ToE and Platonism

[Troublemane]

Does Darwinism (in particular) and modern Evolutionary Theory (in general) reject the Platonist view of 'substance'?

What I mean by this: can living beings be defined by what they are? Or are they to be viewed as 'becomings'?

Do genes define inclusion into a species? Is it causal or is it more loose than that? Are there not clearly defined genes which determine species, but sets of genes? And if you have some of those sets, you are included?

And finally, as species appear and disappear, can it be said with any certainty that there is anything like "survival of the fittest"? If circumstances change all the time, what is "fittest" must be relative, shouldnt it?

 

[lunamoth]

Does Darwinism (in particular) and modern Evolutionary Theory (in general) reject the Platonist view of 'substance'?

What I mean by this: can living beings be defined by what they are? Or are they to be viewed as 'becomings'?

I think you can choose to see living things, or anything for that matter, either way. The distinction you seem to be making is whether 'species,' as currently understood as classifications, are fixed or changeable. I am not a philosopher, but there are at least a few cans of worms in your statements above.

Do genes define inclusion into a species? Is it causal or is it more loose than that?

It is more loose than that, but genetic relatedness can support classifications of species. Closely related populations of individuals are regarded as different species if they do not interbreed. Isolated populations can drift in genetic make-up, and we would only be concerned about the emergence of a new species in comparison to another population of organisms that are similar.

Are there not clearly defined genes which determine species, but sets of genes? And if you have some of those sets, you are included?

Not really. It depends upon reproductive isolation as stated above. Other than that, different genuses, classes, families, etc. are grouped largely upon physiological traits. Genetic classification has caused some rearrangement of the original classifications and shown how different classes, families etc are related to each other. You would probably find that certain genetic markers correlate with different classifications. But, I know of no criteria that say "if you have gene X you must be species Y." It is possible that gene X sequence will correlate with overall genetic relatedness, though.

And finally, as species appear and disappear, can it be said with any certainty that there is anything like "survival of the fittest"? If circumstances change all the time, what is "fittest" must be relative, shouldnt it?

The traits that are 'fittest' will change with the environment. That's pretty much what natural selection is all about. I don't see the problem.

 

[lunamoth]

Maybe you can state again where you would like to go with the questions in your OP. I tend to like the viewpoint of 'beings' as 'becomings.' It is not necessary to take a material or atomic view of existence. We can also take the view that we are fleeting processes, rather than concrete things.

 

[Troublemane]

Perhaps I should state the theory of 'substance', as i understand it. I think it is attributed to Aristotle, he defined substance as that which persists despite changes being made to alter a thing superficially. A horse is still a horse, whether it is dead or alive, painted blue, young or old, big or small, etc. It is a horse because that is its essential defining property. That is the identity upon which all other qualities hang.

You could say, in the Aristotlean sense, that the 'substance' is the horse, and all other qualities are modifications which give it its distinctiveness.

What we have discovered through science is that since the horse is made up of molecules, chromosomes, etc. all arranged to make the horse, one could argue that the DNA code is its substance. Its the pattern which determines the degree of horseness the organism possesses.

But, if all species are adapting and changing through selective factors, what defines the species is relative. So does ToE force us to reject the concept of 'substance' altogether? Or does it merely modify it?

This was an important question to alot of philosphers throughout history, so I am wondering how we might think of it now given our modern outlook, science, etc.

 

[Meow Mix]

Perhaps I should state the theory of 'substance', as i understand it. I think it is attributed to Aristotle, he defined substance as that which persists despite changes being made to alter a thing superficially. A horse is still a horse, whether it is dead or alive, painted blue, young or old, big or small, etc. It is a horse because that is its essential defining property. That is the identity upon which all other qualities hang.

You could say, in the Aristotlean sense, that the 'substance' is the horse, and all other qualities are modifications which give it its distinctiveness.

What we have discovered through science is that since the horse is made up of molecules, chromosomes, etc. all arranged to make the horse, one could argue that the DNA code is its substance. Its the pattern which determines the degree of horseness the organism possesses.

But, if all species are adapting and changing through selective factors, what defines the species is relative. So does ToE force us to reject the concept of 'substance' altogether? Or does it merely modify it?

This was an important question to alot of philosphers throughout history, so I am wondering how we might think of it now given our modern outlook, science, etc.

The problem with applying Aristotlian substance to organisms is that it can be a moving goalpost.

For instance, your horse example: horses are classified as Animalia Chordata Mammalia Perissodactyla Equidae Equus ferus. At what level do we say "aha, that is the substance?"

If the horse speciates then it's no longer E. ferus. More evolutionary branching and extinction would give us organisms that are no longer genus Equus. More might give us organisms that are no longer in family Equidae.

However, it could be argued that after such an evolutionary event (with the key point that we also have the extinction of the original organism through genetic drift or whatever) then the Aristotlian might simply shrug and say the substance is defined at taxonomical level X, and that the organisms which branched off from X are simply a new substance (the essence of X is still there, it just may have gone extinct!)

I don't know enough about Aristotle or Plato's ontologies of substance to know whether or not they would be okay with one substance giving rise to another, though.

 

[Troublemane]

Unless we decide that perhaps information is itself "substance". I am wondering if information could be the modern equivalent?

Although I see your point, MM. Anyone who believes in the Platonist/Aristotlean idea of 'substance' is likely to see in DNA/information support for their belief, while those who reject it will similarly see support for their rejection.

 

[doppelganger]

Unless we decide that perhaps information is itself "substance".

Information is "form."

 

[Troublemane]

Information is "form."

Not quite. To "inform" is to form "inside", to give form to the mind. It means communication, and the idea behind the words. Form is, strictly speaking, something different.

Substance is supposedly what gives the horse its form. So would that be DNA?

The Greeks first proposed atomic theory, you know. So it is not without precedent that an idea held then could (even though vaguely formed) relate pretty well to our own, modern view of the world.

 

[doppelganger]

Not quite. To "inform" is to form "inside", to give form to the mind. It means communication, and the idea behind the words. Form is, strictly speaking, something different.

Or it means, "to impart form." In terms of the 'interior' phenomenology of things, they obtain their substance as things by being associated with information. Substance without form, i.e. undifferentiated and unitary substance unassociated with information is "God" (according to Spinoza) or also the Tao, the Void (Nietzsche), or the Absolutely Maximum (Nicholas of Cusa).

Substance is supposedly what gives the horse its form. So would that be DNA?

There is no "horse" until a form is attached to it.

 

[Troublemane]

There is no "horse" until a form is attached to it.

I don't know about that. If you cut the legs off a horse, it is still a horse. If it is born deformed, even just a lump of flesh, the DNA would tell you it is a horse, even if it wasn't formed properly.

The thing's horseness should inhere regardless of whether it is blue or red, or set on fire, or whether it has cancerous tumors, or whether it has six legs, shouldn't it?

 

[doppelganger]

In Plato's philosophy, the only "true" things are the things of Form found in ideas. In a sense, that's correct, the things of the senses are imitators of the Forms from language (ideas). But that creates the seeming paradox of which comes first - the form of a group of things or the things themselves? One resolution is to recognize that, grammatically, a form (such as a garden variety common noun) does not intrinsically refer to any particular thing of the senses, but is itself a reference to a set of attributes or properties. The recurrence of this set of attributes in memory is the form, which is then associated with a common noun.

 

[doppelganger]

I don't know about that. If you cut the legs off a horse, it is still a horse.

If you put it in a meat grinder, form it into a patty and grill it, is it a "horse"? Or is it a "burger"?

 

[Kilgore Trout]

When labels cease to identify, they become rather useless tools.

 

[doppelganger]

When labels cease to identify, they become rather useless tools.

Sure. When they are used for purposes for which they are not suited, they also become rather useless tools.