going within motion, for him it will follow that there [could be] no going within motion, because there is going within motion.

{Or, following the structure and wording of v. 10: “To claim that there is going within motion implies that there could be no going within motion, because it is asserted there is going within motion.”}

5. If there were going within motion, it would follow that going would be twofold: that by which one becomes someone in motion [in a place] and [that by which one] goes in that [place].

6. If going were twofold, the goer also would be twofold, because going is impossible without a goer.

7. If there were no goer, going would be impossible. If there were no going, where could a goer be existent?

8. When a goer does not go, a non-goer cannot go; what third one other than a goer and a non-goer could go? [cf. v. 15]

9. When a goer* is impossible without going, then how is it possible to say: “a goer goes”?

* {‘gro ba: Ts. 102 glosses this as ‘gro ba po = ‘goer’ which makes more sense and agrees with K. 123. Could this be a textual corruption? l.2 would read better as: ‘gro po thad par mi ‘gyur na.}

10. To claim that a goer goes implies that there could be a goer who does not go, because it is asserted that a goer goes. [cf. v. 4]

11. If the goer goes, it would follow that going would be twofold: that which reveals* the goer and that which goes once [he] has become a goer.

* {Ts. 103 understands mgon as brjod, i.e. “that which allows someone to be designated as a goer.” This agrees with K. 124 (vyapadesa).}

12. If a beginning of going does not exist in what has gone, [if] a beginning of going does not exist also in what has not [yet] gone [and if] there does not exist a beginning within motion, wherein is a beginning of going made?

13. Before a beginning of going, there is not any motion or anything which has gone wherein going could begin. How can going exist in what has not [yet] gone?

14. If a beginning of going is simply not apparent in any way, examine: what has gone? what is motion? what has not [yet] gone?

15. When a goer does not stay, a non-goer cannot stay; what third one other than a goer and a non-goer could stay? [cf. v. 8]

16. When a goer is not possible without going, how then is it possible [to say]: “a goer stays.”

17. There is no reversal of motion*, nor also of what has gone [and] what has not [yet] gone. [Reversal of] going, engagement [to stay] and reversal [of staying] are similar to going.

* {Ts. 105 connects the “reversal of motion” with the “starting to stay”. Skt. seems explicitly to mention “staying”. In the following line, Ts. explains that there is no reversal of motion in either what has gone or not yet gone because both are devoid of going. “Reversal of motion” seems to mean simply “stopping.” Ts’s comm. on l c-d is difficult to trace, suggesting that he may be following a different version of the root text. My rendition of c-d is tentative. K. 127 has: “Movement, commencement and cessation (of movement) are all comparable to motion.”}

18. It is inappropriate to say: “going and a goer are the same.” It is inappropriate to say: “going and a goer are different.”

19. If whatever is going were a goer, it would follow that the actor and the act would be the same too.

20. If going and a goer were conceived as different, there could be going without a goer and a goer without going.

21. If things are not established as the same and as different, how can they be established?

22. That very going by which a goer is made evident does not [enable a goer to] go. Because there is no [goer] before going, who would be going where?

23. [A going] which is other than the going by which a goer is made evident does not [enable a goer to] go. Because it is impossible for going to be twofold within a single goer.

24. One who is a goer does not go in the three aspects of going. Also one who is not [a goer] does not go in the three aspects of going.

25. One who is and is not [a goer] also does not go in the three aspects of going. Therefore, going and a goer and also that which is gone over do not exist.

 

[crossfire]

Any idea what the "three aspects of going" he is referring to in lines 24 & 25 are?

 

[Ablaze]

This chapter derives in large part from the Buddha's teachings on this-that conditionality (idappaccayat&#257 - how there can be no goer without going and vice versa - as well as the subsequent Abhidhamma elucidation of going without a fixed goer.

In particular, Nagarjuna's second chapter in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā simply explains (in not so simple terms) that motion and mover, going and goer, do not exist apart from each other. They are not an independent object and subject - distinct, separate, and dissociable. Instead, the arising of one is necessitated by the arising of the other.

To draw an informative parallel, in the Vigrahavyāvartanī, Nagarjuna evokes the example of a father and son. We often assume that a son cannot exist without a father, since the father is the necessary condition (one of many) for the existence of the son. However, the simple fact that - likewise, a father cannot exist without a son - is often overlooked. Until the son is born, there is no father. The father is born along with the son, in the sense that the identity "father" (as a noun) cannot exist without a son to have fathered (as a verb). Identities are not fixed or immutable. They are interdependently originated.

At its core, this is comparable to this-that conditionality, or simple relativity.

"'When this is, that is.
"'From the arising of this comes the arising of that.
"'When this isn't, that isn't.
"'From the cessation of this comes the cessation of that."

Assutavā Sutta (SN 12.61)

This is the simplest expression of dependent origination to be found in all of the Buddha's teachings. It is also the fundamental expression of truth to be found in all of Nagarjuna's texts. Various other expressions of the same type of this-that (going-goer) conditionality exist throughout the Nidana Saṃyutta (SN 12) from which Nagarjuna draws much of his inspiration.

Importantly, the term that reappears most frequently throughout this chapter is the same go/goer/going/gone (gata, गत) as in the common epithet for the Buddha, "thus gone" (Tathāgata, तथागत). Thus, Nagarjuna seems to be utilizing this central concept of "thus gone"-ness as a means of illustrating an equally central concept, that of conditionality. The difference with a Tathāgata, however, is that the Tathāgata transcends all identity and attempts and classification, having "gone beyond" all such modes of graspability. Soma Thera expresses it wisely:

There, who goes? is a doer-question of the action of going, without first separating efficient cause and action (tattha ko gacchatiti sadhanam kriyañca avinibbhutam katva gamana kriya kattu puccha]. That is for indicating just the bare phenomenon of going, through the condition of denying the-doer-state-endowed-with-a-soul [sa kattubhava visittha atta patikkhepatta dhamma mattasseva gamana dassanato]. (Or in other words the question "Who goes?" anticipates a negative answer, for according to the Abhidhamma there is no doer or goer but just a process dependent on conditions. There is merely a going. No one goes.)

With the words, whose going is it?, the commentator says the same thing in another way after separating efficient cause and action for making clear the absence of a doer-connection [kassa gamananti tamevattham pariyayantarena vadati sadhanam kriyañca akattu sambandhi bhava vibhavanato].

On what account is it? This is a question for the real reason of the action of going from which the idea of a goer is rejected. [kim karanati pana patikkhitta kattukaya gamana kriyaya aviparita karana puccha].

Going is here shown to be one of the particular modes of bare phenomenal movement due to appropriate cause-and-condition, without attributing it to a fallacious reason such as the one formulated thus: The soul comes into contact with the mind, the mind with the sense-organs and the sense-organs with the object (thus there is perception). [idañhi gamanam nama atta manasa samyujjati mano indriyehi indriyani atthehiti evamadi miccha karana vinimutta anurupa paccaya hetuko dhammanam pavatti akara viseso[20]].

No living being or person, because of the proving of the going of only a bare phenomenon and because of the absence of anyone besides that phenomenon. Now to show proof of the going of a bare phenomenon the words beginning with on account of the diffusion of the process of oscillation born of mental activity were spoken by the commentator [dhammamattasseva gamanasiddhito tabbinimuttasa ca kassaci abhavato idani dhammamattasseva gamana siddhim dassetum citta kriya vayo dhatu vippharenati adi vuttam].

There mental activity and the diffusion and agitation in the process of oscillation which is mental activity = diffusion of the process of mental activity [tattha citta kriya ca vippharo vipphandanañcati citta kriya vayo dhatu vippharo]. The commentator, by mentioning mental activity, eschews the diffusion of the process of oscillation connected with inanimate things, and by the mention of the diffusion of the process of oscillation eschews the class of mental activity producing volitional verbal-expression. By the terms mental activity and the process of oscillation, the commentator makes clear bodily expression [tena ettha ca citta kriyaggahanena anindriyabaddha vayodhatu vippharam nivatteti: vayodhatu vippharaggahanena cetana vaciviññatti bhedam citta kriyam nivatteti. Ubhayena pana kaya viññattim vibhaveti].

:namaste

 

[Ablaze]

Any idea what the "three aspects of going" he is referring to in lines 24 & 25 are?

In brief, past, present, and future.

The "three aspects of going" (triprakāraṃ gacchati) refer to going in the path traversed (past tense), the path not yet traversed (future tense), and the path presently traversed (present tense).

Ultimately, the meaning behind these verses is that there is no intrinsic "goer" (noun) independent of the act of "going" (verb). A "goer" whose identity is substantial and whose existence is inherent would not be dependent upon "going" as it exists temporally - in the past, present, and future. Such a "goer" would exist independently of all conditions. However, Nagarjuna demonstrates that no such "goer" exists in-and-of itself.

 

[crossfire]

In brief, past, present, and future.

The "three aspects of going" (triprakāraṃ gacchati) refer to going in the path traversed (past tense), the path not yet traversed (future tense), and the path presently traversed (present tense).

Ultimately, the meaning behind these verses is that there is no intrinsic "goer" (noun) independent of the act of "going" (verb). A "goer" whose identity is substantial and whose existence is inherent would not be dependent upon "going" as it exists temporally - in the past, present, and future. Such a "goer" would exist independently of all conditions. However, Nagarjuna demonstrates that no such "goer" exists in-and-of itself.

Ahh, thanks.

 

[crossfire]

Short chapter for week 3. Aspirin standing by.

3. Investigation of the Sense Organs (Seeing)


1. Seeing and hearing and smelling and tasting and touching, mind are the six sense organs; their experienced objects are what-is-seen and so forth.

2. Seeing does not see itself. How can what does not see itself see anything else?

3. The example of fire is not able to fully establish seeing. It, along with seeing, has been refuted by “gone”, “not gone” and “going.”

4. When not seeing the slightest thing, there is no act of seeing. How can it [then] be reasonable to say: “seeing sees”?

5. Seeing does not see; non-seeing does not see. It should be understood that seeing explains the seer too.

6. Without letting go of [seeing] a seer does not exist; in letting go of seeing, there is also [no seer]. If there is no seer, where can there be what-is-seen and seeing?

7. Just as it is said that a child emerges in dependence on a father and a mother, likewise it is said that consciousness emerges in dependence upon an eye and a visual form.

8. Because there is no what-is-seen and no seeing, the four such as consciousness do not exist. How can clinging etc. exist?

9. It should be understood that seeing explains hearing and smelling and tasting and touching, mind, hearer, what is heard, etc.

 

[Ablaze]

The only way for an eye to see itself is through a reflection, yet the image it sees via the reflection is not the eye. The image it sees is merely a reflection of the eye. Thus, the eye cannot see the naked eye. It can only see its own reflection, which is not the eye itself.

If the eye cannot see itself prior to reflection by the mirror, how can it see things as they truly are? Everything that enters the eye is filtered through the eye and interpreted by the cognitive faculty to produce a coherent image. Due to this filtration process, we do not see things exactly as they are. We only see our individual representation of them, constructed from the meeting of eye as subject with an object of the eye. Contact between sense organ and sense object gives rise to sense consciousness.

Seeing does not exist by itself. It depends on someone to do the seeing. Likewise, a seer does not exist by itself. It depends on something to be seen. Just as a child depends on its parents for its existence and parents are not actually parents until they have a child, so too are subject and object mutually interdependent. Since they do not exist by themselves and instead depend mutually upon each other for their arising, they are said to lack inherent existence.

Vision and objects of sight do not exist independently. In other words, they have no inherent existence or svabhāva. They only emerge in relation to each other. Likewise, audition and its corresponding object, sound, do not exist in-and-of themselves, but only in relation to each other. The same is true of the faculty of smell and scents, the faculty of taste and flavors, the faculty of touch and tactile sensations. None of the sense faculties exist independently.

The consciousness arising from contact between sense faculty and sense media is the means by which the world is perceived, as reflected in the following two discourses from the Saṃyutta Nikāya:

The Blessed One said, "What is the All? Simply the eye & forms, ear & sounds, nose & aromas, tongue & flavors, body & tactile sensations, intellect & ideas. This, monks, is called the All. Anyone who would say, 'Repudiating this All, I will describe another,' if questioned on what exactly might be the grounds for his statement, would be unable to explain, and furthermore, would be put to grief. Why? Because it lies beyond range."

Sabba Sutta: The All (SN 35.23)

"And what is the origination of the world? Dependent on the eye & forms there arises eye consciousness. The meeting of the three is contact. From contact as a requisite condition comes feeling. From feeling as a requisite condition comes craving. From craving as a requisite condition comes clinging. From clinging as a requisite condition comes becoming. From becoming as a requisite condition comes birth. From birth as a requisite condition, then aging & death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress & despair come into play. This is the origination of the world."

Loka Sutta: The World (SN 12.44)

 

[crossfire]

Great comment. Ablaze! :yes:

I'm out of frubals, at the moment. :/

 

[crossfire]

I took my aspirin early for this one.

4. Investigation of the Aggregates (Body)

1. Apart from the cause of form, form is not perceived. Apart from “form”, the cause of form also does not appear.

[Ts. 128 gives “the eye etc.”as examples of “form” and “the four elements” as examples of the “causes of form.”]​

2. If there were form apart from the cause of form, it would follow that form is without cause; there is no object at all that is without cause.

3. If a cause of form existed apart from form, it would exist as a cause without fruit; causes without fruit do not exist.

4. If form existed, a cause of form would be untenable; if form did not exist, a cause of form would be untenable.

5. Forms which do not have a cause are not at all tenable. Therefore, do not conceive the concept of form at all.

[Ts. 129-30 explains “rung min nyid” as being an added emphasis. To “not conceive of the concept of form” he regards as unworthy for the yogin who beholds reality. He cites Buddhapalita, who explains how it is “inappropriate,” in contrast to “how appropriate it would be to reflect on non-abiding.”]​

6. It is untenable to say, “the fruit is like the cause.” It is also untenable to say, “the fruit is unlike the cause.”

7. Feeling and perception, impulses and mind and all things are comparable in every aspect, at every stage with form.

8. When having argued by means of emptiness, everything of that one who objects is not an objection; it is similar to what is to be established .

9. When having explained by means of emptiness, everything of that one who finds fault is not a fault; it is similar to what is to be established.

 

[crossfire]

This is getting easier as it goes along--for the moment! (Big-Bang-ishness here)

5. Investigation of the Elements (Space)

1. Not the slightest bit of space exists prior to the characteristics of space. If [space] existed prior to its characteristics, it would follow that it would be without characteristics.

2. A thing without characteristics does not exist anywhere at all. If a thing without characteristics does not exist, to what do characteristics extend?

3. Characteristics do not extend to that which has no characteristics; nor to what possesses characteristics. They also cannot extend to something other than what either possesses or does not have characteristics.

4. If characteristics do not extend [to something] , something characterized would be impossible. If something characterized is impossible, characteristics too would not exist.

5. Therefore, something characterized does not exist and characteristics do not exist. There also does not exist a thing which is apart from being something characterized or a characteristic.

6. If there is not a thing, of what can there be a non-thing? By whom are the opposites thing and non-thing known [as] a thing and a non-thing?

[Ts. 140 understands “a thing” to refer to the obstructive matter of which space, as a negation and hence a non-thing, is a negation of.]​

7. Therefore, space is not a thing; it is not a non-thing; it is not something characterized; it is not a characteristic. The other five elements too are similar to space.

8. Those of small minds see things as existent and non-existent. They do not behold the utter pacification of what is seen.

 

[Ablaze]

Chapter 4 on the Aggregates has clear parallels in the Prajñā Pāramitā literature, including the Heart and Diamond Sutras. It can also be traced back to the Khandhavagga, the third major section of the Saṃyutta Nikāya from the Sutta Piṭaka of the Pāḷi Canon. As one of various examples, take the Anudhamma Sutta on non-identification with the aggregates:

At Savatthi. "For a monk practicing the Dhamma in accordance with the Dhamma, what accords with the Dhamma is this: that he keep focused on not-self with regard to form, that he keep focused on not-self with regard to feeling, that he keep focused on not-self with regard to perception, that he keep focused on not-self with regard to fabrications, that he keep focused on not-self with regard to consciousness. As he keeps focusing on not-self with regard to form... feeling... perception... fabrications... consciousness, he comprehends form... feeling... perception... fabrications... consciousness. As he comprehends form... feeling... perception... fabrications... consciousness, he is totally released from form... feeling... perception... fabrications... consciousness. He is totally released from sorrows, lamentations, pains, distresses, & despairs. He is totally released, I tell you, from suffering & stress."

Anudhamma Sutta (SN 22.42)

Like the Heart Sutra ("Shariputra, form does not differ from emptiness; emptiness does not differ from form. That which is form is emptiness; that which is emptiness, form. The same is true of feelings, perceptions, impulses, consciousness..."), Nagarjuna's fourth chapter touches on the form aggregate (rūpa) and abbreviates the other four (vedanā, samjñā, samskāra, vijñāna) not as a means of de-emphasizing them but instead to avoid repetition. The Canon on the other hand is full of repetition and makes it clear that all aggregates at all points in time are empty of self:

"Monk, whatever form is past, future, or present; internal or external; blatant or subtle; common or sublime; far or near: that is called the aggregate of form. Whatever feeling is past, future, or present; internal or external; blatant or subtle; common or sublime; far or near: that is called the aggregate of feeling. Whatever perception is past, future, or present; internal or external; blatant or subtle; common or sublime; far or near: that is called the aggregate of perception. Whatever fabrications are past, future, or present; internal or external; blatant or subtle; common or sublime; far or near: those are called the aggregate of fabrication. Whatever consciousness is past, future, or present; internal or external; blatant or subtle; common or sublime; far or near: that is called the aggregate of consciousness.[1] This is the extent to which the term 'aggregate' applies to the aggregates."

[...]

"Monk, one sees any form whatsoever — past, future, or present; internal or external; blatant or subtle; common or sublime; far or near — every form, as it actually is with right discernment: 'This is not mine. This is not my self. This is not what I am.'

"One sees any feeling whatsoever... any perception whatsoever... any fabrications whatsoever...

"One sees any consciousness whatsoever — past, future, or present; internal or external; blatant or subtle; common or sublime; far or near — every consciousness — as it actually is with right discernment: 'This is not mine. This is not my self. This is not what I am.'"

Maha-punnama Sutta (MN 109)

Furthermore, in verses 1-5 of this chapter, Nagarjuna explains that form can only exist with recourse to a cause. It is not causeless. As one of the aggregates, it is conditioned (saṅkhāra). All the aggregates have their corresponding conditions, without which they could not arise and in whose absence they must cease:

"And what is form? The four great existents[1] and the form derived from them: this is called form. From the origination of nutriment comes the origination of form. From the cessation of nutriment comes the cessation of form.

[...]

"And what is feeling? These six classes of feeling — feeling born of eye-contact, feeling born of ear-contact, feeling born of nose-contact, feeling born of tongue-contact, feeling born of body-contact, feeling born of intellect-contact: this is called feeling. From the origination of contact comes the origination of feeling. From the cessation of contact comes the cessation of feeling.

[...]

"And what are fabrications? These six classes of intention — intention with regard to form, intention with regard to sound, intention with regard to smell, intention with regard to taste, intention with regard to tactile sensation, intention with regard to ideas: these are called fabrications. From the origination of contact comes the origination of fabrications. From the cessation of contact comes the cessation of fabrications.

[...]

"And what is consciousness? These six classes of consciousness — eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness, body-consciousness, intellect-consciousness: this is called consciousness. From the origination of name-&-form comes the origination of consciousness. From the cessation of name-&-form comes the cessation of consciousness."

Parivatta Sutta (SN 22.56)

This helps explain how cause and effect are mutually supporting, as in this-that conditionality. To reify form (or the other aggregates) into an existent thing verges on eternalism, in which case an object exists on its own accord, without recourse to a cause. Likewise, to assume form is non-existent verges on annihilationism and eliminates the need for a cause.

In the concluding verses of this short chapter, Nagarjuna does as the Heart Sutra does and asserts that all five aggregates are empty, consistent with the Buddha's Phena Sutta:

Form is like a glob of foam;
feeling, a bubble;
perception, a mirage;
fabrications, a banana tree;
consciousness, a magic trick —
this has been taught
by the Kinsman of the Sun.
However you observe them,
appropriately examine them,
they're empty, void
to whoever sees them
appropriately.

Phena Sutta (SN 22.95)

 

[Ablaze]

Chapter 5 on the Elements likewise takes the approach of the middle path between the extremes of existence and non-existence. It explains that all objects have characteristics (i.e, height, width, depth) and that the characterized only exists in relation to the characteristic, which likewise only exists in relation to the characterized. Subject and object are mutually supporting. In his analysis of the elements and their characteristics, the Buddha taught thus:

"And what is the earth property? The earth property can be either internal or external. What is the internal earth property? Anything internal, within oneself, that's hard, solid, & sustained [by craving]: head hairs, body hairs, nails, teeth, skin, flesh, tendons, bones, bone marrow, kidneys, heart, liver, membranes, spleen, lungs, large intestines, small intestines, contents of the stomach, feces, or anything else internal, within oneself, that's hard, solid, and sustained: This is called the internal earth property. Now both the internal earth property & the external earth property are simply earth property. And that should be seen as it actually is present with right discernment: 'This is not mine, this is not me, this is not my self.' When one sees it thus as it actually is present with right discernment, one becomes disenchanted with the earth property and makes the earth property fade from the mind.

"And what is the liquid property? The liquid property may be either internal or external. What is the internal liquid property? Anything internal, belonging to oneself, that's liquid, watery, & sustained: bile, phlegm, pus, blood, sweat, fat, tears, oil, saliva, mucus, oil-of-the-joints, urine, or anything else internal, within oneself, that's liquid, watery, & sustained: This is called the internal liquid property. Now both the internal liquid property & the external liquid property are simply liquid property. And that should be seen as it actually is present with right discernment: 'This is not mine, this is not me, this is not my self.' When one sees it thus as it actually is present with right discernment, one becomes disenchanted with the liquid property and makes the liquid property fade from the mind.

"And what is the fire property? The fire property may be either internal or external. What is the internal fire property? Anything internal, belonging to oneself, that's fire, fiery, & sustained: that by which [the body] is warmed, aged, & consumed with fever; and that by which what is eaten, drunk, consumed & tasted gets properly digested; or anything else internal, within oneself, that's fire, fiery, & sustained: This is called the internal fire property. Now both the internal fire property & the external fire property are simply fire property. And that should be seen as it actually is present with right discernment: 'This is not mine, this is not me, this is not my self.' When one sees it thus as it actually is present with right discernment, one becomes disenchanted with the fire property and makes the fire property fade from the mind.

"And what is the wind property? The wind property may be either internal or external. What is the internal wind property? Anything internal, belonging to oneself, that's wind, windy, & sustained: up-going winds, down-going winds, winds in the stomach, winds in the intestines, winds that course through the body, in-and-out breathing, or anything else internal, within oneself, that's wind, windy, & sustained: This is called the internal wind property. Now both the internal wind property & the external wind property are simply wind property. And that should be seen as it actually is present with right discernment: 'This is not mine, this is not me, this is not my self.' When one sees it thus as it actually is present with right discernment, one becomes disenchanted with the wind property and makes the wind property fade from the mind.

"And what is the space property? The space property may be either internal or external. What is the internal space property? Anything internal, belonging to oneself, that's space, spatial, & sustained: the holes of the ears, the nostrils, the mouth, the [passage] whereby what is eaten, drunk, consumed, & tasted gets swallowed, and where it collects, and whereby it is excreted from below, or anything else internal, within oneself, that's space, spatial, & sustained: This is called the internal space property. Now both the internal space property & the external space property are simply space property. And that should be seen as it actually is present with right discernment: 'This is not mine, this is not me, this is not my self.' When one sees it thus as it actually is present with right discernment, one becomes disenchanted with the space property and makes the space property fade from the mind.

Dhatu-vibhanga Sutta (MN 140)

The elements, as Nagarjuna reiterates, possess various characteristics, without which they would not be the elements they appear to be. Nothing can exist without its characteristics. If water existed prior to possessing the characteristic of liquidity, or if fire existed prior to possessing the characteristic of heat, then they would not require characteristics to characterize them. However, water without liquidity is not water and fire without heat is not fire. There is no such thing as water in-and-of itself or fire in-and-of itself. They depend on other characteristics, which in turn depend on other characteristics, which in turn depend on other characteristics ad infinitum.

Much of Nagarjuna's work always returns to the fundamental teaching that self neither exists nor does not exist. Non-existence relies on the assumption there is some existing thing which can no longer exist (which is the very ucchedavada or annihilationism the Buddha criticized as a form of micchā diṭṭhi, or wrong view, equally as dangerous as sassatavada or eternalism).

This chapter is ultimately about the mistaken notion of reification. To reify something is to attribute inherent characteristics to it. However, as Nagarjuna demonstrates, characteristics are not inherent, even if they are absolutely necessary to characterize their corresponding object or subject since they too rely on other characteristics in an infinite loop of this-that conditionality.