Once Robinson’s activity came to his attention, the judge at Leeds Crown Court commenced summary contempt proceedings of his own motion
the same day. Having invoked the procedure, and Robinson having ‘admitted’ the contempt, he heard from Robinson’s counsel in mitigation and
proceeded to sentence Robinson that afternoon to an immediate term of imprisonment of 13 months. This term comprised 10 months for the contempt at Leeds consecutive to the activated 3 month suspended sentence from Canterbury.
The appeal to the Court of Appeal was initially only in respect of sentence, but it became apparent that a number of procedural flaws existed in the way that the case had been dealt with at Leeds.
During the appeal, criticisms were levelled by Robinson’s counsel at the process before the Canterbury court too. The Court of Appeal considered these to be without merit. Notably a criticism that Robinson had not been provided with a statement of the particulars of the alleged contempt prior to it being found was given short shrift in the light of an advice from his counsel (in respect of which privilege had been waived) from which it was apparent that a deliberate tactical decision had been made not to seek greater particularity. The Court of Appeal refused permission to appeal against the substantive decision and the sentence, save to amend what had been recorded as a suspended sentence of imprisonment to a suspended committal for contempt.
The chief complaint made in respect of the Leeds matter – that the judge had been too hasty in dealing with and concluding the proceedings – was considered to be well-founded. As the Court noted (
per Lord Burnett CJ at para 60 of the judgment): “
In contrast to the procedure followed in Canterbury, where the appellant had over a week to secure representation and to prepare his response to the allegations against him, the appellant at Leeds was commencing a term of imprisonment of thirteen months within five hours of the conduct complained of. Such haste gave rise to a real risk that procedural safeguards would be overlooked, the nature of the contempt alleged would remain inadequately scrutinised and that points of significant mitigation would be missed. Those risks materialised.”
Put simply, there was no particular need for the judge to do as he did. Robinson had offered to, and did, remove the offending material from the Facebook page. This removed the immediate risk to the fairness of the proceedings that were at that stage ongoing. Once that had been done, there was no pressing need for the contempt proceedings to continue immediately. A more appropriate course would have been to adjourn to permit the hearing to proceed on a better informed basis.
In swiftly embarking on the summary procedure, as opposed to inviting the Attorney General to take contempt proceedings,
the judge had failed properly to particularise
which aspects of Robinson’s ‘report’ breached the postponement order. Of greater concern was the consequence that, while Robinson had ‘admitted’ the contempt (and the Court of Appeal was in no doubt that some of the material
did breach the postponement order) it was unclear what to what his purported admission related. Some of the more potentially inflammatory material may have constituted a free-standing contempt in its own right,
but did not breach the relevant postponement order.
A further difficulty from the speed at which the proceedings were conducted was the absence of time for Robinson’s counsel to marshal mitigation and, in particular, to ensure that the Court had proper information concerning his family situation, something that could have been obtained through a pre-committal report. Had this been a criminal case, the Court would have been obliged, unless it thought it unnecessary, to obtain and consider a pre-sentence report. The Court of Appeal observed that “it would be unusual, to say the least, for a man with three young children to be sent to prison at a first hearing without some independent inquiry into his family’s circumstances”. The level of detail which could be provided to the court concerning the potential impact of a custodial term or its duration upon the appellant’s wife and children was very limited indeed as a result. Furthermore, there was no opportunity for his legal representatives to obtain support from third parties in the form of character references or the like.
Last, but not least, the fact that the Robinson’s sentence was expressed as being a sentence of imprisonment under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 as opposed to a committal for contempt meant that he was wrongly categorised within the prison system (those committed for contempt enjoy the same privileges as unconvicted persons). By categorising him as serving a sentence of imprisonment, the judge’s order had the effect of depriving Robinson of privileges relating to visits by his doctor or dentist, the freedom to choose what clothes to wear and the absence of restrictions on prison visits and the sending and receipt of letters. It also affected the regime upon his release (those committed for contempt are released automatically after half of the sentence; those who are imprisoned are subject to release on licence with the attendant risk of recall).
Case Comment: the Court of Appeal’s decision in Tommy Robinson’s case - The 6KBW Blog
I have provided evidence that Tommy appealed his conviction but so far, you have been unable to provide any evidence that Tommy did not choose for his case to be tried by jury.
Instead, you go off at a tangent by bringing magistrates in as red herrings and convincing gullible readers that your fake news is to be believed.
