For our reality that is completely true; however that does not necessarily hold true for ALL reality, perhaps there are other existences (similar to planes of existence perhaps) that are not bound by the same logical restraints (though the nature of such planes I could not begin to determine) it is merely a theoretical possibility, but one consistent with logic given logic's own theoretical (because it is a domain of human knowledge and thus inherits the limitation of human intellect used to develop and test it) limitation - though yes I know full well that logic is one of the sole 'proven' fields and I cannot perceive any potential failing in the logical framework, other than the purely theoretical one.
I do not believe it is meaningless to briefly consider the possibility of such an existence - but to attempt to define or describe such an entity to any extent IS meaningless.
Sorry, only part of my argument is within this thread (much of what have I said in the past agrees with many of the points you have raised) this discussion has occurred over several threads now, basically consisting of him asking variations of the same question (as all of his posts have been save for his welcome thread).
Well, there actually is a notation in modal ontological logic called "possible worlds semantics." It's a way of thinking about what necessarily exists as opposed to what only contingently exists; and it does so in exactly the way that you propose: by asserting the possibility that some other "world" (some other reality) could be different.
It's possible for other worlds to exist which have completely different physical laws -- where gravity falls up, where water is a solid, where it's possible to walk through walls, and any other number of things.
However, it's not possible for any world to exist without the exact same laws of logic (such as the three important notions I mentioned earlier: identity, excluded middle, and noncontradiction).
For instance, consider the absurdity of saying that some possible world Q might exist in which identity (the notion that something is what it is, A = A) is false.
But that's ludicrous: if we're talking about
that world, Q, then it's obvious that Q is what it is!
Even if we say, "Q is a world where things aren't what they are," we've already contradicted ourselves:
what is a world where things aren't what they are? Q? Necessarily, Q must be what it is rather than something else -- which negates the whole premise that it's a world where that isn't the case. Q = Q, even if we try to say it's a place where that doesn't happen -- by the very "fact" of existing, it
must be what it is, and so vindicate logic yet again.
Does that make sense?