1. Visualizing a triangle is a private experience.
2. Therefore, a private experience exists.
Are you saying that 2 does not follow from 1? Or are you saying that 1 is untrue? If visualizing a triangle is not a private experience, the triangle in your mind can be seen by other people and that is absurd! Or are you saying that a valid syllogism with true propositions does not inevitably lead to a true conclusion?
The syllogism above proves that private experiences exist and that Dennet is wrong because he believes that private experiences do not exist.
Enaidealukal reminds me of the pseudo-intellectuals I met at university. They would pontificate about “modes of alienation” and “paradigm shifts” but when confronted by a syllogism (that has the obviousness of arithmetic) would become silent.
Enaidealukal objects to my syllogism because it doesn’t take into consideration the subtleties of Dennet’s “paradigm shift”. Suppose someone said,
• Let a=b.
Then,
A^2=ab
Then
A^2+A^2 = A^2 +ab
Then
2a^2=a^2+ab
Then
2a^2-2ab=a^2+ab-2ab
Then
2a^2-2ab=a^2-ab
Then
2(a^2-ab)=1(a^2-ab)
Then,
Cancelling the (a^2-ab) from both sides gives
1=2!
I do not need to know the subtleties of his argument to know that it is invalid. (In this case one illegitimately has divided by zero). Similarly,
1. Private experiences do not exist.
2. Visualizing a triangle is a private experience.
3. Therefore, visualizing a triangle is not possible.
Proves that Dennet’s position (1) is not true because it leads inevitably to the absurd conclusion (3). Anyway, back to the original syllogism,
1. Visualizing a triangle is a private experience.
2. Therefore, a private experience exists.
Dennet explicitly says that private experiences do not exist. Is Enaidealukal claiming that if one understands the subtleties of Dennet’s “paradigm shift” one realizes that Dennet did not mean precisely what he said? Is he saying that Dennet would agree with 1?!:
As I have said before, Dennet loves playing games with words and redefining terms in the middle of his argument. For example, Dennet has a fluctuating definition of “private”. The accepted definition of “private” (exemplified in my syllogism) is something that is only experienced by an individual. Unfortunately, Dennet’s definition of “private’ (as exemplified in
Quining Qualia ) is more creative and less stable.
In a nutshell Dennet’s argument is that
Inverted Qualia (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) contradicts itself and therefore, “qualia” is an absurd and meaningless term. Why? Because we have no way of knowing if we are experiencing a new qualia or if our memory is suspect.
Smash your fingers with a hammer! Does it make sense to say, “I think I am in agony, but I might be wrong?” Of course not! Your awareness of your pain is immediate, obvious and private. No one can feel your pain. The fact that I am not certain that 2 years ago when I used the word “pain” I was using it appropriately has nothing to do with my current pain being private. In other words, Dennet’s argument is about our linguistic ability (our ability to apply words correctly) and not about qualia.
My objection to eliminative materialism has also become personal. My mother died last week.
[youtube]qM-gZintWDc[/youtube]
[Great Movie Scenes] Good Will Hunting - Park Scene - YouTube
For the eliminative there is nothing anything feels like * (the definition of qualia) I know that it felt like something when my mom died!
*
Knowledge argument - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia An eliminative will say that Mary has no new knowledge of what red is because there is nothing red feels like!
