Is 'scientism' a thing, or just a slur?

[MikeF]

When I watch a magician do a magic trick, I am "really" watching a magician perform a "real" magic trick. I am "real", the magician is "real", the trick is "real", and the different experience each of us has of that trick's happening is "real". In fact, NONE OF IT WAS UNREAL. The magician really is a magician, and the trick really is a trick, and I really was fooled by it even though I wasn't really fooled by it because I knew it was a trick.

I say all this to try and get you to understand that reality is all there is. Misperceived, misunderstood, mistaken, mislabeled, or whatever else; it's all "real". There is no "unreality" vs "reality". A theory about reality does not exist in some realm apart from the reality it's about until it's "proven to function" by some physical mechanism. The sound of a train horn does not exist apart from the ear that hears it. They are conjoined phenomena. In fact all of existence is a conjoined phenomenon. All the "parts" of it that we perceive are only being perceived as 'parts' in relation to all the other 'parts' of it that we perceive in relation ... you get the idea. In truth, it's just one big complicated phenomenon taking place in an endless sea of 'nothing else'.

Once we understand this: that any 'knowledge' (of existence) we can seek is contextual, we can begin to see what the philosophers are debating, and why. They are debating the contextual validity of a proposed truth-claim against those of other proposed truth-claims. Because philosophers understand that "truth" is a moving target: that it's contextually dependent. And the contextual possibilities are endless, given that the complexity of existence is endless.

Shoot, I thought I was arguing that reality is all there is. Clearly, I am struggling to make myself understood.

I want to explore the train horn analogy a little bit. I could concede that for there to be a sound, there must be an observer to hear the sound, if you want to have a strict definition of the meaning of 'sound'. But I assume you would agree that an expanding wave motion of air molecules still occurs when the train whistle is activated, regardless of whether there is an observer to sense the air motion.

As to truth, I don't see it as a moving target. I think of it more as building a picture that has no defined boundaries. The center of the picture has the highest detail and represents that knowledge with which we hold the most confidence. As we move out, we begin to lose detail and the picture devolves into mere sketches or simplistic outlines or in-descript shading, highlighting the boundary between what we know and what is completely unknown.

 

[mikkel_the_dane]

...

You seem to indicate that ethical principles are judged using reason and intuition. Here is my concern. Reason requires empirical evidence upon which to reason from ( outside of pure abstractions such as math and logic) and in discussing human behavior we are not talking abstractions. Intuition is unbounded and includes the infinity of imagination. It is simply an expression of the imperfect and fallible human being and cannot be taken on face value. This, to me, does not appear to be a strong foundation from which to build ethical principles.

What is empirical evidence?

 

[mikkel_the_dane]

No real complaint here. Certainly conforms to a Scientific Philosophy approach.

Empirical evidence please. Start with better and do that with empirical evidence.

 

[PureX]

No real complaint here. Certainly conforms to a Scientific Philosophy approach.

If you say so, though I see nothing particularly "scientific" about it. I suppose it could be viewed as aligning with philosophical materialism if one insists that it must. What we're really looking for, though, is an unambiguous base 'value' (not quantity or relationship) from which to build our ethical constructs.

I actually find it a bit shocking that humanity has not managed, in all these centuries, to establish such an obvious and simple universal 'prime directive'.

 

[mikkel_the_dane]

If you say so, though I see nothing particularly "scientific" about it. I suppose it could be viewed as aligning with philosophical materialism if one insists that it must. What we're really looking for, though, is an unambiguous base 'value' (not quantity or relationship) from which to build our ethical constructs.

I actually find it a bit shocking that humanity has not managed, in all these centuries, to establish such an obvious and simple universal 'prime directive'.

Because it is not there as long we are subjective when it comes to values of what matters.

 

[MikeF]

If you say so, though I see nothing particularly "scientific" about it. I suppose it could be viewed as aligning with philosophical materialism if one insists that it must. What we're really looking for, though, is an unambiguous base 'value' (not quantity or relationship) from which to build our ethical constructs.

I actually find it a bit shocking that humanity has not managed, in all these centuries, to establish such an obvious and simple universal 'prime directive'.

I think to much of our hard-wiring is contrary to any type of universality. I think evolutionarily, we have been optimized for small, competing groups.

 

[PureX]

Shoot, I thought I was arguing that reality is all there is. Clearly, I am struggling to make myself understood.

I want to explore the train horn analogy a little bit. I could concede that for there to be a sound, there must be an observer to hear the sound, if you want to have a strict definition of the meaning of 'sound'. But I assume you would agree that an expanding wave motion of air molecules still occurs when the train whistle is activated, regardless of whether there is an observer to sense the air motion.

1. We can't know that to be so because such will never be observed, to be known. It becomes a matter of faith, on our part, that such does occur. And 2., it's a moot concern because the 'answer' lays forever beyond our experience (unless we're turning it into a "belief system"). I keep pointing these out to try and show that "reality' is an idea. A perception. It is an aspect of human cognition. A conceptual paradigm that we assemble in our minds, of what we think is all around us. Doing this is the reality of us, as opposed to the reality we imagine ourselves to be existing in. And this reality of us can't be escaped by science because science is based on our observations, and on our cognitive processing of those observations. It relies on them for establishing 'validity'. And is therefor inevitably biased by their shortcomings.

As to truth, I don't see it as a moving target. I think of it more as building a picture that has no defined boundaries. The center of the picture has the highest detail and represents that knowledge with which we hold the most confidence. As we move out, we begin to lose detail and the picture devolves into mere sketches or simplistic outlines or in-descript shading, highlighting the boundary between what we know and what is completely unknown.

But the "picture" we're trying to build is constantly changing. Which makes the pieces very difficult to assemble, and keep assembled. That's why we focus on the "rules" driving the changes. But we can't see those rules except by their effect. And their effect is constant change. It's a bit of a 'catch-22'.

 

[mikkel_the_dane]

I think to much of our hard-wiring is contrary to any type of universality. I think evolutionarily, we have been optimized for small, competing groups.

So what is this "we" of yours, that you otherwise use. Your local cultural group of real humans as rational?!! And the rest, them, are irrelevant?

 

[PureX]

I think to much of our hard-wiring is contrary to any type of universality. I think evolutionarily, we have been optimized for small, competing groups.

But clearly, we are capable of over-riding that genetic hard-wiring. In fact, doing so is what defines us as 'human' as opposed to our being just another 'dumb animal'. Yet I agree that we remain incapable of overcoming it willfully and effectively. Which strikes me as odd given that we are an incredibly willful and effective life form.

 

[MikeF]

But clearly, we are capable of over-riding that genetic hard-wiring. In fact, doing so is what defines us as 'human' as opposed to our being just another 'dumb animal'. Yet I agree that we remain incapable of overcoming it willfully and effectively. Which strikes me as odd given that we are an incredibly willful and effective life form.

I think you are not fully appreciating how socialization to the existing norms dampens any novel and dramatic changes to the norms. Especially if such changes would result in shifts in the existing power structure. We human beings are loath to give up any perceived advantage.

 

[MikeF]

1. We can't know that to be so because such will never be observed, to be known. It becomes a matter of faith, on our part, that such does occur. And 2., it's a moot concern because the 'answer' lays forever beyond our experience (unless we're turning it into a "belief system"). I keep pointing these out to try and show that "reality' is an idea. A perception. It is an aspect of human cognition. A conceptual paradigm that we assemble in our minds, of what we think is all around us. Doing this is the reality of us, as opposed to the reality we imagine ourselves to be existing in. And this reality of us can't be escaped by science because science is based on our observations, and on our cognitive processing of those observations. It relies on them for establishing 'validity'. And is therefor inevitably biased by their shortcomings.

No, it's not a matter of Faith, never Faith.
It is reasoned expectation based on experience. There is a definite difference.

To your second point, I agree to a limited extent your description and characterization of the 'reality of us', but only as applies to the individual. I think you fail to appreciate the improvement of our understanding through intersubjective agreement and corroboration, and the professional principles and standards of scientific observation that mitigate the errors and misperceptions of an individual observer. The very purpose of science is to escape the 'reality of us' and build our picture of reality based on many observation over time and enhancing our limited biological senses of perception with tools that let us far exceed those senses.

Our collective understanding of reality is much, much stronger than you give credit.

But the "picture" we're trying to build is constantly changing. Which makes the pieces very difficult to assemble, and keep assembled. That's why we focus on the "rules" driving the changes. But we can't see those rules except by their effect. And their effect is constant change. It's a bit of a 'catch-22'.

Is the core of the picture constantly changing? No, I don't think so. Our macroscopic perception and interaction with the world around us has not changed for millennia. Animals, plants, rivers, oceans, mountains, celestial objects, all are as they have been. They have not changed (other than through the natural forces of change that are constant).

It is essentially the areas on the boundary of our understanding that we see any dramatic shifting and redrawing of the picture of our understanding. And this is to be expected, as this is the area of sketch and outline. What is clear through history is that this boundary area is being pushed ever outward, that the center of the picture continues to grow and become more clear.

 

[PureX]

I think you are not fully appreciating how socialization to the existing norms dampens any novel and dramatic changes to the norms. Especially if such changes would result in shifts in the existing power structure. We human beings are loath to give up any perceived advantage.

Yes, but it's also quite clear that this attitude is destroying us as a collective, cooperative species. So it would seem that at some point we'd have realized that our own advantage is intrinsically entwined with everyone else's.

But nope. Not so far. In fact, I suspect we once understood this far better than we do, now. Our increased technological prowess has affected us quite badly in this regard.

 

[mikkel_the_dane]

No, it's not a matter of Faith, never Faith.
It is reasoned expectation based on experience. There is a definite difference.

To your second point, I agree to a limited extent your description and characterization of the 'reality of us', but only as applies to the individual. I think you fail to appreciate the improvement of our understanding through intersubjective agreement and corroboration, and the professional principles and standards of scientific observation that mitigate the errors and misperceptions of an individual observer. The very purpose of science is to escape the 'reality of us' and build our picture of reality based on many observation over time and enhancing our limited biological senses of perception with tools that let us far exceed those senses.

Our collective understanding of reality is much, much stronger than you give credit.

...

So right now you are doing bad philosophy, because science is axiomatic at its core and without evidence. Evidence is derived based on faith that the axioms are true.

 

[PureX]

No, it's not a matter of Faith, never Faith.
It is reasoned expectation based on experience. There is a definite difference.

It is placing one's faith in the idea that 'reasoned expectation' will lead to positive results. The only "difference" is what we place our faith in at any given time under any given circumstance.

To your second point, I agree to a limited extent your description and characterization of the 'reality of us', but only as applies to the individual. I think you fail to appreciate the improvement of our understanding through intersubjective agreement and corroboration, and the professional principles and standards of scientific observation that mitigate the errors and misperceptions of an individual observer. The very purpose of science is to escape the 'reality of us' and build our picture of reality based on many observation over time and enhancing our limited biological senses of perception with tools that let us far exceed those senses.

Sorry, but a hundred monkeys are just as subject to their "monkey-ness" as one is. Their shared experience of existence as monkeys does not somehow magically raise them above their own nature. Sadly, I think this is why humanity cannot seem to fully embrace the human, and subjugate the animal, within itself.

Our collective understanding of reality is much, much stronger than you give credit.

Well, that's clearly your 'belief system'. I think you give it WAY TOO MUCH credit. It's not that we don't "know things", it's that we have no clue what to do with what we think we do know.

 

[MikeF]

It is placing one's faith in the idea that 'reasoned expectation' will lead to positive results. The only "difference" is what we place our faith in at any given time under any given circumstance.

Reasoned expectation based on experience is independent of whether or not the result will be positive. We can have negative expectations as well as positive. It is our experience or that learned from others that informs us and allows us to develop reliable expectations. (not to say we can't be disappointed or surprised, just saying on average)

Sorry, but a hundred monkeys are just as subject to their "monkey-ness" as one is. Their shared experience of existence as monkeys does not somehow magically raise them above their own nature. Sadly, I think this is why humanity cannot seem to fully embrace the human, and subjugate the animal, within itself.

No, we and monkeys can learn from our fellows. It makes a difference. We are not isolated islands unto ourselves. That you are unhappy that the human race isn't quite where you want it to be is a wholly different matter.

Well, that's clearly your 'belief system'. I think you give it WAY TOO MUCH credit. It's not that we don't "know things", it's that we have no clue what to do with what we think we do know.

Yeah, not a belief system. The topic at hand was how well we can know anything, and in that light I stand by my statement. What we do with that knowledge is an entirely different question and was not being addressed.

 

[mikkel_the_dane]

Reasoned expectation based on experience is independent of whether or not the result will be positive. We can have negative expectations as well as positive. It is our experience or that learned from others that informs us and allows us to develop reliable expectations. (not to say we can't be disappointed or surprised, just saying on average)



No, we and monkeys can learn from our fellows. It makes a difference. We are not isolated islands unto ourselves. That you are unhappy that the human race isn't quite where you want it to be is a wholly different matter.




Yeah, not a belief system. The topic at hand was how well we can know anything, and in that light I stand by my statement. What we do with that knowledge is an entirely different question and was not being addressed.

Have you actually studied skepticism and the problems of knowledge in regards to metaphysics/ontology and how come science is axiomatic?

 

[Augustus]

I am trying to find common ground as to what it is that Philosophy does in regards to Ethics. If Philosophy is making choices, is arbitrating between options, what is the source or justification used? How are fundamental ethical principles arrived at?

Forget the word philosophy as it seems to be confusing you. The way you use it makes no sense. "Philosophy" isn't 'arbitrating between options', 'arbitrating between options' is (part of one branch of) philosophy.

Humans need to create concepts regarding rights, what they are, who has them, do people have negative or positive rights. They need to decide what we mean by 'right' and 'wrong', and on what criteria we can judge things to be right or wrong. They need to decide if these are universal or relative and if ethics are derived empirically or a priori, etc.

Once they have dealt with these things then they need to create standards for what is right or wrong such as utilitarianism, virtue ethics or natural rights. Then they can apply these frameworks to individual situations.

So regardless of what you call it, humans need to do these things to some extent using their limited and fallible cognitive abilities in one way or another that is significantly subjective.

Great. It's Philosophy. Is it permissible to evaluate how Philosophy attempts to create moral frameworks? Is it possible that there can be an inherent flaw in the way Philosophy is practiced?

Evaluating how we create moral frameworks is also philosophy. Identifying flaws in the way we do this is philosophy also.

If you think there is an 'inherent flaw' what is it and how did you come to that understanding?

You seem to indicate that ethical principles are judged using reason and intuition. Here is my concern. Reason requires empirical evidence upon which to reason from ( outside of pure abstractions such as math and logic) and in discussing human behavior we are not talking abstractions. Intuition is unbounded and includes the infinity of imagination. It is simply an expression of the imperfect and fallible human being and cannot be taken on face value. This, to me, does not appear to be a strong foundation from which to build ethical principles.

There is actually quite a lot of scientific evidence that we make many moral decisions intuitively, although impacted by culture, which is in turn impacted by environment, reason, myth, etc. It is a dynamic system. Humans are not a blank slate though so the degree to which our genetics have 'hard-wired' aspects of morality is open to debate. To say intuition has no role would seem to be very unscientific to me. Also, intuition is often the consequence of internalised empirical experience.

Reason may also be based on empirical experience or may utilised for a priori deductions.

Ultimately though it is all based on imperfect and fallible human beings and their imperfect and fallible perception and cognitive processes.

So instead of trying to work out what "philosophy" does, try to work out what science can contribute to the process and the rest is philosophy. Science is mostly limited to aspect of applied ethics when it can help inform us of what we should do in specific situations where we are trying to create a particular ethical outcome (and we already do this). It can provide information which may aid decision making, but it cannot provide the criteria on which we should be making that decision (see the abortion example).

So, specifically, how do you propose we create a 'scientific' ethics that is qualitatively different from what we do now?

 

[MikeF]

Forget the word philosophy as it seems to be confusing you. The way you use it makes no sense. "Philosophy" isn't 'arbitrating between options', 'arbitrating between options' is (part of one branch of) philosophy.

My intent was to ask how foundational ethical principles or determined in Philosophy, which was to imply the subcategory of Philosophy that addresses the topic.

Humans need to create concepts regarding rights, what they are, who has them, do people have negative or positive rights. They need to decide what we mean by 'right' and 'wrong', and on what criteria we can judge things to be right or wrong. They need to decide if these are universal or relative and if ethics are derived empirically or a priori, etc.
Once they have dealt with these things then they need to create standards for what is right or wrong such as utilitarianism, virtue ethics or natural rights. Then they can apply these frameworks to individual situations.
So regardless of what you call it, humans need to do these things to some extent using their limited and fallible cognitive abilities in one way or another that is significantly subjective.

Of course. I agree.

There is actually quite a lot of scientific evidence that we make many moral decisions intuitively, although impacted by culture, which is in turn impacted by environment, reason, myth, etc. It is a dynamic system. Humans are not a blank slate though so the degree to which our genetics have 'hard-wired' aspects of morality is open to debate. To say intuition has no role would seem to be very unscientific to me. Also, intuition is often the consequence of internalised empirical experience.

You have misunderstood me. I am not saying that intuition has no role or effect. [which we seem to broadly agree is an amalgam of instinctual behavior and emotion, influenced by socialization, as well as internalized empirical experience] I think we are on the same page as to its influence on the individual. What I would argue is that it is the result of scientific inquiry that we are able to identify all these different influences and their potential impacts. Before we can even attempt to adequately address all the tasks you listed above, we have to be aware of all the variables that are at play. My comment on intuition is not that it doesn’t play a role, but rather, that it is the subjective expression of the imperfect and fallible individual, and if relied on to inform our decisions regarding ethics, can lead to less than optimal outcomes, or unnecessarily entrenched behaviors.

For example, if we are living in larger and larger groups, yet our instincts are optimized for small group behaviors that compete with other groups, relying on intuition may be counterproductive. Additionally, the role of myth and traditional custom can negatively impact our ability to improve our ethical principles. This is why I argue that a scientific approach is required. Understand the subject, understand the variables before one starts trying to create an ethical framework.

Reason may also be based on empirical experience or may utilised for a priori deductions.
Ultimately though it is all based on imperfect and fallible human beings and their imperfect and fallible perception and cognitive processes.

And this is why we must take steps to mitigate the imperfection and fallibility at the beginning of the process. This is what science is about. Answering these fundamental questions with this mitigation at the forefront.

So instead of trying to work out what "philosophy" does, try to work out what science can contribute to the process and the rest is philosophy. Science is mostly limited to aspect of applied ethics when it can help inform us of what we should do in specific situations where we are trying to create a particular ethical outcome (and we already do this). It can provide information which may aid decision making, but it cannot provide the criteria on which we should be making that decision (see the abortion example).
So, specifically, how do you propose we create a 'scientific' ethics that is qualitatively different from what we do now?

In the case of abortion, a scientific approach would ignore myth. It would take into account human instinct and emotion, recognizing that as a species we have evolved to produce one offspring at a time and invest heavily in the support and growth of the child to adulthood. It would take into consideration the negative personal impact and social impact of forcing unwanted pregnancies to term. It would take into account that there are a myriad of natural ways in which conception and development can be interrupted and terminated before term is reached. That through this period from gamete to zygote to developing fetus, we are dealing with cells or groups of cells with the potential to result in a live birth but are not yet a viable, self-sustaining entity.

Based on this starting point, I think a reasonable scientific determination would be that contraception must be allowed, and based on rates of natural failure and early termination of pregnancies, and in light of the cost of unwanted births, abortion would also be allowed. At this point, societal interest and historical norms could be allowed some influence if it was deemed there was strong interest in some limitation, resulting in a political compromise limiting abortion some time after the first trimester.

 

[Augustus]

Of course. I agree.

Therefore you agree that philosophy is important as the majority of these things cannot be done using any method that can be considered remotely scientific.

If you think philosophy should be thrown in the bin, then you think science can answer these questions, but it can't because it's not simply 'philosophy 2.0'.

And this is why we must take steps to mitigate the imperfection and fallibility at the beginning of the process. This is what science is about. Answering these fundamental questions with this mitigation at the forefront.

The steps at the beginning of this process are meta-ethical, and so we can't simply say 'we will improve the process by using science' no matter how much we want to avoid human imperfection and fallibility.

In the case of abortion, a scientific approach would ignore myth. It would take into account human instinct and emotion, recognizing that as a species we have evolved to produce one offspring at a time and invest heavily in the support and growth of the child to adulthood. It would take into consideration the negative personal impact and social impact of forcing unwanted pregnancies to term. It would take into account that there are a myriad of natural ways in which conception and development can be interrupted and terminated before term is reached. That through this period from gamete to zygote to developing fetus, we are dealing with cells or groups of cells with the potential to result in a live birth but are not yet a viable, self-sustaining entity.

Based on this starting point, I think a reasonable scientific determination would be that contraception must be allowed, and based on rates of natural failure and early termination of pregnancies, and in light of the cost of unwanted births, abortion would also be allowed. At this point, societal interest and historical norms could be allowed some influence if it was deemed there was strong interest in some limitation, resulting in a political compromise limiting abortion some time after the first trimester.

You have basically just described the contemporary approach in most of Western Europe, there is nothing new about it.

It is also can't be described as 'scientific ethics' as its foundations have nothing to do with science. This is scientism, an exaggerated belief in the scope and efficacy of the methods of science.

Ultimately, you have favoured the rights of the mother. For example, if the father, or family wanted to raise the child then it can't be described as unwanted. You mention the emotional impact on the mother, but not on the father or family. You mention a burden on the state, but not the negative impact of declining birth rates in an ageing society. Also that because some pregnancies result in miscarriage, then that is analogous to abortion, which is questionable at least. You have also defined life as starting when the foetus has developed to the stage that it can be 'self-sustaining' (and is this actually self-sustaining or can be saved by significant medical intervention?).

I'm not saying your view is wrong, or advocating the opposite, just noting the subjectivities involved in the process.

While you utilise scientific information in the decision making process (as we already do in practice, and as many moral philosophers have done for as long as we have had science), the principles you use to choose between options are not scientific. This is the fudge in claiming we can have scientific ethics.

For example, science can tell us when a foetus becomes a viable human, but it can't tell you if the point where it becomes a viable human is the point we ought give it the right to life. Even then do we give it the right to life, or do we allow late term abortions in certain situations? If so, what situations? What level of risk to the mother justifies termination after this point?

Ultimately, the answers to these questions are philosophical, not scientific.

 

[mikkel_the_dane]

Therefore you agree that philosophy is important as the majority of these things cannot be done using any method that can be considered remotely scientific.

If you think philosophy should be thrown in the bin, then you think science can answer these questions, but it can't because it's not simply 'philosophy 2.0'.



The steps at the beginning of this process are meta-ethical, and so we can't simply say 'we will improve the process by using science' no matter how much we want to avoid human imperfection and fallibility.



You have basically just described the contemporary approach in most of Western Europe, there is nothing new about it.

It is also can't be described as 'scientific ethics' as its foundations have nothing to do with science. This is scientism, an exaggerated belief in the scope and efficacy of the methods of science.

Ultimately, you have favoured the rights of the mother. For example, if the father, or family wanted to raise the child then it can't be described as unwanted. You mention the emotional impact on the mother, but not on the father or family. You mention a burden on the state, but not the negative impact of declining birth rates in an ageing society. Also that because some pregnancies result in miscarriage, then that is analogous to abortion, which is questionable at least. You have also defined life as starting when the foetus has developed to the stage that it can be 'self-sustaining' (and is this actually self-sustaining or can be saved by significant medical intervention?).

I'm not saying your view is wrong, or advocating the opposite, just noting the subjectivities involved in the process.

While you utilise scientific information in the decision making process (as we already do in practice, and as many moral philosophers have done for as long as we have had science), the principles you use to choose between options are not scientific. This is the fudge in claiming we can have scientific ethics.

For example, science can tell us when a foetus becomes a viable human, but it can't tell you if the point where it becomes a viable human is the point we ought give it the right to life. Even then do we give it the right to life, or do we allow late term abortions in certain situations? If so, what situations? What level of risk to the mother justifies termination after this point?

Ultimately, the answers to these questions are philosophical, not scientific.

In short, some of these debate go like this in effect:
It is a fact, therefore my subjective opinion on morality follow from the fact. That was noted by David Hume and still apply today. Some people in effect do the following:
P1: X is Y
Therefore X is Z and/or Y is W.