God, Suffering, and Special Pleading

[Meow Mix]

Why does suffering exist? Most are probably at least familiar with the Problem of Evil:

Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent.
Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent.
Is he both able and willing? Then whence cometh evil?
Is he neither able nor willing? Then why call him God?

That discussion's been had a thousand times (usually not satisfactorily, though). Answers come in the form of theodicies which try to explain away evil or defenses which try to demonstrate that evil doesn't contradict God's properties to exist in the first place. However, the point of this post is to talk about the special pleading I so often encounter in these discussions.

I provide the PoE by talking about it in terms of suffering and malevolence: given that God is omnipotent (capable of actualizing any logically possible states of affairs), omniscient (at least the state of knowing which of all states of affairs are logically possible for the sake of this), and omnibenevolent (at least never malevolent for the sake of this), then we shouldn't find any suffering in the world because a world where physical suffering doesn't happen but in which free will exists is possible (we're granting free will is meaningful for this one).

When asked, "Why would God create this world which does contain physical suffering and not one of the possible worlds where there isn't any," the response is usually a theodicy -- readily dismissable -- or, ultimately, special pleading.

By that I mean some variation of, "well it's possible that God has some reason to create the world with suffering that's really good, but is unknowable to you; but despite the apparent contradiction, it was good of God to do so."

And here I get to the meat of what this post is for: this is an unacceptable response -- fallacies are fallacies for a reason. I present an analogy to make the point.

Say that you die and are taken to the afterlife and presented for judgment (or whatever), expecting to reach paradise. Yet instead of receiving judgment, God sets a tiger on you or something. "It's okay," you might think -- "this is God, a benevolent being, so there must be some good reason I just can't understand for this. God is still benevolent despite this, I just can't understand why." Well, 10 years go by and you're still being mauled. 100 years go by -- still being mauled by the tiger. 1,000 years. 1,000,000. Every time you might say, "God has a reason for this that I just don't know, God is benevolent." As it turns out, if special pleading is allowed, God can literally do anything (even the most malevolent, monstrous, demonic sort of thing) and still be "benevolent," somehow, in some "unknowable way." And that's exactly why this sort of special pleading is fallacious and isn't a valid response to the Problem of Evil when contexts have been well-defined.

 

[Laika]

And here I get to the meat of what this post is for: this is an unacceptable response -- fallacies are fallacies for a reason. I present an analogy to make the point.

A "fallacy" is typically a short-hand for much larger and more complex historical disputes about the nature of knowledge. Its a way to sort out what is and isn't knowledge more easily but that doesn't automatically mean that the "common sense" understanding of a fallacy is actually a falsehood. In relative terms, we would have to know why commonsense understanding of a fallacy today is superior to the understanding of say the 16th century when people were still burning Witches. It is not enough to say something is widely regarded as a fallacy and a more precise understanding is required especially when you dealing with a question as complex and wide ranging as god's existence or qualities.

The analogy you present shows that it is not in a person's self-interest to believe in god's benevolence due to the existence of suffering. It does not necessarily follow that self-interest and the subjective experience of suffering are a basis of truth even if the observations need to be taken into account.

As it turns out, if special pleading is allowed, God can literally do anything (even the most malevolent, monstrous, demonic sort of thing) and still be "benevolent," somehow, in some "unknowable way."

I think the "problem of evil" can only be used to logically refute one particular conception of god as omnipotent and omnibenevolent. There is however not "one" true conception of a deity but many. I don't think the problem of evil disproves the existence of god, but taking the answer is proportion to the evidence of the existence of evil, it could well mean there is an "evil" or "ammoral" god. I'm not aware of religions built on such an idea (known as Dystheism), but it would appear a plausible way to reconcile belief in the existence of god and the existence of evil.

 

[Meow Mix]

A "fallacy" is typically a short-hand for much larger and more complex historical disputes about the nature of knowledge. Its a way to sort out what is and isn't knowledge more easily but that doesn't automatically mean that the "common sense" understanding of a fallacy is actually a falsehood. In relative terms, we would have to know why commonsense understanding of a fallacy today is superior to the understanding of say the 16th century when people were still burning Witches. It is not enough to say something is widely regarded as a fallacy and a more precise understanding is required especially when you dealing with a question as complex and wide ranging as god's existence or qualities.

The analogy you present shows that it is not in a person's self-interest to believe in god's benevolence due to the existence of suffering. It does not necessarily follow that self-interest and the subjective experience of suffering are a basis of truth even if the observations need to be taken into account.

I mean it is a formal fallacy in the sense that their claim doesn't speak towards truth (that it's possible an apparent contradiction is resolved in an unknowable way): that it's not a valid response to give any more than some other formal fallacy. I'm not using the word "fallacious" colloquially.

I think the "problem of evil" can only be used to logically refute one particular conception of god as omnipotent and omnibenevolent. There is however not "one" true conception of a deity but many. I don't think the problem of evil disproves the existence of god, but taking the answer is proportion to the evidence of the existence of evil, it could well mean there is an "evil" or "ammoral" god. I'm not aware of religions built on such an idea (known as Dystheism), but it would appear a plausible way to reconcile belief in the existence of god and the existence of evil.

Oh, I agree the PoE can be defeated by simply dropping one of the premises; but that's rather the point of the PoE -- most theists will not even consider it because swathes of worldview depend on those premises. It isn't to say "no god of any kind can exist because of this," but rather "this particular one with these particular properties contradicts observation."

 

[Laika]

I mean it is a formal fallacy in the sense that their claim doesn't speak towards truth (that it's possible an apparent contradiction is resolved in an unknowable way): that it's not a valid response to give any more than some other formal fallacy. I'm not using the word "fallacious" colloquially.

I think I mean more generally than that. If I gave an example about how "pseudo-science" changed it may help. At the start of the 20th century, people regarded eugenics and racism as a "scientific" idea. For a variety of reasons (including the Nazis) this is no longer accepted. Attitudes to whether eugenics or racism were false have changed in the course of the past hundred years and may change again in response to DNA and the possibility of genetic engineering. The boundary between what is accepted as knowledge and is not knowledge shifts. What is true and what is false is not static or fixed but depends on a historical context and the set of assumptions accumulated in human knowledge. there is an element of claiming something to be false that is highly conditional and subjective. Alchemy may be false now but it wasn't in middle ages, and even as Alchemy was proven to be false, that set of illusions gave birth to the basics of modern chemistry because of the experiments and observations collected in it.

To try and tie this up, the problem of evil may show that certain ideas within a conception of god is false but not the whole conception of god. There is space for an evolution of the concept in response to new ideas and knowledge. The problem may also re-occur in secular guises such as "if man is born good, why does he do evil"? these all add up to a larger evolution of thought beyond a black and white or true-false distinction.

Oh, I agree the PoE can be defeated by simply dropping one of the premises; but that's rather the point of the PoE -- most theists will not even consider it because swathes of worldview depend on those premises. It isn't to say "no god of any kind can exist because of this," but rather "this particular one with these particular properties contradicts observation."

My point is that if you were trying to use the Problem of Evil to disprove theism/prove atheism, there is a sort of unexplored "grey" area because the definition of God is so loaded by Christian theology. I'm an atheist but I wonder occasionally whether this is to do with how much I take for granted rather than how much I actually know.

 

[Enoch07]

Why does suffering exist? Most are probably at least familiar with the Problem of Evil:



That discussion's been had a thousand times (usually not satisfactorily, though). Answers come in the form of theodicies which try to explain away evil or defenses which try to demonstrate that evil doesn't contradict God's properties to exist in the first place. However, the point of this post is to talk about the special pleading I so often encounter in these discussions.

I provide the PoE by talking about it in terms of suffering and malevolence: given that God is omnipotent (capable of actualizing any logically possible states of affairs), omniscient (at least the state of knowing which of all states of affairs are logically possible for the sake of this), and omnibenevolent (at least never malevolent for the sake of this), then we shouldn't find any suffering in the world because a world where physical suffering doesn't happen but in which free will exists is possible (we're granting free will is meaningful for this one).

When asked, "Why would God create this world which does contain physical suffering and not one of the possible worlds where there isn't any," the response is usually a theodicy -- readily dismissable -- or, ultimately, special pleading.

By that I mean some variation of, "well it's possible that God has some reason to create the world with suffering that's really good, but is unknowable to you; but despite the apparent contradiction, it was good of God to do so."

And here I get to the meat of what this post is for: this is an unacceptable response -- fallacies are fallacies for a reason. I present an analogy to make the point.

Say that you die and are taken to the afterlife and presented for judgment (or whatever), expecting to reach paradise. Yet instead of receiving judgment, God sets a tiger on you or something. "It's okay," you might think -- "this is God, a benevolent being, so there must be some good reason I just can't understand for this. God is still benevolent despite this, I just can't understand why." Well, 10 years go by and you're still being mauled. 100 years go by -- still being mauled by the tiger. 1,000 years. 1,000,000. Every time you might say, "God has a reason for this that I just don't know, God is benevolent." As it turns out, if special pleading is allowed, God can literally do anything (even the most malevolent, monstrous, demonic sort of thing) and still be "benevolent," somehow, in some "unknowable way." And that's exactly why this sort of special pleading is fallacious and isn't a valid response to the Problem of Evil when contexts have been well-defined.

Free will.

Suffering is a side effect of free will. In order to have free will we pay the price of pain and suffering. You can rid yourself of pain and suffering by giving up your free will. But then you no longer can do whatever you like.

 

[Sunstone]

You can rid yourself of pain and suffering by giving up your free will.

So, if you give up your free will and a tornado comes roaring through, devastates your home and kills your son, you won't suffer?

 

[Enoch07]

So, if you give up your free will and a tornado comes roaring through, devastates your home and kills your son, you won't suffer?

If you never asked for free will. The tornado would never have hit you to begin with.

 

[Tumah]

Say that you die and are taken to the afterlife and presented for judgment (or whatever), expecting to reach paradise. Yet instead of receiving judgment, God sets a tiger on you or something. "It's okay," you might think -- "this is God, a benevolent being, so there must be some good reason I just can't understand for this. God is still benevolent despite this, I just can't understand why." Well, 10 years go by and you're still being mauled. 100 years go by -- still being mauled by the tiger. 1,000 years. 1,000,000. Every time you might say, "God has a reason for this that I just don't know, God is benevolent." As it turns out, if special pleading is allowed, God can literally do anything (even the most malevolent, monstrous, demonic sort of thing) and still be "benevolent," somehow, in some "unknowable way." And that's exactly why this sort of special pleading is fallacious and isn't a valid response to the Problem of Evil when contexts have been well-defined.

I don't really understand what you're saying. You've given an example of where "special pleading" doesn't remove the inherent unpleasant-ness of the suffering. That is not a proof that it's wrong. That just means that the answer doesn't resolve the suffering, it only explains it.

I don't really understand why this returns the PoE either. If G-d is omnibenevolent, then G-d literally can't do anything malevolent, monstrous, demonic, sort of thing. That is what I understood "omnibenevolent" is meant to say: that every occurrence that happens is beneficial. So if something appears presently malevolent, than it must ultimately be beneficial.
In theory, I guess that would mean that there would never be a case where someone is mauled for eternity. I would expect some end where the result proves the means were beneficial.

 

[Jayhawker Soule]

Why does suffering exist? Most are probably at least familiar with the Problem of Evil:



That discussion's been had a thousand times (usually not satisfactorily, though). Answers come in the form of theodicies which try to explain away evil or defenses which try to demonstrate that evil doesn't contradict God's properties to exist in the first place. However, the point of this post is to talk about the special pleading I so often encounter in these discussions.

I provide the PoE by talking about it in terms of suffering and malevolence: given that God is omnipotent (capable of actualizing any logically possible states of affairs), omniscient (at least the state of knowing which of all states of affairs are logically possible for the sake of this), and omnibenevolent (at least never malevolent for the sake of this), then we shouldn't find any suffering in the world because a world where physical suffering doesn't happen but in which free will exists is possible (we're granting free will is meaningful for this one).

When asked, "Why would God create this world which does contain physical suffering and not one of the possible worlds where there isn't any," the response is usually a theodicy -- readily dismissable -- or, ultimately, special pleading.

By that I mean some variation of, "well it's possible that God has some reason to create the world with suffering that's really good, but is unknowable to you; but despite the apparent contradiction, it was good of God to do so."

And here I get to the meat of what this post is for: this is an unacceptable response -- fallacies are fallacies for a reason. I present an analogy to make the point.

Say that you die and are taken to the afterlife and presented for judgment (or whatever), expecting to reach paradise. Yet instead of receiving judgment, God sets a tiger on you or something. "It's okay," you might think -- "this is God, a benevolent being, so there must be some good reason I just can't understand for this. God is still benevolent despite this, I just can't understand why." Well, 10 years go by and you're still being mauled. 100 years go by -- still being mauled by the tiger. 1,000 years. 1,000,000. Every time you might say, "God has a reason for this that I just don't know, God is benevolent." As it turns out, if special pleading is allowed, God can literally do anything (even the most malevolent, monstrous, demonic sort of thing) and still be "benevolent," somehow, in some "unknowable way." And that's exactly why this sort of special pleading is fallacious and isn't a valid response to the Problem of Evil when contexts have been well-defined.

Damn, that was painfully wordy and underwhelming!

But, yes, defining evil as unknowable good is silly. Thanks.

 

[Sunstone]

Damn, that was painfully wordy and underwhelming!

I get wordy and underwhelming too, when I'm running on six hours of sleep a day -- day after day -- as Meow Mix is.

Come to think of it, I don't even need to be exhausted to get wordy and underwhelming. I just need to be me.

 

[Stevicus]

Why does suffering exist? Most are probably at least familiar with the Problem of Evil:



That discussion's been had a thousand times (usually not satisfactorily, though). Answers come in the form of theodicies which try to explain away evil or defenses which try to demonstrate that evil doesn't contradict God's properties to exist in the first place. However, the point of this post is to talk about the special pleading I so often encounter in these discussions.

I provide the PoE by talking about it in terms of suffering and malevolence: given that God is omnipotent (capable of actualizing any logically possible states of affairs), omniscient (at least the state of knowing which of all states of affairs are logically possible for the sake of this), and omnibenevolent (at least never malevolent for the sake of this), then we shouldn't find any suffering in the world because a world where physical suffering doesn't happen but in which free will exists is possible (we're granting free will is meaningful for this one).

When asked, "Why would God create this world which does contain physical suffering and not one of the possible worlds where there isn't any," the response is usually a theodicy -- readily dismissable -- or, ultimately, special pleading.

By that I mean some variation of, "well it's possible that God has some reason to create the world with suffering that's really good, but is unknowable to you; but despite the apparent contradiction, it was good of God to do so."

And here I get to the meat of what this post is for: this is an unacceptable response -- fallacies are fallacies for a reason. I present an analogy to make the point.

Say that you die and are taken to the afterlife and presented for judgment (or whatever), expecting to reach paradise. Yet instead of receiving judgment, God sets a tiger on you or something. "It's okay," you might think -- "this is God, a benevolent being, so there must be some good reason I just can't understand for this. God is still benevolent despite this, I just can't understand why." Well, 10 years go by and you're still being mauled. 100 years go by -- still being mauled by the tiger. 1,000 years. 1,000,000. Every time you might say, "God has a reason for this that I just don't know, God is benevolent." As it turns out, if special pleading is allowed, God can literally do anything (even the most malevolent, monstrous, demonic sort of thing) and still be "benevolent," somehow, in some "unknowable way." And that's exactly why this sort of special pleading is fallacious and isn't a valid response to the Problem of Evil when contexts have been well-defined.

This is part of the reason I'm agnostic. Even if one accepts the basic premise that "there is a God," all of the rest just amounts to so much guessing over this and that. We don't even know if "God" exists, let alone whether "He" is benevolent.

I've heard some religious people say that we were born to suffer, that it's a process we go through which will eventually end up as something better - a heavenly afterlife in paradise, presumably. It may be based on the notion of "no pain, no gain" - just like weightlifters and other athletes go through. I suppose if one really believes this, then a few years of temporal suffering would seem like nothing compared to an eternity of heavenly bliss.

Of course, that still leaves us with the question of "Why?" What's the point of having to go through all this? Why bother doing anything at all? If all of this is a result of "God's will," then any kind of special pleading might be ineffective. If there is some "divine plan" at work, then we would be nothing more than pawns being subtly manipulated towards the realization of that plan. What "we" want, our "freewill," would be meaningless in that context.

 

[Super Universe]

Why does suffering exist? Most are probably at least familiar with the Problem of Evil:



That discussion's been had a thousand times (usually not satisfactorily, though). Answers come in the form of theodicies which try to explain away evil or defenses which try to demonstrate that evil doesn't contradict God's properties to exist in the first place. However, the point of this post is to talk about the special pleading I so often encounter in these discussions.

I provide the PoE by talking about it in terms of suffering and malevolence: given that God is omnipotent (capable of actualizing any logically possible states of affairs), omniscient (at least the state of knowing which of all states of affairs are logically possible for the sake of this), and omnibenevolent (at least never malevolent for the sake of this), then we shouldn't find any suffering in the world because a world where physical suffering doesn't happen but in which free will exists is possible (we're granting free will is meaningful for this one).

When asked, "Why would God create this world which does contain physical suffering and not one of the possible worlds where there isn't any," the response is usually a theodicy -- readily dismissable -- or, ultimately, special pleading.

By that I mean some variation of, "well it's possible that God has some reason to create the world with suffering that's really good, but is unknowable to you; but despite the apparent contradiction, it was good of God to do so."

And here I get to the meat of what this post is for: this is an unacceptable response -- fallacies are fallacies for a reason. I present an analogy to make the point.

Say that you die and are taken to the afterlife and presented for judgment (or whatever), expecting to reach paradise. Yet instead of receiving judgment, God sets a tiger on you or something. "It's okay," you might think -- "this is God, a benevolent being, so there must be some good reason I just can't understand for this. God is still benevolent despite this, I just can't understand why." Well, 10 years go by and you're still being mauled. 100 years go by -- still being mauled by the tiger. 1,000 years. 1,000,000. Every time you might say, "God has a reason for this that I just don't know, God is benevolent." As it turns out, if special pleading is allowed, God can literally do anything (even the most malevolent, monstrous, demonic sort of thing) and still be "benevolent," somehow, in some "unknowable way." And that's exactly why this sort of special pleading is fallacious and isn't a valid response to the Problem of Evil when contexts have been well-defined.

Suffering exists so God can experience it. God did not create the universe solely to experience suffering. He created it to have many varied personality experiences.

The amount of suffering on the earth is exceptional in the universe because the Lucifer Rebellion caused the angels to abandon their mission. They would have been able to remove the extremely selfish genes and disease causing genes from humanity so suffering would have been much less.

God is omnipotent? Sort of. God cannot do anything. In the beginning He could do anything but once certain laws are established they control your further actions. God does not make a law and then violate it.

God is omniscient? Sort of. God knows everything that He knows. He does not know what He doesn't yet know.

God is omnibenevolent? Not really. It's not about you getting what you want or feel you deserve. It's about having many different personalities who can teach the soul how to become a mature universal being. God in heaven is considered to be love by the beings in heaven but their meaning has more to do with the idea that God "supplies that which is needed for life in all the universe."

God will not set a tiger upon you but that does not mean you should walk into the jungle.

 

[Koldo]

I don't really understand what you're saying. You've given an example of where "special pleading" doesn't remove the inherent unpleasant-ness of the suffering. That is not a proof that it's wrong. That just means that the answer doesn't resolve the suffering, it only explains it.

I don't really understand why this returns the PoE either. If G-d is omnibenevolent, then G-d literally can't do anything malevolent, monstrous, demonic, sort of thing. That is what I understood "omnibenevolent" is meant to say: that every occurrence that happens is beneficial. So if something appears presently malevolent, than it must ultimately be beneficial.
In theory, I guess that would mean that there would never be a case where someone is mauled for eternity. I would expect some end where the result proves the means were beneficial.

And what would you understand as 'beneficial' ?
If you consider that God has unlimited power then it must follow that the means are the end.

 

[Etritonakin]

Why does suffering exist? Most are probably at least familiar with the Problem of Evil:



That discussion's been had a thousand times (usually not satisfactorily, though). Answers come in the form of theodicies which try to explain away evil or defenses which try to demonstrate that evil doesn't contradict God's properties to exist in the first place. However, the point of this post is to talk about the special pleading I so often encounter in these discussions.

I provide the PoE by talking about it in terms of suffering and malevolence: given that God is omnipotent (capable of actualizing any logically possible states of affairs), omniscient (at least the state of knowing which of all states of affairs are logically possible for the sake of this), and omnibenevolent (at least never malevolent for the sake of this), then we shouldn't find any suffering in the world because a world where physical suffering doesn't happen but in which free will exists is possible (we're granting free will is meaningful for this one).

When asked, "Why would God create this world which does contain physical suffering and not one of the possible worlds where there isn't any," the response is usually a theodicy -- readily dismissable -- or, ultimately, special pleading.

By that I mean some variation of, "well it's possible that God has some reason to create the world with suffering that's really good, but is unknowable to you; but despite the apparent contradiction, it was good of God to do so."

And here I get to the meat of what this post is for: this is an unacceptable response -- fallacies are fallacies for a reason. I present an analogy to make the point.

Say that you die and are taken to the afterlife and presented for judgment (or whatever), expecting to reach paradise. Yet instead of receiving judgment, God sets a tiger on you or something. "It's okay," you might think -- "this is God, a benevolent being, so there must be some good reason I just can't understand for this. God is still benevolent despite this, I just can't understand why." Well, 10 years go by and you're still being mauled. 100 years go by -- still being mauled by the tiger. 1,000 years. 1,000,000. Every time you might say, "God has a reason for this that I just don't know, God is benevolent." As it turns out, if special pleading is allowed, God can literally do anything (even the most malevolent, monstrous, demonic sort of thing) and still be "benevolent," somehow, in some "unknowable way." And that's exactly why this sort of special pleading is fallacious and isn't a valid response to the Problem of Evil when contexts have been well-defined.

Many even in this time have times of great happiness regardless of past adversity, and past adversity is partly the reason for present states which are good -and which could not have existed without past adversity.

Evil is basically corruption of a perfect system.
When inexperienced beings are introduced to a perfect system, they inevitably corrupt it until they master that system -and themselves as part of that system.
As they are part of that system -and all are subject to the attitudes and actions of themselves and others, they suffer and cause suffering.

Natural disasters are different, but they do teach the necessity of considering and mastering one's environment.
We are not only subject to our own actions, but the "bondage to decay" of the environment.

The plan outlined in the bible -which few really take the time to study in depth -makes clear that present experiences and states will eventually no longer even be remembered -but that the intended future state could not come to pass without the present experiences and states.

It also makes provision for eternal life and mastery of environment.
The creation -the universe -is to be set free from the bondage to decay by the children of God -but the children of God must be perfected first -so they can be given great creative power and access to the universe without any possibility of corruption. They must first learn the basics of existence and reality -and to obey necessary law and government -which will allow for freedom and creativity without conflict.

There is nothing we can destroy which cannot be repaired -no harm or imperfection that cannot be healed -no unpleasant memory which cannot be erased -and there are none that have died who cannot be resurrected.

Even the present works on earth will be burnt up -the elements will melt with a fervent heat -and the surface of the earth will be changed to allow for access to more and better materials -the nature of animals will be changed -but that is only the beginning.

We are to be given bodies similar to the "glorious body" of the Word who became Christ, which allowed for the creation of all things in the first place -and for al things to be made subject to him.

Essentially, we are to be given power over cosmic forces -and create throughout "the heavens" which "were formed to be inhabited".

So.... 120 years or so of human experience -which will eventually no longer come to mind, anyway -will be well worth it. It needed to happen so that it never need happen again.

(That is all in the bible, but people tend to frown upon a lot of cutting and pasting of scripture.)

 

[DavidFirth]

Why does suffering exist? Most are probably at least familiar with the Problem of Evil:



That discussion's been had a thousand times (usually not satisfactorily, though). Answers come in the form of theodicies which try to explain away evil or defenses which try to demonstrate that evil doesn't contradict God's properties to exist in the first place. However, the point of this post is to talk about the special pleading I so often encounter in these discussions.

I provide the PoE by talking about it in terms of suffering and malevolence: given that God is omnipotent (capable of actualizing any logically possible states of affairs), omniscient (at least the state of knowing which of all states of affairs are logically possible for the sake of this), and omnibenevolent (at least never malevolent for the sake of this), then we shouldn't find any suffering in the world because a world where physical suffering doesn't happen but in which free will exists is possible (we're granting free will is meaningful for this one).

When asked, "Why would God create this world which does contain physical suffering and not one of the possible worlds where there isn't any," the response is usually a theodicy -- readily dismissable -- or, ultimately, special pleading.

By that I mean some variation of, "well it's possible that God has some reason to create the world with suffering that's really good, but is unknowable to you; but despite the apparent contradiction, it was good of God to do so."

And here I get to the meat of what this post is for: this is an unacceptable response -- fallacies are fallacies for a reason. I present an analogy to make the point.

Say that you die and are taken to the afterlife and presented for judgment (or whatever), expecting to reach paradise. Yet instead of receiving judgment, God sets a tiger on you or something. "It's okay," you might think -- "this is God, a benevolent being, so there must be some good reason I just can't understand for this. God is still benevolent despite this, I just can't understand why." Well, 10 years go by and you're still being mauled. 100 years go by -- still being mauled by the tiger. 1,000 years. 1,000,000. Every time you might say, "God has a reason for this that I just don't know, God is benevolent." As it turns out, if special pleading is allowed, God can literally do anything (even the most malevolent, monstrous, demonic sort of thing) and still be "benevolent," somehow, in some "unknowable way." And that's exactly why this sort of special pleading is fallacious and isn't a valid response to the Problem of Evil when contexts have been well-defined.

If you are a nontheist, why do you ask such questions or even ponder them? I mean, if you are convinced no deity exists then evil exists because at least some people are evil.

 

[Tumah]

And what would you understand as 'beneficial' ?

With some exception, I would say anything that is enjoyable or pleasurable or ultimately so.

If you consider that God has unlimited power then it must follow that the means are the end.

I agree inasmuch as I think there are temporary, present-term objectives that are part of the broader long-term directive and long-term objectives and that the means represent an ends for the former.

By that I mean, let's say the goal is to grant someone the greatest amount of pleasure possible. Let's say that when you work hard and deserve your reward, you enjoy it more than if you had just loafed around and had it handed to you. Now, in order for you to deserve something (you need a job and), justice is needed to represent that determination of justification. However, a side effect of justice is that you can be judged negatively if you don't deserve it. But that defeats the long-term goal of bestowing pleasure. Instead, judgement becomes a short-term directive to satisfy the negative side of itself, so that the long-term objective of benevolence can be met.

If you ask why not great justice that only has a positive side, I would say that's not true justice and so it would impair its purpose of existence.
If you say why not make it that it doesn't, I would say, that's illogical and if we can't understand the justification for merit, than again it's impaired its purpose.

 

[Etritonakin]

In addition, God would not be benevolent if all things did not work toward a pleasant and acceptable end -but he is, and they do.

Until it has come to pass, however, things can appear to be incessantly unpleasant and futile.
If man is not perfected, given permanence of life and relative invulnerability -if the earth remains subject to successive generations of people who make generally the same mistakes while increased knowledge and ability coupled with that ignorance threatens to bring about self-destruction -then man will become extinct, and all of human history would have been a worthless mess which might as well never have happened.

Though some suffering is not specifically necessary, human suffering is generally necessary as evidence of that which is lacking -which by that experience will be made acceptable.

Human history has allowed for many individuals to experience a crash-course in reality -using recycled materials in a generally-closed system -limiting the adverse effects man could have on the environment to Earth and the general vicinity.
Just when a person gets the general idea, they die.
Meanwhile, human history (or man's path toward self-destruction) as a whole will demonstrate the necessity for just, capable and powerful universal government, permanence, invulnerability, power over environment, etc. -which will be satisfied once we are prepared to receive it.

After freely offering such and being continually rejected, God allowed experience to do the talking -creating a vacuum for -and understanding of a lack of -what he freely offered.
Experience will cause a desire for it -and that desire will be satisfied.

Though God does not do things to us which might be considered demonic -he did allow us to do such things to each other -even literally allowing demons to affect man -and for man to act in ways which could be considered demonic.

However, it is a temporary situation -the adverse effects of which will be corrected.

 

[Koldo]

With some exception, I would say anything that is enjoyable or pleasurable or ultimately so.

But to whom ?
Everyone ?

I agree inasmuch as I think there are temporary, present-term objectives that are part of the broader long-term directive and long-term objectives and that the means represent an ends for the former.

By that I mean, let's say the goal is to grant someone the greatest amount of pleasure possible. Let's say that when you work hard and deserve your reward, you enjoy it more than if you had just loafed around and had it handed to you. Now, in order for you to deserve something (you need a job and), justice is needed to represent that determination of justification. However, a side effect of justice is that you can be judged negatively if you don't deserve it. But that defeats the long-term goal of bestowing pleasure. Instead, judgement becomes a short-term directive to satisfy the negative side of itself, so that the long-term objective of benevolence can be met.

If you ask why not great justice that only has a positive side, I would say that's not true justice and so it would impair its purpose of existence.
If you say why not make it that it doesn't, I would say, that's illogical and if we can't understand the justification for merit, than again it's impaired its purpose.

Consider you want to bake a cake.
There are some different ways to do this, but you still have to go through many steps to do it. You would have to get some ingredients, mix them up, put it in the oven and wait some time until it is finally done. On the other hand, a being with unlimited power wouldn't have to go through all that. It would just have to think of a cake to get it instantly, don't you agree ? I am thinking of 'power' here as the ability to do something, anything.

So, if a being with unlimited power decided to undergo through all the steps, even though it could achieve any state of affairs in an instant, that would have to be a choice that he made. This is what I mean by 'the means are the end'. Because he can skip any or all of those steps if that's what he wanted.

Let's now imagine that this being of unlimited power has as its objective the greatest amount of pleasure possible to us, human beings. And that, quite in fact, when we work hard we enjoy our lives more than ever. If this being wanted to, it could remove this constraint, and make it so our degree of pleasure doesn't depend on how much we work. Or, he could make it so we had some innate feeling ever since birth that we have already worked very hard. What this means is that the fact he went along with the current state of affairs and not some other was strictly a choice he made.

This is problematic because it is possible to imagine a world where a greater amount of pleasure would exist, and this entails that something takes precedence over God's omnibenevolence, which in turn entails that God is not omnibenevolent, but merely benevolent at best.

 

[Tumah]

But to whom ?
Everyone ?



Consider you want to bake a cake.
There are some different ways to do this, but you still have to go through many steps to do it. You would have to get some ingredients, mix them up, put it in the oven and wait some time until it is finally done. On the other hand, a being with unlimited power wouldn't have to go through all that. It would just have to think of a cake to get it instantly, don't you agree ? I am thinking of 'power' here as the ability to do something, anything.

So, if a being with unlimited power decided to undergo through all the steps, even though it could achieve any state of affairs in an instant, that would have to be a choice that he made. This is what I mean by 'the means are the end'. Because he can skip any or all of those steps if that's what he wanted.

Let's now imagine that this being of unlimited power has as its objective the greatest amount of pleasure possible to us, human beings. And that, quite in fact, when we work hard we enjoy our lives more than ever. If this being wanted to, it could remove this constraint, and make it so our degree of pleasure doesn't depend on how much we work. Or, he could make it so we had some innate feeling ever since birth that we have already worked very hard. What this means is that the fact he went along with the current state of affairs and not some other was strictly a choice he made.

This is problematic because it is possible to imagine a world where a greater amount of pleasure would exist, and this entails that something takes precedence over God's omnibenevolence, which in turn entails that God is not omnibenevolent, but merely benevolent at best.

We would have no way of recognizing or experiencing that we were in fact having the greatest possible pleasure if there were no other options. Degree needs contrast.

I don't think being born with an innate feeling of having worked hard is a viable option because it's false. In this model, we're talking about coming into existence straight to this pleasurable whatever, with the feeling of having worked hard for it. I don't think that's reasonable.

 

[Koldo]

We would have no way of recognizing or experiencing that we were in fact having the greatest possible pleasure if there were no other options. Degree needs contrast.

Why would we need to recognize that we were having the greatest possible pleasure ?

I don't think being born with an innate feeling of having worked hard is a viable option because it's false. In this model, we're talking about coming into existence straight to this pleasurable whatever, with the feeling of having worked hard for it. I don't think that's reasonable.

Why would it have to be true ?