So, [by] what formula do you consider your experiences real regardless if others believe you or not?
In view of Vestigial’s post (quote below), does this business really admit a definition in a human language? Our relationship to the cosmos resembles that between subject and circumstantial clause in an English sentence, yet every English sentence centers about the subject and
object of its verb. This creates problems even starting the discussion, much less bringing it to a conclusion.
Ancient Egyptians, beginning to apply the rebus principle to record the spoken word 5kya, ran into this fact: to name is to
believe, a conundrum which only got worse as pen & ink evolved from labels for merchandise jars to legal texts composed in full subject-predicate form developing the paragraph to, circa 2000 BCE, the world’s first known written narrative,
Shipwrecked Sailor (Papyrus Leningrad 1115), already a nested literature, a story within a story within a story, delivered in first, second and third person pronouns.
Read it in hieroglyphic transcription and English at
Mark-Jan Nederhof
University of St. Andrews
https://mjn.host.cs.st-andrews.ac.uk/egyptian/texts/corpus/pdf/Shipwrecked.pdf
(The original 12th Dynasty document at the Hermitage, St. Petersburg, Russia, was produced in a cursive handwriting called hieratic; the hieroglyphs we see carved on walls were used mostly for monuments or temples.)
I hate to bring linguistic considerations into the thread, yet because we talking animals have only this medium to communicate ideas from our privy minds one to another, I must do so. For contra postmodern thinking, the world depends neither upon the observer or that observer’s thoughts, nor, contra the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, upon the language she uses. To subscribe otherwise is to conflate descriptors with the realities they intend to represent.
In short, my experiences are real to me alone, as yours differ from mine. They’re as real to me if my neighbor discredits me as they are if he takes me honest. Yet I cannot claim personal experience to model reality beyond the extent to which mine correspond to the experiences of other people. For this we require
measurables, things we can agree to qualify, quantify, and describe using a shared terminology. We agree roses are red, whatever the color sensation “red” means, as the physics and physiology of light guarantee we’ll all reckon pretty closely on the color of a flower we behold. Just don’t count on Mrs. Honeybee to join our chorus; she sees ultraviolets we do not, yet remains blind to the red we lavish.
Another example - language isn't even a thing to be conceptualized. Not only is there no one to talk to, but that separated mind can't hear anything or form sound on its own to conceptualize what it would be like to even communicate at all. Why would it need words? It would have no concept of "symbols", no experience with visual stimulus whatsoever. And what is there to communicate about anyway?
I suspect the problem not lack of people to talk to or things to talk about, or symbols to use, but of adequate descriptors to convey those elements of our privy minds which might carry meaning to our listeners. While I don’t know the situation of the organism
Ulmus pumila regarding content of mind or ability to communicate such, it’s known that elms do in fact message neighbors. Once infested by elm bark beetles,
Ulmus, by means of a signaling molecule carried by wind, “warns” nearby trees to stiffen their chemical defenses.
Hardly language in a human sense. But it’s got a subject, the second-person pronoun referring to the tree which receives the molecule, and an imperative verb with object, “stop beetles!” All it misses are the flexibility and abstraction humans are capable of, which this thread has alluded to. What I think you meant to say was is that each mind’s content is divided into privy and public with no way to categorize the privy. Of the inaccessible, we need only recall the day Thomas Nagel asked, “What is it like to be a bat?” English’s peculiar existence verb, used to make nominal sentences of identity or equation, invokes something privy unless its scope is confined to mathematics.
Yet Frege’s foundations of arithmetic quaked in 1931 when Kurt Gödel published his undecidability theorem. The category of all non-trivial theorems whose truth vale cannot be determined per Gödel is impossible to delimit; particular cases are so hard to find that the first came to light only in the 1970s. I propose a weak analogy to the privy in minds with this class of Gödelian theorems. What’s worse is although undecidability can be demonstrated in particular cases and we know that
some unprovable theorems are true, we can’t know whether a particular undecidable theorem is actually true—no proof, no disproof!
Hence while I disagree seriously with you regarding ability to conceptualize and existence of targets for messages, you have like a shark scraped the surface of an underlying mystery. What is it like to be a bat? I don’t echolocate moths; Friend Batty never interprets the two-dimensional drawings I handle routinely. What do we share in common, our nexus of communication? All I could think of is to make a wooden bat box and nail it to a tree. The bats knew what it
was and roosted in it, but I doubt they connected the structure with me. Identitarian conception in bats differs from mine; absent human words such as “craftsperson,” they recognize only social hierarchy of roostmates and distinguish their species from the clumsy, bushy-bearded critters like me which they avoid.
Thanks to the rest of this thread’s contributors. I read your posts, but can’t answer due to length limits. Student since 2012, I read Egyptian, currently working on the Coffin Texts. Ain’t we all gonna die someday?