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When Are Designations of Mental Disorders Just Expressions of Prejudice?

Nous

Well-Known Member
Premium Member
“Homosexuality,” “Sexual Orientation Disturbance,” “Ego-Dystonic Homosexuality,” “Gender Identity Disorder,” “Hysterical Personality Disorder,” “Adjustment Reaction Disturbance”. In times past (including years recent), these terms denoted mental disorders in the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual. Presumably most people today would not consider these classifications to be mental disorders, but rather (at least in some cases) as mere expressions of prejudice by the powers-that-be at the APA, motivated by cultural or social mores.

Is there any rational reason to believe that none of the hundreds of mental disorders listed in the current DSM are likewise just expressions of socially sanctioned prejudice? If so, what is that rational reason?

If, on the other hand, you believe it is possible that some of the mental disorders listed in the DSM-5 do not, in fact, denote pathological phenomena, then how does one distinguish between behaviors, thoughts, feelings and beliefs that are pathological and those that are not (if there is a difference)? What makes a behavior, thought, feeling or belief pathological? And, if you know the answer to that question, then why didn't the legion of well-educated people who contrived the above noted mental disorders?
 

Kilgore Trout

Misanthropic Humanist
At the end of the day, the descriptions of, and diagnoses for, mental disorders are little more than somewhat vague, often overly broad, and sometimes arbitrary observations compiled into convenient labels. There seems to be, at best, a very tenuous empirical or scientific basis for these descriptions/labels, or for the process by which they are arrived at and modified, over time. Certainly, a whole spectrum of biases and agendas seem to heavily influence the categorizations at any point in time.

The whole field of psychology seems to be driven largely by inertia, based in questionable assumptions and severely out-of-date perspectives.
 

sun rise

The world is on fire
Premium Member
This thread hits school I had a long time ago. We asked ourselves and others exactly those questions back then.

Certainly some classifications are indeed prejudice as you correctly pointed out. Some, such as panic attacks, extreme suspicion that others are out to get one, schizophrenia and the like are true disorders. Thinking that voices are telling you to murder people is another obvious sign of a problem.

Another part of the answer to me is to start with asking questions: Is what's going on stopping you from living a reasonably happy, productive and fulfilling life? If the question is 'yes', the next step would be to find out more details and then perhaps a label would be useful.

But also what can happen is a classic doctor error. A doctor might see someone's bright eyes and think they have a fever because sick people are what they see. So humility and openness on the part of the clinician is really really important.
 

Brickjectivity

wind and rain touch not this brain
Staff member
Premium Member
When they do not take into account cradle-to-grave studies that reveal what normal psychology is they show a prejudice. Data from such studies only becomes available in the last 50 years or so, so before that time I do not think there exists a way to reveal where there is a prejudice. Now with increasingly accurate models of how thinking happens there are better ways to judge when mental differences are truly mental problems. The assumption of many psychological judgments one hundred years ago is understandable.
 

Nous

Well-Known Member
Premium Member
At the end of the day, the descriptions of, and diagnoses for, mental disorders are little more than somewhat vague, often overly broad, and sometimes arbitrary observations compiled into convenient labels. There seems to be, at best, a very tenuous empirical or scientific basis for these descriptions/labels, or for the process by which they are arrived at and modified, over time. Certainly, a whole spectrum of biases and agendas seem to heavily influence the categorizations at any point in time.

The whole field of psychology seems to be driven largely by inertia, based in questionable assumptions and severely out-of-date perspectives.
How and when did spacetime rip open so that we agree 100% here?

Actually, in your last sentence I would substitute "psychiatry" for "psychology". These days, I think psychology is often more scientific than psychiatry.
 

Nous

Well-Known Member
Premium Member
Certainly some classifications are indeed prejudice as you correctly pointed out. Some, such as panic attacks, extreme suspicion that others are out to get one, schizophrenia and the like are true disorders. Thinking that voices are telling you to murder people is another obvious sign of a problem.
Panic attacks do seem strange. I think having them often is fairly rare. A few years, about 2 a.m., when I was still up working on something but my husband had gone to bed, there was a knock on my front door. I ignored it. Then the doorbell rang. I continued to ignore it, just not wanting to see and talk to whoever was knocking on the door at 2 a.m. Then my husband came into the room and said, "Why are the police at the front door?" I pretty much had a panic attack then--I couldn't get to the door fast enough, and even after one of them asked, "Did someone call from this house?" my heart continued to race. Was that a mental disorder?

I think for most people diagnosed with schizophrenia, the (primary) Criterion A symptom is delusions. What makes a false belief a mental disorder? Why can't it just be a false belief, without it being pathological?

Quantify "extreme" as it modifies "suspicion that others are out to get one". It's the plethora of non-quantified and non-quantifiable adjectives and adverbs in the DSM that makes me think it isn't scientific.

Another part of the answer to me is to start with asking questions: Is what's going on stopping you from living a reasonably happy, productive and fulfilling life? If the question is 'yes', the next step would be to find out more details and then perhaps a label would be useful.
So do all people who are not mentally disordered live "a reasonably happy, productive and fulfilling life"?

Again, quantify "reasonably'.
 

Nous

Well-Known Member
Premium Member
When they do not take into account cradle-to-grave studies that reveal what normal psychology is they show a prejudice. Data from such studies only becomes available in the last 50 years or so, so before that time I do not think there exists a way to reveal where there is a prejudice.
What studies are you referring to?

Now with increasingly accurate models of how thinking happens there are better ways to judge when mental differences are truly mental problems.
How, by what criteria, can one determine what thoughts constitute mental disorders?
 

sun rise

The world is on fire
Premium Member
Panic attacks do seem strange. I think having them often is fairly rare. A few years, about 2 a.m., when I was still up working on something but my husband had gone to bed, there was a knock on my front door. I ignored it. Then the doorbell rang. I continued to ignore it, just not wanting to see and talk to whoever was knocking on the door at 2 a.m. Then my husband came into the room and said, "Why are the police at the front door?" I pretty much had a panic attack then--I couldn't get to the door fast enough, and even after one of them asked, "Did someone call from this house?" my heart continued to race. Was that a mental disorder?

I think for most people diagnosed with schizophrenia, the (primary) Criterion A symptom is delusions. What makes a false belief a mental disorder? Why can't it just be a false belief, without it being pathological?

Quantify "extreme" as it modifies "suspicion that others are out to get one". It's the plethora of non-quantified and non-quantifiable adjectives and adverbs in the DSM that makes me think it isn't scientific.

So do all people who are not mentally disordered live "a reasonably happy, productive and fulfilling life"?

Again, quantify "reasonably'.
That front-door panic was based on a real event. When it gets to things like agoraphobia where the panic is not based on reality. Or another is PTSD.

Psychology/psychiatry is not, for the most part, hard science. Some studies are in a very hard science realm but most are not. One that is based on hard science is Schizophrenia.com - Schizophrenia is a Brain Disease

COS_map.jpg


But also the DSM document itself acknowledges the problem: While DSM has been the cornerstone of substantial progress in reliability, it has been well recognized by both the American Psychiatric Association (APA) and the broad scientific community working on mental disorders that past science was not mature enough to yield fully validated diagnoses—that is, to provide consistent, strong, and objective scientific validators of individual DSM disorders. The science of mental disorders continues to evolve. However, the last two decades since DSM-IV was released have seen real and durable progress in such areas as cognitive neuroscience, brain imaging, epidemiology, and genetics.

In other words, they agree with you that it's not hard science in all respects.

On another note, by asking that a general word reasonably be quantified, you're asking for the circle to be squared. If someone has a panic attack by the thought of walking out their front door, I think that qualifies as not being reasonably happy.
 

Brickjectivity

wind and rain touch not this brain
Staff member
Premium Member
What studies are you referring to?
I have lost the information, however the main outcome is something called Object Relations Theory. This transformed psychological Science (I think in the 1970s).

How, by what criteria, can one determine what thoughts constitute mental disorders?
That is not fully established and is being researched in an ongoing fashion, but it is being researched. In the past it was largely guesswork based upon brains of the cadavers of people with mental problems. There is a vastly improved potential to find real treatments for real problems, so that psychological approaches to treatments 50 or 100 years ago are not comparable to modern treatments.
 

Nous

Well-Known Member
Premium Member
That front-door panic was based on a real event.
That's right. What I described was not even close to meeting the diagnostic criteria of a panic attack disorder. Again, I agree that panic attack disorder is seeminlgy very strange, and when repeated panic attacks or fear of having another panic attack interfere with one's daily functioning and the responsibilities one has agreed to, I find it difficult to not see that as some kind of disorder.

Of course, one important issue is that panic attacks are defined according to overt physiological signs (e.g., tachycardia, sweating, trembling, chest pain, nausea, etc.). According to all DSMs since DSM-IV, if the symptoms can be attributed to some physiological condition ("general medical condition") or drug effect, then it is not a primary mental disorder, but a disorder due to a general medical condition or due to a substance.

Psychology/psychiatry is not, for the most part, hard science. Some studies are in a very hard science realm but most are not. One that is based on hard science is Schizophrenia.com - Schizophrenia is a Brain Disease

COS_map.jpg
Those are beautiful cartoons of a brain. But the DSM does not define schizophrenia nor any other primary mental disorder according to any objective biological measurements. The DSM defines schizophrenia in terms of having delusions, hallucinations, "disorganized speech," "grossly disorganized or catatonic behavior," and/or "negative symptoms," not due to having too little blue and yellow areas in one's brain.

If any mental disorder can be diagnosed on the basis of objective biological measurements, then it is malpractice to not do so, just like it would be malpractice to diagnose diabetes by a mere interview. Right?

While DSM has been the cornerstone of substantial progress in reliability,
Do you believe that the DSM is "reliable"? Do you believe that the diagnostic criteria for its hundreds of mental disorders demonstrate external validity?
 

Nous

Well-Known Member
Premium Member
I have lost the information, however the main outcome is something called Object Relations Theory. This transformed psychological Science (I think in the 1970s).
Are you claiming that none of the designations in recent DSMs are just expressions of socially condoned prejudice, like, presumably you agree, the "Homosexuality" disorder was?

I am unaware that any DSM has mentioned the mental disorders listed within were contrived by way of "Object Relations Theory".

That is not fully established and is being researched in an ongoing fashion, but it is being researched.
By what method does one "research" what makes a behavior, thought or feeling something to be called a mental disorder? That's a mere value judgment, is it not?

In the past it was largely guesswork based upon brains of the cadavers of people with mental problems.
Cite your sources.
 

sun rise

The world is on fire
Premium Member
That's right. What I described was not even close to meeting the diagnostic criteria of a panic attack disorder. Again, I agree that panic attack disorder is seeminlgy very strange, and when repeated panic attacks or fear of having another panic attack interfere with one's daily functioning and the responsibilities one has agreed to, I find it difficult to not see that as some kind of disorder.

Of course, one important issue is that panic attacks are defined according to overt physiological signs (e.g., tachycardia, sweating, trembling, chest pain, nausea, etc.). According to all DSMs since DSM-IV, if the symptoms can be attributed to some physiological condition ("general medical condition") or drug effect, then it is not a primary mental disorder, but a disorder due to a general medical condition or due to a substance.

Those are beautiful cartoons of a brain. But the DSM does not define schizophrenia nor any other primary mental disorder according to any objective biological measurements. The DSM defines schizophrenia in terms of having delusions, hallucinations, "disorganized speech," "grossly disorganized or catatonic behavior," and/or "negative symptoms," not due to having too little blue and yellow areas in one's brain.

If any mental disorder can be diagnosed on the basis of objective biological measurements, then it is malpractice to not do so, just like it would be malpractice to diagnose diabetes by a mere interview. Right?

Do you believe that the DSM is "reliable"? Do you believe that the diagnostic criteria for its hundreds of mental disorders demonstrate external validity?
I believe that the statement that was made in the DSM that I quoted is accurate. The DSM is not a "symptom checker" which reaches a set of possible diagnoses.
 

Kilgore Trout

Misanthropic Humanist
How and when did spacetime rip open so that we agree 100% here?

Actually, in your last sentence I would substitute "psychiatry" for "psychology". These days, I think psychology is often more scientific than psychiatry.

I've yet to encounter a thinking person I don't have some common ground with. Even if our fundamental perspectives and approaches differ.

I would say the only difference between psychiatry and psychology is that psychiatry is clearly more profit-driven, and thus any objective verification of efficacy is incidental, at best, and, more often, irrelevant (if not outright lied about).

The two, obviously, work closely together, but the main force behind pharmaceuticals for "psychiatric" conditions is the pharmaceutical corporations. I think there is more of a drive and intention for science within psychology. It's just that it's never been a very scientifically-minded culture or group.
 

Nous

Well-Known Member
Premium Member
I believe that the statement that was made in the DSM that I quoted is accurate.
For decades now, the studies conducted by the APA have consistently shown that even the most trained clinicians in the most favorable and unrealistic circumstances are unreliable in making diagnoses. In 1993 in “The Myth of the Reliability of DSM,” professors Stuart Kirk and Herb Kutchins wrote:

Twenty years after the reliability problem became the central focus of DSM-III, there is still not a single multi-site study showing that DSM (any version) is routinely used with high reliably by regular mental health clinicians. Nor is there any credible evidence that any version of the manual has greatly increased its reliability beyond the previous version. There are important methodological problems that limit the generalisability of most reliability studies. Each reliability study is constrained by the training and supervision of the interviewers, their motivation and commitment to diagnostic accuracy, their prior skill, the homogeneity of the clinical setting in regard to patient mix and base rates, and the methodological rigor achieved by the investigator in ensuring that the raters make diagnoses "independently." Equally important, most reliability studies have been conducted in specialised research settings and may have little bearing on the actual use of DSM by clinicians in normal, uncontrolled clinical settings, where external bureaucratic demands, reimbursement probabilities and potential stigma influence their judgements (Kirk and Kutchins, 1988; Kutchins and Kirk, 1988).​

https://www.academyanalyticarts.org/kirk-myth-reliability-dsm

In a 2007 paper, psychiatry professor Ahmed Aboraya reviewed some of the evidence of reliable with use of DSM-IV (my bolding):

The DSM-III was also intended to improve the reliability of psychiatric diagnoses, an everlasting problem in psychiatry.[4–13]

Today, 26 years later, did the DSM system succeed in improving the reliability of psychiatric diagnoses? Two answers exist. The DSM did improve the reliability of psychiatric diagnoses at the research level. If a researcher or a clinician can afford to spend 2 to 3 hours per patient using the DSM criteria and a structured interview or a rating scale, the reliability would improve.[13] For psychiatrists and clinicians, who live in a world without hours to spare, the reliability of psychiatric diagnoses is still poor.[2,3] Even Spitzer and Frances, the directors of DSM-III and DSM-IV Task Force, admit that the desired reliability among the practicing clinicians has not been obtained.[3] To illustrate the problem of unreliablity, I reviewed the charts of a 64-year-old African American man who had more than 38 psychiatric admissions over a span of 43 years. Upon discharge the patient had the following diagnoses: schizophrenia, catatonia; schizophrenia, paranoid; schizophrenia, hebephrenic; schizophrenia, undifferentiated; schizoaffective disorder; bipolar type; and bipolar disorder with psychosis. Psychiatrists and clinicians attest that patients with multiple diagnoses are not uncommon.

The Reliability of Psychiatric Diagnoses: Point—Our psychiatric Diagnoses are Still Unreliable

In 2012, Dr. Frances (mentioned above) published an article in Psychology Today:

DSM-5: How Reliable Is Reliable Enough?

This is the title of a disturbing commentary written by the leaders of the DSM 5 Task Force and published in this month's American Journal of Psychiatry. The contents suggest that we must lower our expectations and be satisfied with levels of unreliability in DSM 5 that historically have been clearly unacceptable. Two approaches are possible when the DSM 5 field trials reveal low reliability for a given suggestion: 1) admit that the suggestion was a bad idea or that it is written so ambiguously as to be unusable in clinical practice, research, and forensics; Or, 2) declare by arbitrary fiat that the low reliability is indeed now to be relabeled 'acceptable'.

In the past, 'acceptable' meant kappas of 0.6 or above. When the personality disorders in DSM III came in at 0.54, they were roundly derided and given only a reluctant bye. For DSM 5, 'acceptable' reliability has been reduced to a startling 0.2-0.4. This barely exceeds the level of agreement you might expect to get by pure chance.​

DSM-5: How Reliable Is Reliable Enough?

Besides the diagnoses, the very creation of mental disorder designations is often motivated by political and financial considerations. Due largely to public pressure, in 1973 the diagnosis of “Homosexuality” was eliminated from the 6th printing of DSM-II, but was replaced with Sexual Orientation Disturbance, which designated homosexuality as a mental disorder if the person found his/her same-sex attractions distressing and wanted to change. As has been noted by a number of scholars, creating this disorder allowed psychiatrists to continue to receive insurance reimbursements for “conversion therapy”. In DSM-III (1980), SOD was essentially renamed Ego Dystonic Homosexuality. This disorder was dropped per se from DSM-III-R in 1987, but was specifically described as an example of Sexual Disorder Not Otherwise Specified.

One can easily discern parallels between the APA's handling of “homosexuality” and transgender identity. The Gender Identity Disorder diagnosis came into being in DSM-III, and ever since, transgender persons have pleaded that transgender identification is not a mental illness. The APA is nothing if not recalcitrant in assimilating such information. Eventually in DSM-5, GID was changed to Gender Dysphoria Disorder, with diagnostic criteria that place less emphasis on identity and more on the transgendered person's dissatisfaction with his/her biological sex and primary and secondary sex characteristics, and the desire to change to gender. However, given that mere cross-gender identification will generally entail some degree with dissatisfaction with one's biological gender, it's difficult not to see the DSM-5 as accomplishing nothing more than a change in nomenclature.

Because neither the diagnostic criteria nor the diagnosis of mental disorders entails any objective biological measurements, racism is a factor in the diagnoses of mental disorders. Examining the records of 135,000 US veterans, Blow et al. found that, despite similar symptom presentations, African Americans were more than 4 times more likely than whites to be diagnosed with schizophrenia (instead of bipolar disorder), while Hispanic Americans were 3.15 times more likely to recieve a diagnosis of schizophrenia than whites. As the article notes, people diagnosed with a psychotic disorder are treated quite differently than those given a mood disorder (bipolar) diagnosis. People diagnosed with a psychotic disorder are prescribed more toxic, more debilitating drugs and are more often subjected to forced drugging and confinement.

If any other medical discipline or government-endorsed institution demonstrated such racism today, there would be public outrage. The institution would be shut down.
 

Nous

Well-Known Member
Premium Member
I would say the only difference between psychiatry and psychology is that psychiatry is clearly more profit-driven, and thus any objective verification of efficacy is incidental, at best, and, more often, irrelevant (if not outright lied about).

The two, obviously, work closely together, but the main force behind pharmaceuticals for "psychiatric" conditions is the pharmaceutical corporations. I think there is more of a drive and intention for science within psychology. It's just that it's never been a very scientifically-minded culture or group.
Agree. My comment about psychology being more scientific was based on the fact that I've come across lots of studies by pschologists that are conducted with utmost care toward employing the scientific method. Also, a significant portion of psychologists and social workers in academia are part of the push-back against the nonsense of psychiatry.
 
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