Does Physicalism Entail Panpsychism?

[Nous]

. . . experience very naturally arises in complex systems that interact with their environment.

So all "complex systems that interact with their environment" give rise to experience and volition? How? (Define "complex systems".)

 

[Polymath257]

So all "complex systems that interact with their environment" give rise to experience and volition? How? (Define "complex systems".)

Well, what *is* an experience? it is a type of interaction with the environment. Volition happens because of activation of motor neurons.

 

[atanu]

What bothers me is that if there are several types of fundamental particles, then there would be several types of 'fundamental substance' (pluralism), but it would still be the case that everything supervenes on the physical (physicalism).

There will always be unknown fundamental particles, this is vague at best.

So, I see no reason to think that physicalism necessitates monism (although it could).

Yes. Actually, monism is, imo, not tenable, if physicalism does not entail panpsychism at fundamental level.

But, even in a monistic physicalist system, I see no reason why consciousness (experience) can't be an emergent phenomenon (like pressure or temperature) and not anything fundamental.

The so called emerged consciousness can never know the monistic physicalist system as it is. In this system, there is no monism and this view is same as Descartes' view but with a 'material first' paradigm. Since the knower and known remain distinct, the knowing in this case remains mental-representational only.

 

[atanu]

How does that follow? Our experience *is* the pattern of interactions of our brains and neurons with our sensory apparatus, right? We don't 'experience directly' any 'material'. We only experience what our brains are processing and all sensory information is indirect.

Exactly. It does not follow. Our knowing, as per your own admission, is entirely representational. So, the so-called 'material' (the brain etc.) is likely a construct of mind-consciousness, which is the fundamental substance.

 

[Polymath257]

Exactly. It does not follow. Our knowing, as per your own admission, is entirely representational. So, the so-called 'material' (the brain etc.) is likely a construct of mind-consciousness, which is the fundamental substance.

How does the representationality of knowledge make the material a construct?? The fundamental 'substance' (I prefer bundle theory), is still physical, with the representations built up from physical processes. The mind isn't creating the material, it is *representing* it.

 

[Polymath257]

There will always be unknown fundamental particles, this is vague at best.

Again, I don't see the relevance. Whether consciousness supervenes on the physical is not going to be determined by quantum mechanics, but by studies of brains.

Yes. Actually, monism is, imo, not tenable, if physicalism does not entail panpsychism at fundamental level.

I fail to see why not.

The so called emerged consciousness can never know the monistic physicalist system as it is. In this system, there is no monism and this view is same as Descartes' view but with a 'material first' paradigm. Since the knower and known remain distinct, the knowing in this case remains mental-representational only.

So? That doens't change that the mental processes supervene on the physical, not the other way around.

 

[atanu]

So? That doens't change that the mental processes supervene on the physical, not the other way around.

We get stuck here. To me, as stated in the OP, the fundamental substance cannot be known by a property of it. It is absurd to say that an emergent property of a substance/system can know the truth of the substance/system.

And as has been pointed out earlier that competence for discernment is not a property of material, since it is known by experience that matter devoid of life is never intelligent. A dead body or a dead brain does not exhibit intelligence, therefore intelligence is not a property of matter.

The fundamental substance can only be known as it is, if the fundamental substance entails knowledge. I will again refer you to the following:

Physicalism - Wikipedia

Galen Strawson's realistic physicalism (or "realistic monism") entails panpsychism – or at least micropsychism.[48][49][50] Strawson argues that "many—perhaps most—of those who call themselves physicalists or materialists [are mistakenly] committed to the thesis that physical stuff is, in itself, in its fundamental nature, something wholly and utterly non-experiential... even when they are prepared to admit with Eddington that physical stuff has, in itself, 'a nature capable of manifesting itself as mental activity', i.e. as experience or consciousness".[48] Because experiential phenomena allegedly cannot be emergent from wholly non-experiential phenomena, philosophers are driven to substance dualism, property dualism, eliminative materialism and "all other crazy attempts at wholesale mental-to-non-mental reduction".[48]​

 

[Polymath257]

We get stuck here. To me, as stated in the OP, the fundamental substance cannot be known by a property of it. It is absurd to say that an emergent property of a substance/system can know the truth of the substance/system.

Why is that absurd? It can certainly 'know' good approximations and that is enough for survival (which is what we evolved for).

And as has been pointed out earlier that competence for discernment is not a property of material, since it is known by experience that matter devoid of life is never intelligent. A dead body or a dead brain does not exhibit intelligence, therefore intelligence is not a property of matter.

Matter does frequently have 'discernment'. Such depends on the fact that different types of atoms react differently. That is enough to give information about the environment.

A dead body doesn't show intelligence because it is *dead*: it no longer participates in the energy flow that defines life as a physical process. Instead of using oxygen to drive metabolism, the oxygen is no longer available to the tissues and so other reactions (decomposition) set in.

The fundamental substance can only be known as it is, if the fundamental substance entails knowledge. I will again refer you to the following:

Huh? Why would the fundamental substance 'entail knowledge'? it *allows* information because of differences in interaction and that, in conscious systems (like our brains) gives rise to knowledge 9as an approximation to reality).

Physicalism - Wikipedia

Galen Strawson's realistic physicalism (or "realistic monism") entails panpsychism – or at least micropsychism.[48][49][50] Strawson argues that "many—perhaps most—of those who call themselves physicalists or materialists [are mistakenly] committed to the thesis that physical stuff is, in itself, in its fundamental nature, something wholly and utterly non-experiential... even when they are prepared to admit with Eddington that physical stuff has, in itself, 'a nature capable of manifesting itself as mental activity', i.e. as experience or consciousness".[48] Because experiential phenomena allegedly cannot be emergent from wholly non-experiential phenomena, philosophers are driven to substance dualism, property dualism, eliminative materialism and "all other crazy attempts at wholesale mental-to-non-mental reduction".[48]​

Again, why cannot experiences arise from 'wholly non-experiential' phenomena? No nerve has experiences, but the mass of them does.

 

[Skwim]

True. But then the material that we can directly experience is not the fundamental matter on which every other thing-- material or mental -- supervenes. There is surely something outside the matter that is being experienced.

All I'm saying is that physical stuff is not "something wholly non-experiential." Now, whether or not physical stuff is or is not the "fundamental matter on which every other thing-- material or mental -- supervenes." is a whole other question, which, to me, is a very strange notion, that would have to be explained.

.

 

[siti]

All fundamental particles are *defined* by how they interact with the other fundamental particles.

But surely that's the point isn't it? How can they be *defined* at all unless there is a "something-that-it-is-like-to-be" for a fundamental particle just as there is for a human? Human consciousness and self-awareness comprise (or at least are significant components of) the "something-that-it-is-like-to-be" a human - so what is the difference? I mean is it just a matter of scale and complexity or is the human's "something-that-it-is-like-to-be" categorically wholly other than the electron's "something-that-it-is-like-to-be"?

Of course properties emerge from complexity - I take that as common sense - molecules of water are not liquid, but bodies of water comprising many molecules are - liquidity emerges. But this is not just an emergent property thing is it? I don't know - maybe it is. But I can't see how the world of fundamental particles could be anything like comprehensible if there was no fundamental "something-that-it-is-like-to-be" to go with the fundamental physical realities.

I have to admit - I'm confused by this - ten years ago I would have wholeheartedly agreed with you on the emergence thing. Maybe I'm just getting muddle-headed but I suspect not. I suspect that the world is actually more comprehensible than it appears to be - and perhaps not least because the world is continually comprehending itself through some kind of "pan-proto-experientialism". Give me another century or so and I'll fill in the details.

 

[Polymath257]

But surely that's the point isn't it? How can they be *defined* at all unless there is a "something-that-it-is-like-to-be" for a fundamental particle just as there is for a human? Human consciousness and self-awareness comprise (or at least are significant components of) the "something-that-it-is-like-to-be" a human - so what is the difference? I mean is it just a matter of scale and complexity or is the human's "something-that-it-is-like-to-be" categorically wholly other than the electron's "something-that-it-is-like-to-be"?

I don't think there is "something to be like" an electron in the same sense as there is "something to be like a human". There is no internal self-representation of an electron like there is an internal self-representation of a human. ALL that electrons do is interact.

Of course properties emerge from complexity - I take that as common sense - molecules of water are not liquid, but bodies of water comprising many molecules are - liquidity emerges. But this is not just an emergent property thing is it? I don't know - maybe it is. But I can't see how the world of fundamental particles could be anything like comprehensible if there was no fundamental "something-that-it-is-like-to-be" to go with the fundamental physical realities.

My intuition, backed up by evidence from brain studies and other sources, is that consciousness *is* an emergent phenomenon. It isn't fundamental in any sense of the term.

I have to admit - I'm confused by this - ten years ago I would have wholeheartedly agreed with you on the emergence thing. Maybe I'm just getting muddle-headed but I suspect not. I suspect that the world is actually more comprehensible than it appears to be - and perhaps not least because the world is continually comprehending itself through some kind of "pan-proto-experientialism". Give me another century or so and I'll fill in the details.

I have to admit that I have flirted with a bit of the 'interaction is awareness' viewpoint, mostly in the context of some form of pantheism (with the universe being the 'brain' for the mind of God), but I just can't make myself keep it up: it just pushes definitions a bit too far for my tastes.

 

[siti]

There is no internal self-representation of an electron like there is an internal self-representation of a human.

But how do we know that? Of course electrons don't have brains - but how do we know they don't have some kind of fundamental and unsophisticated "proto-experiential" "pole" (I am trying hard not to use baggage-laden terms here) to the reality of their "being"? How is it that, to paraphrase Forrest Gump's Mum, "electron is as electron does"? How come electrons always do what electrons do if they don't somehow "experience" the world AS an electron.

My intuition, backed up by evidence from brain studies and other sources, is that consciousness *is* an emergent phenomenon. It isn't fundamental in any sense of the term.

Yes I agree - "consciousness" (by which I mean what we usually understand by the term "consciousness) is an emergent phenomenon - but the question is emergent from what? Physical complexity - or experiential complexity? Are mice conscious? What about amoebae? Individual living cells? I am fairly sure these all "experience" their "world" at some level. Isn't it that organic (organismic) complexity from which consciousness emerges?

 

[Nous]

Well, what *is* an experience? it is a type of interaction with the environment.

Define "interaction with the environment."

Here is what Wikipedia refers to as "mental experience":

Mental experience involves the aspect of intellect and consciousness experienced as combinations of thought, perception, memory, emotion, will and imagination, including all unconscious cognitive processes. The term can refer, by implication, to a thought process.​

Experience - Wikipedia

The article also instructs to see the article on "mind," where it says:

The mind is a set of cognitive faculties including consciousness, perception, thinking, judgement, language and memory. It is usually defined as the faculty of an entity's thoughts and consciousness.[3] It holds the power of imagination, recognition, and appreciation, and is responsible for processing feelings and emotions, resulting in attitudes and actions​

Mind - Wikipedia

It seems you have an idiosyncratic idea of what experience is.

Volition happens because of activation of motor neurons.

How does volition activate motor neurons?

 

[Polymath257]

Define "interaction with the environment."

Here is what Wikipedia refers to as "mental experience":

Mental experience involves the aspect of intellect and consciousness experienced as combinations of thought, perception, memory, emotion, will and imagination, including all unconscious cognitive processes. The term can refer, by implication, to a thought process.​

Experience - Wikipedia

The article also instructs to see the article on "mind," where it says:

The mind is a set of cognitive faculties including consciousness, perception, thinking, judgement, language and memory. It is usually defined as the faculty of an entity's thoughts and consciousness.[3] It holds the power of imagination, recognition, and appreciation, and is responsible for processing feelings and emotions, resulting in attitudes and actions​

Mind - Wikipedia

It seems you have an idiosyncratic idea of what experience is.

Perhaps. When I think of 'experience', I tend to think of 'sensory experience', which is definitely an interaction with the outside world.

A mental experience, as you point out, is a different entity, involving internal representation of self. It is still a brain process, though.

How does volition activate motor neurons?

No, volition *is* the activation of those neurons. it is the putting of a decision into action.

 

[Nous]

Perhaps. When I think of 'experience', I tend to think of 'sensory experience', which is definitely an interaction with the outside world.

A mental experience, as you point out, is a different entity, involving internal representation of self. It is still a brain process, though.

So you're abandoning your claim that "experience" is "an interaction with the environment"?

No, volition *is* the activation of those neurons. it is the putting of a decision into action.

No, here is what volition means:

1. the act of willing, choosing, or resolving; exercise of willing:
She left of her own volition.
2. a choice or decision made by the will.
3. the power of willing; will.​

the definition of volition

Equivocation and using idiosyncratic meanings for words will not help you to explain how "complex systems" (which you haven't defined) give rise to either experience or volition.

 

[Koldo]

I cannot restrain myself from providing philosopher Galen Strawson's paper, “Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism,” in which he enumerates his well-discussed argument.

The following seems to me to summarize the critical element of his argument (by “realistic physicalism” he just means non-eliminative physicalism). His argument demonstrates:

. . . that something akin to panpsychism is not merely one possible form of realistic physicalism, real physicalism, but the only possible form, and, hence, the only possible form of physicalism tout court. Eddington is one of those who saw this clearly, and I am now going to join forces with him and ask you to be as tolerant of his terminological loosenesses and oddities as I hope you will be of my appeals to intuition.[¹⁷]

One thing we know about physical stuff, given that (real) physicalism is true, is that when you put it together in the way in which it is put together in brains like ours, it regularly constitutes--is, literally is--experience like ours. Another thing we know about it, let us grant, is everything (true) that physics tells us. But what is this second kind of knowledge like? Well, there is a fundamental sense in which it is ‘abstract’, ‘purely formal’, merely a matter of ‘structure’, in Russell’s words.[¹⁸] This is a well established but often overlooked point.[¹⁹] ‘Physics is mathematical’, Russell says, ‘not because we know so much about the physical world’--and here he means the non-mental, non-experiential world, in my terms, because he is using ‘mental’ and ‘physical’ conventionally as opposed terms--

but because we know so little: it is only its mathematical properties that we can discover. For the rest, our knowledge is negative... . The physical world is only known as regards certain abstract features of its space-time structure--features which, because of their abstractness, do not suffice to show whether the physical world is, or is not, different in intrinsic character from the world of mind.[²⁰]​

Anyone who disputes that “realistic physicalism” entails panpsychism, please show where Strawson goes awry in his argument.

Can you elaborate his argument in the form of premises and conclusions ? Can you then proceed to show that it is logically sound ?

 

[Polymath257]

So you're abandoning your claim that "experience" is "an interaction with the environment"?

As I was meaning 'sensory experience', they are interactions with an enviornment. Mental experiences are not necessarily interaction with an environment. They are, however, inspired by such.

No, here is what volition means:

1. the act of willing, choosing, or resolving; exercise of willing:
She left of her own volition.
2. a choice or decision made by the will.
3. the power of willing; will.​

the definition of volition

Equivocation and using idiosyncratic meanings for words will not help you to explain how "complex systems" (which you haven't defined) give rise to either experience or volition.

OK, so the choice is done by the brain circuitry: it calculates which of various options to put into effect. I fail to see the issue.

 

[atanu]

Why is that absurd? It can certainly 'know' good approximations and that is enough for survival (which is what we evolved for).

Rocks survive better than us.

So how approximate is your own assertion 'knowing good approximations'?

Matter does frequently have 'discernment'. Such depends on the fact that different types of atoms react differently. That is enough to give information about the environment.

We agree. This is the OP.

A dead body doesn't show intelligence because it is *dead*: it no longer participates in the energy flow that defines life as a physical process. Instead of using oxygen to drive metabolism, the oxygen is no longer available to the tissues and so other reactions (decomposition) set in.

Well. Try pumping oxygen to revive a dead body then.

The point is that 'consciousness' is not a property of a physical body like colour or height are. A lifeless body has no consciousness. Furthermore, as pointed earlier, an emergent property of a system cannot know the system. Does Godel's Incompleteness theorem not imply so?

Huh? Why would the fundamental substance 'entail knowledge'? it *allows* information because of differences in interaction and that, in conscious systems (like our brains) gives rise to knowledge 9as an approximation to reality).

See the red above. I said in the OP that material monism is not tenable unless physicalism entails panpsychism. When you speak of interaction monism is negated.

In pure self awareness there is no interaction but only awareness of existence. The western understanding of consciousness is based on manifest result of interaction between subject and object. But that is only the result, the product and not the cause. The eastern understanding is that the subject-object division and the subsequent interactions is possible because the fundamental indivisible substrate is 'competence for knowing'.

Again, why cannot experiences arise from 'wholly non-experiential' phenomena? No nerve has experiences, but the mass of them does.

Mass of nerves are known because of fundamental characteristic of 'competence for knowing' of the substrate. Without consciousness of a living system, no 'nerves' will ever be evident. And, subject alone is conscious. The objects of consciousness that can be pointed as 'this' or 'that' are not conscious. This is self evident. Contrary evidence does not exist.

 

[Polymath257]

Well. Try pumping oxygen to revive a dead body then.

The point is that 'consciousness' is not a property of a physical body like colour or height are. A lifeless body has no consciousness. Furthermore, as pointed earlier, an emergent property of a system cannot know the system. Does Godel's Incompleteness theorem not imply so?

A lifeless body isn't physically the same as a body that is alive. Pumping oxygen in won't help because irreversible chemical reactions have already occurred: that is what death is.

If you could reverse those reactions and get the body back to the same physical state that it was before it died, it would be alive.

No, Godel's incompleteness theorem is irrelevant here. Nothing we are talking about is an abstract formal system of first order logic.

And we don't need *perfect* knowledge: only knowledge good enough for survival (of the species).

See the red above. I said in the OP that material monism is not tenable unless physicalism entails panpsychism. When you speak of interaction monism is negated.

How so? Can't different pieces still interact with each other? Two otherwise identical electrons can interact, even though they are the same 'substance'.

In pure self awareness there is no interaction but only awareness of existence. The western understanding of consciousness is based on manifest result of interaction between subject and object. But that is only the result, the product and not the cause. The eastern understanding is that the subject-object division and the subsequent interactions is possible because the fundamental indivisible substrate is 'competence for knowing'.

Awareness is an interaction between different parts of the conscious mind.

Mass of nerves are known because of fundamental characteristic of 'competence for knowing' of the substrate. Without consciousness of a living system, no 'nerves' will ever be evident. And, subject alone is conscious. The objects of consciousness that can be pointed as 'this' or 'that' are not conscious. This is self evident. Contrary evidence does not exist.

That is a problem of epistemology not of ontology. We know about the world through interaction. That knowledge is imperfect. And yes, we need to be conscious to have knowledge: it is a prerequisite of the type of interaction (accumulating and processing sensory data).

But that doens't say anything about the fundamentals, only the mechanism.

 

[Nous]

OK, so the choice is done by the brain circuitry

What is the evidence that leads to the conclusion that "brain circuitry" chooses between 2 or more possibilities? Use definitions (1) or (2) here: the definition of choose

Does "circuitry" that is not in brains also choose between possibilities? If not, why not? What makes circuitry in brains special?