Scientism: A Muddled Idea that Even the Gods Themselves Pee on

[Polymath257]

So in your world, it's acceptable to abide by propositions that do not have truth value, and are not testable?

Definitions are not propositions. They are linguistic conventions. And yes, it is good to abide by such because it helps communication.

And yes, in matters of morality and aesthetics it is appropriate to abide by propositions that do not have truth values and are not testable. This issue is whether those propositions convey 'knowledge'. My position is that they do not. Nonetheless, they are important for how we act.

 

[Polymath257]

If they are not testable, how do you know what truth value a proposition has? It seems to me that simply by adopting a proposition as being true, provisionally, there will be some result. Even no discernible effect is a result, and would tell us something about the "truth value" of the proposition.

Definitions are conventions. They define how we will use our language going forward. As such, they don't have a truth value.

Truths are defined by testability. That is why moral and aesthetic judgments are not 'true' or 'false', but rather 'good' or 'bad' or 'ugly' or 'beautiful'.

 

[PureX]

Definitions are conventions. They define how we will use our language going forward. As such, they don't have a truth value.

Of course they do. Their value is in how 'truly' they manage to represent the idea that their words are intended to convey. And this is easily tested by using the word to convey the defined idea, to others.

Truths are defined by testability. That is why moral and aesthetic judgments are not 'true' or 'false', but rather 'good' or 'bad' or 'ugly' or 'beautiful'.

For we humans, the best we can get in relation to "truth", is functionality. This is so much the case that a lot of people can't even recognize that there is a difference between truth and functionality. Thus, the rise in popularity of "scientism'.

 

[Polymath257]

Of course they do. Their value is in how 'truly' they manage to represent the idea that their words are intended to convey. And this is easily tested by using the word to convey the defined idea, to others.

That isn't a truth value. That is a utility judgment.

For we humans, the best we can get in relation to "truth", is functionality. This is so much the case that a lot of people can't even recognize that there is a difference between truth and functionality. Thus, the rise in popularity of "scientism'.

And what, precisely, is the difference? Well, certain approximations are functional without being completely true (so they don't always function). But any idea that always functions is true, right? And anything true will always function, right?

 

[PureX]

That isn't a truth value. That is a utility judgment.

Utility has value. For most people, it has the greatest value. And if that value is reliable, people accept it as true, even if it's not. This is why 'scientism' places science as the sole means of obtaining "truth". What is beiong accepted as truth is really just reliable functionality: 'utility'.

But any idea that always functions is true, right? And anything true will always function, right?

The flat Earth and the Earth-centered cosmos ideals functioned for us very well for a very long time. Just as "God" and atheistic "scientism" are functioning quite well for the great many humans that hold to these ideals, today. Everything we think we "know" functions for us until it no longer does, and we come to "know better".

"Knowing" is a bias based on functionality. And since we are not omniscient, it's a bias that's difficult to avoid.

 

[Polymath257]

Utility has value. For most people, it has the greatest value. And if that value is reliable, people accept it as true, even if it's not. This is why 'scientism' places science as the sole means of obtaining "truth". What is beiong accepted as truth is really just reliable functionality: 'utility'.

Truth is that which always works. Therefore truth has value to those who want to understand.

The flat Earth and the Earth-centered cosmos ideals functioned for us very well for a very long time. Just as "God" and atheistic "scientism" are functioning quite well for the great many humans that hold to these ideals, today. Everything we think we "know" functions for us until it no longer does, and we come to "know better".

"Knowing" is a bias based on functionality. And since we are not omniscient, it's a bias that's difficult to avoid.

And the flat earth model no longer functions. So it isn't the truth. In fact, it was a very poor approximation. Simply functioning *now* is not the same as truth. That is your mistake, as i see it. But the truth will always function and whatever *always* functions is true.

Now, what this means is that we can never be certain that anything is true. But we can be certain something is false. Instead, we have to push each and every idea to see where and when it fails. Complacence isn't going to get to better approximations.

 

[PureX]

Truth is that which always works. Therefore truth has value to those who want to understand.

The truth is what is, not what works. This misrepresentation is the fundamental flaw of 'scientism'.

And the flat earth model no longer functions. So it isn't the truth. In fact, it was a very poor approximation. Simply functioning *now* is not the same as truth. That is your mistake, as i see it. But the truth will always function and whatever *always* functions is true.

The flat Earth ideal still functions for most people most of the time. Very few of us are aware of ourselves standing on a sphere at any given time, even though we are. Very few of us need to be aware of it at any given time. And even the spherical Earth ideal could change at some point, and become "untrue", when we understand space-time dimensionalality better that we currently do.

Truth, for we humans, is what we are currently experiencing it to be. It is relative to, and subject to the limitations of the human condition. And science does not change that fact. Since can change some of our limitations, but that does not eliminate them.

 

[Polymath257]

The truth is what is, not what works. This misrepresentation is the fundamental flaw of 'scientism'.

And how do you determine what? By determining what works.

The flat Earth ideal still functions for most people most of the time. Very few of us are aware of ourselves standing on a sphere at any given time, even though we are. Very few of us need to be aware of it at any given time. And even the spherical Earth ideal could change at some point, and become "untrue", when we understand space-time dimensionalality better that we currently do.

Well, there is your misunderstanding. it isn't a matter of what works 'most of the time' or 'with most people'. What is 'true' is 'what always works, in every circumstance and at every time'.

Truth, for we humans, is what we are currently experiencing it to be. It is relative to, and subject to the limitations of the human condition. And science does not change that fact. Since can change some of our limitations, but that does not eliminate them.

No, the truth is NOT what we are experiencing. That is the evidence that points us to the truth, but it is not the truth. To arrive at truth, we have to *test* our ideas and push them to the limits of when they work. Complacence doesn't lead to truth. Simply standing back and experiencing does not work. One has to hypothesize and test, attempting at each stage to *break* the insights until you know when they fail or that they have worked in each and every situation. Only the latter case (where they work in every situation) is truth.

 

[Nous]

Definitions are not propositions. They are linguistic conventions.

According to these definitions of "proposition," which well describe what I mean by the term, a definition is a proposition:

1. anything stated or affirmed for discussion or illustration.
2. Rhetoric . a statement of the subject of an argument or a discourse, or ofthe course of action or essential idea to be advocated.
3. Logic . a statement in which something is affirmed or denied, so that it can therefore be significantly characterized as either true or false.

the definition of proposition

Anyway, I thought the metaphysical ideas you were promoting here were supposed to have something to do with science. Silly me. In post #2, you said:

"We then *define* reality as the collection of statements that every testable theory that makes consistently valid predictions agree to."

And "definitions are ultimately arbitrary."

But then you purport that there exist such phenomena as knowledge and opinions, and that there exists an actual, non-arbitrary definable difference between the two.

I don't see how all these claims amount to anything more than a bubbling caldron of confusion. Perhaps you could explain what is supposed to be the purpose and value of holding all of these contradictory ideas.

 

[Polymath257]

According to these definitions of "proposition," which well describe what I mean by the term, a definition is a proposition:

1. anything stated or affirmed for discussion or illustration.
2. Rhetoric . a statement of the subject of an argument or a discourse, or ofthe course of action or essential idea to be advocated.
3. Logic . a statement in which something is affirmed or denied, so that it can therefore be significantly characterized as either true or false.

the definition of proposition

Anyway, I thought the metaphysical ideas you were promoting here were supposed to have something to do with science. Silly me. In post #2, you said:

"We then *define* reality as the collection of statements that every testable theory that makes consistently valid predictions agree to."

And "definitions are ultimately arbitrary."

But then you purport that there exist such phenomena as knowledge and opinions, and that there exists an actual, non-arbitrary definable difference between the two.

I don't see how all these claims amount to anything more than a bubbling caldron of confusion. Perhaps you could explain what is supposed to be the purpose and value of holding all of these contradictory ideas.

Propositions are statements that have a truth value.

Yes, definitions are ultimately arbitrary: they are *our* linguistic conventions on how we describe the world.

Yes, there are phenomena which we arbitrarily define to be knowledge and opinion. These phenomena are different. Would could have defined them to be white and black, but that would be more confusing. Which words we use in a definition is arbitrary.

 

[PureX]

According to these definitions of "proposition," which well describe what I mean by the term, a definition is a proposition:

1. anything stated or affirmed for discussion or illustration.
2. Rhetoric . a statement of the subject of an argument or a discourse, or ofthe course of action or essential idea to be advocated.
3. Logic . a statement in which something is affirmed or denied, so that it can therefore be significantly characterized as either true or false.

the definition of proposition

Anyway, I thought the metaphysical ideas you were promoting here were supposed to have something to do with science. Silly me. In post #2, you said:

"We then *define* reality as the collection of statements that every testable theory that makes consistently valid predictions agree to."

And "definitions are ultimately arbitrary."

But then you purport that there exist such phenomena as knowledge and opinions, and that there exists an actual, non-arbitrary definable difference between the two.

I don't see how all these claims amount to anything more than a bubbling caldron of confusion. Perhaps you could explain what is supposed to be the purpose and value of holding all of these contradictory ideas.

Yes, the responses are all over the map, and only partially intelligible from what I can tell. I think it's an argument for the sake of posing an argument and the substance is whatever sort of sounds like it might counter the point being opposed, even if in fact it is nonsensical.

 

[Nous]

Yes, the responses are all over the map, and only partially intelligible from what I can tell. I think it's an argument for the sake of posing an argument and the substance is whatever sort of sounds like it might counter the point being opposed, even if in fact it is nonsensical.

Yeah, that's the best I can make of it. Obviously I cited some of the pile of contradictory claims, and asked what is the purpose and value of such claims. Obviously I got no reply.

 

[Polymath257]

I am curious what you consider to be contradictory. Can you give an example of a contradiction? Please be specific.

 

[Polymath257]

I know you don't, and I think that is very unfortunate for you. You are unable to recognize the metaphysical significance of your own cognitive gifts.

Well, I mostly think metaphysics is bunk. So the 'metaphysical significance' is zero.

 

[Polymath257]

If they are not testable, how do you know what truth value a proposition has? It seems to me that simply by adopting a proposition as being true, provisionally, there will be some result. Even no discernible effect is a result, and would tell us something about the "truth value" of the proposition.

Well, then, that would be at least a weak test, wouldn't it?

A proposition is a statement that has a truth value: which means it is testable, at least in theory.

 

[Polymath257]

So in your world, it's acceptable to abide by propositions that do not have truth value, and are not testable?

Most ethical values are untestable. So, in answer to your question, yes. In fact, most of the ideas I abide by in morality are not testable and have no truth value.

 

[Nous]

I am curious what you consider to be contradictory. Can you give an example of a contradiction? Please be specific.

Your first example of contradictory statements occurs in your first post on this thread. You asserted that (1) you “*define* reality as the collection of statements that every testable theory that makes consistently valid predictions agree to” (I find it an odd idea that “reality” a “collection of statements”), and that (2) “definitions are, ultimately, arbitrary.” So even if you were able to provide a list of these alleged “statements that every testable theory that makes consistently valid predictions agree to” (which itself would seem impossible due to the vacuity of the notion of “statements that every testable theory that makes consistently valid predictions agree to”--I can't think of even one such statement), that collection of statements would be ultimately arbitrary because they would consist of a plethora of words whose definitions would be ultimately arbitrary. Hypothesis-testing itself depends on non-arbitrarily defined concepts. Yet in that first post, you indicate that there are real, not arbitrary, distinctions between various phenomena, e.g., between “knowledge” and “belief,” and between “knowledge” and “opinion”. And in your subsequent posts here you have made assertions such as that “definitions” are x, not y, and that “propositions” are z, not w. But if your initial claim that definitions are ultimately arbitrary were true, then your subsequent claims about knowledge, opinions, definitions, propositions, etc., are ultimately arbitrary.

And then yesterday you waylaid us with irony by your claim that you think “metaphysics is bunk.” This after you have posted thousands of words on this thread promulgating your own metaphysics.

Thus, in light of all this, I asked you what is the supposed value and purpose of your various claims here that seem to attempt to construct a metaphysics. But you haven't answered.

 

[Polymath257]

Your first example of contradictory statements occurs in your first post on this thread. You asserted that (1) you “*define* reality as the collection of statements that every testable theory that makes consistently valid predictions agree to” (I find it an odd idea that “reality” a “collection of statements”), and that (2) “definitions are, ultimately, arbitrary.” So even if you were able to provide a list of these alleged “statements that every testable theory that makes consistently valid predictions agree to” (which itself would seem impossible due to the vacuity of the notion of “statements that every testable theory that makes consistently valid predictions agree to”--I can't think of even one such statement), that collection of statements would be ultimately arbitrary because they would consist of a plethora of words whose definitions would be ultimately arbitrary. Hypothesis-testing itself depends on non-arbitrarily defined concepts. Yet in that first post, you indicate that there are real, not arbitrary, distinctions between various phenomena, e.g., between “knowledge” and “belief,” and between “knowledge” and “opinion”. And in your subsequent posts here you have made assertions such as that “definitions” are x, not y, and that “propositions” are z, not w. But if your initial claim that definitions are ultimately arbitrary were true, then your subsequent claims about knowledge, opinions, definitions, propositions, etc., are ultimately arbitrary.

And then yesterday you waylaid us with irony by your claim that you think “metaphysics is bunk.” This after you have posted thousands of words on this thread promulgating your own metaphysics.

Thus, in light of all this, I asked you what is the supposed value and purpose of your various claims here that seem to attempt to construct a metaphysics. But you haven't answered.

OK, you misunderstood. The definition of 'reality' is what is arbitrary. We could, potentially, define 'reality' in other ways, but I have found this one to be the most useful.

The collection of statements would depend on the definitions used in our discussion, so in that sense they would be arbitrary. But the fact that they are testable and pass all observational tests means they are NOT arbitrary in terms of their relation to observation.

I think you confuse the difference in roles of definitions (to define linguistic conventions)and the reality of differences in observations (any testable theory will show the differences we observe). Definitions are our arbitrary way of dividing up our experiences into chunks we can then discuss. Definitions are not, themselves, true or false. They are either useful divisions or not useful. Either they help us to make testable hypotheses that pass observational tests or they do not.

But observations are not arbitrary. When I look at my coat, the blue I see isn't arbitrary. That I define that experiences as 'seeing blue' is, however.

Yes, knowledge and belief are different concepts. The primary difference is that knowledge is justified (true) belief. In other words, all knowledge is belief, but not all beliefs are knowledge. On the other hand, opinions are *unjustified* beliefs. And the way we justify beliefs is through testing. So any belief that cannot be tested is an opinion and cannot be knowledge. Again, these are simply definitional differences. As such, they are not 'knowledge' in the sense of knowledge about the real world. They are definitions we use to divide our experience.

As an example of the arbitrariness of definitions, I could *define* a slorp to be either a red bicycle or a blue totebag. It is then easy enough to determine whether any particular object is a slorp. But whether that definition is *useful* is another question. In this case, it is unlikely that the definition of slorp will be helpful in understanding more about our observations. That doesn't make it 'false', it makes it *useless*. Similarly, I can define this black animal beside me to be a 'cat'. That definition has proven useful for discussion and understanding.

Most *classical* metaphysics is bunk. It doesn't help in acquiring knowledge. Instead, it makes useless distinctions that are not helpful to discussion and learning. It assumes the universe has to be certain ways without actually observing to see if it is, in fact, those ways. it assumes causality without defining the concept rigorously, it fails miserably when it discusses 'possibility' or 'possible worlds', and it fails to distinguish truth from opinion, not even defining the notions.

As for the 'value', that is solely determined by whether these distinctions prove to be useful in discussions, in learning about the universe, and in learning about ourselves. If you find them valueless, then don't worry about them.

 

[sealchan]

The word "scientism" is a very ambiguous term. By one count, there are at least a dozen different meanings to it. And some of those meanings appear to me, at least, to be rather muddled.

Moreover, opinions about scientism seem to be even more diverse than the word's many meanings. On one extreme, there are folks who believe scientism is rampant today, and can be found nearly everywhere in intellectual conversations.

On the other extreme, some folks don't believe scientism even exists, but instead believe the concept has been fabricated merely to smear scientific theories and ideas that someone doesn't agree with. For instance, Daniel Dennett has said:

"When someone puts forward a scientific theory that [religious critics] really don't like, they just try to discredit it as 'scientism'."​

Of course, Dennett is right -- to an extent. The term "scientism" is bandied about thousands of times each day by folks seeking to discredit legitimate scientific theories by smearing them as "scientism". Often the same folks have a very limited and distorted understanding of what the sciences are, and their scope, methods, and major theories. But I think it would be a serious mistake to believe that all and every use of the term is a meaningless smear.

Of all the various definitions of scientism that I've come across, the PBS definition strikes me as the most accurate and generally useful:

"Unlike the use of the scientific method as only one mode of reaching knowledge, scientism claims that science alone can render truth about the world and reality. Scientism's single-minded adherence to only the empirical, or testable, makes it a strictly scientifc worldview, in much the same way that a Protestant fundamentalism that rejects science can be seen as a strictly religious worldview. Scientism sees it necessary to do away with most, if not all, metaphysical, philosophical, and religious claims, as the truths they proclaim cannot be apprehended by the scientific method. In essence, scientism sees science as the absolute and only justifiable access to the truth."​

A Brief History of Scientism

Scientism dates back about 500 years to the very early days of the modern sciences. It can be found to some extent in the writings of Galileo, Descartes, and Francis Bacon, among others. Galileo appears to have assumed that only what can be mathematically quantified constituted true knowledge. Descartes argued for an almost wholly mechanistic universe in which nearly everything could be ultimately reduced to some kind of physical mechanics. And Bacon demoted such things as poetry and history to second-class subjects when compared to the emerging sciences of physics and astronomy.

In their defense, those early thinkers thought the sciences provided a means to overcome sickness, poverty, the miseries of life, and perhaps even death. Much of their rhetorical attacks against other forms of knowledge seem rooted -- not so much in a real distaste for such knowledge -- but in a feeling they must promote the likely or possible benefits of the then new sciences for the sake of humanity.

Still, it's a bit of mystery why it's so common for people to feel that putting down one thing elevates another.

A few years later, David Hume arrives on the scene just in time to divide all real or true knowledge into two kinds -- which today many philosophers would call "synthetic" (empirical) and "analytic" (logical or mathematical). Hume rejected everything beyond those two kinds:

"If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion."​

Fast forward now to the19th Century and scientism gets its full bloom in the philosophies of the positivists. Beginning with Auguste Comte, there is a rejection of anything transcendent or metaphysical. For Comte, the only valid information comes through the senses, and everything -- including all of human nature -- can be reduced by the sciences to natural laws. Comte believed that any ideas outside the realm of the empirical sciences were pure fantasy or superstition.

In the early 20th Century, the Vienna Circle picked up on Comte's ideas and modified them into what has come be known as "logical positivism". Like Comte, the logical positivists argued for the supremacy of empirical knowledge, while rejecting anything transcendent or metaphysical. Unlike Comte, they also argued for the equal supremacy of pure logic and mathematical knowledge. Basically, they revived and updated Hume's division of all legitimate knowledge into two kinds.

The Vienna Circle came under heavy attack by philosophers, such as Karl Popper and W. O. Quine, who managed to show how naive it was about the sciences.

Scientism Today

It's been said that the leading proponents of scientism today are popular scientists -- such as Richard Dawkins, Neil DeGrasse Tyson, E.O Wilson, Leonard Krauss, and Stephen Hawking -- who often, despite their brilliance as scientists, seem to be acutely unaware that they are making philosophical (and not scientific) arguments for the epistemic supremacy of the sciences. To add to the irony, the specific philosophical arguments they often rely on have long been rejected by most philosophers as logically flawed and overly-simplistic. In the highly technical and dispassionate language of philosophy, scientism is "a muddled idea that even the gods themselves pee on".

The popular reaction to such scientism has been concisely summed up by the physicist Ian Hutchinson:

“The health of science is in fact jeopardized by scientism, not promoted by it. At the very least, scientism provokes a defensive, immunological, aggressive response from other intellectual communities, in return for its own arrogance and intellectual bullyism. It taints science itself by association.”​

Meanwhile, the philosopher Massimo Pigliucci has created a short list of questions or issues that lie outside the scope of the sciences -- thus demonstrating that the sciences cannot address everything of possible interest to humans:

• In metaphysics: what is a cause?
• In logic: is modus ponens a type of valid inference?
• In epistemology: is knowledge “justified true belief”?
• In ethics: is abortion permissible once the fetus begins to feel pain?
• In aesthetics: is there a meaningful difference between Mill’s “low” and “high” pleasures?
• In philosophy of science: what role does genetic drift play in the logical structure of evolutionary theory?
• In philosophy of mathematics: what is the ontological status of mathematical objects, such as numbers?

Summary

While it seems to me that the word "scientism" is often used by people who neither genuinely understand the sciences, nor much appreciate them beyond their technological spin-offs, to mindlessly smear legitimate scientific ideas and theories, scientism is nevertheless a very real issue today, and is genuinely espoused by a number of prominent thinkers both inside and outside the sciences.

In a nutshell, scientism posits that the sciences are the only justifiable means of arriving at truths.

Questions? Comments?

As we know from Godel's Incompleteness Theorem and from the many examples of how biological systems are designed we should not expect human epistemology to rest on one rational system capable of deciding all truths. Scientism would seem to be a "one way" sort of attitude similar to that of literalist believers.

My understanding is that truth is multi-modal, that is, truth rests optimally, even ideally, on mutliple ways of knowing and that all respectable ways of knowing have ways of verifying the truths within their compass. Different modes/ways of knowing have differing "domains" and are "differently able" to cover some portion of the whole range of truth. Any one sincere way of knowing cannot be objectively demonstrated to be superior to another. So science has "sciencey" truths which are "different" in their ability to present reproducible knowledge which explains causal behaviors far better than any other way of knowing. This in no way qualifies it as the only, superior way of knowing truth.

 

[Nous]

OK, you misunderstood. The definition of 'reality' is what is arbitrary. We could, potentially, define 'reality' in other ways, but I have found this one to be the most useful.

The collection of statements would depend on the definitions used in our discussion, so in that sense they would be arbitrary. But the fact that they are testable and pass all observational tests means they are NOT arbitrary in terms of their relation to observation.

I think you confuse the difference in roles of definitions (to define linguistic conventions)and the reality of differences in observations (any testable theory will show the differences we observe). Definitions are our arbitrary way of dividing up our experiences into chunks we can then discuss. Definitions are not, themselves, true or false. They are either useful divisions or not useful. Either they help us to make testable hypotheses that pass observational tests or they do not.

But observations are not arbitrary. When I look at my coat, the blue I see isn't arbitrary. That I define that experiences as 'seeing blue' is, however.

Yes, knowledge and belief are different concepts. The primary difference is that knowledge is justified (true) belief. In other words, all knowledge is belief, but not all beliefs are knowledge. On the other hand, opinions are *unjustified* beliefs. And the way we justify beliefs is through testing. So any belief that cannot be tested is an opinion and cannot be knowledge. Again, these are simply definitional differences. As such, they are not 'knowledge' in the sense of knowledge about the real world. They are definitions we use to divide our experience.

As an example of the arbitrariness of definitions, I could *define* a slorp to be either a red bicycle or a blue totebag. It is then easy enough to determine whether any particular object is a slorp. But whether that definition is *useful* is another question. In this case, it is unlikely that the definition of slorp will be helpful in understanding more about our observations. That doesn't make it 'false', it makes it *useless*. Similarly, I can define this black animal beside me to be a 'cat'. That definition has proven useful for discussion and understanding.

Most *classical* metaphysics is bunk. It doesn't help in acquiring knowledge. Instead, it makes useless distinctions that are not helpful to discussion and learning. It assumes the universe has to be certain ways without actually observing to see if it is, in fact, those ways. it assumes causality without defining the concept rigorously, it fails miserably when it discusses 'possibility' or 'possible worlds', and it fails to distinguish truth from opinion, not even defining the notions.

As for the 'value', that is solely determined by whether these distinctions prove to be useful in discussions, in learning about the universe, and in learning about ourselves. If you find them valueless, then don't worry about them.

OK. I must say this sounds to me much better, much more coherent and reasonable

In response, I would just note that reality cannot be reduced to phenomena whose existence is determinable by experimental tests. After all, to take just one example: you and I agree that there exists a difference between between "opinions" or unjustified beliefs and "knowledge." (As of right now, I believe that there is a such a difference--but I can't ultimately prove it.) That difference apparently exists, but it isn't something that can be established by testable observations. No?