Does Physicalism Entail Panpsychism?

[atanu]

Did you know about Strawson's argument, atanu? If you did, you are very clever, and if you didn't, you are very clever. Which is it?

I did not know Galen Strawson's Basic argument. I just now read it. I had some idea about Strawson's idea on Panpsychism, however. I had cited the following in an earlier post.

Physicalism - Wikipedia

Real physicalists must accept that at least some ultimates are intrinsically experience-involving. They must at least embrace micropsychism. Given that everything concrete is physical, and that everything physical is constituted out of physical ultimates, and that experience is part of concrete reality, it seems the only reasonable position, more than just an 'inference to the best explanation'... Micropsychism is not yet panpsychism, for as things stand realistic physicalists can conjecture that only some types of ultimates are intrinsically experiential. But they must allow that panpsychism may be true, and the big step has already been taken with micropsychism, the admission that at least some ultimates must be experiential. 'And were the inmost essence of things laid open to us' I think that the idea that some but not all physical ultimates are experiential would look like the idea that some but not all physical ultimates are spatio-temporal (on the assumption that spacetime is indeed a fundamental feature of reality). I would bet a lot against there being such radical heterogeneity at the very bottom of things. In fact (to disagree with my earlier self) it is hard to see why this view would not count as a form of dualism... So now I can say that physicalism, i.e. real physicalism, entails panexperientialism or panpsychism. All physical stuff is energy, in one form or another, and all energy, I trow, is an experience-involving phenomenon. This sounded crazy to me for a long time, but I am quite used to it, now that I know that there is no alternative short of 'substance dualism'... Real physicalism, realistic physicalism, entails panpsychism, and whatever problems are raised by this fact are problems a real physicalist must face.[48]​

— Galen Strawson, Consciousness and Its Place in Nature: Does Physicalism Entail Panpsychism?

The OP came up as a thought that @Polymath257 has no way to know the fundamental material as it is, if the fundamental material is devoid of power of knowing.

(Edited to clarify).

 

[Polymath257]

I did not know Strawson's argument. I just now read it.

The OP came up as a thought that @Polymath257 has no way to know the fundamental material as it is, if the fundamental material is devoid of power of knowing.

I'm not even convinced there is a 'fundamental material'. And if there were, I'd see no reason to speculate about it being conscious. Especially since we only know of consciousness in entities with brains.

 

[Polymath257]

Ah thank you very much for the crystal clear explanation. Now I understand. I owe Atanu an apology then...which I will attend to.....

By "perceives" in this context we really mean "interacts", don't we?

But are you then contending that an isolated atom in deep space does not exist? Or only exists when it interacts with a passing photon or something? I would have difficulty accepting that.

Well, it would interact with virtual photons in its environment.......

 

[atanu]

I'm not even convinced there is a 'fundamental material'. And if there were, I'd see no reason to speculate about it being conscious. Especially since we only know of consciousness in entities with brains.

I understand physicalism as below:

Physicalism - Wikipedia

In philosophy, physicalism is the metaphysical thesis that "everything is physical", that there is "nothing over and above" the physical,[1] or that everything supervenes on the physical.[2] Physicalism is a form of ontological monism—a "one substance" view of the nature of reality as opposed to a "two-substance" (dualism) or "many-substance" (pluralism) view.
​

First, do you not ascribe to the above view of ontological monism? Then what is your view?

​

Second, the OP is only pointing out the implication of a statement such as "I'd see no reason to speculate about it being conscious. Especially since we only know of consciousness in entities with brains..."

 

[Polymath257]

I understand physicalism as below:

Physicalism - Wikipedia

In philosophy, physicalism is the metaphysical thesis that "everything is physical", that there is "nothing over and above" the physical,[1] or that everything supervenes on the physical.[2] Physicalism is a form of ontological monism—a "one substance" view of the nature of reality as opposed to a "two-substance" (dualism) or "many-substance" (pluralism) view.
​

First, do you not ascribe to the above view of ontological monism? Then what is your view?

​

Second, the OP is only pointing out the implication of a statement such as "I'd see no reason to speculate about it being conscious. Especially since we only know of consciousness in entities with brains..."

I agree with the statement that everything supervenes on the physical. I think the philosophical concept of 'substance' is incoherent and so consider monism to be ill-conceived.

So, for example, are electrons the same 'substance' as muons? How about quarks? Photons? As far as we know, these are all fundamental particles (in the sense that they are not composed of anything else), but they have different properties. Are they different 'substances'? I really don't see that as an interesting question.

But they *are* all physical. So, they are part of what everything supervenes upon. Does that make me a pluralist? meh.

 

[atanu]

I agree with the statement that everything supervenes on the physical. I think the philosophical concept of 'substance' is incoherent and so consider monism to be ill-conceived.

So, for example, are electrons the same 'substance' as muons? How about quarks? Photons? As far as we know, these are all fundamental particles (in the sense that they are not composed of anything else), but they have different properties. Are they different 'substances'? I really don't see that as an interesting question.

But they *are* all physical. So, they are part of what everything supervenes upon. Does that make me a pluralist? meh.

Yeah. You are a pluralist.

And I remind you that that is the OP: without panpsychism, ontological material monism is not tenable.

 

[Polymath257]

Yeah. You are a pluralist.

And I remind you that that is the OP: without panpsychism, ontological material monism is not tenable.

Fair enough. I'm not sure why having only one fundamental 'substance' would affect this aspect, though. For example, if all fundamental particles are strings, that wouldn't affect whether or not consciousness is a product of the brain.

 

[siti]

Regarding your 1st para, we do in fact have a situation fairly closely approximating this in deep space, where atoms, ions or molecules are separated by such distances that they interact with matter or radiation very seldom. (The evidence for this comes from the interactions with radiation that they do occasionally undergo and which we then detect.)

I think therefore I could argue the reason such an isolated atom can be said to exist is because it always has the potential to interact with other material entities, whether or not it is doing so at any given moment.

Well no, that doesn't work I'm afraid - your atom has to be completely isolated or not - if it is not then it is not, in reality isolated at all - is it? And its "existence-establishing" interaction with other stuff is only a matter of time (which may or may not be real - i.e. it matters not that it undergoes relatively few interactions - it interacts and therefore makes a difference and therefore exists.

if one were to contend that existence requires interaction, then one would, rather absurdly, be implying that ordinary everyday matter is continually winking in and out of existence!

Well is that absurd? Or is it what really happens? How could we tell?

After all, interactions occur only at intervals, and in between one has matter and radiation in states that are not interacting.

No again, I'm afraid - interactions occur during intervals and if a thing interacts at all, then it is always in the process of interacting - at the very least it is getting closer (in time and space) to its next 'encounter' with some other part of reality. In any case, could you show me some evidence of matter and radiation in states that are not interacting (with something)?

I don't myself see any purpose being served by such a complicated concept of "existence". To me, the concept of "existence" ought to meet some sort of Ockham's Razor test of practical utility.

How does an isolated atom so far removed from the rest of the universe that it cannot interact with anything else pass your Ockham's Razor test? I would suggest that my notion of "if it makes a difference" is pretty much the most "Ockham's Razor"-ly efficient definition we can have. If it makes a difference it exists - period.

Regarding your 2nd para, I see your point but do not see where such a speculation gets us, given that this is not the case.

But how do you know that its not the case? How do you know that there is not a universe in which there is only one thing? How do you know that this universe is - or at least once was - not just one thing?

Regarding panpsychism, I can quite see that if the idea of "mind" is defined merely to be the process of interactions of matter and radiation, then that nicely gets rid of the problem. The human mind can be seen simply, and correctly in my view, as just the activity of the brain, i.e. the interactions of neurons and the chemistry therein. All other "mind" activities of other organisms, consciousness etc, can be treated likewise, as interactions of material entities. So we have, at a stroke, got rid of dualism and reduced "mind" to a physical basis. But then I do not think I would call that "panpsychism".

That's why I said I don't like the term panpsychism - it just confuses the unwary and leads them to misinterpret what is meant. The kind of 'pan-experientialism' that Strawson (and I) are thinking of is not 'consciousness' - its more along the lines of 'relatedness' - one thing relates to another...or more like a combination of that and 'what-it-is-like-to-be-ness'.

IOW - there is something that it is like to be an electron (or whatever) and being 'next to' an electron makes a difference.

I'm sorry if that's too complicated, but I do not see how anything that does not have a 'what-it-is-like-to-be' about itself and that made no difference (i.e. had no relatedness) to any other part of reality could be said to 'exist'. i honestly think that is as simple as it can be.

 

[Polymath257]

Well no, that doesn't work I'm afraid - your atom has to be completely isolated or not - if it is not then it is not, in reality isolated at all - is it? And its "existence-establishing" interaction with other stuff is only a matter of time (which may or may not be real - i.e. it matters not that it undergoes relatively few interactions - it interacts and therefore makes a difference and therefore exists.

Well is that absurd? Or is it what really happens? How could we tell?

No again, I'm afraid - interactions occur during intervals and if a thing interacts at all, then it is always in the process of interacting - at the very least it is getting closer (in time and space) to its next 'encounter' with some other part of reality. In any case, could you show me some evidence of matter and radiation in states that are not interacting (with something)?

How does an isolated atom so far removed from the rest of the universe that it cannot interact with anything else pass your Ockham's Razor test? I would suggest that my notion of "if it makes a difference" is pretty much the most "Ockham's Razor"-ly efficient definition we can have. If it makes a difference it exists - period.

But how do you know that its not the case? How do you know that there is not a universe in which there is only one thing? How do you know that this universe is - or at least once was - not just one thing?

That's why I said I don't like the term panpsychism - it just confuses the unwary and leads them to misinterpret what is meant. The kind of 'pan-experientialism' that Strawson (and I) are thinking of is not 'consciousness' - its more along the lines of 'relatedness' - one thing relates to another...or more like a combination of that and 'what-it-is-like-to-be-ness'.

IOW - there is something that it is like to be an electron (or whatever) and being 'next to' an electron makes a difference.

I'm sorry if that's too complicated, but I do not see how anything that does not have a 'what-it-is-like-to-be' about itself and that made no difference (i.e. had no relatedness) to any other part of reality could be said to 'exist'. i honestly think that is as simple as it can be.

An atom in the middle of nowhere still interacts with the virtual particles (fields) around it. Such virtual particles inevitably exist. So the basic idea of something that doesn't interact with *anything* else isn't covered by atoms in the middle of space. The interaction with virtual particles is enough to prevent the 'blinking into and out of existence'.

What we do have is that fundamental particles are *defined* by the ways they interact: do they interact via E&M, via the weak force, via the strong force, via gravity? how do the strengths of those interactions differ from those of other fundamental particles?

I definitely have a bias towards saying that it is meaningless to say something exists if it doesn't interact *at all* with anything else. So, interaction is fundamental to existence.

But what does interaction of this form have to do with panpsychism? Do we really want to say all interaction is awareness? I have to admit to not being convinced.

 

[siti]

are electrons the same 'substance' as muons? How about quarks? Photons?

Of course they are from a physicalist point of view - aren't they? They're all matter/energy. That's what 'substance monism' equates to for a 'physicalist'. There is nothing that exists that either is not itself physical or does not supervene upon the physical (where the physical is stuff composed of matter and/or energy).

(And yes I know I am going to get the usual protests about defining energy...etc. etc. etc. and arguing that energy is not material/physical and how can I prove it....none of which I am going to answer - we all know what they are).

 

[siti]

...without panpsychism, ontological material monism is not tenable.

So that's the OP argument. And I have some sympathy, but I don't think that physical (better word than material) monism is untenable. There are (as I may have pointed out, can't remember) two possibilities given that we know for sure that 'experience' exists:

- either it was there from the get go (which is what is referred to as 'panpsychism' - or 'panexperientialism')

- or it emerges (somehow, radically, miraculously) at some level of organic complexity

That means, if I want to be a physicalist I have two options - both of which are distasteful to the rational-skeptical physicalist mind:

... EITHER panexperientialism OR radical emergence of the most extraordinary kind...the former is far too pantheistically cosmologically conscious and the latter too theistically miraculous.

Unfortunately one or the other must be true as far as I can tell - so I'm rather inclined to go with pantheism and put the universe itself in charge rather than holding out for a miracle.

 

[siti]

Do we really want to say all interaction is awareness?

No I really don't want to say that. But what other option is left if we bar the miraculous? (See my previous post). And if it is not, at some level, 'awareness' then how does an electron 'know' what to do when it meets a triad of quarks (as in a hydrogen atom for example)?

 

[atanu]

I once had a philosophy class in college that focused entirely on the subject of knowing. I recall dissecting one of Plato's dialogues wherein Socrates asks Theaetetus, one of his students, "What is knowledge?" As I recall, the ensuing answer, which took up the entire semester to get to, regarded knowledge as taking two forms: direct experience, and reasoning. So in answer to your question here, I would say we recognize "physical stuff" because we experience it: we directly experience its materiality, and we reason that its existence is known by this experience.
.

True. But then the material that we can directly experience is not the fundamental matter on which every other thing-- material or mental -- supervenes. There is surely something outside the matter that is being experienced.

 

[atanu]

Fair enough. I'm not sure why having only one fundamental 'substance' would affect this aspect, though. For example, if all fundamental particles are strings, that wouldn't affect whether or not consciousness is a product of the brain.

Do strings constitute the 'fundamental' substance on which every other thing supervenes?

I reiterate (from WIKI) that 'physicalism' is the metaphysical thesis that "everything is physical", that there is "nothing over and above" the physical, or that everything supervenes on the physical. Physicalism is a form of ontological monism—a "one substance" view of the nature of reality as opposed to a "two-substance" (dualism) or "many-substance" (pluralism) view.

 

[atanu]

Siti has now explained with admirable clarity (post 16) what you were getting at in the OP, which I did indeed apparently misunderstand. So I owe you an apology for saying it was silly. See my reply to 16.

Thank you. No need for apology at all. Your pro-activeness in acknowledging the misundertanding is admirable.

 

[Polymath257]

Do strings constitute the 'fundamental' substance on which every other thing supervenes?

I reiterate (from WIKI) that 'physicalism' is the metaphysical thesis that "everything is physical", that there is "nothing over and above" the physical, or that everything supervenes on the physical. Physicalism is a form of ontological monism—a "one substance" view of the nature of reality as opposed to a "two-substance" (dualism) or "many-substance" (pluralism) view.

What bothers me is that if there are several types of fundamental particles, then there would be several types of 'fundamental substance' (pluralism), but it would still be the case that everything supervenes on the physical (physicalism). So, I see no reason to think that physicalism necessitates monism (although it could).

Like I said, I find the philosophical notion of 'substance' to be too vague to be useful, so the monism, dualism, pluralism split seems like just a problem of language.

But, even in a monistic physicalist system, I see no reason why consciousness (experience) can't be an emergent phenomenon (like pressure or temperature) and not anything fundamental. Physical things interact in certain ways (that's part of why they are considered to be physical). That means there are rules of interaction (patterns of such), which we call physical laws. Once we know where everything physial is and what it is doing, we would know everything there is to know about brain states and thereby everything about conscious experiences.

And yes, in string theory, everything is made of 'strings'. The composition of those strings is not addressed, but they can vibrate and have tension. That is all.

 

[Polymath257]

True. But then the material that we can directly experience is not the fundamental matter on which every other thing-- material or mental -- supervenes. There is surely something outside the matter that is being experienced.

How does that follow? Our experience *is* the pattern of interactions of our brains and neurons with our sensory apparatus, right? We don't 'experience directly' any 'material'. We only experience what our brains are processing and all sensory information is indirect.

 

[Polymath257]

So that's the OP argument. And I have some sympathy, but I don't think that physical (better word than material) monism is untenable. There are (as I may have pointed out, can't remember) two possibilities given that we know for sure that 'experience' exists:

- either it was there from the get go (which is what is referred to as 'panpsychism' - or 'panexperientialism')

- or it emerges (somehow, radically, miraculously) at some level of organic complexity

That means, if I want to be a physicalist I have two options - both of which are distasteful to the rational-skeptical physicalist mind:

... EITHER panexperientialism OR radical emergence of the most extraordinary kind...the former is far too pantheistically cosmologically conscious and the latter too theistically miraculous.

Unfortunately one or the other must be true as far as I can tell - so I'm rather inclined to go with pantheism and put the universe itself in charge rather than holding out for a miracle.

Hmmm...I guess I strongly favor the emergent hypothesis. I just don't see it as miraculous. At least, no more so than it is miraculous that temperature emerges out of the motion of atoms even though no atom has a temperature. Consciousness, as I see it, *is* a pattern of interaction, so experience very naturally arises in complex systems that interact with their environment.

I see this as far more likely than that an electron is 'aware'. The latter seems to be a violence against the word 'aware'. Electrons don't 'know' anything. They just interact with some other particles (like photons). All fundamental particles are *defined* by how they interact with the other fundamental particles.

 

[exchemist]

Thank you. No need for apology at all. Your pro-activeness in acknowledging the misundertanding is admirable.

Mind you, I still can't understand what you write about it. But that's a detail: I can discuss it with Siti and that may do for all of us.

 

[Nous]

The human mind can be seen simply, and correctly in my view, as just the activity of the brain, i.e. the interactions of neurons and the chemistry therein. All other "mind" activities of other organisms, consciousness etc, can be treated likewise, as interactions of material entities. So we have, at a stroke, got rid of dualism and reduced "mind" to a physical basis. But then I do not think I would call that "panpsychism".

How do "interactions of neurons and the chemistry therein" give rise to awareness (experience) and volition ex novo? On what grounds does one conclude that such a creation of awareness and volition ex novo happens as a result of "interaction of neurons and the chemistry therein"?