Now and then, I hear someone argue that "everything people believe is ultimately based on faith", and that, consequently, there is no truly fundamental difference between, say, the beliefs of an evolutionary scientist about the diversity of species, and the beliefs of a young-earth creationist about the diversity of species.
For instance, just as a creationist has faith that his or her deity created within six days the diversity we see in life forms today, an evolutionary scientist has faith that that diversity is the product of evolution over hundreds of millions of years. Why are their beliefs fundamentally equivalent? Because both rest on faith, it is argued. The creationist's beliefs rest on faith in the existence of a creator deity, etc, and the evolutionary scientist's beliefs rest on faith in the constancy of natural laws, etc. Since neither faith can be proven with absolute certainty, the two sets of beliefs are epistemologically the same.
There are variations on that argument. Subtle twists and turns, but that's about the gist of it, in my opinion. I'd love to hear any corrections of my summary of the argument.
Now then, I would like to propose that the notion, "everything people believe is ultimately based on faith", which appears to be the core claim here, is indefensible when furthered by the claim, "Therefore there is no truly fundamental difference between one belief and another." It is indefensible because it rests on a fallacy of logic.
The fallacy in question is one of
equivocation. In brief, the argument equivocates between up to three different meanings of the word "faith", depending on what version it comes in. Which is the same as saying it talks about up to three different things, while calling them all the same thing.
Here are the three different meanings of "faith":
Faith One: A belief in something despite compelling evidence to the contrary of that belief. If I know my spouse has cheated on me with six other people, and yet I still have faith he or she will not cheat on me again, then all else being equal, my faith can be defined as a belief in something despite compelling evidence to the contrary. This is sometimes called a species of "fideism".
Faith Two. A belief in something in the absence of any compelling evidence pro or con to that belief. If I have faith that an undetectable leprechaun is farting undetectable rainbows just beneath my windowsill, my faith can be defined as a belief in something in the absence of any compelling evidence pro or con. Of course, one can argue that the compelling evidence here is a complete lack of evidence. i.e. "if the leprechaun existed, there would be some compelling evidence of its existence". And while that may or may not be a strong argument to most people, it is also an irrelevant point in this context, since it does nothing to change the fact that it might not be a compelling argument to some other people. It seems to me at least some theists use faith in this sense of the word.
Faith Three. A belief in something in the presence of compelling evidence for that belief. If I believe, based on solid experience, that my car will start on this cold winter morning, then my faith can be defined as a belief in something in the presence of compelling evidence for that belief. That is, I cannot be absolutely certain that my car will start, so it can be said of me that my expectation it will start amounts to a kind of faith it will. But my faith here is distinct from faith one, because I have no compelling evidence to contradict it, and it is distinct from faith two, because I have compelling evidence to support it. This would seem to me to be the kind of "faith" that one might ascribe to, say, and evolutionary scientist.
Now let us apply what has just been said to the notion that "everything people believe is ultimately based on faith, and consequently, there is no fundamental (i.e. epistemic) difference between one belief and another".
If that were true, there would be no fundamental difference between faiths one, two, and three. And yet we have seen that there are fundamental differences between the three faiths in terms of how each treats empirical evidence. Put differently, a belief arrived at via faith one is based on a different epistemology from a belief arrived at via faith two or faith three. To argue otherwise is to argue that belief contrary to evidence, belief in the absence of evidence, and believe in congruence with evidence are all one and the same thing. But tut tut! I say, tut tut! That's just not so!
CONFESSION TIME: I whipped all this out on the spur of a moment in order to ward off an inner explosion of boredom, and I haven't had the time nor the inclination yet to give it all a good, searching scrutiny. Instead, I thought it would be much more fun for everyone if I just posted it and then let y'all critique it in the hopes that at least some of your critiques might be downright insightful and thrilling. So please have at it! Enjoy! I look forward to your comments, insights, poignant misunderstandings, clever criticisms, and deeply meaningful, angst-ridden rants -- except yours,
@Debater Slayer . I don't look forward to yours.
