The humankind is not yet done with Fermat's Last Theorem: Colin McLarty, ``What does it take to prove Fermat's last theorem? Grothendieck and the logic of number theory,'' Bulletin of Symbolic Logic {\bf 16}(3), 359--377 (2010). It is not yet rigorously proven!
According to the definition of Omniscience, there are two types of knowledge: found and not found. But since the word KNOWLEDGE is defined as what someone knows, then there must be Omniscient Being (All-Knowing One). We all strive for omniscience. The moment you would know everything about everything, you would understand that the Omniscient Being exists. Therefore, accept now: Omniscient Being exists, and ask Him for the gift of Omniscience. If the All-Knowing One exists, then He knows about His existence. Therefore, among the knowledge that can be acquired, there is knowledge about the existence of the All-Knowing One.
The rejection of the Fermat's Last Theorem one way or another raises question of the 4 numbers (n,a,b,c=?) of the counter-example. Because there are infinite amount of integers, the probability to pick correct ones is absolutely zero. Thus, the Omniscient one can not answer the question of counter-example, if the Fermat's theorem is wrong. We came to contradiction, thus, the Fermat's Theorem is right.
The same line of reasoning proves the Riemann Hypothesis.
But the conclusion from everything must be done as follows: If Fermat's Theorem or the Riemann Hypothesis is not true, then it has an infinite number of counterexamples. And since a very huge array of numbers on the super-computer was substituted into these hypotheses, but a counter-example was not found (unlike cases n=1, n=2), the probability of the hypothesis being false is almost zero. For example, the density of counter-examples (due to the lack of information about the probability distribution function) is associated with the probability of a constant horizontal line. And if so, then indeed, the probability of failure of the hypotheses is completely calculable and is almost zero.