Nagarjuna's Mula madhyamaka karika

[ametist]

Kinds of texts is not there to derive information or knowledge out of them but to get a narrowing gap towards metaphysical which can be achieved through an increased desire while at the start trying to work up the individual intelligence and greed towards knowledge. Both of which dont have any touching point to the goal. All designed for you to give up at the right height so when you fall you will be dead enough for contact and alive enough for the recall of the individual understanding. There is no collective death and no collective recalling of the understanding. so at the point it may be useful there is no explanation of text and at the start when explanation is given it isnt to do with goal and isnt useful.

 

[crossfire]

Addiction and other chronic phenomena. I have a chronic headache! {But it is getting easier}

Chapter 6. Investigation of Desire and the Desirous One (Addiction)


1. If a desirous one without desire exists before desire, desire would exist dependent on that [desirous one]. [When] a desirous one exists, desire exists.

2. If there were no desirous one, how could there be desire? The same follows for the desirous one too: [it depends on] whether desire exists or not.

3. It is not reasonable for desire and the desirous one to arise as co-existent. In this way desire and the desirous one would not be mutually contingent.

4. Identity has no co-existence: something cannot be co-existent with itself. If there were difference, how could there be co-existence?

5. If the identical were co-existent, [co-existence] would also occur between the unrelated; if the different were co-existent, [co-existence] would also occur between the unrelated.

[grogs med par is translated by K, G [and Gnoli] as “without association”. The Tibetan literally means “without assistance”. Grogs pa is the defining characteristic ofrkyen (condition), i.e. it implies a functional relationship, usually causal; it is what helps something become what it is.]​

6. If the different were co-existent, how would desire and the desirous one be established as different or, if that were so, [how would] those two be co-existent?

[this verse seems to say no more than v.7 below, but says it less neatly]​

7. If desire and the desirous were established as different, because of what could one understand them as co-existent?

8. If one asserts them to be co-existent because they are not established as different, then because they would be very much established as co-existent, would one not also have to assert them to be different?

9. Since different things are not established, co-existent things are not established. If there existed any different things, one could assert them as co-existent things.

10. In that way, desire and the desirous one are not established as co-existent or not co-existent. Like desire, all phenomena are not established as co-existent or not co-existent.

[Ts. 153 explains “all phenomena” to refer to hatred and the hater, stupidity and the confused one, and proceeds to reconstruct v.1 substituting “hatred” for “desire” etc.]​

 

[crossfire]

Oh, another long chapter. Break out the aspirin, again.

Chapter 7. Investigation of Birth, Abiding and Perishing (Birth)

Skt. title is “investigation of the compounded - samskrta”​

1. If birth were compounded, it would possess the three characteristics [of a compound]. If birth were uncompounded, how would it be a characteristic of a compound?

{The three marks of existence--impermanence, anatta, and dukkha? Birth is dukkha!--crossfire}​

2. The three such as birth cannot individually be that which characterises compounds. How is it possible for one at one time to be compounded [of all three]?

3. If birth, abiding and perishing had an other characteristic of being compounded, this would be endless. If not, they would not be compounded.

4. The birth of birth gives birth to the root birth alone. The root birth also is that which gives birth to the birth of birth.

5. If your birth of birth gives birth to the root birth, how does that which is not yet born from your root give birth to that [root birth]?

6. If that which is born from your root birth gives birth to the root, how does that root which is born from that give birth to that [from which it is born]?

7. If that which has not been born is able to give birth to that, that of yours which is being born should be able to give birth to that.

[v. 4-7: This is a clear example of another hand interfering with the text. Not only is it incapable of being reset as poetry, it is incompatible with the style of the verses that precede and especially those that follow. Also cf. MMK 1: 7-9]​

8. Just as lamplight illuminates itself and others, likewise birth too gives birth to both itself and the thing of others.

[“itself and the thing of others” is the clumsy Tibetan form of svaparaatma, cf. svabhava / parabhava.]​

9. Wherever lamplight is present there is no darkness. What does lamplight illuminate? It illuminates by dispelling darkness.

10. If, when lamplight is being generated, it does not encounter darkness, how does the generation of lamplight dispel darkness?

11. If darkness is dispelled even though it does not encounter lamplight, this [lamplight] dwelling here would eliminate the darkness that dwells in all the worlds.

12. If lamplight illuminated itself and the thing of others, darkness too would without doubt obscure itself and the thing of others.

13. How can unborn birth give birth to itself? If the born gives birth, when it has been born, what would be born?

14. The born and the unborn, the being born do not in any way give birth. That has been explained by the gone, not gone and going.

15. When being born does not arise in what is born, then how can one say “[it is] being born in dependence on the born”?

16. Whatever is dependently arising, that is by nature pacified. Therefore, being born and what is born too are pacified.

[Ts. 174-6 gives a good summary of the identity of dependent arising and emptiness with citations, including (174): “Whoever sees dependent and relational arising sees the Dharma; whoever sees the Dharma sees the Buddha.” and (175) “What is born from conditions is unborn. By its very nature it has no birth. What is dependent on conditions is said to be empty. He who knows emptiness is conscientious (bag yod)”]​

17. If any unborn thing existed anywhere, on being born that [unborn] thing would not exist. If so, what would be born?

18. If that which has been born gives birth to what is being born, what [other thing] that has been born would be giving birth to that which has been born?

19. If another [thing] that has been born gives birth [to it], this would be endless. If it is born without [another] which has been born [OR if it is born without being born], everything would be born like that [i.e. causelessly].

20. Thus it is not reasonable for what exists or does not exist to be born. It has been shown above that there is no existent or non-existent.

21. It is not tenable for a thing that is perishing to be born. It is not tenable for that which is not perishing to be a thing.

22. A thing that has remained does not remain. A thing that has not [yet] remained does not remain. That which is remaining also does not remain. What unborn [thing] can remain?

23. It is not possible for a thing that is perishing to remain. It is not possible for that which is not perishing to be a thing.

24. If all things at all times are aging and dying phenomena, what things are there which could remain without aging and dying?

25. It is not reasonable for what remains to remain due to something else that remains or due to itself. This is like how what has been born is not given birth to by itself or another. [cf. v.18-19]

26. What has ceased does not cease. What has not ceased also does not cease. Likewise what is ceasing also does not. What unborn [thing] can cease? [cf. v. 22]

27. It is not possible for a thing which has remained to cease. It is also not possible for a thing which has not remained to cease.

[past tense “has remained” follows Skt. (K .175). Tib. and Ts. 183 could read: “It is not possible for a thing which remains to cease. It is also not possible for a thing which does not remain to cease.”]​

28. A particular state [of something] does not cause that particular state itself to cease. Moreover, another particular state does not cause that particular state to cease.

[Ts. 184 illustrates this with the example of milk and curds (butter), i.e.: milk does not cause milk to cease, nor do curds cause milk to cease.]​

29. When the birth of all phenomena is not possible, then the cessation of all phenomena is not possible.

30. Cessation is not possible in an existent thing. Thingness and nothingness are not possible in one.

31. Cessation is not possible also in what is not a thing. This is similar to how there is no cutting off a second head. [i.e. a person cannot be beheaded twice]

32. Cessation does not exist by its own self, nor does cessation [exist] by something else. This is like how what has been born is not given birth to by itself or another [cf. 25]

33. Because birth and remaining and perishing are not established, there is no conditioned. Because the conditioned is utterly unestablished, how can the unconditioned be established?

34. Like a dream, like a magician’s illusion, like a city of gandharvas, likewise birth and likewise remaining, likewise perishing are taught.

 

[crossfire]

Chapter 8: Investigation of Act and Actor (Actors)

1. One who exists as an actor does not do that which exists as an act. One who does not exist as an actor also does not do that which does not exist as an act.

2. One who exists has no activity; [something] would also exist as an act without an actor. One who exists has no activity; [something] would also exist as an actor without an act.

3. If one who does not exist as an actor did that which does not exist as an act, the act would have no cause; the actor too would have no cause.

4. If there were no cause, effect and cause would not be evident. If they were non-existent, activity and agent and doing would not be evident.

5. If activity etc. did not appear, dharma and adharma would not be evident. If dharma and adharma did not exist, there would be no fruit that comes from them.

6. If there were no fruit, the path of liberation and higher states would not be appropriate. Also it would follow that all activities are meaningless.

7. One who exists and does not exist as an actor does not do what exists and does not exist [as an act]. Since existence and non-existence are mutually contradictory in one [thing], where can they exist?

8. One who exists as an actor does not do an act which is not existent. One who does not exist [as an actor] also does not do what exists [as an act]. Here too faults will follow for one.

9. One who exists as an actor does not do what does not exist as an act and what neither exists or not [as an act], because of what was demonstrated by the proof above.

[Verses 9-11 are suspect. This degree of systematic nit-picking as well as the scholarly reference to “the proof above” seem out of character.]​

10. One who does not exist as an actor does not do what exists as an act and what neither exists or not [as an act], because of what was demonstrated by the proof above.

11. One who neither exists nor does not exist as an actor does not do that which exists and does not exist as an act. Here too this is to be known through the proof demonstrated above.

12. An actor depends on acts and acts too occur in dependence on an actor. Apart from this, one does not see a cause which is established.

13. Likewise, one should understand clinging, because act and actor are dispelled. Remaining things too should be understood by means of actor and act.

 

[von bek]

7. Just as it is said that a child emerges in dependence on a father and a mother, likewise it is said that consciousness emerges in dependence upon an eye and a visual form.

Mastering just this one line of Nagarjuna's teaching will make you lord of your sense gates. Having mastered the sense gates, much progress on the path can be made.

Nagarjuna loves to pack lots of information into few words! Thank you for posting these chapters, Crossfire! Reading along has caused me to pull Nagarjuna from off my shelf and go through it again.

 

[crossfire]

Short Chapter.

9. Investigation of the Presence of Something Prior (Already)

1. Some say that whatever is involved in seeing, hearing etc. and feeling etc. exists prior to them.

2. If [that] thing is not evident, how can there be seeing etc? Therefore, the presence [of that] thing [must] exist before them.

3. What configures/makes known that thing which is present before seeing and hearing etc. and feeling etc.?

4. If it were present even without seeing etc., there would be no doubt that they would exist even without it.

5. It is illuminated by them; they are illuminated by it. How could it exist without them? How could they exist without it?

6. It is not evident prior to the totality of seeing etc. From among seeing etc. a different one illuminates [it] at different times.

7. If it is not evident prior to the totality of seeing etc., how can it be evident prior to [each of them] seeing etc. individually?

8. If the seer itself [were] the hearer and the feeler [were] it too, if it existed prior to each, in that way it would not make sense.

9. If the seer were different, the hearer different, the feeler different, at the time the seer exists, there would be a hearer. Many selves would come about.

10. Also it is not evident in the elements from which seeing and hearing etc. and feeling etc. occur.

11. If that to which seeing and hearing etc. and feeling etc. belong is not evident, they too could not be evident.

12. Reject the concepts “it exists,” “it doesn’t exist” about that which is not evident prior to, now or after seeing etc.

 

[crossfire]

This chapter is interesting.

10. Investigation of Fire and Firewood (Fire)

1. If firewood were fire, actor and act would be one. If fire were other than wood, it would occur even without wood.

2. [Fire] would burn permanently and would not arise from causes for burning. Starting [a fire] would be meaningless. If it were like that, there would also be no act.

3. Because [fire] does not depend on anything else, it would not arise from causes for burning. If it burned permanently, starting it would be meaningless.

4. Concerning this, if one thinks that while burning it is firewood, if it is such only at that time, by what could that firewood be ignited?

5. Because [fire] is other, it would not connect; if it did not connect, it would not ignite; if it did not ignite, it would not die; if it did not die, it would also remain in possession of its own characteristic.

6. Just as a woman connects with a man and a man too with a woman, although fire is other than wood, it is fit to connect with wood.

7. If fire and wood eliminated each other, even though fire is something other than wood, it would have to connect with wood.

8. If fire were dependent on wood and wood were dependent on fire, of what becomes fire and wood dependently, which would be established first?

9. If fire were dependent on wood, [already] established fire would be established [again]. Firewood also would be [such] even without fire.

10. If a thing (A) is established dependently (on B), [but] if what it depends upon (B) is established also in dependence on that very thing (A), what would be established in dependence on what?

11. How can a thing (A) which is established dependently (on B) be dependent (on B) when it (A) is not established? If one asks, “how can establishment be dependent?” It is not reasonable for it (A) to be dependent.

12. There is no fire that is dependent on wood; there is also no fire that is not dependent on wood. There is no wood that is dependent on fire; there is also no wood that is not dependent on fire.

13. Fire does not come from something else; fire also does not exist in wood. Likewise, the remainder of wood has been shown by gone, not-gone and going.

14. Wood itself is not fire; fire is also not something other than wood. Fire does not possess wood; wood does not exist in fire; that (fire) does not exist in it.

15. Through fire and wood is explained without exception all the stages of self and the grasped and at the same time jugs, cloth and so on.

16. I do not think those who teach the identity or difference of self and things are wise in the meaning of the teaching.

 

[crossfire]

I took a week off for PMS. (I used to save reading Nagarjuna for when I had PMS, but this year I wanted to try something different.)


Chapter 11: Investigation of Extremes of Before and After (Before)

1. When asked, “is a before-extreme evident?” the great Muni said, “it is not.” Samsara has no beginning, no end; it has no before, no after.

2. For that without beginning [and] end, where can a middle be in that? Therefore, it is not possible for it to have before, after, and simultaneous phases.

3. If birth were before and aging/death after, there would be birth without aging/death and also without dying one would be born.

4. If birth were after and aging/death before, how could there be an uncaused aging/death which has no birth?

5. It is not suitable for birth and aging/death to be simultaneous; that which is being born would be dying and both would be without cause.

6. Why fixate on that birth, that aging/dying, for which the phases of before, after, simultaneity are impossible?

7. It is not just samsara alone that has no before-extreme, cause and fruit themselves, and characteristics and the basis for characteristics themselves,

8. feeling and the feeler, whatever is suitable to bear meaning, also all things have no before-extreme.

 

[crossfire]

12. Investigation of Anguish (Dukkha)

[Tib. has “Investigation of what is made by me and made by others” while Skt. has duhkha.]

1. Some assert that anguish arises from being made by self, made by other, by both, without cause. To do that is not suitable.

2. If it were made by self, therefore it would not be contingently arising, because those aggregates arise contingently on these aggregates.

[A difficulty with this entire chapter is to know what bdag (self) refers to in the context of the creation of anguish. Does it refer to “oneself”, i.e. the person who suffers, or to anguish “itself?” In verse 2, the latter reading would seem to suggest itself, but then it would be at odds with the subsequent verses, where N. explicitly introduces the ideas of svapudgala and parapudgala (one’s own person and the other person) as the creators of anguish. Verse 10, with its comparison of anguish with external things, likewise would suggest the latter reading. I have chosen to translate the entire chapter (thus leaving v. 10 ambiguous) in the former sense. The crucial issue here, I feel, is the confusion around what it means to say “I cause myself pain.”]

3. If that were other than this and if this were other than that, anguish would be made by other and that would be made by those others.
[ Ts. 244 is happy with the reading of c-d by Buddhapalita and Sherab Dronme: /gzhan de dag gis ‘di byas pas//sdug bsngal gzhan gyis byas par ‘gyur/ = “...anguish would be made by others since those others made this.”]

4. If anguish were made by one’s own person, who would that person be who has made anguish by himself, but is not included in the anguish?

5. If anguish arose from another person, how could it be suitable for there to be [someone] not included in the anguish, who has been given it by another who made the anguish?

6. If anguish arose [from] another person, who would that other person be who, having made it, gives it to someone else, but is not included in the anguish?
[Ts. 246 points out that this verse is not found in Buddhapalita or Sherab Dronme, but is found in Chandrakirti.]

7. Since it is not established as made by self, how can anguish have been made by other? [For] whatever anguish is made by other, that has been made by his self.

8. Anguish is not made [by] self; that is not made by that itself. If it is not made by an other self, how can anguish be made by other?

9. If it is made by each, anguish would be made by both. Not made by self, not made by other, how can anguish have no cause?

10. Not only does anguish alone not have the four aspects, external things too do not have the four aspects.

 

[crossfire]

Hahaha! I just realized that the Hsin Hsin Ming is an excellent refutation of Nagarjuna's Mula Madhyamaka Karika!

http://www.thezensite.com/ZenTeachings/Translations/HsinHsinMingTranslation.html

"In theory, there is no difference between theory and practice. In practice, there is."

 

[DreadFish]

Hahaha! I just realized that the Hsin Hsin Ming is an excellent refutation of Nagarjuna's Mula Madhyamaka Karika!

http://www.thezensite.com/ZenTeachings/Translations/HsinHsinMingTranslation.html

"In theory, there is no difference between theory and practice. In practice, there is."

Im a big fan of the Hsin Hsin Ming. It's one of those things that seems to encourage awareness of what it's talking about in the reader's mind.

It's one of the first Zen pieces I ever read, I think.

How is it an excellent refutation of the Madhramaka Karika? (ie. spell it out for me, please. Im lazy and don't want to read those huge paragraphs )

 

[crossfire]

Im a big fan of the Hsin Hsin Ming. It's one of those things that seems to encourage awareness of what it's talking about in the reader's mind.

It's one of the first Zen pieces I ever read, I think.

How is it an excellent refutation of the Madhramaka Karika? (ie. spell it out for me, please. Im lazy and don't want to read those huge paragraphs )

Here's a snippet of the Hsin Hsin Ming from thezensite. Try reading it while keeping in mind the chapter titles/investigation subjects from Nagarjuna.

II) 5) Do not follow conditions, (4)
Do not dwell in emptiness.
Cherishing oneness in the hearth,
Everything will stop by itself.


6) Rest to stop motion, (5)
And rest will move you again.
If you are merely in either,
How will you know oneness?

7) Not understanding oneness (6)
You will miss in two ways.
Expelling being you will be without it,
Following emptiness you are always behind it.

8) The more words and thoughts (7)
The more you will go astray
Stop speaking, stop thinking
And there is nothing you cannot understand.

9) Return to the root and obtain the purport. (8)
Following the outcome you lose the source.
For a moment turn inward,
And surpass the emptiness of things.
Changes that go on in emptiness (9)
All have their cause in ignorance.​

 

[DreadFish]

Here's a snippet of the Hsin Hsin Ming from thezensite. Try reading it while keeping in mind the chapter titles/investigation subjects from Nagarjuna.

II) 5) Do not follow conditions, (4)
Do not dwell in emptiness.
Cherishing oneness in the hearth,
Everything will stop by itself.


6) Rest to stop motion, (5)
And rest will move you again.
If you are merely in either,
How will you know oneness?

7) Not understanding oneness (6)
You will miss in two ways.
Expelling being you will be without it,
Following emptiness you are always behind it.

8) The more words and thoughts (7)
The more you will go astray
Stop speaking, stop thinking
And there is nothing you cannot understand.

9) Return to the root and obtain the purport. (8)
Following the outcome you lose the source.
For a moment turn inward,
And surpass the emptiness of things.
Changes that go on in emptiness (9)
All have their cause in ignorance.​

Hmm, I think I see what you mean. Nagarjuna seems to speak of the interaction of the myriad things, while the Hsin Hsin Ming focuses on what is beyond that. Though the historical Buddha taught a lot about causation, lately I find myself leaning towards the "why bother learning how the dreams work when you can just wake up?" line of thinking.

 

[crossfire]

Hmm, I think I see what you mean. Nagarjuna seems to speak of the interaction of the myriad things, while the Hsin Hsin Ming focuses on what is beyond that. Though the historical Buddha taught a lot about causation, lately I find myself leaning towards the "why bother learning how the dreams work when you can just wake up?" line of thinking.

Hsin Hsin Ming specifically seems to encourage letting go of mental formations. (fourth skandha) Nagarjuna seems to work almost exclusively with them (negating them.)

 

[von bek]

Though the historical Buddha taught a lot about causation, lately I find myself leaning towards the "why bother learning how the dreams work when you can just wake up?" line of thinking.

Ah, but what if learning how dreams work is the key to waking up?

 

[DreadFish]

Hsin Hsin Ming specifically seems to encourage letting go of mental formations. (fourth skandha) Nagarjuna seems to work almost exclusively with them (negating them.)

Yeah, it kinda seems Nagarjuna's point is going beyond causation by picking the hell out of it until there's nothing left to talk about.

Ah, but what if learning how dreams work is the key to waking up?

This is a valid point. However, in my leaning towards atma vichara as my main practice, I see a different POV now. If the point is freedom from suffering, it definitely seems the key element keeping the whole dream in motion is the simple identification of being a person and an entity with attributes.

So, instead of taking each brick apart and seeing how the house is built, why not just knock out the cornerstone that's keeping the whole structure standing?

But I think it works both ways a bit. In my experience so far, holding on to the center, you start to naturally see how things work without effort to understand them and identification with anything and everything naturally atrophies without any effort

 

[von bek]

This is a valid point. However, in my leaning towards atma vichara as my main practice, I see a different POV now. If the point is freedom from suffering, it definitely seems the key element keeping the whole dream in motion is the simple identification of being a person and an entity with attributes.

So, instead of taking each brick apart and seeing how the house is built, why not just knock out the cornerstone that's keeping the whole structure standing?

But I think it works both ways a bit. In my experience so far, holding on to the center, you start to naturally see how things work without effort to understand them and identification with anything and everything naturally atrophies without any effort

Honestly, I believe that both concepts, "understanding how dreams work" and "just waking up", are not at odds. The two are interconnected. There may be debate as to which causes which, but we will agree that where one of them is present the other will soon follow.

I find that breaking things down is the most effective way for me to overcome afflictions. This is one of the reasons I admire Nagarjuna's work. He takes a sledgehammer to every concept he can think of. After he's finished, he melts down the sledgehammer.

 

[DreadFish]

Honestly, I believe that both concepts, "understanding how dreams work" and "just waking up", are not at odds. The two are interconnected. There may be debate as to which causes which, but we will agree that where one of them is present the other will soon follow.

I find that breaking things down is the most effective way for me to overcome afflictions. This is one of the reasons I admire Nagarjuna's work. He takes a sledgehammer to every concept he can think of. After he's finished, he melts down the sledgehammer.

Yeah, I think this is why there have been a variety of different teachers. Different approaches work best with different minds.

 

[crossfire]

The question between Nagarjuna and the Hsin Hsin Ming: does taking a proverbial sledgehammer to concepts constitute clinging to them?

I can see how those who cling to concepts might call Nagarjuna's work nihilism. However, if you refute all that you can think of, it doesn't mean that there is nothing there--it just means that you have refuted whatever you could conceptualize. There might be something left that cannot be conceptualized--as is hinted by the Hsin Hsin Ming.

 

[crossfire]

Since this has been popping up quite a bit for me in the past week, I guess it's time for another chapter: this one seems much more straightforward:


Verses from the Center

13. Investigation of Samskaras (Change)

1. The Bhagavan said that whatever dharma is deceptive, that is false. All conditions [are] deceptive dharmas, thus they are false.

[The key to this verse lies in the source of the statement of the Buddha. Hopkins points out that a similar statement is found in the Dhatuvibhanga-sutra of theMajjhima Nikaya [MN 140: 26, p.1093]. This passage is translated from the Pali as: “For that is false, bhikkhu, which has a deceptive nature, and that is true which has an undeceptive nature - Nibbana. Therefore a bhikkhu possessing [this truth] possesses the supreme foundation of truth. For this, bhikkhu, is the supreme noble truth, namely, Nibbana, which has an undeceptive nature.” Tsongkhapa’s outline treats this verse under the heading: “explaining non-inherent existence by means of a citation well-known to others.” He then cites this text, which reads: “Bhikshus, whatever phenomenon is a deceptive conditioned thing, (‘dus byas) that is false and whatever phenomenon - nirvana - is undeceptive, that is the sublime truth.” And then another: “Likewise, a conditioned thing is also a deceptive phenomenon. It is also an utterly perishing phenomenon.” [Ts. 250-1]]

2. If whatever is a deceptive phenomenon is false, what is deceptive about it [in what way is it deceptive]? That statement by the Bhagavan is a complete presentation of emptiness.

3. Things have no essential nature because they are seen to change into something else. Things do not lack an essential nature because things are emptiness.

4. If there were no essential nature, whose [nature] would it be to change into something else? If there were an essential nature, how would it be possible to change into something else?

5. This itself does not change into something else. The other itself too does not [either]. Because youth does not age. Because age too does not age.

6. If this itself changes into something else, milk itself would be curds. Something other than milk would be the being of curds.

7. If a bit of the non-empty existed, a bit of the empty would also exist. If there did not exist a bit of the non-empty, how could the empty exist?

8. The Conquerors taught emptiness as the forsaking of all views. Those who view emptiness are taught to be without realisation [incurable/incorrigible].