Some notes on trying to comprehend David Hume

[amorphous_constellation]

"That cause, which excites the passion, is related to the object, which nature has attributed to the passion; the sensation, which the cause separately produces, is related to the sensation of the passion: from this double relation of ideas and impressions the passion is derived. The one idea is easily converted into its correlative ; and the one impression into that which resembles and corresponds to it: with how much greater facility must this transition be made, where these movements mutually assist each other, and the mind receives a double impulse from the relations both of its impressions and ideas!"

Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature by David Hume in Two Volumes. J. M. Dent & sons, E. P. Dutton & co, 1911, p. 13.

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The object is the 'verb' of the passion, i.e. the pain, pleasure, or other state which it induces, as an 'acting state' on the self. The cause refers to a 'non-abstract practical piece of matter.' Say for example, a porcupine quill.

So from the porcupine quill, imagine two abstract lines going out from it. One line represents the mere sensation of pain, and the other line represents the 'passion combination' of the sensation of pain with the abstract notion of pain. So the former line is an 'impression,' and the latter is more like an 'idea'

So all that hume is saying, is that this 'double relation' is supposedly what decreases the latency of the 'impulse' that the mind receives. But also I suppose, that the power of the non-abstract qualities of an impression is really what would do that job. Supposedly.

 

[RestlessSoul]

Isn't he also saying that object, subject, observation, and reaction are inseparable? And that only when these inseparable elements are in harmony, is the effect unequivocal?

 

[amorphous_constellation]

Isn't he also saying that object, subject, observation, and reaction are inseparable? And that only when these inseparable elements are in harmony, is the effect unequivocal?

Something like that. Something that is thorny, is both objectively thorny, without you, and subjectively thorny, when you 'receive it as an impression.' But these two notions combine, to affect you, I guess

 

[amorphous_constellation]

"Nothing is more fluctuating and inconstant on many occasions than the will of man; nor is there anything but strong motives which can give us an absolute certainty in pronouncing concerning any of his future actions. When we see a person free from these motives, we suppose a possibility either of his acting or forbearing; and though, in general, we may conclude him to be determined by motives and causes, yet this removes not the uncertainty of our judgment concerning these causes, nor the influence of that uncertainty on the passions. Since, therefore, we ascribe a power of performing an action to every one who has no very powerful motive to forbear it, and refuse it to such as have, it may justly be concluded, that power has always a reference to its exercise, either actual or probable, and that we consider a person as endowed with any ability when we find, from past experience, that it is probable, or at least possible, he may exert it"

Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature by David Hume in Two Volumes. J. M. Dent & sons, E. P. Dutton & co, 1911, p. 37.

I guess what might connect with what he's saying, is how we might understand the modern idea of impulse, and socialization. I suppose that most socializing forces might be described in terms of learned rote motive. But then, Hume goes onto say that we can basically also be uncertain of how causes will turn into action. But I figure, that this must have meant that one motivation had failed, and was replaced by a stronger one. Or, confusingly, it was replaced by an impulse, which is not exactly a motivation, but something like it