Is Lying Unethical/Immoral?

[Augustus]

In debate, a strawman argument is a distortion of the opponent's argument. What you are accusing me of is not a strawman.

This is the strawman, so either quote me saying anything remotely like this or just accept you are wrong and stop trying to quibble.

Thus far, you are the only member in this forum who denies that this quote clearly affirms that social scientists like Bloom, Haidt, Greene and others have cast off the stupid old notion that we are born with a clean slate and have to be taught to discern right from wrong. Read the quote again. What else could it mean?

Haidt was probably the first to demonstrate that moral judgments are intuitive. He probably supports your position best. But he's been all over the map with his thinking from the very beginning. He doesn't impress me. I'd rather be debating him than you.

So one who believes culture and reason play a role.

Bloom's work with babies and toddlers best supports my position that we are born with the basic framework of a conscience. Now, here's the part that seems to be confusing you the most. In order to use our conscience properly sometimes there is some learning involved that is cultural. For example: The ways we might insult others will vary widely from culture to culture. So, if we visit another culture and if we want to avoid insulting others accidentally, we have to learn their customs. But the basic conscience we're born with will guide us to avoid intentionally causing harm to innocent people. And since insults cause harm they are wrongful acts in every culture. The cultural learning informs us but the conscience does not need to be informed.

You misunderstand his arguments (again).

As you can see, he's another who believes culture and reason play a role:

He clearly believes cuture/socialisation plays a role:

Henrich et al. looked at 15 societies, and they had the people in these societies play a series of economic games. They found considerable variation in how nice people are to anonymous strangers, and then did some analyses to see what determines this niceness. One finding is that capitalism makes people nicer. That is, immersion in a market economy has a significant relationship with how nice we are to anonymous strangers, presumably because if you're in a market economy, you're used to dealing with other people in long-term relationships, even if they're not your family and they're not your friends. The second factor was membership in a world religion — Christianity or Islam. This makes people nicer, perhaps because it immerses people into a larger social group and entrains them to deal with strangers.

Also reason:

reasons do affect us, but they do so indirectly, through the medium of emotions... [thus moral progress depends on] factors other than our evolutionary history. They are due to our culture, our intelligence and our imagination

Some more detail that seems incompatible with your view:

I find the idea of an innately pure kindness to be extremely implausible. For one thing, our brains have evolved through natural selection. And that means that the main force that shaped our psyche is differential reproductive success. Our minds have evolved through processes such as kin selection and reciprocal altruism. We should therefore be biased in favor of those who share our genes at the expense of those who don't, and we should be biased in favor of those who we are in continued interaction with at the expense of strangers...

The dominant trend of humanity has been to view strangers — non-relatives, those from other tribes — with hatred, fear and disgust...

the niceness we see now in the world today, by at least some people in the world, seems to clash with our natural morality, which is nowhere near as nice.

The Harvard group, Cushman, Hauser, et al, probably support me best.

And strike 3...


I argue that our moral faculty is equipped with a universal moral grammar, a toolkit for building specific moral systems. Once we have acquired our culture’s specific moral norms—a process that is more like growing a limb than sitting in Sunday school and learning about vices and virtues—we judge whether actions are permissible, obligatory, or forbidden, without conscious reasoning and without explicit access to the underlying principles. Marc Hauser - Moral Minds


But while punishment in cultures of honor is remarkable for its effect in prompting punitive behavior, it appears to build upon many of the ordinary psychological foundations that we considered at the beginning of this essay in terms of punitive judgments. Punishment is triggered by causal responsibility, and although it need not be targeted at the responsible individual, at least it must be targeted at the responsible individual’s clan...

Many of the features that make punishment a daunting object of psychological study also make it an exemplar of the moral domain. If the psychology of punishment can only be understood as an interaction between biology, culture, and institutions, then surely the same is true of the psychology of cooperation, forgiveness, generosity, fairness, character, trust, and so forth.
Punishment in Humans: From Intuitions to Institutions -

 

[joe1776]

This is the strawman, so either quote me saying anything remotely like this or just accept you are wrong and stop trying to quibble.

I wrote this: Thus far, you are the only member in this forum who denies that this quote clearly affirms that social scientists like Bloom, Haidt, Greene and others have cast off the stupid old notion that we are born with a clean slate and have to be taught to discern right from wrong. Read the quote again. What else could it mean?

Why is that a strawman argument? I have disagreed with your argument, but how exactly have I misrepresented it?

This is the quote that ignites your objections. Should I not assume by your objections that you find something wrong with the quote?

Humans are born with a hard-wired morality: a sense of good and evil is bred in the bone/ i know this claim might sound outlandish, but it's supported now by research in several laboratories --- Paul Bloom, Yale Psychologist

When we have resolved your strawman charge. I'll move on to the other points you made in your recent post.

 

[Augustus]

I wrote this: Thus far, you are the only member in this forum who denies that this quote clearly affirms that social scientists like Bloom, Haidt, Greene and others have cast off the stupid old notion that we are born with a clean slate and have to be taught to discern right from wrong. Read the quote again. What else could it mean?

Why is that a strawman argument? I have disagreed with your argument, but how exactly have I misrepresented it?

This is the quote that ignites your objections. Should I not assume by your objections that you find something wrong with the quote?

Humans are born with a hard-wired morality: a sense of good and evil is bred in the bone/ i know this claim might sound outlandish, but it's supported now by research in several laboratories --- Paul Bloom, Yale Psychologist

When we have resolved your strawman charge. I'll move on to the other points you made in your recent post.

It's a strawman because I didn't say what you claimed, which is why you can't quote me saying anything of the sort.

I did not say deny "that this quote clearly affirms that social scientists like Bloom, Haidt, Greene and others have cast off the stupid old notion that we are born with a clean slate and have to be taught to discern right from wrong"

Go back and read what I did say as I've quoted it, bolded it and underlined it to make it easier for you to understand.

If you need any help understanding what I did say, ask specifically about a specific sentence or sentences.

If you want my views on the above quote, human babies are animals, they have intuitions that relate to socialisation and survival. Some of these could relate to things that we term "morals", although I think it is naive to try to isolate "conscience" from other evolved cognitive functions that aid survival. Babies may have an intuitive sense of fairness likely tied to their need to get an equitable share of resources. Babies also learn to discriminate in favour of their in group and against outsiders. Again there is an obvious survival benefit to this. There is also no reason to believe that babies having instincts in any way offers evidence for a perfect, universal conscience in adults.

 

[joe1776]

It's a strawman because I didn't say what you claimed, which is why you can't quote me saying anything of the sort. I did not say deny "that this quote clearly affirms that social scientists like Bloom, Haidt, GreeIf you want my views on the above quote ne and others have cast off the stupid old notion that we are born with a clean slate and have to be taught to discern right from wrong"

It's true that you refrained from saying anything specific about the quote that you objected to several times. But you didn't have to say it. What I wrote is the opposing theory to that offered by Bloom.. Namely, that we are born with a blank slate and taught to discern right from wrong by experience.

Therefore, I could logically infer from the fact that you objected to this quote repeatedly that it challenged your beliefs.

Humans are born with a hard-wired morality: a sense of good and evil is bred in the bone. I know this claim might sound outlandish, but it's supported now by research in several laboratories --- Paul Bloom, Yale Psychologist

If you want my views on the above quote...

Well, sure, I'd love to hear them since you have previously accused me of repeatedly distorting your views into strawman arguments.

If you want my views on the above quote human babies are animals, they have intuitions that relate to socialisation and survival. Some of these could relate to things that we term "morals", although I think it is naive to try to isolate "conscience" from other evolved cognitive functions that aid survival. Babies may have an intuitive sense of fairness likely tied to their need to get an equitable share of resources. Babies also learn to discriminate in favour of their in group and against outsiders. Again there is an obvious survival benefit to this. There is also no reason to believe that babies having instincts in any way offers evidence for a perfect, universal conscience in adults.

I don't have the time to debate your entire list, but I'll point out that the way conscience deals with the act of killing is well-aligned with the survival of our species. But your idea that discriminating in favor of the in-group has survival benefits is false. It's that very characteristic of in-group behavior that leaders have used to attack their neighbors, to start wars, and pose a threat to survival.

Conscience signals us that the act of killing is wrongful when the act intentionally harms an innocent person (a victim). When the facts support a killing done as an act of self-defense, it's justifiable. If survival is the objective, can you offer any logical reason why the judgments of conscience should vary from one culture to another?

 

[Augustus]

It's true that you refrained from saying anything specific about the quote that you objected to several times. But you didn't have to say it. What I wrote is the opposing theory to that offered by Bloom.. Namely, that we are born with a blank slate and taught to discern right from wron

I said that the quote doesn't support your argument. That babies have some intuitive capacity that resembles morality doesn't in any way mean that adults share an infallible universal conscience.

It's already been pointed out to you by multiple people including me that Bloom and every other person you cite supports the idea that culture and socialisation impact morality.

But you just continue to cherry pick and quote mine to pretend they support you. Quoting someone who explicitly says you are wrong in support of your argument is not intellectually honest.

You then strawmanned me, and now instead of addressing the substance of the post and the evidence the scientists you claim support your view actually reject it you are deflecting by quibbling about your strawman.

This is what usually happens in these threads as you find some minor trivia to quibble rather than addressing the substance of the argument against your position.

Such as Bloom:

Henrich et al. looked at 15 societies, and they had the people in these societies play a series of economic games. They found considerable variation in how nice people are to anonymous strangers, and then did some analyses to see what determines this niceness. One finding is that capitalism makes people nicer. That is, immersion in a market economy has a significant relationship with how nice we are to anonymous strangers, presumably because if you're in a market economy, you're used to dealing with other people in long-term relationships, even if they're not your family and they're not your friends. The second factor was membership in a world religion — Christianity or Islam. This makes people nicer, perhaps because it immerses people into a larger social group and entrains them to deal with strangers.

Therefore, I could logically infer from the fact that you objected to this quote repeatedly that it challenged your beliefs.

The problem with your logical inferences is they are terrible and start from false premises based on your own mistakes in comprehension.

Humans are born with a hard-wired morality: a sense of good and evil is bred in the bone. I know this claim might sound outlandish, but it's supported now by research in several laboratories --- Paul Bloom, Yale Psychologist

Now that we've established you made a mistake regarding this quote, why don't you address the quoted material that shows Bloom clearly rejects your "universal conscience" idea.

I don't have the time to debate your entire list, but I'll point out that the way conscience deals with the act of killing is well-aligned with the survival of our species.

As usual. Time to endlessly quibble trivia, but not time to address the fact that the scientists you claim support you, in fact reject your view

, but I'll point out that the way conscience deals with the act of killing is well-aligned with the survival of our species. But your idea that discriminating in favor of the in-group has survival benefits is false. It's that very characteristic of in-group behavior that leaders have used to attack their neighbors, to start wars, and pose a threat to survival.

Again, you would have to make a rational case against the mountains of logical, scientific, anecdotal, experiential and historical evidence that supports the idea we do indeed discriminate and that such discrimination is an evolutionary advantage (or at least was in our 'natural' environment). Just stating you are correct is not a rational argument.

Let's see what your man Bloom says eh?

Bloom:

I find the idea of an innately pure kindness to be extremely implausible. For one thing, our brains have evolved through natural selection. And that means that the main force that shaped our psyche is differential reproductive success. Our minds have evolved through processes such as kin selection and reciprocal altruism. We should therefore be biased in favor of those who share our genes at the expense of those who don't, and we should be biased in favor of those who we are in continued interaction with at the expense of strangers...

Here are some sources of evidence for this claim. We've known for a long time that babies are biased towards the familiar when it comes to individuals. A baby will prefer to look at her mother's face than the face of a stranger. A baby will prefer to listen to her mother's voice as opposed to the voice of a stranger. This bias also extends to categories. Babies prefer to listen to their native language rather than to a language that's different from theirs. Babies who are raised in white households prefer to look at white people than at black people. Babies who are raised in black households prefer to look at black people than at white people.

We know that this last fact isn't because the babies know that they themselves are white or black, because babies that are raised in multi-ethnic environments show no bias. It has to do with the people around them. And as they get older, this bias in preference translates into a bias in behavior. Young children prefer to imitate and learn from who look like them and those who speak the same language as them. Around the age of nine months, they'll show stranger anxiety — they avoid new people.

There are also studies now with preschool children, older children, and adolescents that show that it is fairly easy to get them to categorize in favor their own group over others, even when the group is established in the most minimal and arbitrary circumstances. This is all based on Taijfel’s work on “minimal groups”. For instance, in experiments by Bigler and others, you take a bunch of children and you say okay, kids, I have some red t-shirts and blue t-shirts, I'm just going to give them to you guys. You get the children to put on the t-shirts, so that now you have a red t-shirt group and the blue t-shirt group. Now you approach a child from the red t-shirt group, and you say: I have some candy to give out, and you can't get any, but I'm asking you how you give it to other people. Who do you want to give it to? Do you want to give it to everybody equally, or you want to give it more to the red or more to the blue?

It turns out that children are biased to give more to their own group, even when they don’t personally profit from the giving. And when asked about the properties of their group — who's nice, who's mean, who's smart, who's stupid — a child who just put on a red t-shirt will tend to favor the red t-shirt group over the blue t-shirt group — even though it’s perfectly clear that the assigned were divided on an arbitrary basis...

The dominant trend of humanity has been to view strangers — non-relatives, those from other tribes — with hatred, fear and disgust...

the niceness we see now in the world today, by at least some people in the world, seems to clash with our natural morality, which is nowhere near as nice.

Conscience signals us that the act of killing is wrongful when the act intentionally harms an innocent person (a victim). When the facts support a killing done as an act of self-defense, it's justifiable. If survival is the objective, can you offer any logical reason why the judgments of conscience should vary from one culture to another?

Because we do and have lived in very different environments and what it takes to be successful in one is not the same as what it takes to be successful in the other. Also, survival for us and our kin is more important than survival of some unconnected stranger, hence in-group bias.

And, who is "innocent" is a very much a culturally defined concept in many situations.

 

[joe1776]

I said that the quote doesn't support your argument. That babies have some intuitive capacity that resembles morality doesn't in any way mean that adults share an infallible universal conscience.

First of all, let's establish that despite objecting to the Bloom quote several times, you didn't get around to explaining your objection to it until your previous post. Yet, before that, you made multiple accusations of strawman arguments. Since I could not have made strawmen from an argument you never made, either you can't recognize a strawman argument or you can and knew you were bringing false charges.

It's already been pointed out to you by multiple people including me that Bloom and every other person you cite supports the idea that culture and socialisation impact morality.

(1) You are the only forum member who has engaged me on this topic, so your "multiple people" claim is pure fabrication. (2) I have explained to you previously one way that cultures impact moral choices using the examples of insults. (3) You don't seem to realize that the extent of cultural impact you are advocating is in line with the old notion that the judgments of conscience are taught and learned as the product of reason. Current science, as the quote from Bloom indicates, denies your argument.

This is what usually happens in these threads as you find some minor trivia to quibble rather than addressing the substance of the argument against your position.

I wonder if you realize that a strawman argument is a sly, deliberate attempt to cheat in debate by fabricating a false position for one's opponent. I don't "quibble" about being accused of cheating.

The problem with your logical inferences is they are terrible and start from false premises based on your own mistakes in comprehension.

If there was any truth to this BS statement, you would be able to present actual examples. You know, like in a debate.

Now that we've established you made a mistake regarding this quote, why don't you address the quoted material that shows Bloom clearly rejects your "universal conscience" idea.

Read the quote again. Are you actually claiming that Bloom is referring to humans being born with culturally-specific consciences?

Humans are born with a hard-wired morality: a sense of good and evil is bred in the bone/ i know this claim might sound outlandish, but it's supported now by research in several laboratories --- Paul Bloom, Yale Psychologist

If evolution has our species geared for survival, why would our moral intuition differ from culture to culture?

Again, you would have to make a rational case against the mountains of logical, scientific, anecdotal, experiential and historical evidence that supports the idea we do indeed discriminate and that such discrimination is an evolutionary advantage (or at least was in our 'natural' environment). Just stating you are correct is not a rational argument.

I'm making a rational case. Can you logically infer that Russian in-group discrimination and American in-group discrimination, both sides having nuclear options, bodes well for the survival of our species?

Let's see what your man Bloom says eh? I find the idea of an innately pure kindness to be extremely implausible. For one thing, our brains have evolved through natural selection. And that means that the main force that shaped our psyche is differential reproductive success. Our minds have evolved through processes such as kin selection and reciprocal altruism. We should therefore be biased in favor of those who share our genes at the expense of those who don't, and we should be biased in favor of those who we are in continued interaction with at the expense of strangers.

The words 'kin selection' and 'reciprocal altruism' tipped me off. Bloom is giving us an hypothesis that traces back to Richard Dawkins' book The Selfish Gene which offers a biological explanation for the selfish side of human nature but, as Dawkins admitted, his theory couldn't explain altruism. In his book he offered kin selection to patch the altruism hole while admitting it was insufficient. Subsequently, biologists have offered more patches based on the concept of reciprocity. As of four or five years ago, they had amassed seven reciprocity patches in attempts to cover the altruism hole.

It's my position that any theory, no matter how weak, can be patched. To describe human nature, I prefer simple, elegant theories that don't require patches. It took me a few years to figure it out, but I can now explain altruism as a function of conscience.

Conscience relies only on the pain and pleasure functions of our brains. If the act is wrong it feels wrong. If its a wrongful act that we have already done, we are punished with guilt or remorse. If the act is justifiable, we feel nothing.
If we perform an act of kindness for someone, the pleasure function rewards us: we feel good about it.'

Our brains are using the reward and punishment method to train us. When we perform selfish acts at the expense of others, we are punished. When we put the welfare of others foremost in our minds, we are rewarded with pleasure. This creates the selfishness paradox: We serve ourselves best when we act with the welfare of other foremost in our minds. This is the simple explanation for altruism.

So, bottom line: Bloom and I disagree on the topic of altruism, but we agree that we humans are born with a conscience.

 

[Augustus]

First of all, let's establish that despite objecting to the Bloom quote several times, you didn't get around to explaining your objection to it until your previous post. Yet, before that, you made multiple accusations of strawman arguments. Since I could not have made strawmen from an argument you never made, either you can't recognize a strawman argument or you can and knew you were bringing false charges.

Good grief I explained in the first post that I just quoted again and you just quoted back to me.

Never mind. It's beyond you.

(1) You are the only forum member who has engaged me on this topic, so your "multiple people" claim is pure fabrication. (2) I have explained to you previously one way that cultures impact moral choices using the examples of insults. (3) You don't seem to realize that the extent of cultural impact you are advocating is in line with the old notion that the judgments of conscience are taught and learned as the product of reason. Current science, as the quote from Bloom indicates, denies your argument.

1. Every thread you say pretty much the same thing. Other people have pulled you up on your quote mining/source misrepresentatiin too.

2. That is not a rebuttal of Bloom's arguments about the influence of culture. Or Cushman's. Or Hauser's

3. Nope. That's just your misunderstanding.

Read the quote again. Are you actually claiming that Bloom is referring to humans being born with culturally-specific consciences?

No. They acquire them over time. This is supported by every author you have cited and I have provided you with quotes demonstrating this in numerous threads.

Your argument all your hand picked sources are wrong whenever they disagree with you is basically "because I say so"

I'm making a rational case. Can you logically infer that Russian in-group discrimination and American in-group discrimination bodes well for the survival of our species?

This is an example of your terrible "logical deductions".

It did in the environment we evolved in, hence we are still here.

Dogs, wolves, monkeys, apes, hyenas, lions, etc. display similar behaviour. They don't focus on the level of the species, but what aids lower scale survival, especially our own.

We didn't evolve with nukes and the ability to end the planet and we didn't evolve caring about random strangers the same as our family and friends.

I genuinely find it amazing you think we are not biased towards our in-group.

It is so self evident most small children can intuitively grasp it, and it is also so well supported by sceintifc evidence that it's basically indisputable.

The words 'kin selection' and 'reciprocal altruism' tipped me off. Bloom is giving us an hypothesis that traces back to Richard Dawkins' book The Selfish Gene which offers a biological explanation for the selfish side of human nature but, as Dawkins admitted, his theory couldn't explain altruism. In his book he offered kin selection to patch the altruism hole while admitting it was insufficient. Subsequently, biologists have offered more patches based on the concept of reciprocity. As of four or five years ago, they had amassed seven reciprocity patches in attempts to cover the altruism hole.

I personally favour multi level selection theories of evolution, but they are no more amenable to your argument.

So basically your argument relies on both of the major competing theories of evolution to being wrong.

Our brains are using the reward and punishment method to train us. When we perform selfish acts at the expense of others, we are punished. When we put the welfare of others foremost in our minds, we are rewarded with pleasure. This creates the selfishness paradox: We serve ourselves best when we act with the welfare of other foremost in our minds. This is the simple explanation for altruism

A simple explanation not favoured by any scientist and not supported by any evidence.

So, bottom line: Bloom and I disagree on the topic of altruism, but we agree that we humans are born with a conscience.

Ok, but that still means every scientist you've ever quoted fundamentally rejects your thesis.

Why do you think everyone is wrong except you?

 

[joe1776]

Good grief I explained in the first post that I just quoted again and you just quoted back to me.

Nope. You didn't explain your objection to the quote until your post #63. Here it is:

If you want my views on the above quote, human babies are animals, they have intuitions that relate to socialisation and survival.........

Prior to that you ducked answering the question directly while charging me with strawman arguments on an argument you hadn't yet made.

As always though, I'm not bothered by the fact that you are unconvinced by my argument. There was never any hope of that. But you've heard this before: I debate imagining intelligent, unbiased lurkers, my goal is to persuade those imagined people that I'm right.

 

[Augustus]

Nope. You didn't explain your objection to the quote until your post #63. Here it is:

Don't lie

It's already been pointed out to you by multiple people including me that Bloom and every other person you cite supports the idea that culture and socialisation impact morality.

But you just continue to cherry pick and quote mine to pretend they support you. Quoting someone who explicitly says you are wrong in support of your argument is not intellectually honest.

Simple enough yet?

Prior to that you ducked answering the question directly while charging me with strawman arguments on an argument you hadn't yet made.

As always though, I'm not bothered by the fact that you are unconvinced by my argument. There was never any hope of that. But you've heard this before: I debate imagining intelligent, unbiased lurkers, my goal is to persuade those imagined people that I'm right.

Like I said, you will endlessly quibble something trivial instead of actually facing up to the fact that every scientist you quote actually explicitly rejects your thesis.

The lurkers can read what these scientists say too. They can also understand in/out group biases as you are the only person I have encountered who can't grasp these.

Maybe the lurkers are persuaded by you saying everyone is wrong except me. I guess most aren't, for the same reason your views have no scientific support: you just made them up based on naive, wishful thinking

 

[joe1776]

...Maybe the lurkers are persuaded by you saying everyone is wrong except me. I guess most aren't, for the same reason your views have no scientific support: you just made them up based on naive, wishful thinking

I think Bloom's quote provides scientific support for my position that we are born with a conscience. Logically, when survival is considered, it makes perfect sense that our instincts would apply species-wide.

I think Harvard Moral Sense Test is scientific evidence of a universal conscience. Here's a quote from their original justification (link below)

"..For hundreds of years, scholars have argued that our moral judgments arise from rational, conscious, voluntary, reflective deliberations about what ought to be. This perspective has generated the further belief that our moral psychology is a slowly developing capacity, founded entirely on experience and education, and subject to considerable variation across cultures. With the exception of a few trivial examples, one culture’s right is another’s wrong. We believe this hyper rational, culturally-specific view is no longer tenable. The MST has been designed to show why and offer an alternative. Most of our moral intuitions are unconscious, involuntary, and universal, developing in each child despite formal education.. "

Is there a scientist who agrees with me completely on everything? I doubt it. They don't agree with each other on everything.

In addition to a lot of argumentative nonsense, your argument boils down to the tired, old ploy of setting the bar for evidence impossibly high.

THE MORAL SENSE TEST | Edge.org

Intuitive moral judgments are robust across variation in gender, education, politics, and religion: A large-scale web-based study
https://faculty.georgetown.edu/lbh24/BanerjeeEtAl.pdf

 

[Augustus]

I think Harvard Moral Sense Test is scientific evidence of a universal conscience. Here's a quote from their original justification (link below)

The problem is you have completely misunderstood what Hauser means by a universal conscience.

He means it like the idea of a universal grammar in language, this universal grammar obviously allows for variation between languages.

So, he very clearly rejects your view:

I argue that our moral faculty is equipped with a universal moral grammar, a toolkit for building specific moral systems. Once we have acquired our culture’s specific moral norms—a process that is more like growing a limb than sitting in Sunday school and learning about vices and virtues—we judge whether actions are permissible, obligatory, or forbidden, without conscious reasoning and without explicit access to the underlying principles. Marc Hauser - Moral Minds

The second point is to draw on an analogy with language and ask whether there might be something like a universal moral grammar, a set of principles that every human is born with. It’s a tool kit in some sense for building possible moral systems. In linguistics, there is a lot of variation that we see in the expressed languages throughout the world. The real deep insight of Chomskian linguistics was to ask the question, “Might this variation at some level be explained by certain common principles of universal grammar?” That allows, of course, for every language to have its own lexicon. The analogy with morality would simply be: There is going to be a suite of universal principles that dictate how we think about the nature of harming and helping others, but each culture has some freedom—not unlimited—to dictate who is harmed and who is helped.


Is Morality Innate and Universal?

As such you are clearly misrepresenting his ideas by quoting him in support of your view when he fundamentally and explicitly rejects it.

 

[joe1776]

The problem is you have completely misunderstood what Hauser means by a universal conscience.

He means it like the idea of a universal grammar in language, this universal grammar obviously allows for variation between languages.

So, he very clearly rejects your view:

I argue that our moral faculty is equipped with a universal moral grammar, a toolkit for building specific moral systems. Once we have acquired our culture’s specific moral norms—a process that is more like growing a limb than sitting in Sunday school and learning about vices and virtues—we judge whether actions are permissible, obligatory, or forbidden, without conscious reasoning and without explicit access to the underlying principles. Marc Hauser - Moral Minds

The second point is to draw on an analogy with language and ask whether there might be something like a universal moral grammar, a set of principles that every human is born with. It’s a tool kit in some sense for building possible moral systems. In linguistics, there is a lot of variation that we see in the expressed languages throughout the world. The real deep insight of Chomskian linguistics was to ask the question, “Might this variation at some level be explained by certain common principles of universal grammar?” That allows, of course, for every language to have its own lexicon. The analogy with morality would simply be: There is going to be a suite of universal principles that dictate how we think about the nature of harming and helping others, but each culture has some freedom—not unlimited—to dictate who is harmed and who is helped.


Is Morality Innate and Universal?

As such you are clearly misrepresenting his ideas by quoting him in support of your view when he fundamentally and explicitly rejects it.

Hauser and I are saying the same thing but using different terminology. I've said that we are born with the basic framework of a conscience that allows for cultural variations. I used insults as my example in an earlier post.

Hauser is using Chomsy's language analogy saying that we are born with a universal moral grammar that allows for cultural variation.

We both agree that moral judgments are intuitive, He thinks they are without exception. We differ only on moral dilemmas. I think moral dilemmas involve both reason and intuition. He thinks they are solely intuitive.

 

[Augustus]

Hauser and I are saying the same thing but using different terminology. I've said that we are born with the basic framework of a conscience that allows for cultural variations. I used insults as my example in an earlier post.

Hauser is using Chomsy's language analogy saying that we are born with a universal moral grammar that allows for cultural variation.

We both agree that moral judgments are intuitive, He thinks they are without exception. We differ only on moral dilemmas. I think moral dilemmas involve both reason and intuition. He thinks they are solely intuitive.

Hauser believes intuitive moral judgements vary significantly by culture. Not just on trivialities like manners, but on core questions like when is it ok to kill someone. This is unsurprising as human cultures evolved in very different environments and so what it takes to survive and thrive would not be identical. These values are learned and internalised over generations and simply form part of someones intuitive worldview, they are not simply conscious and rational judgements.

So you believe people from different cultures may respond differently to the same set of "moral facts" and make very different intuitive judgements?

Once we have acquired our culture’s specific moral norms—a process that is more like growing a limb than sitting in Sunday school and learning about vices and virtues—we judge whether actions are permissible, obligatory, or forbidden, without conscious reasoning and without explicit access to the underlying principles... There is going to be a suite of universal principles that dictate how we think about the nature of harming and helping others, but each culture has some freedom—not unlimited—to dictate who is harmed and who is helped.


So for example:

A woman cheats on her husband, a cousin in an arranged marriage, and it becomes publicly known in her village. She felt unsatisfied in the marriage as the husband forbade her from having an education and getting a job. She just had to look after the kids. Her husband provided well for the family, was kind to the children but was pretty cold towards her and occasionally slapped her with a moderate amount of force if she went against his command, but never to significant injury. Feeling depressed and unloved, she cheated with her childhood friend who she had always loved and who had always loved her and treated her kindly and with respect.

Who, if anyone, is guilty in this situation and what punishment do they deserve?

Is your position that say 10 rural Afghan men would differ significantly in their moral judgement than 10 liberal Californian women? Perhaps even to the extent that the Californian liberals would intuitively think the male should be prosecuted and the woman is blameless, while the Afghans may intuitively think the woman should be killed by her own family?

Hauser believes so (see The Moral Mind p144 onwards). We may use the same moral grammar, but culture often informs us who is innocent and who is guilty, and what punishment, including death, the guilty party deserves.

I always thought you argued culture wouldn't matter. Any 'unbiased jury' would return the same result. If you say you are saying the same thing as Hauser, you believe the judgements given may vary greatly as we are all impacted by out culture.

We do not expect universality across the board. Rather, we expect something much more like linguistic variation: systematic differences between cultures, based on parametric settings... The central issue in thinking about cross-cultural variation is to figure out how different societies build from these universal factors to generate differences in moral judgments. The moral mind - Hauser

 

[joe1776]

Hauser believes intuitive moral judgements vary significantly by culture. Not just on trivialities like manners, but on core questions like when is it ok to kill someone.

You are attributing to Hauser you own beliefs. I don't know exactly where he draws the line on what you are calling "core questions" and neither do you. If Hauser and I sat and talked, it would amaze me if we didn't have different opinions on such a complex topic. I can imagine debating with him on some things just as I do with you. However, in this discussion, the important things to remember are that Hauser and I agree that we humans are born with what I call "the basic framework of conscience" and he, using Chomsky's analogy, refers to being born with a "moral grammar."

This is unsurprising as human cultures evolved in very different environments and so what it takes to survive and thrive would not be identical. These values are learned and internalised over generations and simply form part of someones intuitive worldview, they are not simply conscious and rational judgements.

I'm pretty sure that Hauser would disagree with your statement as do I since it seems to go too far. It reads like you would eliminate the universal nature of conscience idea on which Hauser and I agree.

So you believe people from different cultures may respond differently to the same set of "moral facts" and make very different intuitive judgements?

No. You are not understanding what I mean by "cultural variations." In Japan, you might insult your hosts if you walked into their homes with your shoes on. So, you refrain from doing it, not because you think the act itself is morally wrong, but because your conscience, that basic structure you were born with, signals you that it is wrong to intentionally harm innocent people -- and insults cause harm in every culture on the planet (therefore, it's universal).

Once we have acquired our culture’s specific moral norms—a process that is more like growing a limb than sitting in Sunday school and learning about vices and virtues—we judge whether actions are permissible, obligatory, or forbidden, without conscious reasoning and without explicit access to the underlying principles... There is going to be a suite of universal principles that dictate how we think about the nature of harming and helping others, but each culture has some freedom—not unlimited—to dictate who is harmed and who is helped.

So for example:
A woman cheats on her husband, a cousin in an arranged marriage, and it becomes publicly known in her village. She felt unsatisfied in the marriage as the husband forbade her from having an education and getting a job. She just had to look after the kids. Her husband provided well for the family, was kind to the children but was pretty cold towards her and occasionally slapped her with a moderate amount of force if she went against his command, but never to significant injury. Feeling depressed and unloved, she cheated with her childhood friend who she had always loved and who had always loved her and treated her kindly and with respect.
Who, if anyone, is guilty in this situation and what punishment do they deserve?

We need an unbiased "jury" to decide the issue -- which might mean that the "trial" might have to be moved to another "jurisdiction" because of cultural biases. If I were on the jury, I'd see immoral acts on both husband and wife but I would send them to marriage counseling and wouldn't punish either.

Is your position that say 10 rural Afghan men would differ significantly in their moral judgement than 10 liberal Californian women? Perhaps even to the extent that the Californian liberals would intuitively think the male should be prosecuted and the woman is blameless, while the Afghans may intuitively think the woman should be killed by her own family?

Agreed. It's unlikely that an unbiased jury could be found in either place.

Hauser believes so (see The Moral Mind p144 onwards). We may use the same moral grammar, but culture often informs us who is innocent and who is guilty, and what punishment, including death, the guilty party deserves.

I read the Hauser quote and its unclear what he means. But the important thing for our discussion is what he doesn't mean. He can't mean that the conscience we were born with allows cultural biases. He can't mean that because that idea contradicts his thesis of its universal nature.

For example, in 1850 half the world condoned slavery as moral while the other half didn't. Hauser can't be saying that both opposing cultural beliefs were supported by conscience. That's not consistent with his opinion on its universal nature.

 

[Augustus]

You are attributing to Hauser you own beliefs

By directly quoting his book? That's a strange case of cognitive dissonance you have there...

We do not expect universality across the board. Rather, we expect something much more like linguistic variation: systematic differences between cultures, based on parametric settings... The central issue in thinking about cross-cultural variation is to figure out how different societies build from these universal factors to generate differences in moral judgments. The moral mind - Hauser

I don't know exactly where he draws the line on what you are calling "core questions" and neither do you

You could read his book The moral mind then rather than rather than continuing this peculiar charade where you pretend his explicit statements on the role of culture don't exist.

I'm pretty sure that Hauser would disagree with your statement as do I since it seems to go too far. It reads like you would eliminate the universal nature of conscience idea on which Hauser and I agree.

You clearly haven't read or understood much of his work then. He's pretty explicit about it as I've already shown. Keep reading and I'll show you more

No. You are not understanding what I mean by "cultural variations."

I understand, I was just emphasising your view is very different to his.

We need an unbiased "jury" to decide the issue -- which might mean that the "trial" might have to be moved to another "jurisdiction" because of cultural biases. If I were on the jury, I'd see immoral acts on both husband and wife but I would send them to marriage counseling and wouldn't punish either

No one can escape their cultural perspectives on marriage and infidelity. There is no neutral position.

Your view is just your cultural bias. You are no more neutral than an Afghan or Californian Liberal.

I read the Hauser quote and its unclear what he means. But the important thing for our discussion is what he doesn't mean. He can't mean that the conscience we were born with allows cultural biases. He can't mean that because that idea contradicts his thesis of its universal nature.

It's perfectly clear what it means, even more so if you bothered to actually read his works, and with an open mind.

You thus miss out the obvious other option: you have completely misunderstood his ideas and what he means by a universal moral grammar.

A universal grammar allows for massive variations in language (including grammar), it just means there is a basic framework common to all.

In morality, it may be that all societies put limitations on killing (universal), but what constitutes a justifiable killing varies significantly (culture).

Or, to use your example, insults are bad in all cultures, but whether you should ignore it or respond violently is cultural (Hauser uses this specific example when discussing honour cultures).

In some cultures ignoring it is virtuous, and in others it marks you out as a weak and dishonourable so you have to respond with violence to regain your honour.

Again from the moral mind discussing the difference between Southern US honour cultures and Northern US, and emphasising these are instinctive not 'rational':

When the stooge bumped and insulted the Southerners, they reported greater anger, showed a massive stress response as indicated by an increase in the hormone cortisol, as well as an increase in testosterone, one indicator of aggressive intent. Northerners found the bump and verbal insult more amusing and showed no noticeable change in cortisol or testosterone. In a second experiment, one stooge bumped and insulted the subject, and soon thereafter, a second stooge—a six-foot- three-inch, 250-pound male—approached. Not only did Southerners experience greater anger than Northerners, but they were unwilling to move when the hulk approached. Having been insulted once, they had no intention of being insulted again. They were fighting for the status of king of the hallway.

When Northerners are insulted, they can ignore it, inhibiting the impulse to strike back either verbally (“Yeah, well, you’re an ******* too!”) or physically. Southerners have a different physiological set point. The Southern system of control [i.e the extent to which it is rejects violence as legitimate] is weaker than the Northern, at least at this point in history. These results show that culture can push around our aggressive tendencies, specifically the threshold for triggering our impulses to fight. All humans have the capacity for aggression. Each human has a different boiling point. Humans in some cultures have more similar boiling points than humans in other cultures. In the South, not only are people more likely to respond aggressively to insult, but they expect others to respond violently to insult. If a Northerner sees someone walk away from an insult, that is the proper thing to do. If a Southerner sees someone walk away from an insult, he’s a wimp.

This is from the chapter 'grammars of violence' where he explains how honour killings are intuitively justifiable in certain cultures.

Are you still going to pretend he agrees with you?

For example, in 1850 half the world condoned slavery as moral while the other half didn't. Hauser can't be saying that both opposing cultural beliefs were supported by conscience.

As the above quote shows, he absolutely would (remember slavery was mostly abolished down the barrel of an imperial gun in the non-western world)

 

[Augustus]

the important thing for our discussion is what he doesn't mean. He can't mean that the conscience we were born with allows cultural biases. He can't mean that because that idea contradicts his thesis of its universal nature.

If you want one more so you don't have to take my word for it regarding a book you haven't read:


Hauser does a good job of explaining why honour killings come to be considered as morally permissible, or even morally obligatory, in some cultures, but highly immoral in others. However, he does not directly ask whether or when an instance of honour killing, which upholds the mores of one culture, ought to be tolerated by another. It may be, as Hauser argues, that all human moral judgement involves appealing to particular variants of an underlying universal moral grammar, but there is clearly considerable variation in the ways in which this grammar is expressed.

Review: MORAL MINDS on JSTOR

 

[joe1776]

By directly quoting his book? That's a strange case of cognitive dissonance you have there...

Why? The mere fact that you quote him means nothing. You are attributing to Hauser your own beliefs by your biased interpretation of those selected quotes.

Now, your argument boils down to insisting that you are right when logically you have Hauser arguing against the universal nature of our moral sense that the Moral Sense Test that he and others at Harvard hope to demonstrate.

You seem to think that insisting that you're right constitutes a valid argument. OK, I'll accept that and counter by insisting that you're wrong.

 

[Augustus]

Why? The mere fact that you quote him means nothing. You are attributing to Hauser your own beliefs by your biased interpretation of those selected quotes.

Now, your argument boils down to insisting that you are right when logically you have Hauser arguing against the universal nature of our moral sense that the Moral Sense Test that he and others at Harvard hope to demonstrate.

You seem to think that insisting that you're right constitutes a valid argument. OK, I'll accept that and counter by insisting that you're wrong.

Unsurprisingly you ignore multiple direct quotes that clearly show you to be wrong and think pretending they don't exist actually fools anyone else reading this.

If they are out of context, prove me wrong by providing the real context. Simply pretending they are out of context is juvenile.

You won't even attempt a rational argument against these unequivocal rejections of your view? Note these are direct quotes, not my own views.

When the stooge bumped and insulted the Southerners, they reported greater anger, showed a massive stress response as indicated by an increase in the hormone cortisol, as well as an increase in testosterone, one indicator of aggressive intent. Northerners found the bump and verbal insult more amusing and showed no noticeable change in cortisol or testosterone. In a second experiment, one stooge bumped and insulted the subject, and soon thereafter, a second stooge—a six-foot- three-inch, 250-pound male—approached. Not only did Southerners experience greater anger than Northerners, but they were unwilling to move when the hulk approached. Having been insulted once, they had no intention of being insulted again. They were fighting for the status of king of the hallway.

When Northerners are insulted, they can ignore it, inhibiting the impulse to strike back either verbally (“Yeah, well, you’re an ******* too!”) or physically. Southerners have a different physiological set point. The Southern system of control [i.e the extent to which it is rejects violence as legitimate] is weaker than the Northern, at least at this point in history. These results show that culture can push around our aggressive tendencies, specifically the threshold for triggering our impulses to fight. All humans have the capacity for aggression. Each human has a different boiling point. Humans in some cultures have more similar boiling points than humans in other cultures. In the South, not only are people more likely to respond aggressively to insult, but they expect others to respond violently to insult. If a Northerner sees someone walk away from an insult, that is the proper thing to do. If a Southerner sees someone walk away from an insult, he’s a wimp.

We do not expect universality across the board. Rather, we expect something much more like linguistic variation: systematic differences between cultures, based on parametric settings... The central issue in thinking about cross-cultural variation is to figure out how different societies build from these universal factors to generate differences in moral judgments. The moral mind - Hauser


Hauser does a good job of explaining why honour killings come to be considered as morally permissible, or even morally obligatory, in some cultures, but highly immoral in others. However, he does not directly ask whether or when an instance of honour killing, which upholds the mores of one culture, ought to be tolerated by another. It may be, as Hauser argues, that all human moral judgement involves appealing to particular variants of an underlying universal moral grammar, but there is clearly considerable variation in the ways in which this grammar is expressed.

Review: MORAL MINDS on JSTOR

 

[joe1776]

If you want one more so you don't have to take my word for it regarding a book you haven't read:


Hauser does a good job of explaining why honour killings come to be considered as morally permissible, or even morally obligatory, in some cultures, but highly immoral in others. However, he does not directly ask whether or when an instance of honour killing, which upholds the mores of one culture, ought to be tolerated by another. It may be, as Hauser argues, that all human moral judgement involves appealing to particular variants of an underlying universal moral grammar, but there is clearly considerable variation in the ways in which this grammar is expressed.

Review: MORAL MINDS on JSTOR

See the underlined: The reviewer of the book is close to the truth here. It took about three centuries for conscience to rid human societies of legal slavery. It may take just as long for conscience to rid human societies of honor killings.

You need to understand that the mere fact that human societies have some different morals is not evidence that all are acceptable to conscience. In 1850 half the world condoned legal slavery. They were wrong, at the time lagging behind other cultures morally.

 

[Augustus]

See the underlined: The reviewer of the book is close to the truth here. It took about three centuries for conscience to rid human societies of legal slavery. It may take just as long for conscience to rid human societies of honor killings.

You need to understand that the mere fact that human societies have different morals is not evidence that all are acceptable to conscience. In 1850 half the world condoned legal slavery. They were wrong, at the time lagging behind other cultures morally.

Simple question, have you read The Moral Mind?

Hauser unequivocally states culture impacts what is acceptable to conscience.

Honour killings, in some societies, are acceptable to intuitive judgements of conscience.

Hauser does a good job of explaining why honour killings come to be considered as morally permissible, or even morally obligatory, in some cultures, but highly immoral in others.

The review confirms this. As does his example on honour culture that shows physical changes in body chemistry to insults in honour cultures.

When the stooge bumped and insulted the Southerners, they reported greater anger, showed a massive stress response as indicated by an increase in the hormone cortisol, as well as an increase in testosterone, one indicator of aggressive intent... Humans in some cultures have more similar boiling points than humans in other cultures. In the South, not only are people more likely to respond aggressively to insult, but they expect others to respond violently to insult. If a Northerner sees someone walk away from an insult, that is the proper thing to do. If a Southerner sees someone walk away from an insult, he’s a wimp.


Seeing as you have not read his book, why do you insist you are right and people who have read his book are wrong?