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Is Lying Unethical/Immoral?

It's fine that you want to quote Hauser and Cushman for support but I can't debate them.

What an odd sentiment.

Rationally critique their arguments then instead of pretending they are misleading or don't exist. To understand a book or article you don't have to ask the author to explain it to you. That's kind of the point.

You will endlessly quibble trivialities but never seem to have the time to directly address much of the scientific materials.

Funny that...

Why would honor killings support survival in one environment but not in others?

You seriously don't think that camel herders in the deserts of Arabia may need a different cultural toolkit than people living on a small, isolated tropical island where fish and fruit are near endless?

I've already explained this twice, with evidence from both Hauser and Cushman, including that those who are from honour cultures have objectively different and measurable bodily responses to their honour being threatened.

This does not suggest these are rational responses, but intuitive.

Honour cultures develop in different parts of the world that share common characteristics.

Humans require resources, such as food and clothing, to stay alive.

When resources that provide these are a) scarce b) can be stolen or acquired by force c) there is weak law enforcement, people are required to create their own systems of protection.

When such things are a matter of life or death they acquire great importance and harsh cultures develop.

There are many more things to add about how honour cultures may help as regards survival, but I'll see if you address this first.

a cultural bias that the moral intuition we were all born with will someday wipe out?

This assumes there is some "pure" human state metaphorically akin to Adam and Eve before the fall and the "goal" of human history is to regain what was lost.

All culture is bias, yours, mine, everyone's. There is no unbiased state, we cannot escape our social conditioning.

If honour cultures do die out it will be due to a change in environment making them no longer beneficial (arguably true in most places now). Not some innate biological programming to favour an individualistic rights based view or some other alternative.

This happened in places like the Scottish Highlands already. It wasn't moral progress though but harsh economic and political treatment that destroyed cultural bonds and increased centralised government control.
 

joe1776

Well-Known Member
Rationally critique their arguments then instead of pretending they are misleading or don't exist. To understand a book or article you don't have to ask the author to explain it to you. That's kind of the point.
If I quote an article in support of my argument, I will be happy to explain what you don't understand. If I can't, you are free to ignore the quote. I expect the same courtesy from you.

Given that evolution has our survival in mind, why would our moral intuition on the act of killing vary from place to place? I can't ask that question of the author of your quote, I expect you to answer if you understand the quote you offered.

Isn't it more likely that honor killings are cultural biases like the condoning of slavery once was, and like the treatment of women as property still is in some of the world's cultures? Isn't it likely that honor killings will be wiped out in time by the moral intuition we were all born with?

You seriously don't think that camel herders in the deserts of Arabia may need a different cultural toolkit than people living on a small, isolated tropical island where fish and fruit are near endless?
If by "cultural toolkit" you mean a different innate moral sense, I do not.

I've already explained this twice, with evidence from both Hauser and Cushman, including that those who are from honour cultures have objectively different and measurable bodily responses to their honour being threatened.
This does not suggest these are rational responses, but intuitive.
Not rational but intuitive? You have created a false dichotomy. They are probably neither. They are more likely to be emotional reactions of males with low self-esteem.

Honour cultures develop in different parts of the world that share common characteristics. Humans require resources, such as food and clothing, to stay alive. When resources that provide these are a) scarce b) can be stolen or acquired by force c) there is weak law enforcement, people are required to create their own systems of protection.
The more likely explanation for honor cultures is very low self-esteem among the males. They over-react to insults, etc. It probably has nothing whatsoever to do with the environment.

All culture is bias, yours, mine, everyone's. There is no unbiased state, we cannot escape our social conditioning.
You are using the word "bias" in a way that I don't understand. When I write of a cultural moral bias, I'm referring to an attitude or opinion that would send an intuitive judgment of conscience off its true course.
 
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If I quote an article in support of my argument, I will be happy to explain what you don't understand. If I can't, you are free to ignore the quote. I expect the same courtesy from you.

If you want an explanation, just tell me what you don't understand and I'll explain what it means.

Deal?

Given that evolution has our survival in mind, why would our moral intuition on the act of killing vary from place to place?

Whose survival?

Do you agree we are biased to preferring our survival and that of our family and friends and associates and group members over strangers or enemies?

We'd all save our loved ones over strangers given the chance.

What best ensures the survival of us and our group varies from place to place so our view on killing does.

The more likely explanation for honor cultures is very low self-esteem among the males. They over-react to insults, etc. It probably has nothing whatsoever to do with the environment.

This seems to suggest you don't know what an honour culture is.

It's basically impossible that millions of males over millennia in certain regions overwhelmingly had "low self esteem" and so created a complex morality of honour and social obligation that proved successful and enduring that differed to their "high esteem" neighbours.

Here is an explanation of honour Culture, do you want me to explain it more?

The issues relates to how esteem is granted in
(2011) described honor culture and dignity culture. First, in honor cultures, honor is the value of a person in his or her own eyes, but also in the eyes of society. In honor cultures, people base their self-esteem in large part on their social reputation and on how well they live up to the culturally defined honor code (Peristiany, 1965; Stewart, 1994). The honor code involves a set of norms that are defined by values that are emphasized within a culture and can refer to different domains, such as family honor, masculine honor, feminine honor, or integrity (Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead, & Fischer, 2002a). For example, it is important for males to have a reputation of toughness and to be able to protect their families and possessions. For females, modesty and the avoidance of shameful behaviors—especially sexual immodesty or adultery—is key (Vandello & Cohen, 2003

Isn't it likely that honor killings will be wiped out in time by the moral intuition we were all born with?


Humans evolved with this perfectly uniform and benevolent moral intuition, but from day one, instead of following these intuitions they decided to be violent and divisive instead. We evolved with moral intuition that guaranteed global harmony, but only after we had spent a hundred thousand years being increasingly violent and oppressive before returning back to what should have been our "true" state?

I can't imagine many things less likely than that. That's why religions need to make up myths like the fall to explain human evil.

You are using the word "bias" in a way that I don't understand. When I write of a cultural moral bias, I'm referring to an attitude or opinion that would send an intuitive judgment of conscience off its true course.

I'll explain using a previous quote.

For example, Hauser:

I favor a pluralistic position, one that recognizes different moral systems, and sees adherence to a single system as oppressive. The notion of a universal moral grammar with parametric variation provides one way to think about pluralism. It requires us to understand how, in development, particular parameters are fixed by experience. It also requires us to appreciate that, once fixed, we may be as perplexed by another commu- nity’s moral system as we are by their language. Appreciating the fact that we share a universal moral grammar, and that at birth we could have acquired any of the world’s moral systems, should provide us with a sense of comfort, a sense that perhaps we can understand each other.

He is saying he accepts moral pluralism: the idea that more than one moral system can be "correct" and that is a good thing.

Our universal grammar is impacted by "parametric variation" (by which he means inputs such as culture and experience). Hauser: "It requires us to understand how, in development, particular parameters are fixed by experience"

Once we are socialised into one system we can't escape it and other systems seem incompressible.

As such you can't see honour culture as anything other than an "error": once fixed, we may be as perplexed by another community’s moral system as we are by their language.

Isn't he saying this is bad and we need to get back to our "pure" state? No, quite the opposite, knowing we are all a product of our culture and cannot escape this allows us to appreciate moral differences not as the result of cuktures being "good" or "bad", but instead they are just and accident of history: "I favor a pluralistic position, one that recognizes different moral systems, and sees adherence to a single system as oppressive. Appreciating the fact that we share a universal moral grammar, and that at birth we could have acquired any of the world’s moral systems, should provide us with a sense of comfort, a sense that perhaps we can understand each other."
 

joe1776

Well-Known Member
Whose survival?
The survival of our species.

Do you agree we are biased to preferring our survival and that of our family and friends and associates and group members over strangers or enemies?
Yes, but that comment takes us off-topic. We are not concerned with why people act selfishly. We are discussing the intuitive moral guidance that would insure survival of our species. Conscience doesn't guide people to act selfishly.

What best ensures the survival of us and our group varies from place to place so our view on killing does.
You need to support your claim with reasons. Why and how would species survival depend on the environment?
It's basically impossible that millions of males over millennia in certain regions overwhelmingly had "low self esteem."
If we humans are a product of our genes, low self-esteem, being passed along from generation to generation is, at the very least, a plausible explanation. Can you provide a plausible explanation for your claim that the environment causes honor cultures? Are you going to stick with the shortage of resources story as the ultimate cover?

Here is an explanation of honour Culture, do you want me to explain it more?
You didn't explain honor culture, you defined it. Your explanation is simply "The environment did it." So, you need to plausibly explain, how over the millennia, the environment did it.

Humans evolved with this perfectly uniform and benevolent moral intuition, but from day one, instead of following these intuitions they decided to be violent and divisive instead. We evolved with moral intuition that guaranteed global harmony, but only after we had spent a hundred thousand years being increasingly violent and oppressive before returning back to what should have been our "true" state? I can't imagine many things less likely than that. That's why religions need to make up myths like the fall to explain human evil.
You can't imagine that we humans have two sides to our nature, good and bad? I can. You can't imagine that we humans, guided by our intuitive moral sense, are making moral progress; learning to treat each other better as time passes? I can. It's happening.

I'll explain using a previous quote.
That quote doesn't explain "bias." At least not in my understanding of the word.

The quote you provided from Hauser seems to clash with the Hauser quote from the MST. My hypothesis explains the cultural differences in a way that is consistent with his MST quote:

...For hundreds of years, scholars have argued that our moral judgments arise from rational, conscious, voluntary, reflective deliberations about what ought to be. This perspective has generated the further belief that our moral psychology is a slowly developing capacity, founded entirely on experience and education, and subject to considerable variation across cultures. With the exception of a few trivial examples, one culture’s right is another’s wrong. We believe this hyper rational, culturally-specific view is no longer tenable. The MST has been designed to show why and offer an alternative. Most of our moral intuitions are unconscious, involuntary, and universal, developing in each child despite formal education. When humans, from the hunter-gathers of the Rift Valley to the billionaire dot-com-ers of the Silicon Valley generate moral intuitions they are like reflexes, something that happens to us without our being aware of how or even why. We call this capacity our moral faculty....
 
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The quote you provided from Hauser seems to clash with the Hauser quote from the MST. My hypothesis explains the cultural differences in a way that is consistent with his MST quote:

What do you think is more likely to present a nuanced and accurate view of someone's scientific research: a 20 year old blurb on a website (promotional writing designed to attract attention) or the author's most recent monograph outlining his research and beliefs in general?

What do you think this quote means:

"we are born with abstract rules or principles, with nurture entering the picture to set the parameters and guide us toward the acquisition of particular moral systems. Empirical research will enable us to distinguish the principles from the parameters and thus to discover what limitations exist on the range of possible or impossible moral systems.”

Born to Be Good (Published 2006)

The survival of our species.

The unit of selection is survival of some members of the species (or their specific genes or group), not survival of the entire species.

You are thinking in terms of the quasi-religious concept of Humanity.

Conscience doesn't guide people to act selfishly.

Survival does though, and conscience is just part of an integrated survival toolkit that includes competition and cooperation and manipulation and violence etc.

Being too "nice" is often an evolutionarily poor strategy.

You can't imagine that we humans have two sides to our nature, good and bad? I can. You can't imagine that we humans, guided by our intuitive moral sense, are making moral progress; learning to treat each other better as time passes? I can. It's happening.

For me that's just a secular attempt at recasting a religious view: the idea good must triumph over evil due to what is functionally equivalent to Divine Providence.

I think "good" and "bad" are really emergent properties of our social and survival needs leading to both pro-social and selfish behaviours. I don't think they can be isolated and treated as independent entities.

we humans are a product of our genes, low self-esteem, being passed along from generation to generation is, at the very least, a plausible explanation. Can you provide a plausible explanation for your claim that the environment causes honor cultures? Are you going to stick with the shortage of resources story as the ultimate cover?

Because animals adapt their behaviour to their environment,. I'd say this is established fact. As explained with references, these behaviours are successful in certain environments, and such patterns of behaviour are replicated over geographically and culturally diverse areas.

The idea that people in diverse regions, often very successful, adopted a culture with many, often quite incredibly chivalrous and pro-social elements, simply because they all evolved with "low self esteem" is fantastical and completely unsupported by any evidence or evolutionary logic. Genetically similar populations in nearby, but environmentally different, regions often display completely different behaviours, meaning it's unlikely to be genetics, especially as these behaviours also generally decline in migrants from honour cultures.

It seems like something you just made up because you need a reason to reject something that goes against your thesis.
 

joe1776

Well-Known Member
What do you think is more likely to present a nuanced and accurate view of someone's scientific research: a 20 year old blurb on a website (promotional writing designed to attract attention) or the author's most recent monograph outlining his research and beliefs in general?
Since that 20-year old quote explained WHY the research was undertaken in the first place, your argument is weak.

What do you think this quote means:
"we are born with abstract rules or principles, with nurture entering the picture to set the parameters and guide us toward the acquisition of particular moral systems. Empirical research will enable us to distinguish the principles from the parameters and thus to discover what limitations exist on the range of possible or impossible moral systems.”
That quote is vague. He might have clarified it by giving examples of the "abstract rules or principles" he's referring to. However, I'll agree that the quote doesn't seem to support the MST's stated purpose.

However, from the paper I posted earlier on the "robust" preliminary results and the fact that Harvard has been running the study since 2003, we can logically infer that the study hasn't been failing in its attempt to show a universal moral sense.

The unit of selection is survival of some members of the species (or their specific genes or group), not survival of the entire species. You are thinking in terms of the quasi-religious concept of Humanity.
I mean the same thing you mean. Your quibbling with my wording shows frustration.

[Conscience doesn't guide people to act selfishly.] Survival does though, and conscience is just part of an integrated survival toolkit that includes competition and cooperation and manipulation and violence etc. Being too "nice" is often an evolutionarily poor strategy.

If you choose to define self-defense as a selfish act, conscience does indeed allow that. However, I was referring to selfishness done purely at the expense of innocent others.

For me that's just a secular attempt at recasting a religious view: the idea good must triumph over evil due to what is functionally equivalent to Divine Providence.
For me, it's a secular attempt to state a fact supported by evidence.
I think "good" and "bad" are really emergent properties of our social and survival needs leading to both pro-social and selfish behaviours. I don't think they can be isolated and treated as independent entities.
I don't understand what you mean.
Because animals adapt their behaviour to their environment,. I'd say this is established fact. As explained with references, these behaviours are successful in certain environments, and such patterns of behaviour are replicated over geographically and culturally diverse areas.
Yes, it's an establish fact that animals adapt to their environment. What isn't an established fact is your claim that scarce resources caused honor cultures. That's pure speculation that defies logic.

The roots of that claim go back to the myth of the Noble Savage, a favorite character in fiction for centuries. In America, millions of people believe that our native people once lived in harmony with nature and only went to war when food resources were scarce. It's a favorite theme for people who want to believe that Humanity is sliding downward morally.
 
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Since that 20-year old quote explained WHY the research was undertaken in the first place, your argument is weak.

The 20 year old blurb is more reliable than the much later book by the same author?

Since the book incorporated all he had learned since writing the promotional blurb, and from the MST itself and was written to accurately convey his latest beliefs with all required nuance, your argument is nonsensical.

I mean the same thing you mean. Your quibbling with my wording shows frustration.

If you think it's a quibble, you are completely missing the point. Noting the primary unit of selection means everything.

Before I explain, which view of evolution do you think is most accurate? Gene centred or multi-level selection (or anything else you like)?

Yes, it's an establish fact that animals adapt to their environment.

So you also accept that successful human cultures and behaviours will also adapt to their environment?

If you choose to define self-defense as a selfish act, conscience does indeed allow that. However, I was referring to selfishness done purely at the expense of innocent others.

Nothing to do with self-defense.

[Conscience doesn't guide people to act selfishly.] Survival does though, and conscience is just part of an integrated survival toolkit that includes competition and cooperation and manipulation and violence etc. Being too "nice" is often an evolutionarily poor strategy.

I don't understand what you mean.

Good and bad are human linguistic constructs.

We evolved with a range of instincts related to socialisation, competition, survival and reproduction and shouldn't treat "conscience" as separate from these or unaffected by them.

However, from the paper I posted earlier on the "robust" preliminary results and the fact that Harvard has been running the study since 2003, we can logically infer that the study hasn't been failing in its attempt to show a universal moral sense.

What paper? Can you link to it to support your claim. AFAIK you linked to a blurb and the test that said results not published yet. If there was another would be good to see.

Just the link is fine.
 

joe1776

Well-Known Member
The 20 year old blurb is more reliable than the much later book by the same author?
To insist you're right would mean that you think Harvard is wasting its time with this 19 year-old study. Is that your position?

If you think it's a quibble, you are completely missing the point. Noting the primary unit of selection means everything.
You asked "Whose survival?" Evolution is ultimately about the survival of the species. That goal isn't altered by the fact that there are different approaches to selection being offered.
Before I explain, which view of evolution do you think is most accurate? Gene centred or multi-level selection (or anything else you like)?

Gene-centered

So you also accept that successful human cultures and behaviours will also adapt to their environment?

To a limited extent, sure.


Nothing to do with self-defense.

[Conscience doesn't guide people to act selfishly.] Survival does though, and conscience is just part of an integrated survival toolkit that includes competition and cooperation and manipulation and violence etc. Being too "nice" is often an evolutionarily poor strategy.
I can't guess what kind of acts you're referring to. How about a couple of examples -- specific acts supporting survival that can't be called "self-defense?" All those general categories of acts you posted could include acts of self-defense.
Good and bad are human linguistic constructs.
As are all words.
We evolved with a range of instincts related to socialisation, competition, survival and reproduction and shouldn't treat "conscience" as separate from these or unaffected by them.
Like all words, 'conscience' simply represents something. I don't know how one might separate that something from other related somethings even if one tried.

What paper? Can you link to it to support your claim. AFAIK you linked to a blurb and the test that said results not published yet. If there was another would be good to see.
I posted the link earlier. Here it is again:
https://faculty.georgetown.edu/lbh24/BanerjeeEtAl.pdf
 
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To insist you're right would mean that you think Harvard was wasting its time with this 19 year-old study. Is that your position?

No, I'm saying it's delusional to think an older blurb based on less information and written for promotional reasons is likely more accurate than a book based on more information and written to inform and elucidate a scientist's position rather then promote a website.

As are all words

Some words are natural kinds, things which exist independently of human consciousness (trees, rocks, bees, the moon, etc.)

Other things only exist due to subjective human cognition (honour, justice, freedom, conscience, etc.)

Things that aren't natural kinds could be classified in very different ways which would influence our interpretation of them.

I posted the link earlier. Here it is again:
https://faculty.georgetown.edu/lbh24/BanerjeeEtAl.pdf

Thank you :thumbsup:

I think this shows where you have gone wrong.

The article is quite clear that it is talking about unfamiliar moral judgements, and they all relate to unnatural moral dilemma type scenarios regarding life and death.

The article also clearly notes judgement vary to some degree on these, but that these are only small variations (but not universal as you claim).

What you seem to be overlooking is that most moral judgements are familiar, and relate to far more trivial and subjective matters.

What you posted completely support's Hauser's stated position of a culturally defined moral pluralism limited by a universal moral grammar.

The argument thus far should not, of course, be taken as evidence against the role of reflection and reasoning in our moral psychology. Indeed, according to the linguistic analogy, it is possible that alternative patterns of moral judgment might sometimes be integrated into our cognitive repertoire


According to this view, deliberative and emotional mechanisms are often recruited antecedently to the production of an intuitive moral judgment in a way that translates the relevant moral judgments into the sorts of morally relevant actions that have been evaluated across the more familiar studies on moral behavior (Dwyer et al., in press; Huebner, Dwyer, & Hauser, 2008). However, according to this model, moral judgments about unfamiliar cases are generated by a computational system that operates rapidly and automatically on the basis of the causal and intentional representations that can be recovered, often unconsciously, from the structure of the moral dilemma at hand....

First, it is possible that local and idiosyncratic patterns of judgment might emerge in some contexts as a result of a cultural pressure on a particular sort of morally and culturally relevant scenario. In these cases, we would expect to find specific and theoretically predictable patterns of judgments for those particular cases (e.g., Huebner & Hauser, in press; Hauser et al., 2009) with no significant effect on unfamiliar moral scenarios. Alternatively, there may be some cases in which the relevant cultural difference does evoke a modification to a central moral principle (as suggested by Abarbanell & Hauser’s (2010) research on a rural Mayan population); but even here, we predict that the relevant variation will leave the vast majority of moral judgments untouched. Specifically, in these cases, the variation should only have a significant impact on moral judgments that rely on the use of that particular principle
 

joe1776

Well-Known Member
No, I'm saying it's delusional to think an older blurb based on less information and written for promotional reasons is likely more accurate than a book based on more information and written to inform and elucidate a scientist's position rather then promote a website.
I can read what you are claiming. It's what you are refusing to admit that is far more interesting, which is:

(1) The bright people at Harvard have kept the Moral Sense Test devised by Hauser and others online for 19 years. It's highly unlikely they would do that if the results were not showing that we humans share a universal, intuitive moral sense.

(2) Preliminary results of the MST showed that "Intuitive moral judgments are robust across variation in gender, education, politics, and religion."

I think this shows where you have gone wrong...

The article is quite clear...

The article also clearly notes…

What you posted completely support's Hauser's stated position…
You are claiming that you read a 24-page research paper in less than 30 minutes and came up with three conclusions that not only demonstrate that I'm clearly wrong but that the title to the paper is deceptive.:rolleyes:
 
I can read what you are claiming. It's what you are refusing to admit that is far more interesting, which is:

(1) The bright people at Harvard have kept the Moral Sense Test devised by Hauser and others online for 19 years. It's highly unlikely they would do that if the results were not showing that we humans share a universal, intuitive moral sense.

(2) Preliminary results of the MST showed that "Intuitive moral judgments are robust across variation in gender, education, politics, and religion."

Do you accept that it is at least possible that you have misunderstood what Hauser means by universal moral grammar? Or do you consider that impossible?

You are claiming that you read a 24-page research paper in less than 30 minutes and came up with three conclusions that not only demonstrate that I'm clearly wrong but that the title to the paper is deceptive.:rolleyes:

If you understand how to read research papers it's effectively about 7 pages long. Also, the article itself often adds a bit of nuance to the title which is often written to catch attention.

But again you quibble some triviality (you can't read 7 pages in under 30 mins), rather than actually addressing the scientific evidence cited which you dismiss out of hand. I even explained and bolded it to help you understand.

So,, now we've established humans can read 7 pages of text quite quickly:

I think this shows where you have gone wrong.

The article is quite clear that it is talking about unfamiliar moral judgements, and they all relate to unnatural moral dilemma type scenarios regarding life and death. The purpose of this is to remove the influence of culture as much as possible.

The article also clearly notes judgement vary to some degree on these, but that these are only small variations (but not universal as you claim).

What you seem to be overlooking is that most moral judgements are familiar, and relate to far more trivial and subjective matters.

What you posted completely support's Hauser's stated position of a culturally defined moral pluralism limited by a universal moral grammar.

The argument thus far should not, of course, be taken as evidence against the role of reflection and reasoning in our moral psychology. Indeed, according to the linguistic analogy, it is possible that alternative patterns of moral judgment might sometimes be integrated into our cognitive repertoire


According to this view, deliberative and emotional mechanisms are often recruited antecedently to the production of an intuitive moral judgment in a way that translates the relevant moral judgments into the sorts of morally relevant actions that have been evaluated across the more familiar studies on moral behavior (Dwyer et al., in press; Huebner, Dwyer, & Hauser, 2008). However, according to this model, moral judgments about unfamiliar cases are generated by a computational system that operates rapidly and automatically on the basis of the causal and intentional representations that can be recovered, often unconsciously, from the structure of the moral dilemma at hand....

First, it is possible that local and idiosyncratic patterns of judgment might emerge in some contexts as a result of a cultural pressure on a particular sort of morally and culturally relevant scenario. In these cases, we would expect to find specific and theoretically predictable patterns of judgments for those particular cases (e.g., Huebner & Hauser, in press; Hauser et al., 2009) with no significant effect on unfamiliar moral scenarios. Alternatively, there may be some cases in which the relevant cultural difference does evoke a modification to a central moral principle (as suggested by Abarbanell & Hauser’s (2010) research on a rural Mayan population); but even here, we predict that the relevant variation will leave the vast majority of moral judgments untouched. Specifically, in these cases, the variation should only have a significant impact on moral judgments that rely on the use of that particular principle
 

joe1776

Well-Known Member
Do you accept that it is at least possible that you have misunderstood what Hauser means by universal moral grammar? Or do you consider that impossible?

Of course it's possible that I misunderstand Hauser. But it's far more likely that you misunderstand him because of four reasons:

(1) Your emphasis on the cultural impact on our moral sense directly opposes any sensible use of the word "universal" which obviously implies "cross-cultural."

(2) Your emphasis on the cultural impact on our morals logically implies that we humans learn to discern right from wrong from our culture -- and learning implies the use of reason not intuition. Your hypothesis is a better fit for the rational explanation of moral choices which research over the past 25 years has been rejecting.

(3) It isn't only Hauser's opinions that you have to twist to fit your hypothesis. The reputations of other researchers and of Harvard University are at stake. They haven't kept the Moral Sense Test online now for 19 years because it's been failing.

The 24-page paper you read in under 30-minutes and trashed was the MST's preliminary results. It was written by Hauser and others. Its title: Intuitive moral judgments are robust across variation in gender, education, politics, and religion: A large-scale web-based study

(4) No, I'm not absolutely certain of Hauser's position. In fact, I'd say the only thing in our discussion that I regard as near certain is that when you use the word "clearly," you will follow it with a gross exaggeration or a very doubtful claim.
 
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Of course its possible that I misunderstand Hauser. But it's far more likely that you misunderstand him because...

Your emphasis on the cultural impact on our moral sense directly opposes any sensible use of the word "universal" which obviously implies "cross-cultural."

How would you interpret this passage then to better support your view than mine?

He is noting cross cultural variability here even with unfamiliar moral dilemmas, never mind the average moral judgement.

We presented Mayan participants with moral dilemmas translated into their native language, Tseltal. Paralleling several studies carried out with educated subjects living in large-scale, developed nations, the Mayan participants judged harms caused as the means to a greater good as more forbidden than harms caused as a side-effect (i.e., side-effect bias). However, unlike these other populations living in largescale societies, as well as a more educated and less rural Mayan comparison group, the target rural Mayan participants did not judge actions causing harm as worse than omissions (i.e., omission bias). A series of probes targeting the action–omission distinction suggest that the absence of an omission bias among the rural Mayan participants was not due to difficulties comprehending the dilemmas, using the judgment scale, or in attributing a greater causal role for actions over omissions. Thus, while the moral distinction between means and side-effect may be more universal, the moral distinction between actions and omission appears to be open to greater cross-cultural variation.

We consider the results presented here as a starting point for further experimental research and discussion of which morally relevant psychological distinctions are universal, which open to cross-cultural variation, and how experience and development can create distinct moral signatures (Haidt, 2007; Hauser, 2006a; Kohlberg, 1981; Turiel, 1983). Ultimately, this research may suggest that some psychological distinctions are moral absolutes, true (descriptively) in all cultures, whereas others may be more plastic, relative to a culture’s social dynamics, mating behavior, and belief systems.

Mayan morality: An exploration of permissible harms
Linda Abarbanell & Marc D. Hauser

Mayan morality: An exploration of permissible harms - ScienceDirect
 

joe1776

Well-Known Member
How would you interpret this passage then to better support your view than mine? He is noting cross cultural variability here even with unfamiliar moral dilemmas, never mind the average moral judgement.

There's no such thing, in reality, as an average moral dilemma. Each is unique. While the vast majority of moral judgments are purely intuitive, moral dilemmas are exceptional cases. They involve both intuition and reason.

Yale's Joshua Greene noted that when subjects were considering moral dilemmas while their brains were being examined (fMRI), two parts of their brain lit up. Yet, he still didn't suspect that both reason and intuition were involved in judging moral dilemmas.

The skeletal framework in moral dilemmas is similar. You have two optional actions available and both immediately feel intuitively wrong. Conscience urges us to choose the option that will cause the least harm. Doing that requires that we need to weigh the consequences of each act -- and that is not something that conscience can do. Thus, reason is the final judge in moral dilemmas.

I have no idea why the Mayan group differed in judging moral dilemmas but the difference was due to a reasoning bias and not flawed intuition.

In other words, if a moral sense test could somehow eliminate. or at least minimize, bias, and test intuition in ordinary situations rather than the moral dilemmas, they would get even stronger results for universality than the MST.
 
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There's no such thing, in reality, as an average moral dilemma. Each is unique. While the vast majority of moral judgments are purely intuitive, moral dilemmas are exceptional cases. They involve both intuition and reason.

Yale's Joshua Greene noted that when subjects were considering moral dilemmas while their brains were being examined (fMRI), two parts of their brain lit up. Yet, he still didn't suspect that both reason and intuition were involved in judging moral dilemmas.

The skeletal framework in moral dilemmas is similar. You have two optional actions available and both immediately feel intuitively wrong. Conscience urges us to choose the option that will cause the least harm. Doing that requires that we need to weigh the consequences of each act -- and that is not something that conscience can do. Thus, reason is the final judge in moral dilemmas.

I have no idea why the Mayan group differed in judging moral dilemmas but the difference was due to a reasoning bias and not flawed intuition.

In other words, if a moral sense test could somehow eliminate bias, and test intuition in ordinary situations rather than as moral dilemmas, they would get even stronger results than the MST.

Average moral judgement, not average moral dilemma.

The article you misunderstood about unfamiliar moral judgements was designed to reduce the impact of cultural influences to try to identify an underlying moral grammar.

The above article specifically noted a cultural exception to something they thought was universal via the moral sense test.

They also noted that this made them question whether some things they thought were universal were in fact culturally specifc.

while the moral distinction between means and side-effect may be more universal, the moral distinction between actions and omission appears to be open to greater cross-cultural variation.

In other words, if a moral sense test could somehow eliminate bias, and test intuition in ordinary situations rather than as moral dilemmas, they would get even stronger results than the MST.

That's not what Hauser et al say. You just made that up.

They say the opposite.

We consider the results presented here as a starting point for further experimental research and discussion of which morally relevant psychological distinctions are universal, which open to cross-cultural variation, and how experience and development can create distinct moral signatures (Haidt, 2007; Hauser, 2006a; Kohlberg, 1981; Turiel, 1983). Ultimately, this research may suggest that some psychological distinctions are moral absolutes, true (descriptively) in all cultures, whereas others may be more plastic, relative to a culture’s social dynamics, mating behavior, and belief systems.
 

joe1776

Well-Known Member
That's not what Hauser et al say. You just made that up.
They say the opposite.

Well yeah, of course, they do. I just explained where I think they went wrong and could have gotten even stronger results than they did. Did you not understand that part?
 
Well yeah, of course, they do. I just explained where I think they went wrong and could have gotten even stronger results than they did. Did you not understand that part?

I understand that you will just make up whatever best supports your preconceived ideas and will disregard all scientific evidence that suggests you are wrong yes.

No scientist supports anything remotely resembling your views yet you insist you are the only person who is smart enough to realise such a simple truth.

You claim the MST unequivocally supports your view, they claim morality is culturally and environmentally contingent :

We consider the results presented here as a starting point for further experimental research and discussion of which morally relevant psychological distinctions are universal, which open to cross-cultural variation, and how experience and development can create distinct moral signatures (Haidt, 2007; Hauser, 2006a; Kohlberg, 1981; Turiel, 1983). Ultimately, this research may suggest that some psychological distinctions are moral absolutes, true (descriptively) in all cultures, whereas others may be more plastic, relative to a culture’s social dynamics, mating behavior, and belief systems.
 

joe1776

Well-Known Member
I understand that you will just make up whatever best supports your preconceived ideas and will disregard all scientific evidence that suggests you are wrong yes.

If that's true, and if you knew much of anything at all about our topic, you ought to be able to debate what I wrote with on-point counter-arguments rather than just posting silly crap like this comment.

No scientist supports anything remotely resembling your views yet you insist you are the only person who is smart enough to realise such a simple truth.

You mean that you are unaware of any. Isn't that true? I doubt that I'm alone but I can't identify those who might agree. I have read criticism of the idea of testing using moral dilemmas. It's hardly surprising since testing methods in science rarely avoid criticism.

You claim the MST unequivocally supports your view, they claim morality is culturally and environmentally contingent :
Wrong. I haven't claimed unequivocal support of my view. I have argued that your position is logically rebutted by the "robust" preliminary MST results and mine is not.
 
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Wrong. I haven't claimed unequivocal support of my view. I have argued that your position is logically rebutted by the "robust" preliminary MST results and mine is not.


If you had read the article you claim support you, you'd realise that statement is qualified to unfamiliar moral dilemmas which the authors note are the least likely to be impacted by culture (they exact opposite of what you claimed). But seems 7 pages (you generally don't need to read references, appendix and method sections of papers btw) was too much and you couldn't get past the title.

What do you think this means:

First, it is possible that local and idiosyncratic patterns of judgment might emerge in some contexts as a result of a cultural pressure on a particular sort of morally and culturally relevant scenario. In these cases, we would expect to find specific and theoretically predictable patterns of judgments for those particular cases (e.g., Huebner & Hauser, in press; Hauser et al., 2009) with no significant effect on unfamiliar moral scenarios. Alternatively, there may be some cases in which the relevant cultural difference does evoke a modification to a central moral principle (as suggested by Abarbanell & Hauser’s (2010) research on a rural Mayan population); but even here, we predict that the relevant variation will leave the vast majority of moral judgments untouched. Specifically, in these cases, the variation should only have a significant impact on moral judgments that rely on the use of that particular principle


If that's true, and if you knew much of anything at all about our topic, you ought to be able to debate what I wrote with on-point counter-arguments rather than just posting silly crap like this comment.

You almost never reply to the author's words, just find something to quibble like tone. It all goes back to your failure to understand the most elementary concept what they mean by universal.

So we start with the analogy: a universal moral grammar - UMG basically means there are some intuitive language functions that we are born with and don't need to learn, however each language will vary significantly for many reasons and many other factors are involved in language development. So we have a wide but not infinite range of linguistic possibilities that may develop from our intuitive functions.

The logical assumption from this analogy would be that moral intuitions can develop differently, otherwise the analogy would be terrible, but maybe they made a terrible analogy, so we look for more evidence of what they mean in case we made the error. Funnily enough it's present in basically everything the write:

Ultimately, this research may suggest that some psychological distinctions are moral absolutes, true (descriptively) in all cultures, whereas others may be more plastic, relative to a culture’s social dynamics, mating behavior, and belief systems.

Or perhaps:

I favor a pluralistic position, one that recognizes different moral systems,
and sees adherence to a single system as oppressive. The notion of a universal moral grammar with parametric variation provides one way to think about pluralism. It requires us to understand how, in development, particular parameters are fixed by experience.
 

joe1776

Well-Known Member
...
Or perhaps:

I favor a pluralistic position, one that recognizes different moral systems,
and sees adherence to a single system as oppressive. The notion of a universal moral grammar with parametric variation provides one way to think about pluralism. It requires us to understand how, in development, particular parameters are fixed by experience.
You are either unable or unwilling to seriously debate your own view, so you cherry-pick Hauser's book, focus on the word 'pluralistic' and imply that he favors your position.

Morality is a complex topic. It's very likely that Hauser and I would disagree on the extent to which cultures differ on moral judgments. It's also a near-certainty that he would disagree sharply with you since your culturally-specific position denies the universal description which Hauser and others at Harvard set out to prove 19 years ago.

Since I can't question him in debate,, my guess is that Hauser is trying to explain morality by finding greater similarity to Chomsky's language analogy. This is a common error in logical reasoning. It explains why 'arguments from analogy' are notoriously weak and often listed as a common logical fallacy.

IMO, we are born with a basic framework that is universal. I stick with the label we humans pinned on that basic framework long ago: 'conscience.' The cultural differences you think you see are not differences in the judgments of conscience. They can be explained.

As part of the basic framework: Conscience warns us to not intentionally harm innocent others but it will allow harm done to others in self-defense or in the protection of innocent others.

Three examples of how cultural differences in moral judgments can be explained as matters of perception and do not deny a universal conscience:

1) Insults vary from culture to culture but they are wrong in every culture when they harm someone innocent.

2) Thanks to conscience, humanity is making moral progress but not all cultures are on the same level at the same time. Example: The abolition of legal slavery took over three centuries to make the moral choice universal. There are other moral advances going on right now. Some cultures currently lag on the equal treatment of women.

3) Our reasoning minds love to make rules. Some of the rules we make conflict with the guidance of conscience to become biases. For example, there are Christian sects who have reasoned from their Bible that killing is always wrong. Their rule will conflict with conscience in clear cases of killing in self-defense.
 
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