What do you mean by "free will?"

[9-10ths_Penguin]

His argument was, because he cannot chose the choices he gets to chose from, that free will does not exist. My analysis is spot on. We get to chose from the cards we been dealt. That is free will.

... but we don't choose which cards we're dealt, so our behaviour - and therefore our capacity to actually inflict evil on others - is limited by external factors.

 

[Enoch07]

... but we don't choose which cards we're dealt, so our behaviour - and therefore our capacity to actually inflict evil on others - is limited by external factors.

We do the best we can with what we have.

Why is our capacity limited? Any person can molest a child or rape someone. These are the 2 most evil things you can do to someone.

 

[Apologes]

The free will defense presupposes the coherence of libertarian free will. It doesn't argue for it but aims to resolve the difficulty between evil and God existing by pointing to us having this free will.

What you're objecting to isn't the defense itself but a theologically neutral idea which the defense presupposes.

 

[Koldo]

The free will defense presupposes the coherence of libertarian free will. It doesn't argue for it but aims to resolve the difficulty between evil and God existing by pointing to us having this free will.

What you're objecting to isn't the defense itself but a theologically neutral idea which the defense presupposes.

Not quite. Even if we accept that libertarian free will exists, that still doesn't explain why God doesn't interfer on step #3 ( refer back to the OP ).

 

[9-10ths_Penguin]

The free will defense presupposes the coherence of libertarian free will. It doesn't argue for it but aims to resolve the difficulty between evil and God existing by pointing to us having this free will.

Even libertarianists don't argue that "free will" implies that any desire we have must be physically possible.

What you're objecting to isn't the defense itself but a theologically neutral idea which the defense presupposes.

If you have a complete defense in mind, please give it.

 

[Apologes]

Not quite. Even if we accept that libertarian free will exists, that still doesn't explain why God doesn't interfer on step #3 ( refer back to the OP ).

Even libertarianists don't argue that "free will" implies that any desire we have must be physically possible.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but by the third step are you asking why does God construct the world in such a way that we can in fact fulfill these evil desires even if He allowed these desires to be completely free and up to the agent and why instead He couldn't have created a world in which, even when one tries, they fail (for any reason) to fulfill this desire?

For example, a maniac decides to run over a pedestrian but his car engine suddenly dies and he fails to run him over.

 

[Koldo]

Correct me if I'm wrong, but by the third step are you asking why does God construct the world in such a way that we can in fact fulfill these evil desires even if He allowed these desires to be completely free and up to the agent and why instead He couldn't have created a world in which, even when one tries, they fail (for any reason) to fulfill this desire?

For example, a maniac decides to run over a pedestrian but his car engine suddenly dies and he fails to run him over.

Not exactly what I had in mind.
I meant: why doesn't God interfer when people go around fulfulling evil desires ?
Not by design, but by divine intervention.

 

[9-10ths_Penguin]

Correct me if I'm wrong, but by the third step are you asking why does God construct the world in such a way that we can in fact fulfill these evil desires even if He allowed these desires to be completely free and up to the agent and why instead He couldn't have created a world in which, even when one tries, they fail (for any reason) to fulfill this desire?

For example, a maniac decides to run over a pedestrian but his car engine suddenly dies and he fails to run him over.

A better way of looking at it: our desires often don't get fulfilled already.

If I wanted to, say, poison someone with water, stab them with licorice, or make their head explode by telekinesis, the person won't die.

In a more pedestrian sense: if I lie in wait for someone on their usual route home but they choose a different route, my will will be thwarted. The Spanish Armada's invasion of Britain was thwarted by bad weather.

There are lots of cases where we will something to happen, but it doesn't happen. We don't need to propose things like magic cars to see that if our will can be thwarted now but we still have free will, it could be thwarted even more while still maintaining our free will.

Edit: my question isn't so much "why does God construct the world in such a way that we can in fact fulfill these evil desires?" as it is "why does God construct the world in such a way that we can fulfill some evil desires, given that he's constructed the world in such a way as to prevent us from fulfilling most of the spectrum of possible evil desires?"

 

[Apologes]

Not exactly what I had in mind.
I meant: why doesn't God interfer when people go around fulfulling evil desires ?
Not by design, but by divine intervention.

A better way of looking at it: our desires often don't get fulfilled already.

If I wanted to, say, poison someone with water, stab them with licorice, or make their head explode by telekinesis, the person won't die.

In a more pedestrian sense: if I lie in wait for someone on their usual route home but they choose a different route, my will will be thwarted. The Spanish Armada's invasion of Britain was thwarted by bad weather.

There are lots of cases where we will something to happen, but it doesn't happen. We don't need to propose things like magic cars to see that if our will can be thwarted now but we still have free will, it could be thwarted even more while still maintaining our free will.

Edit: my question isn't so much "why does God construct the world in such a way that we can in fact fulfill these evil desires?" as it is "why does God construct the world in such a way that we can fulfill some evil desires, given that he's constructed the world in such a way as to prevent us from fulfilling most of the spectrum of possible evil desires?"

Well, as I see it, your example of a person choosing a different route fails because, while it is true that you are fully free in your choice to wait for the would-be-victim, it is actually the would-be-victim's freedom that God would impair because He would have to make them decide to change the route. Since "you can't make someone freely do something" this is clearly a violation of free will on God's part. Such scenarios of avoiding evil wouldn't be possible for God to actualize as it is in control of the agent rather than God which route they take on their way home.

The example of bad weather you mention or the car breaking down are more sensible because there doesn't seem to be any interference with the agents choosing something but, while it is true that pure freedom isn't impaired, it is, in a way, trivialized for now we must ask why have this world of free creatures when all freedom is good for is determining what one would try to do, which you yourself seem to ask in a rather different wording with the bold. Why is it that God lets people actually suceed in the evils they freely choose to do when they would be morally condemnable for merely attempting them?

If I have understood your question correctly then I'd point out that God didn't, in fact, give us free will simply to evaluate our moral behaviour when faced with a particular choice. Rather, as a Christian, I take God's bestowing us with free will and leaving us as moral agents in a world of our own to be for the purpose of being rulers of our own world, so that through our free choices we shape the world around us, so that we can decide which course the history of our world will take, for better or worse. The answer to the question why does God not interfere with our evils much like a parent slapping the hand of a disobedient child as it tries to steal a candy from a store would is that God gave us full integrity to mold both our characters and the world around us as we see fit. Man is of the world but the world is also of man. That's the way I see it.

 

[9-10ths_Penguin]

Well, as I see it, your example of a person choosing a different route fails because, while it is true that you are fully free in your choice to wait for the would-be-victim, it is actually the would-be-victim's freedom that God would impair because He would have to make them decide to change the route. Since "you can't make someone freely do something" this is clearly a violation of free will on God's part. Such scenarios of avoiding evil wouldn't be possible for God to actualize as it is in control of the agent rather than God which route they take on their way home.

There are plenty of ways that circumstance can get in the way of us doing what we want. If you don't like that one, there are infinitely many other examples we could use.

My point is that the mere fact that someone wants some outcome to happen does not make it inevitable that the outcome will actually happen.

The example of bad weather you mention or the car breaking down are more sensible because there doesn't seem to be any interference with the agents choosing something but, while it is true that pure freedom isn't impaired, it is, in a way, trivialized for now we must ask why have this world of free creatures when all freedom is good for is determining what one would try to do, which you yourself seem to ask in a rather different wording with the bold. Why is it that God lets people actually suceed in the evils they freely choose to do when they would be morally condemnable for merely attempting them?

But we aren't "free" for the most part, as I've been pointing out.

If I have understood your question correctly then I'd point out that God didn't, in fact, give us free will simply to evaluate our moral behaviour when faced with a particular choice. Rather, as a Christian, I take God's bestowing us with free will and leaving us as moral agents in a world of our own to be for the purpose of being rulers of our own world, so that through our free choices we shape the world around us, so that we can decide which course the history of our world will take, for better or worse.

Sounds like you didn't actually understand what I'm asking.

The answer to the question why does God not interfere with our evils much like a parent slapping the hand of a disobedient child as it tries to steal a candy from a store would is that God gave us full integrity to mold both our characters and the world around us as we see fit. Man is of the world but the world is also of man. That's the way I see it.

That doesn't actually answer what I'm asking.

We don't have "full integrity to mold both our characters and the world around us as we see fit." We only have limited ability to do this. We also don't have the freedom to choose what we will regard as "fit;" we don't choose our desires.

So how do you reconcile evil acts that happen with the existence of a loving god, given that the "free will" defense - by itself - can't be squared with the facts of human existence?

 

[Apologes]

There are plenty of ways that circumstance can get in the way of us doing what we want. If you don't like that one, there are infinitely many other examples we could use.

You are free to offer more, because I don't consider the examples so far provided sucessful for reasons already mentioned.

But we aren't "free" for the most part, as I've been pointing out.

We don't have "full integrity to mold both our characters and the world around us as we see fit." We only have limited ability to do this. We also don't have the freedom to choose what we will regard as "fit;" we don't choose our desires.

As has been said in my first post here, the free will defense presupposes the truth of libertarian free will according to which we are free to fully determine our own character, desires included (the concept known as Ultimate Responsibility). Any discussion on the free will defense requires us to make that assumption, unless, ofcourse, you want to reject it by rejecting libertarian free will itself, hence why I said in my first post that you're objecting to libertarian free will (the sense in which we are "free") in general rather than the free will defense (the notion that free will resolves the apparent incompatibility between God existing and there being evil in the world) in specific.

Sounds like you didn't actually understand what I'm asking.

That doesn't actually answer what I'm asking.

Until a sound explanation of why my answer was unsatisfactory is proposed, these will remain baseless assertions.

 

[Koldo]

The answer to the question why does God not interfere with our evils much like a parent slapping the hand of a disobedient child as it tries to steal a candy from a store would is that God gave us full integrity to mold both our characters and the world around us as we see fit. Man is of the world but the world is also of man. That's the way I see it.

I will strictly reply to this part of your post since it is the one that addresses my post.
Do you mean that letting us mold our characters is more important to God than preventing evil ?
As in letting someone become a child rapist through his actions is more important to God than preventing children from being raped ?

 

[Apologes]

Do you mean that letting us mold our characters is more important to God than preventing evil ?
As in letting someone become a child rapist through his actions is more important to God than preventing children from being raped ?

Yes.

 

[Koldo]

Yes.

How is that benevolent ?

 

[Apologes]

How is that benevolent ?

I believe it is up to you to explain how permitting an evil to occur in favor of moral autonomy presents a defeater for divine omnibenevolence.

 

[9-10ths_Penguin]

Yes.

Then why are many rapes prevented by circumstances that are presumably under God's control?

 

[Koldo]

I believe it is up to you to explain how permitting an evil to occur in favor of moral autonomy presents a defeater for divine omnibenevolence.

If you were watching a child being raped, would you interfer ? Wouldn't you regard doing so as a moral action ? Wouldn't you regard not doing so as an immoral action ?

 

[Apologes]

If you were watching a child being raped, would you interfer ? Wouldn't you regard doing so as a moral action ? Wouldn't you regard not doing so as an immoral action ?

Then why are many rapes prevented by circumstances that are presumably under God's control?

Before I get to pointing out the disanalogy between God and us I want to explain the concept of intristic goods. As I said already, freedom of the will is an intristic good such that it is better to have a world of free agents that do good and evil than to have a world of automata that are programmed to only do good.

Further more, an even greater intristic good is to have a world in which these free agents are free to mold their characters and the world around them (which results in there being evil in the world) than to have a world in which these free agents are only free in attempting to do evil (wherein all attempts would fail and so they would be completely restricted in their molding the world around them as well as, to a lesser degree, their characters).

Finally, the greatest intristic good of them all is to have a world in which free agents who are capable of molding their characters and the world around them for good or evil choose to mold it for good rather than evil and come to, despite being faced with horrible evils that result either from moral or natural sources, know God and enter a loving relationship with Him along with their fellow humans.

Given such a framework, I think I can provide adequate answers to both of yours questions. As far as the question of "Why does God not prevent a certain evil when we ought to" goes, the answer is that unlike God we cannot assess the full value of these intristic goods while an omniscient being supposedly could and are blinded in part by our specism. (Hardly anyone bats an eye when a lion rapes another lion.) Also, God, being a provident deity, has so ordained the world to have just the right amount of good and evil so as to create the world of most intristic value. Given such a state of affairs, it would be actually morally wrong for God to change this balance which results in an overall better world in favor of accomplishing a lesser good. In a way, forsaking a greater good in favor of a lesser good which down the line produces worse results would be the truly evil thing to do.

Unlike God however, man is mandated (by God, no less) to prevent all evil he is capable of preventing thus excercising free will to help bring about a state of most intristic value. Also, our duty to prevent a given evil is because we do not know which evil will result in a world with more intristic good and, either way, as far as we're concerned, these results could only come from us failing to stop it after trying, for it is better to have a world in which an evil wasn't stopped even though we did all we could to stop it than a world in which an evil wasn't stopped because we didn't even try to stop it. It is our doing the most we can to be the best moral agents that increases the intristic value of a given world.

Similarly, the question of "Why do certain evils occur and others are prevented by circumstances outside of man's control" can be answered by pointing out that the evils that occur are sufficient for creating a world with the right amount of intristic good and in which adding further evil would result in a state of affairs which is more destructive than constructive, ie being less intristically good.

 

[Koldo]

Before I get to pointing out the disanalogy between God and us I want to explain the concept of intristic goods. As I said already, freedom of the will is an intristic good such that it is better to have a world of free agents that do good and evil than to have a world of automata that are programmed to only do good.

I will accept this for the debate's sake.

Further more, an even greater intristic good is to have a world in which these free agents are free to mold their characters and the world around them (which results in there being evil in the world) than to have a world in which these free agents are only free in attempting to do evil (wherein all attempts would fail and so they would be completely restricted in their molding the world around them as well as, to a lesser degree, their characters).

This is a bit complicated, because you certainly don't mean we should stand-by and watch while people perform evil, right ? You certainly mean that we, as free agents, also have the freedom to mold ourselves by preventing evil, isn't that correct ? And, at the end of the day, it is better when free agents do prevent evil, isn't that right ?

In that case, then the same applies to God. It is better when God, as a free agent, prevents evil.

Finally, the greatest intristic good of them all is to have a world in which free agents who are capable of molding their characters and the world around them for good or evil choose to mold it for good rather than evil and come to, despite being faced with horrible evils that result either from moral or natural sources, know God and enter a loving relationship with Him along with their fellow humans.

Given such a framework, I think I can provide adequate answers to both of yours questions. As far as the question of "Why does God not prevent a certain evil when we ought to" goes, the answer is that unlike God we cannot assess the full value of these intristic goods while an omniscient being supposedly could and are blinded in part by our specism. (Hardly anyone bats an eye when a lion rapes another lion.) Also, God, being a provident deity, has so ordained the world to have just the right amount of good and evil so as to create the world of most intristic value. Given such a state of affairs, it would be actually morally wrong for God to change this balance which results in an overall better world in favor of accomplishing a lesser good. In a way, forsaking a greater good in favor of a lesser good which down the line produces worse results would be the truly evil thing to do.

I don't quite understand what you mean here. What do you mean by 'ordained the world to have just the right amount of good and evil' ? How can that be the case if the world is composed of free agents ?

Unlike God however, man is mandated (by God, no less) to prevent all evil he is capable of preventing thus excercising free will to help bring about a state of most intristic value. Also, our duty to prevent a given evil is because we do not know which evil will result in a world with more intristic good and, either way, as far as we're concerned, these results could only come from us failing to stop it after trying, for it is better to have a world in which an evil wasn't stopped even though we did all we could to stop it than a world in which an evil wasn't stopped because we didn't even try to stop it. It is our doing the most we can to be the best moral agents that increases the intristic value of a given world.

Do you mean that God needs certain evils to happen to achieve the greater good ?
Why ?

 

[Apologes]

I don't quite understand what you mean here. What do you mean by 'ordained the world to have just the right amount of good and evil' ? How can that be the case if the world is composed of free agents ?

I'm not sure where you think the conflict lies, are you're asking how the world can be composed of free agents if there are external influences which dictate that some things will not be possible (for example a man decides to go out but he is forced to stay inside because the snow that has been falling all night is blocking his doorway) considering how this would not allow them to mould the world in the way they intended (which could, perhaps, be either the man stealing something from an old lady or, more positively, helping that lady carry her heavy bags)?

If this is your question (a charge that we are prevented by divinely ordained circumstances from freely doing certain things) then I can answer it on two fronts:

1) This is, again, more of an attack on the coherence of libertarian free will rather than something unique to the free will defense, for it is a general question of how external influences (be they random, brute facts or divinely orchestrated) can be squared off with the idea that we are the ultimate source of our characters and actions. The problem is not, therefore, one that I find relevant for discussing whether free will (on the assumption that it is real) solves the problem of evil.

2) As I said in my previous post, God's goal is to balance the world so as to have optimal intristic value which may mean making certain situations impossible. The agents would still be free but certain situations which would lead to overriding deficiencies would be prevented from happening (such as the case of the man wanting to go out but being unable due to the snow blocking his door).

This is a bit complicated, because you certainly don't mean we should stand-by and watch while people perform evil, right ? You certainly mean that we, as free agents, also have the freedom to mold ourselves by preventing evil, isn't that correct ? And, at the end of the day, it is better when free agents do prevent evil, isn't that right ?

In that case, then the same applies to God. It is better when God, as a free agent, prevents evil.

Do you mean that God needs certain evils to happen to achieve the greater good ?
Why ?

I believe I have answered these two questions in my previous post so, unable to make myself much clearer, I will not answer them again.