Q: What happens when an irresistible force hits an immovable object?
A: Mu. If there is an irresistible force, there can't also be an immovable object. If there's an immovable object, there can't also be an irresistible force.
This trite piece of paradox crops up every now and then when some people talk about omnipotence: the argument goes that, well, omnipotence is clearly an incoherent property because if God can do anything, can God make a rock so heavy it can't lift it?!
Of course, this is a silly argument because rational theists don't define omnipotence as "the ability to do anything" -- it's typically defined as the ability to do any logically possible thing. Since it's absurd for God to create both an irresistible force and an immovable object in the same cosmos, the question becomes absurd rather than the property of God the theist is attempting to expound upon.
The purpose of this thread is to look a little bit into omniscience as a property, which in my opinion is poorly defined.
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The problem with omniscience is that it deals with knowledge, which therefore means metacognition will come into play here: in order to know x, you must also know that you know x. If you really want to get sticky then it can be pointed out that in order to know that you know that you know x... (you see where this is going).
Humans are fallible beings -- we don't have a perfect epistemic method and we don't have access to all of the facts (we often don't even have access to the same facts as each other). Since we know we're not perfect, problems with this infinite regress of metacognition are just sort of shrugged off ultimately; though problems like this are the root of the major schisms in epistemic approaches (e.g., foundationalism vs. coherentism vs. infinitism, etc.)
But how does an omniscient being deal with this sort of problem?
Well, that seems to depend. I'm not even sure whether or not omniscient beings have an epistemic method or if they have something more direct, like some sort of perception of knowledge.
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Let's deal with omniscience as being without a method: as something raw and direct. Ostensibly an omniscient being's perception of knowledge would be perfect: any truths which could be known would be known, and no falsities would be believed. Is such a being safe from the ravages of fallibilism, infinite regresses, and otherwise skepticism?
I'm not sure, actually. Suppose God believes that God is omnipotent and omniscient -- but isn't, but has rather instead only been made to think so by an omnipotent demon.
"Well, then God would just omnisciently know there isn't an omnipotent demon to worry about," you might say.
But what if THAT is another ruse?
Aren't we right back to an infinite regress and fallibilism here? For every iteration of the cycle that God convinces itself there is no omnipotent demon messing with its mind since its mind is omniscient and omnisciently KNOWS so; there is another iteration of the cycle where, no, the demon MIGHT exist and just make God THINK nothing is wrong (falsely). Ad infinitum.
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So, how about the other possible version of omniscience with some sort of perfect epistemic method? Let's say that -- just as a hypothetical illustration -- that omniscient knowledge is to have justified true belief + O (henceforth JTB+O) where O is a Gettier defeater, a perfect fact analyzer and perceiver, so on and so forth.
"Aha!" we might think. Now an omnipotent demon can't mess with God by making God think it's omniscient when it really isn't -- because God has a perfect method which justifies the belief that there is NOT an omnipotent demon and that God really is omniscient.
Well... there still seems to be a problem actually, at least with the "JTB+O" example given (though the same sort of fundamental problem will crop up, I'm pretty sure, no matter what method is used by God).
Suppose the omnipotent demon attacks God's metacognition instead. Say God forms a true belief that Jefferson City is the capitol of Missouri, and believes it has knowledge since it THINKS it has perfect justification for this belief through O.
But how does God know an omnipotent demon hasn't implanted this belief that Jefferson City is the capitol of Missouri -- and the false feeling of the belief being justified? Suddenly the belief, while true, doesn't qualify as knowledge anymore since it isn't justified and there's an infinite chain of metacognition missing; leaving God *thinking* it's omniscient -- but isn't.
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So the problem here is that it seems even omniscience suffers from infinite regresses and fallibilism. While it seems easy to say "well nah, if God is actually omniscient then it would simply omnisciently know that it's omniscient," that doesn't appear to work because it's just starting an infinite regress of "omnisciently knowing I am actually omniscient" vs. "being tricked by an omnipotent demon into only THINKING I'm omnisciently knowing I am actually omniscient."
This isn't that much of a problem actually, but it does reiterate my point that I think omniscience as a concept is poorly defined and poorly understood. I'm not saying it's a nonsensical property, or that "therefore God doesn't exist," or anything remotely like that -- I'm just saying I think some care and attention should be given to the definition of omniscience to clean it up from silly little absurdities like the "rock so big" shennanigans with omnipotence.
A: Mu. If there is an irresistible force, there can't also be an immovable object. If there's an immovable object, there can't also be an irresistible force.
This trite piece of paradox crops up every now and then when some people talk about omnipotence: the argument goes that, well, omnipotence is clearly an incoherent property because if God can do anything, can God make a rock so heavy it can't lift it?!
Of course, this is a silly argument because rational theists don't define omnipotence as "the ability to do anything" -- it's typically defined as the ability to do any logically possible thing. Since it's absurd for God to create both an irresistible force and an immovable object in the same cosmos, the question becomes absurd rather than the property of God the theist is attempting to expound upon.
The purpose of this thread is to look a little bit into omniscience as a property, which in my opinion is poorly defined.
----------
The problem with omniscience is that it deals with knowledge, which therefore means metacognition will come into play here: in order to know x, you must also know that you know x. If you really want to get sticky then it can be pointed out that in order to know that you know that you know x... (you see where this is going).
Humans are fallible beings -- we don't have a perfect epistemic method and we don't have access to all of the facts (we often don't even have access to the same facts as each other). Since we know we're not perfect, problems with this infinite regress of metacognition are just sort of shrugged off ultimately; though problems like this are the root of the major schisms in epistemic approaches (e.g., foundationalism vs. coherentism vs. infinitism, etc.)
But how does an omniscient being deal with this sort of problem?
Well, that seems to depend. I'm not even sure whether or not omniscient beings have an epistemic method or if they have something more direct, like some sort of perception of knowledge.
-----
Let's deal with omniscience as being without a method: as something raw and direct. Ostensibly an omniscient being's perception of knowledge would be perfect: any truths which could be known would be known, and no falsities would be believed. Is such a being safe from the ravages of fallibilism, infinite regresses, and otherwise skepticism?
I'm not sure, actually. Suppose God believes that God is omnipotent and omniscient -- but isn't, but has rather instead only been made to think so by an omnipotent demon.
"Well, then God would just omnisciently know there isn't an omnipotent demon to worry about," you might say.
But what if THAT is another ruse?
Aren't we right back to an infinite regress and fallibilism here? For every iteration of the cycle that God convinces itself there is no omnipotent demon messing with its mind since its mind is omniscient and omnisciently KNOWS so; there is another iteration of the cycle where, no, the demon MIGHT exist and just make God THINK nothing is wrong (falsely). Ad infinitum.
-----
So, how about the other possible version of omniscience with some sort of perfect epistemic method? Let's say that -- just as a hypothetical illustration -- that omniscient knowledge is to have justified true belief + O (henceforth JTB+O) where O is a Gettier defeater, a perfect fact analyzer and perceiver, so on and so forth.
"Aha!" we might think. Now an omnipotent demon can't mess with God by making God think it's omniscient when it really isn't -- because God has a perfect method which justifies the belief that there is NOT an omnipotent demon and that God really is omniscient.
Well... there still seems to be a problem actually, at least with the "JTB+O" example given (though the same sort of fundamental problem will crop up, I'm pretty sure, no matter what method is used by God).
Suppose the omnipotent demon attacks God's metacognition instead. Say God forms a true belief that Jefferson City is the capitol of Missouri, and believes it has knowledge since it THINKS it has perfect justification for this belief through O.
But how does God know an omnipotent demon hasn't implanted this belief that Jefferson City is the capitol of Missouri -- and the false feeling of the belief being justified? Suddenly the belief, while true, doesn't qualify as knowledge anymore since it isn't justified and there's an infinite chain of metacognition missing; leaving God *thinking* it's omniscient -- but isn't.
-----
So the problem here is that it seems even omniscience suffers from infinite regresses and fallibilism. While it seems easy to say "well nah, if God is actually omniscient then it would simply omnisciently know that it's omniscient," that doesn't appear to work because it's just starting an infinite regress of "omnisciently knowing I am actually omniscient" vs. "being tricked by an omnipotent demon into only THINKING I'm omnisciently knowing I am actually omniscient."
This isn't that much of a problem actually, but it does reiterate my point that I think omniscience as a concept is poorly defined and poorly understood. I'm not saying it's a nonsensical property, or that "therefore God doesn't exist," or anything remotely like that -- I'm just saying I think some care and attention should be given to the definition of omniscience to clean it up from silly little absurdities like the "rock so big" shennanigans with omnipotence.