Scientism: A Muddled Idea that Even the Gods Themselves Pee on

[Polymath257]

OK. I must say this sounds to me much better, much more coherent and reasonable

In response, I would just note that reality cannot be reduced to phenomena whose existence is determinable by experimental tests. After all, to take just one example: you and I agree that there exists a difference between between "opinions" or unjustified beliefs and "knowledge." (As of right now, I believe that there is a such a difference--but I can't ultimately prove it.) That difference apparently exists, but it isn't something that can be established by testable observations. No?

Right. Again, it is a definitional distinction. it isn't a fact about the 'real world', but rather a distinction between aspects of our beliefs. Some of those beliefs are justified (by observation and testing) and others are not (and are thereby opinions). This is matter of categorization of beliefs, not a matter of knowledge about reality.

 

[Polymath257]

As we know from Godel's Incompleteness Theorem and from the many examples of how biological systems are designed we should not expect human epistemology to rest on one rational system capable of deciding all truths. Scientism would seem to be a "one way" sort of attitude similar to that of literalist believers.

My understanding is that truth is multi-modal, that is, truth rests optimally, even ideally, on mutliple ways of knowing and that all respectable ways of knowing have ways of verifying the truths within their compass. Different modes/ways of knowing have differing "domains" and are "differently able" to cover some portion of the whole range of truth. Any one sincere way of knowing cannot be objectively demonstrated to be superior to another. So science has "sciencey" truths which are "different" in their ability to present reproducible knowledge which explains causal behaviors far better than any other way of knowing. This in no way qualifies it as the only, superior way of knowing truth.

Godel's results are limited to systems of first order logic with axioms systems that are decidable by Turing machines. In particular, they fail for second order logic, which is the default for human investigations outside of mathematics.

 

[Revoltingest]

....reality cannot be reduced to phenomena whose existence is determinable by experimental tests.

This appears to be the opposite of scientism,
& also neither provable nor disprovable.

 

[Nous]

Right. Again, it is a definitional distinction. it isn't a fact about the 'real world', but rather a distinction between aspects of our beliefs. Some of those beliefs are justified (by observation and testing) and others are not (and are thereby opinions). This is matter of categorization of beliefs, not a matter of knowledge about reality.

This appears to be the opposite of scientism,
& also neither provable nor disprovable.

I believe that someone tried to illegally enter my house last night.

Do I (a) actually have such a belief, i.e., does that belief exist in the real world, or did I (b) just lie about believing that proposition, and therefore no such belief exists in the real world?

Presumably there exists a difference between (a) and (b). I.e., the world where (a) is true is not the same world where (b) is true. Right? How do you test for whether (a) or (b) is true?

 

[Polymath257]

I believe that someone tried to illegally enter my house last night.

Do I (a) actually have such a belief, i.e., does that belief exist in the real world, or did I (b) just lie about believing that proposition, and therefore no such belief exists in the real world?

Presumably there exists a difference between (a) and (b). I.e., the world where (a) is true is not the same world where (b) is true. Right? How do you test for whether (a) or (b) is true?

Well, these are testable through brain scans, for example. At least theoretically.

Other ways to collection observational evidence connect to your statements, your body language, etc. if, even theoretically, none of these methods is able to decide the matter, then it isn't a question in the 'real world'. But, my belief (grin) is that they can be so resolved and hence are questions about the real world.

 

[Revoltingest]

I believe that someone tried to illegally enter my house last night.

Do I (a) actually have such a belief, i.e., does that belief exist in the real world, or did I (b) just lie about believing that proposition, and therefore no such belief exists in the real world?

Presumably there exists a difference between (a) and (b). I.e., the world where (a) is true is not the same world where (b) is true. Right? How do you test for whether (a) or (b) is true?

I'm not following this totally.
But I'll state that a malfunctioning brain, with all
its misperceptions, is part of the natural world.

 

[Nous]

Well, these are testable through brain scans, for example.

Prove it. Link to the study, or hopefully studies, showing that there exists a testable difference between a person's true belief and a lie about having the belief.

 

[Nous]

I'm not following this totally.
But I'll state that a malfunctioning brain, with all
its misperceptions, is part of the natural world.

I don't know how to make it much clearer. The world where I say, "I believe someone tried to illegally enter my house last night," and I actually have that belief, is different from the world where I say the same and I don't hold that belief. Is it not? I am asking how do you test to determine that difference.

 

[Polymath257]

Prove it. Link to the study, or hopefully studies, showing that there exists a testable difference between a person's true belief and a lie about having the belief.

Here's a recent one. There are many other available, though.
Illuminating lies with brain scan outshines polygraph test: fMRI spots more lies in first controlled comparison of the two technologies

 

[Polymath257]

I don't know how to make it much clearer. The world where I say, "I believe someone tried to illegally enter my house last night," and I actually have that belief, is different from the world where I say the same and I don't hold that belief. Is it not? I am asking how do you test to determine that difference.

Well, if nothing else (like brain scans) work, then your subsequent actions can resolve that issue.

 

[sealchan]

Godel's results are limited to systems of first order logic with axioms systems that are decidable by Turing machines. In particular, they fail for second order logic, which is the default for human investigations outside of mathematics.

Okay you sent me to Google and to Wikipedia...I can't dispute you because I'm having trouble digesting the Wiki article on second-order logic...but it did say this...

from Second-order logic - Wikipedia

It is a corollary of Gödel's incompleteness theorem that there is no deductive system (that is, no notion of provability) for second-order formulas that simultaneously satisfies these three desired attributes:[4]

• (Soundness) Every provable second-order sentence is universally valid, i.e., true in all domains under standard semantics.
• (Completeness) Every universally valid second-order formula, under standard semantics, is provable.
• (Effectiveness) There is a proof-checking algorithm that can correctly decide whether a given sequence of symbols is a proof or not.

Does this contradict what you are claiming? Or is it more complicated?

I would argue on other grounds that no single system of rationality of any kind can be self-sufficient, but I thought Godel's Incompleteness Theorem seemed like the most elegant indication of that.

 

[Polymath257]

Okay you sent me to Google and to Wikipedia...I can't dispute you because I'm having trouble digesting the Wiki article on second-order logic...but it did say this...

from Second-order logic - Wikipedia

Does this contradict what you are claiming? Or is it more complicated?

It's more complicated. The deductive systems are first order constructs and such cannot deal with the full range of second order logic. But little outside of mathematics is fully deductive. So the study of the real world is mostly inductive, which means the 'axiom system' is being continuously revised and modified. So it fails to be a deductive system in Godel'The second order aspect becomes more important.

 

[sealchan]

It's more complicated. The deductive systems are first order constructs and such cannot deal with the full range of second order logic. But little outside of mathematics is fully deductive. So the study of the real world is mostly inductive, which means the 'axiom system' is being continuously revised and modified. So it fails to be a deductive system in Godel'The second order aspect becomes more important.

Well, I suspect that underlying many people's outlooks, particularly around science and rationality, that perhaps the underlying faith is in the rationality of reproducible results and how that appears to show a "first order" logic. But I can't be sure that is correct as I am still unclear on first-order vs second-order, etc.

 

[Polymath257]

Well, I suspect that underlying many people's outlooks, particularly around science and rationality, that perhaps the underlying faith is in the rationality of reproducible results and how that appears to show a "first order" logic. But I can't be sure that is correct as I am still unclear on first-order vs second-order, etc.

The primary difference is that first order logic only allows quantification (exists, for every) over objects, but second order allows quantification over *properties* of the objects. The difference is most dramatic in the model theory (semantics), but it happens in the syntactic aspects also.

The point is that humans often create second order statements (about properties) and not just first order (objects).

 

[Nous]

Prove it. Link to the study, or hopefully studies, showing that there exists a testable difference between a person's true belief and a lie about having the belief.

Here's a recent one. There are many other available, though.
Illuminating lies with brain scan outshines polygraph test: fMRI spots more lies in first controlled comparison of the two technologies

Wow. The Concealed Information Test entails instructing subjects to answer a series of questions in a certain way, which includes answering one question falsely. The polygraph or fMRI examiners then try to determine which question the subject gave a false answer to. In the experiment you linked to (which is behind a paywall), a total of 28 subjects (“participants”):

. . . secretly wrote down a number between 3 and 8 on a slip of paper and were questioned about what number they wrote during consecutive and counterbalanced fMRI and polygraphy sessions. The Concealed Information Test (CIT) paradigm was used to evoke deceptive responses about the concealed number. Each participant's preprocessed fMRI images and 5-channel polygraph data were independently evaluated by 3 fMRI and 3 polygraph experts, who made an independent determination of the number the participant wrote down and concealed.​

Polygraphy and Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging in Lie Detection: A Controlled Blind Comparison Using the Concealed Information Test. - PubMed - NCBI

So each of the 6 experts had either a 1-in-6 or 1-in-4 chance of correctly guessing which false answer the participant gave. And the expert fMRI examiners were 24% more likely than the polygraph examiners to identify the false answer that the participants were instructed to give.

Frankly, I would be reluctant to assert that any result beyond chance has been found by this study.

In any case, in your first post on this thread, you said that you “*define* reality as the collection of statements that every testable theory that makes consistently valid predictions agree to.” Obviously one cannot argue that the theory of General Relativity or Quantum Theory “agree to” any statement summarizing the findings of the experiment you have cited here. Correct?