Free will deniers

[Willamena]

"Deny" is a loaded word to use here because it seems to imply rejection of an established or evidenced phenomenon. I don't "deny" free will any more than I deny the existence of dragons and fairies, since I don't believe it is a coherent concept to begin with.

It's really not. Loaded, that is.
It just means that you see falsehood in the subject of topic.
Falsehood would lead to rejection. Naturally.

 

[Willamena]

I wish I could read the whole thread. Love you all.

 

[Koldo]

So you think ethics are a misconception or mistake? This seems to concede my point.

No, not ethics itself. I was talking about a particular part of ethics that deals with moral accountability. And I am not even saying it is a misconception per se, just that it could be.

No, it doesn't. Some interpretations probably lead to absurd cconclusions. And QM, as I understand it, leads us to question some of our prior assumptions in physics. But it doesn't lead to anything obviously absurd or incoherent.

Must interpretations that lead to absurd conclusions be wrong?

What does "hold them responsible" even mean in such a scenario?

To treat them as moral agents, liable to moral judgment and the consequences of it.

How can you be responsible for something over which you have no control?

By just... being responsible. If your action was willed and conscious and without coercion, why shouldn't you be held morally responsible?

 

[Willamena]

No. This is what I have been trying to clarify since the start of this topic. I can grant you that's not how free will is understood in the philosophical debates. The simple 'choice, therefore free will' is how laymen understand free will.

No, it's pretty much how we each understand it.

 

[Koldo]

I have no idea what you are talking about.

You have said that the mere fact that we can choose between x and y means we have free will. I am saying that is how laymen understand the term 'free will'.

Within the realm of philosophical debates, the concept of free will circles around where we were talking about before: being able to have chosen something other what we chose at the time we chose it.

This is why I told you: If "we would not have been able to choose anything except what we chose at the time we chose it", then we don't have free will. That's it.

 

[Koldo]

No, it's pretty much how we each understand it.

We who?

 

[Willamena]

We who?

You and me. Who else?

 

[Left Coast]

No, not ethics itself. I was talking about a particular part of ethics that deals with moral accountability.

What part of ethics doesn't? Seems a rather wide net.

And I am not even saying it is a misconception per se, just that it could be.

How?

Must interpretations that lead to absurd conclusions be wrong?

At minimum, it gives us strong evidence that they're wrong. You disagree? Absurdities and logical impossibilities be damned?

To treat them as moral agents, liable to moral judgment and the consequences of it.

Whoa whoa whoa. Moral agents? You're literally denying that they have agency. How can someone be an agent who has no agency?

By just... being responsible. If your action was willed and conscious and without coercion, why shouldn't you be held morally responsible?

What does "willed" mean? You're denying we have choices when we make decisions, are you not? A choice, by definition, implies that you have more than one option that you have the ability to take. If I have no choice but to take an action, why should I be held responsible for it?

 

[Trailblazer]

Within the realm of philosophical debates, the concept of free will circles around where we were talking about before: being able to have chosen something other what we chose at the time we chose it.

This is why I told you: If "we would not have been able to choose anything except what we chose at the time we chose it", then we don't have free will. That's it.

There were two choices, x or y.
All you know is that you chose y.
You do not KNOW that you would not have been able to choose x instead of y at the time you chose it.

 

[Koldo]

You and me. Who else?

I don't count myself as part of that 'We'.

 

[Koldo]

What part of ethics doesn't? Seems a rather wide net.

Most of it.
It is all connected, but I need to make no reference to moral accountability to discuss most subjects covered by ethics.

How?

How not? I mean, when did we collectively reach the conclusion with absolute certainty about pretty much any philosophical subject?

At minimum, it gives us strong evidence that they're wrong. You disagree? Absurdities and logical impossibilities be damned?

It's a fair standard to ask for strong evidence for what seems absurd. I am just saying that something being absurd doesn't mean it should be regarded as automatically untrue. Also, being absurd doesn't entail being necessarily logically contradictory.

Whoa whoa whoa. Moral agents? You're literally denying that they have agency. How can someone be an agent who has no agency?

To have agency is to have the capacity to make (conscious) actions (and choices). When did I say people don't have agency?

What does "willed" mean? You're denying we have choices when we make decisions, are you not? A choice, by definition, implies that you have more than one option that you have the ability to take. If I have no choice but to take an action, why should I be held responsible for it?

Willed means to act in accordance to one's will, according to how one wants. You should be held responsible for an willed action because you consciously chose it, regardless of whether you could have chosen otherwise.

 

[Left Coast]

I tend to think of actions in terms of cause and effect as well as the material conditions that have led to them, not ethical terms per se. My primary ethical principle is not to unnecessarily harm any conscious creatures (e.g., without needing to do so for self-defense, food, etc.).

And knowing you, I'm betting you make conscious choices (meaning, you could do otherwise) to avoid harming others. Which is wonderful.

We could talk about whether some random tribe's practice of animal sacrifice is arguably unethical, but that, by itself, would largely be a pointless discussion: I think a more relevant and useful question would be how that practice ended up arising within the tribe and why they still practice it. Merely telling someone that what they're doing is unethical is unlikely to change their actions or beliefs, whereas material conditions such as education, economic status, place of upbringing or residence, etc., all have an effect on people's beliefs and actions.

Those factors are certainly relevant, there's no doubt. But ethical considerations are also highly effective at convincing people to make different choices as well. Examples of this are legion in every one of our lives.

So, due to practical considerations and the usefulness of the concept of ethics in everyday life, I don't regard it as pointless. However, if you ask me why a murderer should be prosecuted, my answer wouldn't be, "Because he's immoral!" since a lot of immoral things are neither illegal nor even possible to outlaw. It would be because of the sheer harm to others that a murderer's actions cause.

And I would agree that murder should be illegal because of the harm it causes. But the point here is that harming others is in many cases a choice, and we hold people morally accountable for their decisions to harm others because we recognize that they could do otherwise but don't. This is why manslaughter is distinguished from murder in the law, for example.

It's similar to why I would support locking up a crocodile roaming the streets of some town despite not believing the crocodile has any free will or even a conception of morality; its mere presence would pose a risk to the residents of the town and therefore be enough to justify locking it up or releasing it elsewhere it couldn't cause harm to people.

But we aren't crocodiles, DS. We are creatures who use reasoning to arrive at decisions we make. And those decisions have moral relevance.

 

[Koldo]

There were two choices, x or y.
All you know is that you chose y.
You do not KNOW that you would not have been able to choose x instead of y at the time you chose it.

I will have to go back to a previous explanation, but I need to make progress here. Do you accept that saying that merely choosing between x and y doesn't entail free will?

I just don't want to to go over explaining how I can claim that I couldn't have chosen otherwise just to eventually read you saying that choosing between x and y means free will exist. I definitely don't want to be stuck into a loop.

 

[Left Coast]

Most of it.
It is all connected, but I need to make no reference to moral accountability to discuss most subjects covered by ethics.

Not really. But I'll be fascinated by future ethical discussions of yours that make no reference to moral responsibility.

How not? I mean, when did we collectively reach the conclusion with absolute certainty about pretty much any philosophical subject?

All the rubber/glue retorts are not helpful. I'm asking genuinely, how are ethics rooted in a misconception? Explain what you mean.

It's a fair standard to ask for strong evidence for what seems absurd. I am just saying that something being absurd doesn't mean it should be regarded as automatically untrue.

It means, at minimum, we should regard with very strong suspicion whatever is being alleged. And that it's more than likely as silly as it sounds. (I've read enough wacky OP's on this website to have learned that lesson in spades )

Also, being absurd doesn't entail being necessarily logically contradictory.

I had in mind things like...moral agents with no agency. Choices wherein a person only has one. And so on.

To have agency is to have the capacity to make (conscious) actions (and choices). When did I say people don't have agency?

Below, at least. A choice is the ability to decide between multiple possibilities.

Willed means to act in accordance to one's will, according to how one wants. You should be held responsible for an willed action because you consciously chose it, regardless of whether you could have chosen otherwise.

Regardless of whether you could have chosen otherwise? This is substantively no different than coercion.

 

[Debater Slayer]

And knowing you, I'm betting you make conscious choices (meaning, you could do otherwise) to avoid harming others. Which is wonderful.

Yes. The accumulation of my biology (e.g., not being a psychopath), upbringing, exposure to different sources of information, and interactions with certain people, among many other factors, have all contributed to my worldview and desire to avoid harming anyone.

Those factors are certainly relevant, there's no doubt. But ethical considerations are also highly effective at convincing people to make different choices as well. Examples of this are legion in every one of our lives.

As I said, I regard concepts of ethics as useful and usually even necessary in everyday contexts as well as in discussions about such topics, but that's mainly because they're a relatable way to talk about these issues with most people. It wouldn't make much sense to discard the relatable wording and instead say, "We have no free will, so let's just set aside the issue of moral accountability and focus on cause and effect as well as outcomes."

And I would agree that murder should be illegal because of the harm it causes. But the point here is that harming others is in many cases a choice, and we hold people morally accountable for their decisions to harm others because we recognize that they could do otherwise but don't. This is why manslaughter is distinguished from murder in the law, for example.

This goes back to an earlier point I raised: who is doing the "choosing"? Our sense of self is, in my opinion, merely a function of our biology, which in turn is controlled by natural laws. Whether or not natural laws have some randomness (e.g., in some areas of quantum mechanics) changes nothing: we still don't control this randomness or the laws of nature.

Distinguishing manslaughter from murder speaks to the intentions of the person carrying out the action, but it says nothing about how those intentions originated in the first place. That's a separate question altogether.

But we aren't crocodiles, DS. We are creatures who use reasoning to arrive at decisions we make. And those decisions have moral relevance.

I don't see free will as a necessary byproduct of reasoning. Many species have varying levels of intelligence, and dolphins, for example, are much smarter than hippos, but do they have more free will as a result? Is there a specific threshold of intelligence and reasoning beyond which a species possesses free will?

The fact that reasoning is a function of our biological and psychological constitution doesn't necessarily say anything about free will or lack thereof. It just says that the collection of our thoughts and possible actions is larger than that of a dolphin, which in turn is larger than that of a housefly or mosquito. We're still confined to the limits that nature allows; it's just that we can think of more concepts and consequently engage in more varied activities than other species.

As a hypothetical to further demonstrate my point, suppose an alien species came to Earth tomorrow, and their intelligence were multiple times that of humans. They would have far more advanced technology, far more developed reasoning abilities, and fewer (or no) flaws in their heuristics.

Would they, as a function of their much greater intelligence, have more free will than humans just as we supposedly have free will owing to our reasoning abilities but crocodiles don't? If yes, then that brings up the question of just how free we are or whether free will is a spectrum rather than a strict dichotomy. If no, then there's an implicit assumption that a specific threshold of reasoning ability is what enables free will but that further reasoning ability doesn't lead to an increase in free will. What would that threshold be, and who is to say that humans have passed it?

 

[robocop (actually)]

Free will is made up of two words.
Will= it's something we want.
Free= it's when nobody prevents us from doing what we want.

It's not something paradoxical...because in order to be a wish, it has to be something that doesn't affect others' life.
Otherwise it's not will...it's tyranny, overbearingness, prepotency...etc...

For example: the psycho J. complains because he wants to murder the woman B., and he says he has no free will because the law enforcement prevents him from doing that.

Is that your point? That is, that in your view, free will implies that criminals should be free to affect people's lives, by destroying them?

Thank you. Now I can believe in "free will."

 

[Trailblazer]

I will have to go back to a previous explanation, but I need to make progress here. Do you accept that saying that merely choosing between x and y doesn't entail free will?

I just don't want to to go over explaining how I can claim that I couldn't have chosen otherwise just to eventually read you saying that choosing between x and y means free will exist. I definitely don't want to be stuck into a loop.

No, I believe that choosing between x and y entails free will.

 

[Left Coast]

Yes. The accumulation of my biology (e.g., not being a psychopath), upbringing, exposure to different sources of information, and interactions with certain people, among many other factors, have all contributed to my worldview and desire to avoid harming anyone.

And the choices you make to carry out those desires.

As I said, I regard concepts of ethics as useful and usually even necessary in everyday contexts as well as in discussions about such topics, but that's mainly because they're a relatable way to talk about these issues with most people. It wouldn't make much sense to discard the relatable wording and instead say, "We have no free will, so let's just set aside the issue of moral accountability and focus on cause and effect as well as outcomes."

It's not that they're "relatable," it's that they're necessary for the concept of moral accountability to even cohere.

I don't think we need to choose )) between understanding that humans have agency and that human behavior has causes and effects outside our direct control. Both can be true. The question is, to what degree are our actions dictated by external causes over which we have no control. The determinist, to make her case, has to argue that number is 100%. I'm aware of no account of them ever having done so.

This goes back to an earlier point I raised: who is doing the "choosing"? Our sense of self is, in my opinion, merely a function of our biology, which in turn is controlled by natural laws. Whether or not natural laws have some randomness (e.g., in some areas of quantum mechanics) changes nothing: we still don't control this randomness or the laws of nature.

Distinguishing manslaughter from murder speaks to the intentions of the person carrying out the action, but it says nothing about how those intentions originated in the first place. That's a separate question altogether.

If we're in agreement that intent matters when administering punishments for crimes, then we're in agreement that our account of morality involves more than mere assessment of harm. And we're in agreement that someone whose intent is to harm merits greater punishment than one who doesn't. If our intents are completely uncontrolled by us, this distinction makes no sense.

I don't see free will as a necessary byproduct of reasoning. Many species have varying levels of intelligence, and dolphins, for example, are much smarter than hippos, but do they have more free will as a result? Is there a specific threshold of intelligence and reasoning beyond which a species possesses free will?

First, let's dispense with "free will" as the label here. I prefer agency. We have agency, ie the ability to make choices. Choices are decisions we have the ability to make between multiple options.

Back to your question - I'd argue that yes, animals with higher intelligence probably do have greater agency over their actions than those with less intelligence.

The fact that reasoning is a function of our biological and psychological constitution doesn't necessarily say anything about free will or lack thereof. It just says that the collection of our thoughts and possible actions is larger than that of a dolphin, which in turn is larger than that of a housefly or mosquito. We're still confined to the limits that nature allows; it's just that we can think of more concepts and consequently engage in more varied activities than other species.

It's more than us having more concepts in our heads. It's that we have more conscious control of our behavior, rather than reacting to stimuli purely on instinct.

As a hypothetical to further demonstrate my point, suppose an alien species came to Earth tomorrow, and their intelligence were multiple times that of humans. They would have far more advanced technology, far more developed reasoning abilities, and fewer (or no) flaws in their heuristics.

Would they, as a function of their much greater intelligence, have more free will than humans just as we supposedly have free will owing to our reasoning abilities but crocodiles don't? If yes, then that brings up the question of just how free we are or whether free will is a spectrum rather than a strict dichotomy. If no, then there's an implicit assumption that a specific threshold of reasoning ability is what enables free will but that further reasoning ability doesn't lead to an increase in free will. What would that threshold be, and who is to say that humans have passed it?

These are fascinating questions, to which I don't know the answer. I do agree, though, that agency seems to exist on a spectrum - we have relatively less agency or more, it's not black and white. Whether there's an upper limit of agency, beyond which greater intelligence lends no greater agency, I have no idea.

 

[Debater Slayer]

And the choices you make to carry out those desires.

If we call our actions "choices," then sure. Again, though, I think there has to be an established idea of what the "choosing self" is before we can talk about whether actions are choices or not.

It's not that they're "relatable," it's that they're necessary for the concept of moral accountability to even cohere.

I don't think we need to choose )) between understanding that humans have agency and that human behavior has causes and effects outside our direct control. Both can be true. The question is, to what degree are our actions dictated by external causes over which we have no control. The determinist, to make her case, has to argue that number is 100%. I'm aware of no account of them ever having done so.

I think that depends on what one defines as "control." I'm not merely arguing that external circumstances absolutely restrict our ability to choose; I'm arguing that the very notion of a free, choosing agent implies some degree of separation of our concepts of self from our biological constitution and from natural laws.

If the experience of the self is merely a product of biology and natural laws, then the supposed agent we're talking about is simply the result of natural processes in action—be they random or deterministic. The expression of the self then becomes a more elaborate and detailed version of wind blowing on leaves: a natural process (wind) stimulates an organism (the plant), but the plant doesn't choose which way to go and isn't free from the influence of said natural process.

If we're in agreement that intent matters when administering punishments for crimes, then we're in agreement that our account of morality involves more than mere assessment of harm. And we're in agreement that someone whose intent is to harm merits greater punishment than one who doesn't. If our intents are completely uncontrolled by us, this distinction makes no sense.

Not necessarily: knowing someone's intent has predictive value about their future actions as well as the most suitable approach to limit or prevent further harm, so its usefulness doesn't have to be connected to some notion of moral accountability. Someone who intentionally kills another person has demonstrated a particularly malignant and dangerous tendency, whereas someone who inadvertently runs another person over may be a reckless driver but not an intentional murderer. Addressing each of the actors in these two scenarios would therefore require different approaches.

First, let's dispense with "free will" as the label here. I prefer agency. We have agency, ie the ability to make choices. Choices are decisions we have the ability to make between multiple options.

I see this as connected to my above point about the self and its emergent nature. If we offer a dolphin dog food and a fish, it will most likely "choose" the fish, but why did it do so? Does that exercise in opting for one option out of two possible alternatives imply that the dolphin has free will? It intended some action, but why it intended it is a different story. It's merely expressing its nature and the effect of natural laws on its functioning.

Back to your question - I'd argue that yes, animals with higher intelligence probably do have greater agency over their actions than those with less intelligence.

They all still live and act according to their instincts, biology, and the result of the interactions between nature and their own bodies. We also act according to the thoughts and desires we have.

A quote I cited earlier on in this thread was, "I can do as I wish, but I cannot wish as I wish." For example, the thoughts that we have drive our actions and plans, yet we can't make ourselves want to do something on demand or choose exactly what makes us have specific thoughts at specific times. You and I can't make ourselves believe that the Earth is flat on demand, nor can we will ourselves into desiring to eat roaches. A lot of what humans do and think is a product of nature interacting with our bodies, as I said above, even though it certainly feels quite elaborate and sophisticated in general.

It's more than us having more concepts in our heads. It's that we have more conscious control of our behavior, rather than reacting to stimuli purely on instinct.

The reactions are not the result of a conscious choice either; they're bound by natural processes and a manifestation of both our biology and psychology. I don't have anger issues, but I didn't "choose" this. It's just a result of my natural disposition and practice of certain techniques that I encountered. I didn't just will myself into being this way, nor did John Doe who rages at every little thing will himself into being that way—and in order for him to address the anger issues, he would have to undergo a treatment plan that also addressed cause and effect by teaching him how to cope and react to anger.

These are fascinating questions, to which I don't know the answer. I do agree, though, that agency seems to exist on a spectrum - we have relatively less agency or more, it's not black and white. Whether there's an upper limit of agency, beyond which greater intelligence lends no greater agency, I have no idea.

Sometimes I do wonder whether we would be more reasonable if we were more intelligent as a species (as I don't think reason and intelligence are synonymous), but since we have no higher frame of reference for intelligence than that of humans, I don't think we'll ever know the answer.

 

[Nakosis]

And how would something motivate us without us being prone to being motivated by it in the first place?

Not the point. The point is that the actual past is not necessarily causal. Therefore the future does not have to be determined by an actual past.
Determinism is not a valid belief.