Does Plato's Euthyphro Dilemma Defeat Divine Command Theory?

[Sunstone]

CAUTION: This thread -- like most of my threads -- might be far too thrilling for those folks with prior heart conditions. Please consult your doctor before proceeding.


So here's the question: Does Plato's Euthyphro Dilemma actually defeat Divine Command Theory?


A few days ago, I was -- like so many thrill-seeking people these days -- surfing the net for stimulating photos of naked truth tables when I stumbled across a website that daringly claimed the Euthyphro Dilemma actually and decisively defeats Divine Command Theory. Not just challenges it, but defeats it!

Naturally, it set my spine to tingling. But I didn't have time to read it all, so I simply left the tab open, while neglecting to bookmark the site.

Unfortunately -- and this is true -- I somehow lost the site over the next day or so, and I haven't been able to find it since. BUMMER! I have been wandering around my cottage ever since, trying to cope with my deep sense of loss and meaninglessness. So this thread is pretty much my effort to console myself.

The Nature of Divine Command Theory

There are many, many variations of Divine Command Theory. The one thing they all have in common is the claim that morality and moral obligations ultimately depend on God.

The Nature of the Euthyphro Dilemma

The Dilemma is traditionally stated as the question, "Is what is morally good commanded by God because it is morally good, or is it morally good because it is commanded by God?"

The Dilemma's Challenge (or Defeat?) for Divine Command Theory

Divine Command Theory was very popular in ancient Greece around the time Plato wrote the Euthyphro dialog roughly 2,400 years ago. Today, it seems most popular in only certain religions -- mainly, Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and Baha'i. The Euthyphro Dilemma challenges the Theory:

First, if God commands us to do something because something is "objectively" good -- that is, good by itself, independent of God -- that would imply, at the very least, two things about God.

It would imply that God is not entirely sovereign. He is bound by the rules for what is good, rather than being the creator of the rules.

It would imply that God is not omnipotent. Not even God would have the power to turn good into evil, or evil into good.
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Second, if something is good solely because God commands it, that would at the very least seem to imply:

That God's commands are arbitrary (i.e., based on pure whim). In turn, this would trivialize the goodness or evilness of his commands.

That anything -- no matter how evil today -- could upon God's whim become good. For instance, child rape could suddenly become moral and virtuous.

That God's goodness is suspect. If the standards for goodness are set by God's commands, then to say God is good is to say no more than God obeys his own commands. Not a very compelling reason to believe he's good. As Leibniz said: "this opinion would hardly distinguish God from the devil." That is, we would have no moral grounds for distinguishing God from an all powerful demon.
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There are several other criticisms of Divine Command Theory that the Dilemma raises, but I suspect you get the picture. The Dilemma at least challenges the notion that morality and moral obligations ultimately depend on God.

But does it defeat the notion? Such a spine-tingling question is not for the faint of heart!

Questions? Comments?


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For a much, much better commentary on the Euphyphro Dilemma and Divine Command Theory, see:

Divine Command Theory

 

[Curious George]

this opinion would hardly distinguish God from the devil."

Is there a meaningful difference?

 

[ameyAtmA]

1. Morality IS God
2. Morality is defined by God;s commandment because God is moral
3. Human concepts of morality are inherited from God and God is the foundation of living beings.
4. Among earthlings humans are most evolved
5. Morals are a result of sAttvic thought. Mother nature comprises of 3 modes or qualities - sattva - goodness, rAjas - passion, tAmas - ignorance. All created elements have a combination of these 3 including the human mind.
6. The larger the proportion of sattva (goodness) the more moral the being is.
7. God the unmanifest is nirguN - beyond all modes, and hence His closest manifestation is that of vishuddha-sattva (pure goodness without any percentage of the other 2 - passion and ignorance).
8. Thus God manifesting with vishuddha sattva proves morality as inherent to God (when unmanifest He is even beyond goodness - hence called nirguNa - clear , sheer, no color)

Therefore those 2 theories are merely an ascent and descent version of the same -- i.e. Morality descends from God, and human philosophers ascend with understanding of what is moral (because they are ultimately made of God fabric / their source is God)

Bhagavad Gita 4.7, 4.8
यदा यदा हि धर्मस्य ग्लानिर्भवति भारत ।
अभ्युत्थानमधर्मस्य तदात्मानं सृजाम्यहम् ॥४-७॥

परित्राणाय साधूनां विनाशाय च दुष्कृताम् ।
धर्मसंस्थापनार्थाय सम्भवामि युगे युगे ॥४-८॥
YadA yadA hi dharmasya glAnirbhavati bhArata |
AbhythAnamadharmasya tadAtmAnam srijAmyaham ||

ParitrANaya sAdhunAM vinAshAy cha dushkRutAm |
DharmasaMsthApanArthAya sambhavAmi yuge yuge ||

Translation:
Whenever there is a decline of righteousness, O Bharata,
And there is a rise in unrighteousness, then I Myself come forth (descend);

For the protection of the good, for the destruction of evil-doers, or wicked
For the sake of firmly establishing righteousness (dharma), I appear (descend) here from age to age, era to era, millenium to millenium.

 

[Glaurung]

From my understanding, the yardstick for goodness lies in the divine nature itself. Thus I would dismiss the question as a false dilemma. The divine will is good because the divine nature is in and of itself good. A thing is good only to the degree it reflects the divine nature.

Goodness is thus not so much decreed by God as positive law, rather goodness (and the resultant moral law) is consequential from the reality that is God.

 

[Sunstone]

Is there a meaningful difference?

Interesting question. A bit off topic here, except in the sense that - if what's good (or evil) is merely a fiat of God, then there would be no way to distinguish the two on moral grounds.

 

[Sunstone]

From my understanding, the yardstick for goodness lies in the divine nature itself. Thus I would dismiss the question as a false dilemma. The divine will is good because the divine nature is in and of itself good. A thing is good only to the degree it reflects the divine nature.

Goodness is thus not so much decreed by God as positive law, rather goodness (and the resultant moral law) is consequential from the reality that is God.

To challenge the Dilemma on the grounds it's a false dilemma is classic. That's how I would challenge it too. Yet, I'm not familiar with all the ramifications of asserting that God's nature is in and of itself good to know how successful that would be in the long run.

 

[Duke_Leto]

I don’t think that to say “God is good” indicates God is somehow compelled to act morally, or that morality is somehow a power greater than God, any more than saying “God is all-powerful” indicates that God is subordinate to an abstract idea of omnipotence — Rather that we already have an idea of morality, and find that when God acts, his actions accord with what we consider good.

However, I think the dilemma makes the mistake of assuming there’s an objective notion of “good” in the first place which can survive outside of subjective experience. And if there isn’t, it means, even that to begin with, God can’t in fact be “good” — at least not to everyone, and all the time, since everyone thinks differently what is “good”. To form a more precise description you’d have to say something like “God is benevolent” — something which could be objectively understood.

@Sunstone , since you mentioned “asserting that God’s nature is in itself good” — Again, I’m not familiar with philosophy at all, but what would one even mean by saying something is “good”, without accepting that “good” can necessarily only exist subjectively? I suspect there’s no real answer to that, without resorting to dilemmas like these.

 

[Curious George]

Interesting question. A bit off topic here, except in the sense that - if what's good (or evil) is merely a fiat of God, then there would be no way to distinguish the two on moral grounds.

A bit, but you did bring up the issue. I wondered about your opinion.

 

[Sunstone]

A bit, but you did bring up the issue. I wondered about your opinion.

My opinion? Thanks for asking! I'm not sure how we could distinguish between an all powerful god and an all powerful demon except on moral grounds. But if our god can change around morals at whim, then what moral grounds do we have to distinguish the two?

 

[Koldo]

1. Morality IS God
2. Morality is defined by God;s commandment because God is moral
3. Human concepts of morality are inherited from God and God is the foundation of living beings.
4. Among earthlings humans are most evolved
5. Morals are a result of sAttvic thought. Mother nature comprises of 3 modes or qualities - sattva - goodness, rAjas - passion, tAmas - ignorance. All created elements have a combination of these 3 including the human mind.
6. The larger the proportion of sattva (goodness) the more moral the being is.
7. God the unmanifest is nirguN - beyond all modes, and hence His closest manifestation is that of vishuddha-sattva (pure goodness without any percentage of the other 2 - passion and ignorance).
8. Thus God manifesting with vishuddha sattva proves morality as inherent to God (when unmanifest He is even beyond goodness - hence called nirguNa - clear , sheer, no color)

Therefore those 2 theories are merely an ascent and descent version of the same -- i.e. Morality descends from God, and human philosophers ascend with understanding of what is moral (because they are ultimately made of God fabric / their source is God)

Bhagavad Gita 4.7, 4.8
यदा यदा हि धर्मस्य ग्लानिर्भवति भारत ।
अभ्युत्थानमधर्मस्य तदात्मानं सृजाम्यहम् ॥४-७॥

परित्राणाय साधूनां विनाशाय च दुष्कृताम् ।
धर्मसंस्थापनार्थाय सम्भवामि युगे युगे ॥४-८॥
YadA yadA hi dharmasya glAnirbhavati bhArata |
AbhythAnamadharmasya tadAtmAnam srijAmyaham ||

ParitrANaya sAdhunAM vinAshAy cha dushkRutAm |
DharmasaMsthApanArthAya sambhavAmi yuge yuge ||

Translation:
Whenever there is a decline of righteousness, O Bharata,
And there is a rise in unrighteousness, then I Myself come forth (descend);

For the protection of the good, for the destruction of evil-doers, or wicked
For the sake of firmly establishing righteousness (dharma), I appear (descend) here from age to age, era to era, millenium to millenium.

How can morality be defined by God's commandment if God is moral in the first place ? Do you mean that God's commandments merely elucidates what is moral ?

 

[Koldo]

From my understanding, the yardstick for goodness lies in the divine nature itself. Thus I would dismiss the question as a false dilemma. The divine will is good because the divine nature is in and of itself good. A thing is good only to the degree it reflects the divine nature.

Goodness is thus not so much decreed by God as positive law, rather goodness (and the resultant moral law) is consequential from the reality that is God.

Doesn't this mean that God has no sovereignty over morality ?

 

[Curious George]

My opinion? Thanks for asking! I'm not sure how we could distinguish between an all powerful god and an all powerful demon except on moral grounds. But if our god can change around morals at whim, then what moral grounds do we have to distinguish the two?

I think we are far worse than that. I would say that we could only distinguish them on moral grounds as they would both appear as gods to us regardless of whether both or neither were omnipotent. I suppose one can make an argument that whatever way the good God believed was good we would feel compelled to act accordingly (and perhaps this leads into @ameyAtmA 's notion) or alternatively one could argue that no evil god can exist. But honestly, I tend to side with closer to Plato here. However, I would actually suggest that what is good is a conglomeration of goods. I suppose we might be able to abstract a good trope from this and again be in concert with plato, but my point here is that different notions of good can conflict. We are prevented from knowing any universal good because we cannot deduce what will be (problem of induction). Consequently, we try to exert some control and offer an argument from ignorance. (To tie in a couple of your other threads).

 

[Glaurung]

Doesn't this mean that God has no sovereignty over morality ?

I wouldn't consider God having an unchangeable nature to be a meaningful limitation on His sovereignty. Asking if God can change the essential nature of the Good is much the same as asking if God can change the essential nature of circles. The question (if not incoherent) is meaningless.

 

[Koldo]

I wouldn't consider God having an unchangeable nature to be a meaningful limitation on His sovereignty. Asking if God can change the essential nature of the Good is much the same as asking if God can change the essential nature of circles. The question (if not incoherent) is meaningless.

I don't mind about that part either although it is bothersome to some people. My next question is: If God had a divine nature similar to Hitler, wouldn't that mean that morality would be twisted as a consequence ? Doesn't this mean that it would be possible for genocide to be moral ? In other words, doesn't this make morality arbitrary in a certain sense ?

 

[LuisDantas]

It seems to me that Divine Command Theory is inherently fragile, because it relies on a literal divine mystery to attempt to provide answers that need clarity and an interpersonal nature.

It is not so much false as it insists on sabotating its own ability to hold a meaning.

Come to think of it, it is very much the "god of the gaps" idea translated to the field of morality.

It attempts to link the ideas of morality and divinity, but only succeeds by compromising both the clarity of morality and the meaningfulness of divinity.

Or, by a probably more enlightened reading, it is not at all a statement about the nature or meaning of morality (despite being clearly enunciated as one in the OP), but rather the other way around: it instead defines God as a personification or representation of morality.

In a nutshell, it is morality that validates divinity, while divinity is powerless to even attempt to define morality.


Euthyphro's Dilemma does not fare particularly well by a logical analysis either, IMO. It suffers from the unreasonable expectation that God could be at once transcendental and predictable. But the crippling blow comes with the expectation that a God-concept could sustain a morality. That is not and can never be possible. Morality can only exist when informed by actual, specific situations that impose choices. Bringing a god-concept into the mix serves only to make it redundant and, ultimately, irrelevant. It can only survive to the extent that it manages to express itself by way of actual moral discernment.

 

[sealchan]

My opinion? Thanks for asking! I'm not sure how we could distinguish between an all powerful god and an all powerful demon except on moral grounds. But if our god can change around morals at whim, then what moral grounds do we have to distinguish the two?

This seems to reflect the dilemma which I think is probably the best answer to the dilemma.

In our reality all things arise out of a relationship with each other and so when we trace any quality back to its source we run into this dilemma. Our rationality seems to collapse a singular tower of constructed knowledge into a duality of perspectives. Which came first "God or Goodness?" Based on the experience of our systemic reality it must be that they were "co-created" in relationship to each other.

If God is All then we should recognize that both good and that which gives us perspective on what is good (evil) emerges from Him/Her/It.

If God is not All then saying God is Good is an acceptable limitation of God's nature.

God is one of those "whole terms" which are a "meaning container" of all things. There is nothing we can know outside of God by our definition of God. So to know God without a background to measure God with is inherently contradictory. God is immersed in mystery than no rationality can exhaust.

Is this an objective understanding of God or a recognition of the subjective limitations of rational human knowledge?

Ideas are mirrors.

 

[BSM1]

The fly in the ointment, as I see it, is that humans have placed weight on the terms "good" and "bad', "moral" and "immoral". They (not God, although the Deity(s) get the blame) say "this is good" or "that is bad"; this makes morality highly subjective. God Itself gives you the heads up in Isaiah 45:7 by mentioning the fact that He "...creates good and evil...". Anything created by God has to have equal footing in the grand scheme of thing or, like one author pointed out, there has to be something greater than God; God would have to be subject to Her own subjectivity, as it were. This, in my extrapolated humble opinion, was the taboo about the apple in the Garden. A&E bit the fruit of the Tree of The Knowledge Of Good And Evil (not the Tree Of Good And Evil). The knowledge of good and evil is that it is up to Man to decide what's good and what's evil; innocence was sacrificed at that exact moment. From that point on we opened ourselves to experiences that had to catagorized as moral/not moral, being very careful not to cross the line.

 

[Glaurung]

I don't mind about that part either although it is bothersome to some people. My next question is: If God had a divine nature similar to Hitler, wouldn't that mean that morality would be twisted as a consequence ? Doesn't this mean that it would be possible for genocide to be moral ? In other words, doesn't this make morality arbitrary in a certain sense ?

But God doesn't have a nature like Hitler no more than a square can share the essential nature of a circle. It is in my view because the Good exists as a reality in God that Hitler can be coherently condemned. It is not (if my beliefs are correct) my mere opinion that murdering six million people is an evil thing to do.

 

[sayak83]

My opinion? Thanks for asking! I'm not sure how we could distinguish between an all powerful god and an all powerful demon except on moral grounds. But if our god can change around morals at whim, then what moral grounds do we have to distinguish the two?

Morality constitute those actions that cause a reduction in avoidable suffering experienced by sentient beings and in an increase in well-being experienced by sentient beings.

Don't see how morality, thus defined, can be changed at whim by anyone.

 

[Curious George]

But God doesn't have a nature like Hitler no more than a square can share the essential nature of a circle. It is in my view because the Good exists as a reality in God that Hitler can be coherently condemned. It is not (if my beliefs are correct) my mere opinion that murdering six million people is an evil thing to do.

What part of murdering six million people shares a nature with the nature of evil. Can you more accurately define this trope?