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An Essay Concerning Human Understanding
CHAPTER II
No innate Principles in the Mind.
1. It is an established opinion amongst some men, That there are in the understanding certain innate principles; some primary notions, characters, as it were stamped upon the mind of man, which the soul receives in its very first being; and brings into the world with it. It would be sufficient to convince unprejudiced readers of the falseness of this supposition, if I should only show (as I hope I shall in the following parts of this discourse) how men, barely by the use of their natural faculties, may attain to all the knowledge they have, without the help of any innate Impressions; and may arrive at certainty, without any such original notions or principles. For I imagine anyone will easily grant, That it would be impertinent to suppose, the ideas of colors innate in a creature, to whom God hath given sight, and a power to receive them by the eyes from external objects: and no less unreasonable would it be to attribute several truths, to the impressions of nature, and innate characters, when we may observe in our selves faculties, fit to attain as easie and certain knowledge of them, as if they were originally imprinted on the mind. But because a man is not permitted without censure to follow his own thoughts in the search of truth, when they lead him ever so little out of the common road: I shall set down the reasons, that made me doubt of the truth of that opinion, as an excuse for my mistake, if be in one, which I leave to be considered by those, who, with me, dispose themselves to embrace truth, where-ever they find it.
2. There is nothing more commonly taken for granted, than that there are certain principles both speculative and practical (for they speak of both) universally agreed upon by all mankind: which therefore they argue, must needs be the constant impressions, which the souls of men receive in their first beings, and which they bring into the world with them, as necessarily and really as they do any of their inherent faculties.
3. This argument, drawn from universal consent, has this misfortune in it, that if it were true in matter of fact, that there were certain truths, wherein all mankind agreed, it would not prove them innate, if there can be any other way shown, how men may come to that universal agreement, in the things they do consent in; which I presume may be done.
4. But, which is worse, this argument of universal consent, which is made use of, to prove innate principles, seems to me a is demonstration that there are none such: because there are none to which all mankind give an universal assent. I shall begin with the speculative, and instance in those magnified principles of demonstration, whatsoever is, is; and' tis impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be, which of all others I think have the most allowed title to innate. These have so setled a reputation of maxims universally received, that 'twill, no doubt, be thought strange, if anyone should seem to question it. But yet I take liberty to say, that these propositions are so far from having an universal assent, that there are a great part of mankind, to whom they are not so much as known.
5. For, first 'tis evident, that all children, and idiots, have not the least apprehension or thought of them: and the want of that is contradiction, to say, that there are truths imprinted on the soul, witch it perceives or understands not; imprinting, if it signify any thing? being nothing else, but the making certain truths to be perceived. For to imprint any thing on the mind without the mind's perceiving it, seems to me hardly intelligible. If therefore children and idiots have souls, have minds, with those impressions upon them, they must unavoidably perceive them, and necessarily know and assent to these truths, which since they do not, it is evident that there are no such impressions. For if they are not notions naturally imprinted, how can they be innate? And if they are notions imprinted, how can they be unknown? To say a notion is imprinted on the mind, and yet at the same time to say, that themind is ignorant of it, and never yet took notice of it, is to make this impression nothing. No proposition can be said to be in the mind, which it never yet knew, which it was never yet conscious of. for if anyone may; then, by the same reason, all propositions that are true, and the mind is capable ever of assenting to, may be said to be in the mind, and to be imprinted: since if anyone can be said to be in the mind, which it never yet knew, it must be only because it is capable of knowing it; and so the mind is of all truths it ever shall know. Nay, thus truths may be imprinted on the mind, which it never did, nor ever shall know: for a man may live long, and die at last in ignorance of many truths, which his mind was capable of knowing, and that with certainty. So that if the capacity of knowing be the natural impression contended for, all the truths a man ever comes to know, will, by this account, be, every one of them, innate; and this great point will amount to no more, but only to a very improper way of speaking; which whilst it pretends to assert the contrary, says nothing different from those, who deny innate principles. For no body, I think, ever denied, that the mind was capable of knowing several truths. The capacity, they say, is innate, the knowledge acquired. But then to what end such contest for certain innate maxims? If truths can be imprinted on the under standing without being perceived, I can see no difference there can be, between any truths the mind is capable of knowing in respect of their original: they must all be innate, or all adventitious: in vain shall a man go about to distinguish them. He therefore that talks of innate notions in the understanding, cannot (if he intend thereby any distinct sort of truths) mean such truths to be in the understanding, as it never perceived, and is yet wholly ignorant of. For if these words (to be in the understanding) have any propriety,
they signify to be understood. So that, to be in the understanding,
and, not to be understood; to be in the mind, and, never to be
perceived, is all one, as to say, any thing is, and is not, in the mind or understanding. If therefore these two propositions, whatsoever is, is; and, it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be, are by nature imprinted, children cannot be ignorant of them: infants, and all that have souls must necessarily have them in their understandings, know the truth of them, and assent to it.
6. To avoid this, 'tis usually answered, that all men know and assent to them, when they come to the use of reason, and this is enough to prove them innate. I answer,
7.Doubtful expressions, that have scarce any signification, go for clear reasons to those, who being prepossessed, take not the pains to examine even what they themselves say. For to apply this answer with any tolerable sence to our present purpose, it must signify one of these two things; either, that as soon as men come to the use of reason, these supposed native inscriptions come to be known, and observed by them: or else, that the use and exercise of men's reasons assists them in the discovery of these principles, and certainly makes them known to them.
8. If they mean that by the use of reason men may discover these principles; and that this is sufficient to prove them innate; their way of arguing will stand thus, (viz.) that whatever truths reason can certainly discover to us, and make us firmly assent to, those are all naturally imprinted on the mind; since that universal assent, which is made the mark of them, amounts to no more but this; that by the use of reason, we are capable to come to a certain knowledge of, and assent to them; and by this means there will be no difference between the maxims of the mathematicians, and theorems they deduce from them: all must be equally allow'd innate, they being all discoveries made by the use of reason, and truths that a rational creature may certainly come to know, if he apply his thoughts rightly that way.
9. But how can these men think the use of reason necessary to
discover principles that are supposed innate, when reason (if we
may believe them) is nothing else, but the faculty of deducing unknown truths from principles or propositions, that are already known? That certainly can never be thought innate, which we have need of reason to discover, unless as I have said, we will have all the certain truths, that reason ever teaches us, to be innate. We may as well think the use of reason necessary to make our eyes discover
visible Objects, as that there should be need of reason, or the exercise thereof, to make the understanding see, what is originally engraven in it, and cannot be in the understanding, before it be perceived by it. So that to make reason discover those truths thus imprinted, is to say, that the use of reason discovers to a man,
what he knew before; and if men have these innate, impressed truths originally, and before the use of reason, and yet are always ignorant of them, till they come to the use of reason, 'tis in effect to say, that men know, and know them not at the same time.
IO. 'Twill here perhaps be said, that mathematical demonstrations, and other truths, that are not innate, are not assented to, as soon as proposed, wherein they are distinguished from these maxims, and other innate truths. I shall have occasion to speak of
assent upon the first proposing, more particularly by and by. I shall here only, and that very readily, allow, that these maxims,
and mathematical demonstrations are in this different; that the one has need of reason using of proofs, to make them out, and to gain our assent; but the other, as soon as understood, are, without any the least reasoning, embraced and assented to. But I withal beg leave to observe, that it lays open the weakness of this subterfuge,
which requires the use of reason for the discovery of these general truths: since it must be confessed, that in their discovery, there is no use made of reasoning at all. And I think those who give this answer, will not be forward to affirm, that the knowledge of this maxim, that it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be, is a deduction of our reason. For this would be to destroy that bounty of nature, they seem so fond of, whilst they make the knowledge of those principles to depend on the labor of our thoughts. For all reasoning is search, and casting about, and requires pains and application. And how can it with any tolerable sense be supposed that what was imprinted by nature, as the foundation and guide of our reason, should need the use of reason to discover it?
11. Those who will take the pains to reflect with a little attention on the operations of the understanding, will find, that this ready assent of the mind to some truths, depends not, either on native inscription, or the use of reason; but on a faculty of the mind ,quite distinct from both of them as we shall see hereafter. Reason therefore, having nothing to do in procuring our assent to these maxims, if by saying, that men know and assent to them, when they come to the use of reason, be meant, that the use of reason assists us in the knowledge of these maxims, it is utterly false; and were it true, would prove them not to be innate.
12. If by knowing and assenting to them, when we come to the use of reason be meant, that this is the time, when they come to be taken notice of by the mind; and that as soon as children come to the use of reason, they come also to know and assent to these maxims; this also is false, and frivolous. First, It is false. Because it is evident, these maxims are not in the mind so early as the use of reason: and therefore ,the coming to the use of reason is falsly assigned, as the time of their discovery. How many instances of the use of reason may we observe in children, a long time before they have any knowledge of this maxim, that it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be? and a great part of illiterate people, and savages, pass many years, even of their rational age, without ever thinking on this, and the like general propositions. I grant men come not to the knowledge of these general and more abstract truths, which are thought innate, till they come to the use of reason; and I add, nor then neither. Which is so, because till after they come to the use of reason, those general abstract ideas are not framed in the mind, about which those general maxims are, which are mistaken for innate principles, but are indeed discoveries made, and veri tes introduced, and brought into the mind by the same way, and discovered by the same steps, as several other propositions, which no body was ever so extravagant as to suppose
innate. This I hope to make plain in the sequel of this discourse. I allow therefore a necessity, that men should come to the use of reason, before they get the knowledge of those general truths: but deny, that men's coming to the use of reason is the time of their discovery.
13. In the mean time, it is observable, that this saying, that men know, and assent to these maxims, when they come to the use of reason, aplounts in reality of fact to no more but this, that they are never known, nor taken notice of before the use of reason, but may possibly be assented to sometime after, during a man's life; but when, is uncertain: and so may all other knowable truths, as well as these, which therefore have no advantage, nor distinction from
others, by this note of being known when we come to the use of reason; nor are thereby proved to be innate, but quite the contrary.
14. But secondly, were it true, that the precise time of their being known, and assented to, were, when men come to the use of reason; neither would that prove them innate. This way of arguing is as frivolous, as the supposition of it self is false. For by what kind of logic will it appear, that any notion is originally by nature imprinted in the mind in its first constitution, because it comes first to be observed, and assented to, when a faculty of the mind, which has quite a distinct province, begins to exert it self? And therefore, the coming to the use of speech, if it were supposed the time, that these maxims are first assented to (which it may be with as much truth, as the time when men come to the use of reason) . would be as good a proof that they were innate, as to say, they are innate because men assent to them, when they come to the use of reason. I agree then with these men of innate principles, that there is no knowledge of these general and self-evident maxims in the mind, till it comes to the exercise of reason: but I deny that the coming to the use of reason, is the precise time when they are first taken notice of; and, if that were the precise time, I deny that it would prove them innate. All that can with any truth be meant by this proposition, that men assent to them when they come to the use of reason, is no more but this, that the making of general abstract ideas, and the understanding of general names, being a concomitant of the rational faculty, and growing up with it, children commonly get not those general ideas, nor learn the names that stand for them, till having for a good while exercised their reason about familiar and more particular ideas, they are by their ordinary discourse and actions with others, acknowledged to be capable of rational conversation. If assenting to these maxims, when men come to the use of reason, can be true in any other sense, I desire it may be shown; or at least, how in this, or any other sense it proves them innate.
15. The senses at first let in particular ideas, and furnish the yet empty cabinet: and the mind by degrees growing familiar with some of them, they are lodged in the memory, and names got to them. Afterwards the mind proceeding farther, abstracts them, and by degrees learns the use of general names. In this manner the mind comes to be furnished with ideas and language, the materials
about which to exercise its discursive faculty: and the use of reason becomes daily more visible, as these materials, that give it employment, increase. But though the having of general ideas, and the use of general words and reason usually grow together: yet, I see not, how this any way proves them innate. The knowledge of some truths, I confess, is very early in the mind; but in a way that shows them not to be innate. For, if we will observe, we shall find it still to be about ideas, not innate, but acquired: it being about those first, which are imprinted by external things, with which infants have earliest to do, and which make the most frequent impressions
on their senses. In ideas thus got, the mind discovers, that some
agree, and others differ, probably as soon as it has any use of memory; as soon as it is able, to retain and receive distinct ideas. But whether it be then, or no, this is certain, it does so long before it has the use of words; or comes to that, which we commonly call the use of reason. For a child knows as certainly, before it can speak,
the difference between the ideas of sweet and bitter (i.e. that sweet is not bitter) as it knows afterwards (when it comes to speak) that worm-wood and sugar-plumbs, are not the same thing.
16. A child knows not that three and four are equal to seven, till he comes to be able to count to seven, and has got the name and idea of equality: and then upon the explaining those words, he presently assents to, or rather perceives the truth of that proposition. But neither does he then readily assent, because it is an innate truth, nor was his assent wanting, till then, because he wanted the use of reason; but the truth of it appears to him, as soon as he has setlled in his mind the clear and distinct ideas, that these names stand for: and then, he knows the truth of that proposition, upon the same grounds, and by the same means, that he knew before, that a rod and cherry are not the same thing; and upon the same grounds also, that he may come to know afterwards, that it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be, as shall be more fully shown hereafter. So that the later it is before anyone comes to have those general ideas, about which those maxims are; or to know the signification of those general terms, that stand for them; or to put together in his mind, the ideas they stand for: the later also will it be, before he comes to assent to those maxims, whose terms, with the ideas they stand for, being no more innate, than those of a cat or a weasel, he must stay till time and observation have acquainted him with them; and then he will be in a capacity to know the truth of these maxims, upon the first occasion, that shall make him put together those idear in his mind, and observe,
whether they agree or disagree, according as is expressed in those propositions. And therefore it is, that a man knows that eighteen and nineteen, are equal to thirty seven, by the same self-evidence, that he knows one and two to be equal to three: yet, a child knows this, not so soon as the other; not for want of the use of reason: but because the ideas the words eighteen, nineteen, and thirty seven stand for, are not so soon got, as those, which are signified by one, two, and three.
17. This evasion therefore of general assent, when men come to the use of reason, failing as it does, and leaving no difference between those supposed-innate, and other truths, that are afterwards acquired and learnt, men have endeavored to secure an universal assent to those they call maxims, by saying, they are generally assented to, as soon as proposed, and the terms they are proposed in, understood: seeing all men, even children, as soon as they hear and understand the terms, assent to these propositions, they think it is sufficient to prove them innate. For since men never fail, after they have once understood the words, to acknowledge them for undoubted truths, they would infer, that certainly these propositions were first lodged in the understanding, which, without any teaching, the mind at very first proposal, immediately closes with, and assents to, and after that never doubts again.
-to be continued-