Moral Truths

[Mycroft]

Most of our morals are carryovers from our tribal ancestry. Those morals were the only way they had of managing the society of that time when resources were difficult to come by.

Let's look at stealing, there are two facets to it. On one hand a tribe only had a certain amount of resources. Particularly in winter. Stealing would deplete those resources. But, on the other hand, tribes of olde were much more based on community, everyone did their bit. So if you stole all of your neighbours food and he went hungry, he would not be strong enough to work/hunt/whatever meaning others would have to pick up that workload.

The same reason behind murder. If you murdered a fellow tribesman, the rest of the tribe would have to pick up that workload to keep things going. This is, incidentally, how law came into being, too.

They didn't come into being, as far as I can see, through morality, but through necessity.

I'm not advocating that such morals are outdated or obsolete, incidentally. Merely detailing the history of law and morality.

 

[Enai de a lukal]

So her question is: "Do moral truths exist (as strings of words) floating around in space or nestled within the Great Noggin of God?"

No, not really- if there are such things as moral truths, then there is a truthmaker for moral truths, something like moral facts. But what sorts of things are these? Its unclear what a moral fact would even look like- what fact corresponds to an ought?

 

[McBell]

No, not really- if there are such things as moral truths, then there is a truthmaker for moral truths...

Only if you are of the mind that if something exists it had to have a maker.
Which is tossed out the window once it gets back to God.

 

[Enai de a lukal]

With how often certain posters claim that objective morality provides a basis for belief in the existence of God, I'm surprised nobody has popped up on this thread to say that God's ethical commands provide an objective basis for moral truths... This is usually the easiest (and, by the same token, the least adequate) way to provide a factual/objective/corroborative basis for morality.

 

[McBell]

With how often certain posters claim that objective morality provides a basis for belief in the existence of God, I'm surprised nobody has popped up on this thread to say that God's ethical commands provide an objective basis for moral truths... This is usually the easiest (and, by the same token, the least adequate) way to provide a factual/objective/corroborative basis for morality.

How can you present a factual/objective/corroborative basis for morality by using something you cannot present a factual/objective/corroborative basis for as the foundation?

 

[Enai de a lukal]

Only if you are of the mind that if something exists it had to have a maker.

No, you're mistaking the line of reasoning here; the thought is that if moral claims/beliefs are truth-apt, that is, that they can be true or false, then they are similar to all other (cognitive, truth-apt) propositions in this respect. And for propositions generally, propositions are truth-bearers (they are what bears the property of truth) whereas something like facts are the truth-makers- they are that, in virtue of which, certain propositions are true. For instance, the proposition "snow is white" is true, and is true in virtue of the fact that snow is white- the fact that snow is white is the truthmaker for the claim "snow is white". So when we ask what moral statements correspond to, we are asking what, supposing moral statements are truth-apt, the truthmakers for moral truths would be. An alternative way of posing the same question would just be to ask what the truth-conditions for a moral claim would be- what circumstances/facts/states-of-affairs would have to obtain for it to be true?

 

[Enai de a lukal]

How can you present a factual/objective/corroborative basis for morality by using something you cannot present a factual/objective/corroborative basis for as the foundation?

That's one reason why its not an adequate answer... You can do this, but its not going to be very convincing, because one has basically the same problem, only at one remove.

 

[McBell]

No, you're mistaking the line of reasoning here; the thought is that if moral claims/beliefs are truth-apt, that is, that they can be true or false, then they are similar to all other (cognitive, truth-apt) propositions in this respect. And for propositions generally, propositions are truth-bearers (they are what bears the property of truth) whereas something like facts are the truth-makers- they are that, in virtue of which, certain propositions are true. For instance, the proposition "snow is white" is true, and is true in virtue of the fact that snow is white- the fact that snow is white is the truthmaker for the claim "snow is white". So when we ask what moral statements correspond to, we are asking what, supposing moral statements are truth-apt, the truthmakers for moral truths would be. An alternative way of posing the same question would just be to ask what the truth-conditions for a moral claim would be- what circumstances/facts/states-of-affairs would have to obtain for it to be true?

My apologies.
I mistook your use of "truth" to mean fact.

 

[AmbiguousGuy]

'True' as in grounded in reality. Again, I hear you...in short I not only don't believe in a moral truth, but I can't imagine what one would look like.

Yeah. How would a moral truth look or smell or feel? What atoms would it displace?

If it isn't a physical thing at all, what is it? Well, I think it's a human concept, which means it's a string of words trying to define itself... something like that.

"Don't dropkick babies!"

Alas, once we cast the moral truth -- forming it into physical words -- then here comes the ambiguity inherent in all language. Can we dropkick baby turnips? That's OK? Well, how about baby squirrels? No? But what if we are a starving paraplegic and see a baby squirrel falling from a tree? May we dropkick it into the soup pot?

Oh, you say it is only human babies which we ought not dropkick? But I saw a nurse dropkick a newborn baby once. The little slimeball had slipped from her hands and she caught it with her foot just before it hit the hard floor, but she used a bit too much force and it bounced off her foot. A lucky little dropkicked baby and a moral nurse.

Etc.

It's why lawbooks are so thick, I think. A couple of years ago I was visiting with an old lawyer and he showed me a two-volume set of state lawbooks from the 1950s. He said he had pretty much memorized those two books in order to pass the bar. Then he swept his arm across the shelves and shelves of modern lawbooks, which appeared to be at least a couple of encyclopedia sets big. The law grows like an unruly hedge.

I think that a moral law can either be a string of words or else it can be God's Opinion about a particular behavior. But if it is God's Opinion about a specific behavior, we're all screwed, since we don't have access to God's law library nor can we visit one of his legal experts for consultation.

We have the Ten Commandmants and we have our local pastor, but both of those seem pretty flawed so far as figuring God's Opinion.

 

[Enai de a lukal]

Yeah. How would a moral truth look or smell or feel? What atoms would it displace?

Well, this seems to be a category error since, as you've noted yourself, a truth would be propostional- it would be a "string of words", a series of utterances, a sequence of symbols or marks on a page. In other words, it wouldn't smell like anything, any more than any other truth or linguistic item would.

Alas, once we cast the moral truth -- forming it into physical words -- then here comes the ambiguity inherent in all language.

As you say, this is inherent in all language, not just moral claims; this is nothing peculiar to moral statements.

I think that a moral law can either be a string of words

Sure, but the question is what, if anything, does this particular type of string of words (moral strings of words) correspond to, or denote?

... or else it can be God's Opinion about a particular behavior. But if it is God's Opinion about a specific behavior, we're all screwed, since we don't have access to God's law library nor can we visit one of his legal experts for consultation."

Well, but if moral truths correspond to certain moral facts, namely God's Opinion about particular behaviors, then at least we have a candidate for a moral fact or a moral truthmaker- the will of God. We may not be able to always distinguish God's will, but this would, in theory at least, answer the OP's question (although, as I remarked to Mestemia, this is not a very satisfactory answer once we bring it under the analytic microscope).

 

[AmbiguousGuy]

Sure, but the question is what, if anything, does this particular type of string of words (moral strings of words) correspond to, or denote?

As I say, I can't think of anything other than the 500-pound gorilla in the room... God's will. There can be no ought without an oughter, so it seems to me.

But even that wouldn't work for me as a denotation destination because without a prophet of God in the room -- to ask clarifying questions -- we can't know what God means when He holds the opinion (moral truth) that Thou Shalt Not Dropkick Babies.

Another way I can say it is that I don't believe in an objective thing which we can label 'dropkicking babies', which behavior is always condemned by God. I mean, does that include zombie babies? What if the baby is hidden in a box and we dropkick the box and baby together, ignorantly? What if we have a huge sponge on our foot and we're dropkicking the baby into the swimming pool and she loves it? Are we offending the moral truth about dropkicking babies?

I think God would have to follow us around and gives us His Opinion on the morality of everything we plan to do, every moment of our lives, and that would not seem like a 'moral truth' in action.

 

[Enai de a lukal]

As I say, I can't think of anything other than the 500-pound gorilla in the room... God's will. There can be no ought without an oughter, so it seems to me.

But even that wouldn't work for me as a denotation destination because without a prophet of God in the room -- to ask clarifying questions -- we can't know what God means when He holds the opinion (moral truth) that Thou Shalt Not Dropkick Babies.

Another way I can say it is that I don't believe in an objective thing which we can label 'dropkicking babies', which behavior is always condemned by God. I mean, does that include zombie babies? What if the baby is hidden in a box and we dropkick the box and baby together, ignorantly? What if we have a huge sponge on our foot and we're dropkicking the baby into the swimming pool and she loves it? Are we offending the moral truth about dropkicking babies?

I think God would have to follow us around and gives us His Opinion on the morality of everything we plan to do, every moment of our lives, and that would not seem like a 'moral truth' in action.

Sure, and the shortcomings of a morality consisting in nothing more than a finite set of rules is the topic of this thread (although the OP is somewhat helter-skelter). But there are other possibilities- perhaps consequentialism is correct and the morality of an act is a function of its (objective) tendency to cause pleasure and pain. Or perhaps deontology is correct, and there are certain acts or duties which are moral or duties, as a matter of rationality or reason. As it happens, I don't think either of these ultimately succeed in providing an acceptable objective/factual basis for moral statements, but they are at least candidates for the job.

 

[gilligan8914]

The Morality Of God.

"Strange, indeed, that you should not have suspected that your universe and its contents were only dreams, visions, fiction! Strange, because they are so frankly and hysterically insane—like all dreams: a God who could make good children as easily as bad, yet preferred to make bad ones; who could have made every one of them happy, yet never made a single happy one; who made them prize their bitter life, yet stingily cut it short; who gave his angels eternal happiness unearned, yet required his other children to earn it; who gave his angels painless lives, yet cursed his other children with biting miseries and maladies of mind and body; who mouths justice and invented hell—mouths mercy and invented hell—mouths Golden Rules, and forgiveness multiplied by seventy times seven, and invented hell; who mouths morals to other people and has none himself; who frowns upon crimes, yet commits them all; who created man without invitation, then tries to shuffle the responsibility for man's acts upon man, instead of honorably placing it where it belongs, upon himself; and finally, with altogether divine obtuseness, invites a poor, abused slave to worship him!" . . .

Mark Twain

 

[Willamena]

Then an Oughter is required to serve as the subject, the actor. Would you agree?

Even if it's 'the impersonal universe,' there has to be some entity who cares what we ought to do -- if it is true that we ought to do things. So it seems to me.

For people with a religious bias, sure--but the true culprit is grammar. Our indoctrination into the English language has taught us to distinguish between subject and verb, object and verb, and of course, between subject and object. The actor is given his significant due only as an inference, inferred from the perceived necessity of a subject for each verb.

The ought that is "cast out" to be something that can turn around and affect our own thought, our own ways, comes from the subconscious. The "little voice" inside. When we prefer green over red, we can own that; when we ought to prefer green over red, the little voice is the true owner.

 

[Meow Mix]

The only difference, so far as I can see, is that with preferences, we're only referring to ourselves and not setting out any prescriptions for anyone else- if I say "I like Pepsi", or "Chocolate is the best flavor of ice cream", I'm expressing a value-judgment, similar to if I say "stealing is wrong"- but in most cases, I'm not implying that YOU (or anyone else) should have Pepsi or chocolate ice cream, only that this is MY preference. With moral statements, on the other hand, we seem to not only be expressing a preference or value-judgment ("stealing is wrong" says, for one thing, that I don't like stealing), but also an imperative- do not steal. Thus, moral statements are not only statements of preference, they are disguised imperatives- "stealing is wrong" says two things; that I don't like stealing, and I don't want you to do it.

Otherwise, you're preaching to the choir here; I feel like some form of moral anti-realism/non-cognitivism is correct, its only a question of which. Moreover, I think that much of the opposition to this view is rooted in fear, rather than rational reasons- we desperately want there to be an objective Good and Evil, Right and Wrong, we want our moral notions to correspond to something in reality, and not be an arbitrary social game.

I'm out of frubals for you, so I thought I'd do that thing where I publicly give you some props for the contribution.

 

[Meow Mix]

I don't think Meow Mix is concerned with whether a moral truth is a linguistic item- it seems fairly uncontroversial that a moral truth is "a string of words", given that it would be a truth, and thus propositional. What she seems to be asking is whether moral truths correspond to anything- something like moral facts (the way that non-moral truths, like "the cat is on the mat", correspond to non-moral facts, such as the cat being on the mat). In other words, are moral statements truth-apt, and if so, what are the truthmakers of moral statements?

Yes, that ^

I'm self-taught with philosophy so I don't always know the right terminology :\ Saying the above seems far easier than my garbled OP in any case.

 

[Meow Mix]

Indeed there are differences in oughts and preferences, I can prefer ice in my water, though that does not correspond with an ought towards reality, other than an ought to me (though it does not even necessarily become an ought to me either) -- Consider this, if I preferred drinking Pepsi compared to drinking hot sauce, this does not mean I ought to drink Pepsi instead of hot sauce, it simply means that I choose not to. Although, if I were forced to, I still could and would not consider the act bad, considering it would be good (compared to other circumstances if I hadn't).

Although, some moral absolutists I have talked to responded to that matter that there is an absolute way of measuring it in comparison to other things. That when it comes to the option and no force, and I did happen to drink hot sauce, I would have decided that it was the wrong choice. But, if it were to be between hot sauce and lava it'd obviously be a good choice.

My response to that is, how many lines can be drawn before something becomes so stretched out that it hardly can be considered absolute anymore? "This is right compared to *big list of things" then "This is wrong compared to... *big list of things"

Another thing is, while it reflects reality, it doesn't exactly mean anything. I could say that a hallucination actually happened, although the hallucination itself did not exist. Thoughts actually are there, but as well the thought may not be realistic. Basically, while the indicator exists, the indication does not. If that makes sense.

If not, I'll try one more time: Something subjective can and does exist objectively, although the subject it beholds is legitimately subjective.



BTW, Good to see you posting again.

Good to see you too!

As enaidealukal pointed out though, the concern here isn't over whether or not it's objective there's a thought about a moral preference; the question is whether there is a referent out there in external reality for a moral "truth."

 

[Meow Mix]

First I want to start by saying this was a very well made OP and I wish more OP's were like this. Its very coherent despite this being a very often confusing or complex issue.

Thanks, you have no idea how happy that makes me because when I look through it I just see a garbled, ADHD ridden mess I was at work, constantly multitasking, losing my train of thought and then coming back. Hmm, that or you just find a method in my madness

But the first thing that comes to mind when discussing the differences between an ought and a preference is not simply the basis for why we do them but rather the function that provide.

There is no functional purpos for "Erin thinks green is the best color". I think it has already been mentioned that its purely asthetic for the basis of the discussion. While "dropkicking a baby" has real world applicaple function.

Why is whether or not I should dropkick a baby more applicable than whether or not I should wear a green shirt? What does "to be applicable" mean? I'm not being obtuse, I get what you mean, I'm just pointing out though that you're bringing in a framework here already that depends on mental states rather than external facts.

Then if we look even deeper at "preferences" many psychologists and neurobiologists agree that we have subconsious reasons even for preferences that have applicable real world function. Both are subjective to evolution and you brought up a very very very good point when talking about what corrosponds to reality. Morality as a "truth" however is a little bit different.

When we think of "moral truth" we don't have to assume that its an external truth or fact in the universe that exist devoid of our own intereaction with it. Its the exact opposite. Moral Truth can only be looked at within our respective interactions.

To explain this more clearly. It is usually assumed it is morally wrong(ought not) for John to stab Suzan. However we at the same time do not find it morally wrong(ought not) for an astroid to hit the planet Venus.

Sentience is required for us to have morality. There must be an empathatic logical reasoning with a predisposition for "survial" to have morality even make remote sense. So with the goal of "survival" there can be moral truths that reflect upon the functional applications and resulting benifits but not otherwise.

However it still stands true that even if there is no sentient beings it would still be universally and morally wrong for [x] to happen to [y+sentient being].

That's quite a bomb to drop though: if there is a universal truth that x happening to y (where y is sentient), what is corresponding to reality?

That's a good question, but that's why I'm doubting there's any correspondence at all in the relevant sense. We can make truth statements about whether we feel we ought to do x, but I'm not sure how we could make truth statements about whether we ought to do x.

Though specifically on colors. Some "preferences" do develop evolutionarily without "ought" and "ought-not" with functional applications. What would you categorize them?

The "ought" implication I was speaking of had more to do with categorical imperatives: IF I value this color over that one, IF that valuation extends to displaying it, etc., then I feel as though I ought to choose a green shirt over a yellow one (given the right chain of ifs). It seems like categorical imperatives are "oughts" to me, they give the same feeling as moral "oughts" in that we just vaguely feel as though we "should" do some particular thing.

 

[Meow Mix]

So her question is: "Do moral truths exist (as strings of words) floating around in space or nestled within the Great Noggin of God?"

My question is: in order to have a "truth" about something, there must be a referent in reality for that truth to correspond to.

If there are moral truths, then what is the referent they're corresponding to?

We can't say "it's our thoughts" or "it's our behavior," I've covered why those aren't the correct answers in the OP and various conversations in the thread have been touching on it since. Those don't work. So if moral truths exist, what do they correspond to?

 

[Meow Mix]

Yeah...I get you. I have a lot of trouble conceptualising 'moral truth'. Even from a hypothetical standpoint, it's not a concept I can really grasp, to be honest.



'True' as in grounded in reality. Again, I hear you...in short I not only don't believe in a moral truth, but I can't imagine what one would look like.

I can't imagine it either, I'm leaning towards noncognitivism on the issue -- but that's why I brought it up for everyone to poke at. Who knows

Basically, yes. As a total, bald-arsed guess, I'd think there are a lot more factors at play which are beyond our control with some moral decisions than with a simple preference statement like choice of colour, but there is no objective difference between them that I can tell.
I guess that's what I was trying to clumsily illustrate. If reality is a guy burning a Bible, and a group of people can interpret that in different ways, yet remain rational within their own worldview, it suggests strongly that morals are entirely subjective, and interpretive in nature. Hence, no moral truths.

Fair enough.

Definitely. My preference for green can almost entirely be attributed to my love of the Boston Celtics. Ridiculous, I know, but there you have it.

Now where'd you get that preference though? (Just kidding ) More seriously, it's worth pointing out that green was at least palatable to you as a color -- what if the Celtics' color was a poopy brown or... uh... like a 70's barfy color rug?

It might depend on how you define 'freely'. I think we have some limited control over our choices, beliefs and preferences, but that in general terms this control needs to be exercised before the point of decision.



I would have no choice but to be skeptical.



I can't quite come at that concept. As briefly mentioned previously, I'd think that at the point of action (in this case, you telling me about the dinosaur) the freedom of choice for me has largely passed, in terms of belief. I still have freedom of action, to a degree (I could override my skepticism and act like I believed you) but I couldn't control my thoughts in that way.

It's hard to work my thoughts into your example, since it's a pretty black and white one, but I think we take considered actions throughout our life which impact on our thoughts, morals and beliefs, whether we like them to or not. For example, if I forced myself to sell all my worldly possessions apart from the absolute basics, and devote my life exclusively to caring for the homeless, regardless of my thoughts on the homeless, I think my morals and beliefs around distribution of wealth and related moral issues would change.

I tend to think in psychological terms, rather than hard science (psych major...sorry!) but I'd see important reasons for this as including;

• Cognitive dissonance in shifting my beliefs to the left (ideologically) would be far reduced
• Need to justify to myself and externally my fairly extreme actions
• An element of moral superiority.

Do you think the very act of investigation has the potential to impact and change our standards, preferences, and even feelings though? I would think a higher level of self-awareness would impact on these, if only to a minor degree. And if that investigation is deliberately undertaken with the knowledge that this might be the end result, would that be considered doxastic voluntarism, even thought it's not direct control of choice at the moment of decision?

These are all fair points, I don't mean to glaze them over by grouping them but it mostly just means I agree with many and don't have much to add.

Regarding your question, yes, I believe investigation can be used to impact our standards/preferences/etc.

But that's because I suspect that our preferences and such are like the output of a program or something (I don't really know, I've moved to the armchair for this bit of the topic but I'll continue anyway), and that the reason you can read a book and "decide" to change your belief about something is actually simply because you've widened the input of the program by learning more information about stuff. At least, that's the goofiest analogy I feel like putting towards it at the moment, I'm a bit sleep deprived.