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Does anyone actually agree with Daniel Dennett that consiousness is an illusion?

Whateverist

Active Member
In From Bacteria to Bach and Back, Daniel Dennett reiterates his claim that consciousness is an “illusion" that can be accounted for by evolutionary theory and other materialistic approaches. Credit: W.W. Norton

Of all the odd notions to emerge from debates over consciousness, the oddest is that it doesn’t exist, at least not in the way we think it does. It is an illusion, like “Santa Claus” or “American democracy.”

Both quotes come from this article titled Is Consciousness Real? by John Horgan
in Scientific American, March 21, 2017: Is Consciousness Real?.

I think philosopher Dennett, like physicist Lawrence Krauss and evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins, is one of a number of experts in one field using the platform of that reputation to rattle people's chains with seemingly outrageous claims which exceed the limits of the field on which they are qualified to speak with any authority: "consiousness is an illusion"; "everything from nothing"; "selfish genes". Minus the assumed expertise anyone would think they were nuts. In case you can't tell I disagree strongly with Dennett and frankly wonder what his motivation is for saying something so outlandishly foolish.

Here I want to share a lengthy excerpt from Iain McGilchrist's book I just read in chapter 25, Matter and Consciousness - Kindle pages 1599-1600. Full disclosure I find these comments entirely convincing, supporting my position against Dennett's.

I am with analytical philosopher Galen Strawson here, as often on the topic of consciousness, in his opinion that ‘this particular denial is the strangest thing that has ever happened in the whole history of human thought, not just the whole history of philosophy.’ For, as he puts it, ‘experience is itself the fundamental given natural fact; it is a very old point that there is nothing more certain than the existence of experience.’19

To claim that consciousness is non-existent is self-exploding, since it requires consciousness both to make, and to make sense of, the claim: and to state that consciousness exists, but is an illusion, is no better, since an illusion requires a consciousness in which such an illusion might occur. Some philosophers ‘are prepared to deny the existence of experience’, writes Strawson:

"At this we should stop and wonder. I think we should feel very sober, and a little afraid, at the power of human credulity, the capacity of human minds to be gripped by theory, by faith. For this particular denial is the strangest thing that has ever happened in the whole history of human thought, not just the whole history of philosophy. It falls, unfortunately, to philosophy, not religion, to reveal the deepest woo-woo of the human mind. I find this grievous, but, next to this denial, every known religious belief is only a little less sensible than the belief that grass is green." 20

‘The capacity of human minds to be gripped by theory...’ The reader knows by now which hemisphere backs theory in the face of experience. In any case, it is absurd, Strawson continues, to reject the idea of there ‘seeming’ to be experience: The phenomenon of there seeming to be experience – the phenomenon we’re supposing to be an illusion – can’t exist unless there really is experience. Daniel Dennett tries this move. He proposes that ‘there is no such thing’ as phenomenology: ‘There seems to be phenomenology ... but it does not follow from this undeniable, universally attested fact that there really is phenomenology.’ In fact it does follow, for the reason I’ve just given: for there to seem to be phenomenology is for there to be phenomenology. When it comes to experience, you can’t open up the is/seems 21

If we seem to have the experience of sunlight on a bowl of strawberries, that means we have the experience of sunlight on a bowl of strawberries. ‘Dennett and his kind find themselves at one with many religious believers’, Strawson comments on another occasion: This seems at first ironic, but the two camps are deeply united by the fact that both have unshakable faith in something that lacks any warrant in experience. That said, the religious believers are in infinitely better shape, epistemologically, than the Dennettians ...22

19 Strawson 2006 (4). Cf James 1897, 'The Will To Believe': 1-31 (15): 'There is but one indefectively certain truth that pyrrhonistic scepticism itself leaves standing, -the truth that the present phenomenon of consciousness exists'.
20 Strawson 2008 (55)
21 Strawson 2013.
22 Strawson 2008 (55)

I accidentally posted this without including subjects covered. Hopefully those with any interest will find it.
@vulcanlogician and @Windwalker and @RestlessSoul











'
 

Ella S.

*temp banned*
Yes, I do.

That is not to say that I believe that metacognition, awareness, or wakefulness do not exist.

However, the concept of "consciousness" is vague and often given traits that I do not believe accurately reflect reality. I think the "hard problem of consciousness" can only exist in reference to a form of consciousness that has no relationship with reality.

I am conscious right now, meaning that I am awake and self-aware. There is nothing inherently special about these features, though, in the way that the "hard problem of consciousness" proposes. I do not believe that phanerons "exist" or that qualia "exist." They are abstractions of patterns of activity in our nervous systems. What we call "red" is not a distinct qualia but how our eye reacts to a certain wavelength, the signals our eyes send to our brains, and how our brains react to those signals.

It can be understood, broadly, as a form of biochemical computation.

Questions about precisely when we can say that an artificial intelligence has gained consciousness or if they even can are, in my opinion, devoid of real meaning. Questions about whether "consciousness survives after death" can only be coherent when we conceive of consciousness as something other than a name for neural processes like metacognition, awareness, wakefulness, memory, identity, language, rational thought, etc.

Consciousness is a convenient metaphor or shorthand for real, physical processes but, in my opinion, it carries with it a variety of misleading baggage. This is quite in line with what Dennett has said on a number of occassions.

I think the quote you have given here attacks a straw man of Dennett's position.

The question is about reductive vs eliminative materialism, not about whether human beings are capable of mental processes.
 
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Heyo

Veteran Member
That depends on your definition of consciousness - which you probably not have.
I'm as agnostic towards consciousness as I am towards gods, and for exactly the same reason. There is no agreed upon definition.
And, like with gods, it leads towards the suspicion that it might not exist. It is a diffuse feeling we have, but we can't put our finger on it. It is just an illusion.

"If you wish to converse with me, first define your terms." - Voltair

What is your definition of consciousness? How can I test if something or someone has consciousness? (And be prepared that I might apply that test to ChatGPT.)
For any given definition where consciousness is real (like the medical definition, awake and aware), it is likely that a sea sponge has it and that the vast majority will disagree that that is consciousness. For any complex definition it is likely that it can be explained as an illusion. (And that the vast majority will disagree that that is consciousness.)

Pick your way to defeat.
 

Rival

se Dex me saut.
Staff member
Premium Member
I'm not sure what's nuts about The Selfish Gene. That is Dawkins writing in his field and it's widely accepted in biological academia, as well as the broader population. Our genes just want to selfishly reproduce.
 
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Brian2

Veteran Member
In From Bacteria to Bach and Back, Daniel Dennett reiterates his claim that consciousness is an “illusion" that can be accounted for by evolutionary theory and other materialistic approaches. Credit: W.W. Norton

Of all the odd notions to emerge from debates over consciousness, the oddest is that it doesn’t exist, at least not in the way we think it does. It is an illusion, like “Santa Claus” or “American democracy.”

Both quotes come from this article titled Is Consciousness Real? by John Horgan
in Scientific American, March 21, 2017: Is Consciousness Real?.

I think philosopher Dennett, like physicist Lawrence Krauss and evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins, is one of a number of experts in one field using the platform of that reputation to rattle people's chains with seemingly outrageous claims which exceed the limits of the field on which they are qualified to speak with any authority: "consiousness is an illusion"; "everything from nothing"; "selfish genes". Minus the assumed expertise anyone would think they were nuts. In case you can't tell I disagree strongly with Dennett and frankly wonder what his motivation is for saying something so outlandishly foolish.

Here I want to share a lengthy excerpt from Iain McGilchrist's book I just read in chapter 25, Matter and Consciousness - Kindle pages 1599-1600. Full disclosure I find these comments entirely convincing, supporting my position against Dennett's.



19 Strawson 2006 (4). Cf James 1897, 'The Will To Believe': 1-31 (15): 'There is but one indefectively certain truth that pyrrhonistic scepticism itself leaves standing, -the truth that the present phenomenon of consciousness exists'.
20 Strawson 2008 (55)
21 Strawson 2013.
22 Strawson 2008 (55)

I accidentally posted this without including subjects covered. Hopefully those with any interest will find it.
@vulcanlogician and @Windwalker and @RestlessSoul

I wonder what he says has been tricked into thinking it is conscious.
 

RestlessSoul

Well-Known Member
Great idea for a thread. I'll start by saying I'm not sure if I've understood Dennett's position, but I'm going to respond in the broadest terms anyway.

We could argue forever about what we mean by consciousness, but to get to grips with Dennett's argument, it might be more productive to ask what is meant by illusion? There is much about our experience of reality which is illusory, if by illusion we mean the deception of the mind by the senses, or perhaps the misinterpretation of sense data by the mind. Anyone who has looked at the moon beneath the surface of a lake will be familiar with the concept, but perhaps the most persistent and beguiling conjuror's trick the universe plays on us daily, is the illusion that the sun rises in the east and sets in the west. Illusion is an intrinsic part of our experience of the world.

So is it possible that illusion, by which we mean erroneous or deceptive perception, extends to consciousness itself? That seems very possible, though it's not immediately clear how that might work. But in any case, I don't really think that's what Dennett is saying. If his theory amounts simply to the reductionist argument that consciousness can be understood and explained entirely by physical processes in the brain (or presumably the arms in the case of an octopus, which has most of it's neurons there), then I disagree. The problem with reductionism is that in reducing any phenomenon to it's constituent parts, you inevitably lose something of value; because the whole is always greater than the sum of it's parts. Any explanation of consciousness which takes no account of it's experiential qualities, which does not address the question "Why is it that there is something that it is like to be conscious?" is necessarily incomplete. Beethoven's Fifth Symphony is not reducible to notations on a page, or a groove in a piece of vinyl. John Singer Sargent's 'Carnation, Lily, Lily, Rose' is not reducible to pigment on canvas. At least not without something of great value being lost. This, surely, is axiomatic.

For an explanation of consciousness which may potentially satisfy materialists, idealists and dualists (yeah, right!), I consider David Chalmers to be much more on the right track, in postulating that consciousness may be as fundamental in our reality as space, time, mass and energy. I'll return to that later if I get time, but for now I'll point out that Chalmers, who has been wrongly accused of being a bit 'woo', has some great scientific minds in his corner:

"Consciousness cannot be accounted for in physical terms. For consciousness is absolutely fundamental. It cannot be accounted for in terms of anything else."
- Erwin Schrodinger
"General Scientific and Popular Papers." In Collected Papers, Vol. 4. Vienna

"The premise that you can describe in terms of physics the whole function of a human being ... including knowledge and consciousness, is untenable. There is still something missing."
- Rudolf Peierls, quoted in "Matter Undermined", Economic Times 2019
 

Ella S.

*temp banned*
Great idea for a thread. I'll start by saying I'm not sure if I've understood Dennett's position, but I'm going to respond in the broadest terms anyway.

We could argue forever about what we mean by consciousness, but to get to grips with Dennett's argument, it might be more productive to ask what is meant by illusion? There is much about our experience of reality which is illusory, if by illusion we mean the deception of the mind by the senses, or perhaps the misinterpretation of sense data by the mind. Anyone who has looked at the moon beneath the surface of a lake will be familiar with the concept, but perhaps the most persistent and beguiling conjuror's trick the universe plays on us daily, is the illusion that the sun rises in the east and sets in the west. Illusion is an intrinsic part of our experience of the world.

So is it possible that illusion, by which we mean erroneous or deceptive perception, extends to consciousness itself? That seems very possible, though it's not immediately clear how that might work. But in any case, I don't really think that's what Dennett is saying. If his theory amounts simply to the reductionist argument that consciousness can be understood and explained entirely by physical processes in the brain (or presumably the arms in the case of an octopus, which has most of it's neurons there), then I disagree. The problem with reductionism is that in reducing any phenomenon to it's constituent parts, you inevitably lose something of value; because the whole is always greater than the sum of it's parts. Any explanation of consciousness which takes no account of it's experiential qualities, which does not address the question "Why is it that there is something that it is like to be conscious?" is necessarily incomplete. Beethoven's Fifth Symphony is not reducible to notations on a page, or a groove in a piece of vinyl. John Singer Sargent's 'Carnation, Lily, Lily, Rose' is not reducible to pigment on canvas. At least not without something of great value being lost. This, surely, is axiomatic.
I do not understand this.

What of value do you think is lost by reducing 'Carnation, Lily, Lily, Rose' to pigment on a canvas? That is all it is. Beethoven's Fifth Symphony is also merely a string of notes played by particular instruments.

Maybe one might have emotional sentiments towards these works when they are completed but I think that is more due to the faulty heuristics of the human mind than anything else. Emotion is fairly persistent cognitive error. It does not give us reliable information about anything, in my opinion. It is vestigial in rational animals.
 

Whateverist

Active Member
I'm not sure what's nuts about The Selfish Gene. That is Dawkins writing in his field and it's widely accepted in biological academia, as well as the broader population. Our genes just want to selfishly reproduce.

But isn’t it peculiar to imagine that we ourselves lack the volition we imagine our DNA possesses? Seems like that would render us parasitized zombies, lurching through the world at the behest of strings of chemicals.

But I agree that what Dawkins has to say about biology and evolution are spot on or at least appear to be from this nonspecialist’s POV. But I do think he could been clearer when he sought to comment on what it is like to be human that he was being humorous, poetic or at least metaphoric in appearing to attribute our intentions to these bundles of chemicals alone.
 

wellwisher

Well-Known Member
Humans have two centers of consciousness, which are the ego and the inner self. This creates two overlapping perceptions of the world around us. The inner self is more natural and innate, and is what all animals have. The ego is more cultural; externally induced through watching and learning. Like having two eyes, compared one eye, the two centers creates a more stereo-optic view of reality; team of two is more that the sum of its parts; 3-D. Other times, these two eyes can become crossed so we see two separated things; mixed feelings. The mistake often made it to think in terms of consciousness instead of consciousnesses.

As a simple example, say you had a phobia of cats. This is felt at a deep level. You also have the power of reason and can see that the kitten is harmless. However, you cannot help feel threatened, which is irrational. There are two centers that each see the same data in their own way.

On the other hand, you are on the golf course and are feeling especially good today. It is not something your ego is doing, but this well being comes from within. That day you do you personal best. This was not the will of the ego, since you are average, but the inner self is running the show, and the ego is more than willing to flow.

On another day, you are in the lab, going through the procedural motions and suddenly a new idea comes to mind, but since the system expects X, you ignore it. The two centers push, reinforce, and even can conflict with each other to create a more stereo-optic combined consciousness, where the left and right eyes can each lead or work together.

Many people sense a secondary center and know it is not the ego or the cultural center. They may sense the inner self being natural and the product of evolution and our human DNA; collective human. They sense that it must go on, which it does, in each generation; shared human nature. It a source of higher human potential; divine. Religion tend to be more perceptive of the secondary, which is really the primary; inner self.
 

Whateverist

Active Member
Yes, I do.

That is not to say that I believe that metacognition, awareness, or wakefulness do not exist.

However, the concept of "consciousness" is vague and often given traits that I do not believe accurately reflect reality. I think the "hard problem of consciousness" can only exist in reference to a form of consciousness that has no relationship with reality.

I am conscious right now, meaning that I am awake and self-aware. There is nothing inherently special about these features, though, in the way that the "hard problem of consciousness" proposes.

I agree with you up to here. The ‘hard problem’ Falls away when rightly understood like any other paradox, and as with all the rest, seeing through it bestows insight. But for the exercise to move you closer to the truth it isn’t enough merely to defeat the paradox, we also want to draw the correct insight from the exercise. There is more to say but not tonight. Later.
 

Brian2

Veteran Member
What of value do you think is lost by reducing 'Carnation, Lily, Lily, Rose' to pigment on a canvas? That is all it is. Beethoven's Fifth Symphony is also merely a string of notes played by particular instruments.

To use our consciousness to show that consciousness is an illusion, and to inform to illusion of consciousness in others, would be funny if it wasn't so sad.
 

Revoltingest

Pragmatic Libertarian
Premium Member
In From Bacteria to Bach and Back, Daniel Dennett reiterates his claim that consciousness is an “illusion" that can be accounted for by evolutionary theory and other materialistic approaches. Credit: W.W. Norton

Of all the odd notions to emerge from debates over consciousness, the oddest is that it doesn’t exist, at least not in the way we think it does. It is an illusion, like “Santa Claus” or “American democracy.”

Both quotes come from this article titled Is Consciousness Real? by John Horgan
in Scientific American, March 21, 2017: Is Consciousness Real?.

I think philosopher Dennett, like physicist Lawrence Krauss and evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins, is one of a number of experts in one field using the platform of that reputation to rattle people's chains with seemingly outrageous claims which exceed the limits of the field on which they are qualified to speak with any authority: "consiousness is an illusion"; "everything from nothing"; "selfish genes". Minus the assumed expertise anyone would think they were nuts. In case you can't tell I disagree strongly with Dennett and frankly wonder what his motivation is for saying something so outlandishly foolish.

Here I want to share a lengthy excerpt from Iain McGilchrist's book I just read in chapter 25, Matter and Consciousness - Kindle pages 1599-1600. Full disclosure I find these comments entirely convincing, supporting my position against Dennett's.



19 Strawson 2006 (4). Cf James 1897, 'The Will To Believe': 1-31 (15): 'There is but one indefectively certain truth that pyrrhonistic scepticism itself leaves standing, -the truth that the present phenomenon of consciousness exists'.
20 Strawson 2008 (55)
21 Strawson 2013.
22 Strawson 2008 (55)

I accidentally posted this without including subjects covered. Hopefully those with any interest will find it.
@vulcanlogician and @Windwalker and @RestlessSoul











'
Consciousness is detectable.
So not an illusion.
Is it somehow useful to us to treat consciousness as an illusion?
(That didn't work out so well for claims that reality is an illusion.)
 

Nakosis

Non-Binary Physicalist
Premium Member
In From Bacteria to Bach and Back, Daniel Dennett reiterates his claim that consciousness is an “illusion" that can be accounted for by evolutionary theory and other materialistic approaches. Credit: W.W. Norton

Of all the odd notions to emerge from debates over consciousness, the oddest is that it doesn’t exist, at least not in the way we think it does. It is an illusion, like “Santa Claus” or “American democracy.”

Both quotes come from this article titled Is Consciousness Real? by John Horgan
in Scientific American, March 21, 2017: Is Consciousness Real?.

I think philosopher Dennett, like physicist Lawrence Krauss and evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins, is one of a number of experts in one field using the platform of that reputation to rattle people's chains with seemingly outrageous claims which exceed the limits of the field on which they are qualified to speak with any authority: "consiousness is an illusion"; "everything from nothing"; "selfish genes". Minus the assumed expertise anyone would think they were nuts. In case you can't tell I disagree strongly with Dennett and frankly wonder what his motivation is for saying something so outlandishly foolish.

Here I want to share a lengthy excerpt from Iain McGilchrist's book I just read in chapter 25, Matter and Consciousness - Kindle pages 1599-1600. Full disclosure I find these comments entirely convincing, supporting my position against Dennett's.



19 Strawson 2006 (4). Cf James 1897, 'The Will To Believe': 1-31 (15): 'There is but one indefectively certain truth that pyrrhonistic scepticism itself leaves standing, -the truth that the present phenomenon of consciousness exists'.
20 Strawson 2008 (55)
21 Strawson 2013.
22 Strawson 2008 (55)

I accidentally posted this without including subjects covered. Hopefully those with any interest will find it.
@vulcanlogician and @Windwalker and @RestlessSoul
'

First, to say something is an illusion is not the same as saying it is non-existent. It is simply saying that the apparent reality of what we appear to be experiencing is not the actual reality of what we are experiencing. IOW, it is not denying the experience. It is only saying the experience is not what it seems to be.

Consciousness is a relatively small functional process of the brain. Most of the heavy lifting of being is done behind the scenes. However the part of our brain which is consciously aware is unaware of these unconscious processes. So it seems to the conscious process that it exists as the entirety of the self giving the illusion that the conscious self itself is separate from the brain.

So yes we experience reality as if our conscious self exists separate from the brain. Whereas in actuality we are simply a brain, or more accurately, a central nervous system, with limited self awareness.
 

RestlessSoul

Well-Known Member
I do not understand this.

What of value do you think is lost by reducing 'Carnation, Lily, Lily, Rose' to pigment on a canvas? That is all it is. Beethoven's Fifth Symphony is also merely a string of notes played by particular instruments.

Maybe one might have emotional sentiments towards these works when they are completed but I think that is more due to the faulty heuristics of the human mind than anything else. Emotion is fairly persistent cognitive error. It does not give us reliable information about anything, in my opinion. It is vestigial in rational animals.


Value, like meaning and purpose, are qualities assigned to phenomena by the conscious observer; so it seems to me that everything of value is lost in the process of this form of reductionism.

It's not just emotion or sentiment that we discard if we dismiss the fundamental importance of qualitative experience as an aspect of consciousness; if we eliminate experience, we eliminate everything, from the human perspective. Without experience, nothing is left to us. Experience is literally all that we have, and all that we are.
 
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Whateverist

Active Member
Consciousness is a relatively small functional process of the brain. Most of the heavy lifting of being is done behind the scenes. However the part of our brain which is consciously aware is unaware of these unconscious processes. So it seems to the conscious process that it exists as the entirety of the self giving the illusion that the conscious self itself is separate from the brain.

So yes we experience reality as if our conscious self exists separate from the brain.

Yep completely agreed. So if there is any illusion it is that our conscious minds (CMs) are in charge and the most important part of us. For Jonathon Haidt in The Righteous Mind regarding our moral volition, our intellect (CM) is like the Mahout sitting atop an elephant. We think we are in charge but most of our efforts go into making excuses for what the elephant does. This probably part of what leads some (but not me) to question free will. We have as much as we earn by creating a good relationship with that elephant. But if free will is thought of as unfettered force of will on the part of the Mahout, of course that doesn’t exist.

Whereas in actuality we are simply a brain, or more accurately, a central nervous system, with limited self awareness.

That is further than I would go but then I resist the idea that anything is just something else but especially the idea that the ‘material’ explains the phenomenon. Can you tell me why this move seems justified here or why it appeals to you?
 
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