Truthseeker
Non-debating member when I can help myself
I warn Baha'is not to advocate the overthrow of the government of Iran. Any discussion should be factual only.
Closing Circles: Iran’s Exclusionary 2024 Elections | Crisis Group
On 1 March, Iran held its twelfth parliamentary election since the 1979 revolution as well as its sixth contest for the Assembly of Experts, the clerical body nominally tasked with selecting the next supreme leader. Official results indicate a turnout of 41 per cent, marking a historic low for the legislative race and the third consecutive electoral cycle in which the majority of voters stayed away – a sign of widespread frustration with the system and scepticism that political change can occur via the ballot box.
Taken together, the population’s growing dissatisfaction and the system’s overt effort to deepen conservative political dominance underscore a widening divide between state and society. Should this gap continue to grow, it could put the country’s stability at risk. Yet for Iran’s leadership, the overriding imperative is strengthening ideological conformity and political control at the top, even at the cost of losing ever more of its legitimacy from below....
Iranian elections have always been tightly regulated. But the trendline since 2020 has been one of increasingly restricted political expression, and falling participation, resulting in largely uncompetitive races with predictably conservative outcomes. In both the 2020 parliamentary elections and the 2021 presidential race that brought Ebrahim Raisi into office, the Guardian Council, an unelected oversight body, barred candidates who could threaten a conservative victory.
In July 2023, an amendment to the parliamentary election law added more layers to process for vetting candidates, including expanding the authority of the above-referenced Guardian Council to shape the outcome of national polls. This change, most notably, gave the Council the power to disqualify politicians not just before the elections but even after voters had elected them. Critics including the Reformist Front, comprising over 30 reformist factions, decried the move as manipulation further tilting the playing field in the conservatives’ favour. Breaking with its tradition, the Front refrained from issuing a statement encouraging its members and supporters to register as candidates for the parliamentary race. Anticipating unfair elections, many reformist figures, whose fortunes have dwindled in recent years, did not register at all....
The consolidation of power among the regime’s most conservative elements bodes ill for its ability to address Iran’s accumulating challenges. The state of the economy remains woeful, despite modest growth after a decade-long slump. Diplomacy that could help it, by securing relief from U.S. and other sanctions, appears moribund, while corruption and mismanagement are pervasive. The government’s pivot toward closer ties with Russia and China has yet to yield tangible economic benefits....
The same government has imposed more conservative cultural mandates, a move at odds with a society leaning toward diminished religiosity, as evidenced by state-conducted polls. In the summer of 2021, Raisi decreed additional dress code restrictions for women, leading the “morality police” to accost more women its officers judged to be immodestly attired. These policies are broadly unpopular. Outrage at them erupted as part of the 2022 protests, which quickly took a wider anti-regime tone. Polls indicate that over three quarters of the population are either unconcerned with women forgoing the hijab or inclined to keep their objections to themselves when they encounter a woman not wearing one....
The prognosis for the Islamic Republic is bleak: a government formed by a shrinking minority, pursuing maximalist ideological goals that are deeply out of sync with those of a growing majority. While minority rule does not pose an imminent existential threat to the system, it will almost certainly further weaken it in the long run. The disconnect foreshadows continued failures in addressing social, political and economic challenges, and thus a deepening legitimacy crisis for the Islamic Republic and its ostensibly representative institutions.
Closing Circles: Iran’s Exclusionary 2024 Elections | Crisis Group
On 1 March, Iran held its twelfth parliamentary election since the 1979 revolution as well as its sixth contest for the Assembly of Experts, the clerical body nominally tasked with selecting the next supreme leader. Official results indicate a turnout of 41 per cent, marking a historic low for the legislative race and the third consecutive electoral cycle in which the majority of voters stayed away – a sign of widespread frustration with the system and scepticism that political change can occur via the ballot box.
Taken together, the population’s growing dissatisfaction and the system’s overt effort to deepen conservative political dominance underscore a widening divide between state and society. Should this gap continue to grow, it could put the country’s stability at risk. Yet for Iran’s leadership, the overriding imperative is strengthening ideological conformity and political control at the top, even at the cost of losing ever more of its legitimacy from below....
Iranian elections have always been tightly regulated. But the trendline since 2020 has been one of increasingly restricted political expression, and falling participation, resulting in largely uncompetitive races with predictably conservative outcomes. In both the 2020 parliamentary elections and the 2021 presidential race that brought Ebrahim Raisi into office, the Guardian Council, an unelected oversight body, barred candidates who could threaten a conservative victory.
In July 2023, an amendment to the parliamentary election law added more layers to process for vetting candidates, including expanding the authority of the above-referenced Guardian Council to shape the outcome of national polls. This change, most notably, gave the Council the power to disqualify politicians not just before the elections but even after voters had elected them. Critics including the Reformist Front, comprising over 30 reformist factions, decried the move as manipulation further tilting the playing field in the conservatives’ favour. Breaking with its tradition, the Front refrained from issuing a statement encouraging its members and supporters to register as candidates for the parliamentary race. Anticipating unfair elections, many reformist figures, whose fortunes have dwindled in recent years, did not register at all....
The consolidation of power among the regime’s most conservative elements bodes ill for its ability to address Iran’s accumulating challenges. The state of the economy remains woeful, despite modest growth after a decade-long slump. Diplomacy that could help it, by securing relief from U.S. and other sanctions, appears moribund, while corruption and mismanagement are pervasive. The government’s pivot toward closer ties with Russia and China has yet to yield tangible economic benefits....
The same government has imposed more conservative cultural mandates, a move at odds with a society leaning toward diminished religiosity, as evidenced by state-conducted polls. In the summer of 2021, Raisi decreed additional dress code restrictions for women, leading the “morality police” to accost more women its officers judged to be immodestly attired. These policies are broadly unpopular. Outrage at them erupted as part of the 2022 protests, which quickly took a wider anti-regime tone. Polls indicate that over three quarters of the population are either unconcerned with women forgoing the hijab or inclined to keep their objections to themselves when they encounter a woman not wearing one....
The prognosis for the Islamic Republic is bleak: a government formed by a shrinking minority, pursuing maximalist ideological goals that are deeply out of sync with those of a growing majority. While minority rule does not pose an imminent existential threat to the system, it will almost certainly further weaken it in the long run. The disconnect foreshadows continued failures in addressing social, political and economic challenges, and thus a deepening legitimacy crisis for the Islamic Republic and its ostensibly representative institutions.
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