I'll just focus on the article, as we won't make progress with any of the other stuff.
Thanks for providing the article. It is interesting, but doesn't actually support your worldview.
First, the article says people arrive at moral judgement by 2 methods, systematic (reason) and heuristic (intuition). The latter tends to be more common in any issue involving conflict or emotion, whereas the former can be activated if one is more detached or is not under pressure.
In addition, it notes "The model is a social model in that it de-emphasizes the private reasoning done by individuals, emphasizing instead the importance of social and cultural influences."
This is exactly what I said, intuition is significantly dependent on culture:
Children in Orissa constantly encounter spaces and bodies structured by purity, and they learn to respect the dividing lines. They learn when to remove their shoes, and how to use their heads and feet in a symbolic language of deference (as when one touches one’s head to the feet of a highly respected person). They develop an intuitive sense that purity and impurity must be kept apart. By participating in these interlinked custom complexes, an Oriya child’s physical embodiment comes to include experiences of purity and pollution. When such children later encounter the intellectual content of the ethics of divinity (e.g., ideas of sacredness, asceticism, and transcendence), their minds and bodies are already prepared to accept these ideas, and their truth feels self-evident (see Lakoff, 1987).
American children, in contrast, are immersed in a different set of practices regarding space and the body, supported by a different ideology. When an American adult later travels in Orissa, he may know how rules of purity and pollution govern the use of space, but he knows these things only in a shallow, factual, consciously accessible way; he does not know these things in the deep cognitive/affective/motoric way that a properly enculturated Oriya knows them.
Here you have a clear explanation. of cultural differences that result in a fundamentally different perception of certain aspects of reality. This is hard to reconcile with the assumption of inevitable harmony.
Also, as I noted about the problems that may occur when one's survival is at stake:
When people are asked to think about their own deaths, they appear to suppress a generalized fear of mortality by clinging more tightly to their cultural world view. Death-primed participants then shift their moral judgments to defend that world view. They mete out harsher punishment to violators of cultural values, and they give bigger rewards to people who behaved morally (Rosenblatt et al., 1989). Death-primed participants have more negative attitudes towards those who do not fully share their world view (e.g., Jews; Greenberg et al., 1990). From a terror management perspective, moral judgment is a special kind of judgment, since moral judgments always implicate the cultural world view.
This basically says the exact opposite of your statement that "I don't think anything can happen that will turn evolution in a different direction. So, no, our moral intuition would face a severe challenge and overcome it eventually to assure survival of our species."
By "survival of our species", I assume you mean something that maintains the inevitable global harmony you are advocating.
In numerous discussions I've expressed the opinion that when people are fearful of their safety, harmony is anything but inevitable. Your article seems to support this view, as does the entirety of human history.
The animal kingdom is full of examples of behavioural change between infants and adults, so I wouldn't assume too much, especially given that the article you provided clearly notes the importance of socialisation and culture in intuitive moral judgements.