Determinism vs Free Will by Physicists.

[joe1776]

Yes, thoughts are physical *processes* in our brains, somewhat like computer programs running on a computer hardware. Just like the bits in a computer have meaning, but are still physical (based on matter and energy), so are our thoughts. But, once again, our thoughts are closer to the running programs than just a collection of bits.

Maybe thoughts are only physical to you because you have defined them so.

Logically, we can assert that thoughts are either metaphysical or physical (beyond that, we run out of options). If our definition of thought is metaphysical, it is safe to say that metaphysical thoughts do not have mass since they are by definition not physical, and mass is a property of a physical things. However, if we define a thought as a physical thing, it becomes a little trickier to determine whether or not it has mass.

Do thoughts have mass? - MIT McGovern Institute

I'm not sure why you say physical processes don't seem to be consistent with each other. The whole of physics shows the opposite: there is a consistent way to model the physical world. Even your mentioning of matter and energy is based on the concepts of physics.

I was thinking of quantum spookiness when I made that comment.

 

[Polymath257]

Maybe thoughts are only physical to you because you have defined them so.

Logically, we can assert that thoughts are either metaphysical or physical (beyond that, we run out of options). If our definition of thought is metaphysical, it is safe to say that metaphysical thoughts do not have mass since they are by definition not physical, and mass is a property of a physical things. However, if we define a thought as a physical thing, it becomes a little trickier to determine whether or not it has mass.

Do thoughts have mass? - MIT McGovern Institute

Does a running computer program have mass?

Not all physical things have mass. Photons, for example.

I was thinking of quantum spookiness when I made that comment.

As I thought you did. Non-causality is not the same as inconsistent. That we have a very detailed mathematical theory of quantum mechanics that has worked in every situation in which it has been tested shows the consistency.

 

[Koldo]

What evidence do you have for that claim? And how do you explain near-death experiences in patients with no detectable brain activity? I obviously can't refer you to religious experiences, which raise the question of where a god keeps their brain, since as an atheist you obviously refuse to believe in them. You obviously have more skill than I in belief without evidence and disbelief in the face of it!

I would like to know your source please.

 

[joe1776]

First of all, I accept that people have religious *experiences*. I just believe they are products of brain activity and have nothing at all to do with a supernatural. Those OBEs that have happened with 'no brain activity' have been in situations where the detectors have been low quality (EEGs and not MRIs, for example) and where the timing is suspect: are we sure the experience happened during the time when there was no detectable activity?

Remember that the brain commonly rewrites its experiences to make them 'work'. So why would we suspect that rewriting after the fact didn't happen in these?

And, as for evidence that the brain is where thoughts happen, pretty much all of brain research over the past century shows that: you affect the brain and you affect thoughts.

The most common OBE happens when people are asleep. They find themselves floating on the ceiling, looking down at their sleeping bodies, the experience in unlike a dream, they are able to think rationally. The possibilities are (a) they are a delusion or (b) they are evidence that the mind can separate from the brain.

The philosophical materialist who believes he knows the truth about OBEs and the theist who thinks he does are both jumping to conclusions based on the confirmation bias.

 

[joe1776]

As I thought you did. Non-causality is not the same as inconsistent. That we have a very detailed mathematical theory of quantum mechanics that has worked in every situation in which it has been tested shows the consistency.

I'm not sure but you seem to be using the word consistent inconsistently.

In your opinion, is free will inconsistent with causality, non-causality, or both?

 

[Polymath257]

The most common OBE happens when people are asleep. They find themselves floating on the ceiling, looking down at their sleeping bodies, the experience in unlike a dream, they are able to think rationally. The possibilities are (a) they are a delusion or (b) they are evidence that the mind can separate from the brain.

Or that they are *dreaming*?

Dreams are known for creating nonsense situations: they are the brain playing over all sorts of possibilities. Even animals dream.

And I have been able to 'think rationally' while in a dream. At least I thought I was at the time.

The philosophical materialist who believes he knows the truth and the theist who thinks he does are both jumping to conclusions based on the confirmation bias.

The vast majority of the evidence points to materialism. Ancient beliefs point the other way. Which do you choose?

 

[Polymath257]

I'm not sure but you seem to be using the word consistent inconsistently.

In your opinion, is free will inconsistent with causality, non-causality, or both?

Again, I'm not sure I have a good definition of 'free will'.

If it implies the existence of multiple futures, where the specific one experienced is a matter of personal choice, then the concept seems to be contradicted by science.

But I can see other definitions that are consistent even with determinism. For example, if the future has fast divergence from closely separated initial states and the determination of a specific future happens primarily in our brains.

 

[Koldo]

The most common OBE happens when people are asleep. They find themselves floating on the ceiling, looking down at their sleeping bodies, the experience in unlike a dream, they are able to think rationally. The possibilities are (a) they are a delusion or (b) they are evidence that the mind can separate from the brain.

The philosophical materialist who believes he knows the truth about OBEs and the theist who thinks he does are both jumping to conclusions based on the confirmation bias.

Or (c) OBE is a misnomer and people are actually experiencing what they claim to experience without truly being out of their bodies. Their consciousness is being projected outwards without ever being separated from their bodies.

 

[joe1776]

Or (c) OBE is a misnomer and people are actually experiencing what they claim to experience without truly being out of their bodies. Their consciousness is being projected outwards without ever being separated from their bodies.

How would that be different than the delusion possibility?

 

[joe1776]

Or that they are *dreaming*?
Except for the strangeness involved with floating on the ceiling looking at myself and my wife sleeping, my OBE was more like reality than a dream.

The vast majority of the evidence points to materialism. Ancient beliefs point the other way. Which do you choose?

I don't know whether my OBE was a delusion or evidence of mind separating from the brain. Nor do I feel the need to stake out an opinion either way.

 

[joe1776]

Again, I'm not sure I have a good definition of 'free will'.

If it implies the existence of multiple futures, where the specific one experienced is a matter of personal choice, then the concept seems to be contradicted by science.

But I can see other definitions that are consistent even with determinism. For example, if the future has fast divergence from closely separated initial states and the determination of a specific future happens primarily in our brains.

I haven't given the debate much thought. I'm satisfied that we can't tell the difference between free will and the illusion of free will. However, as a pragmatist, the debate has no significance for me because it isn't going to change my decision-making either way.

 

[Koldo]

How would that be different than the delusion possibility?

The experience actually happened. It wasn't just a dream. Merely the interpretation is what is misguided.

 

[Skwim]

Again, I'm not sure I have a good definition of 'free will'.

I think the Cambridge Dictionaries Online has a good definition of "will":

"the mental power used to control and direct your thoughts and actions, or a determination to do something, despite any difficulties or opposition:"

(The Will does not refer to any particular desire, but rather to the capacity to act decisively on one's desires.)​

And Wikipedia has a good definition of "free will":

"the ability to choose between different possible courses of action."
​

Or, as I like to put it

The ability to have done differently.

.​

 

[Polymath257]

I think the Cambridge Dictionaries Online has a good definition of "will":

"the mental power used to control and direct your thoughts and actions, or a determination to do something, despite any difficulties or opposition:"

(The Will does not refer to any particular desire, but rather to the capacity to act decisively on one's desires.)​

And Wikipedia has a good definition of "free will":

"the ability to choose between different possible courses of action."
​

Or, as I like to put it

The ability to have done differently.
.​

So, for example, if I fall out of an airplane, I do NOT have the 'free will' to choose to not fall.

Now, the ambiguous parts that could still work even under determinism: 'control', 'direct', 'choose'. ALL of those are problematic terms.

But, it seems to me that to have the 'ability to choose between different courses of action' is a weaker proposition that 'The ability to have done differently'.

For example, suppose I perceive there are two options that I can choose between. I ponder the choices and decide to do things one way. That seems, to me, to be compatible with determinism and and physics and to be compatible with the 'ability to choose between different possible courses of action'.

On the other hand, under determinism, I could NOT have done differently, so it would not qualify under the second definition.

Now, the place where physics comes in is the notion of 'possible courses of action'. What, exactly, does that mean? And what, precisely, does it mean to 'choose' between such?

For example, it is possible some situations allow for quantum indeterminacy to be macroscopic. In that case, there is 'more than one possible course'. But in what sense can I 'choose' between them? As far as we can see, absolutely none at all. So, instead of having 'free will', we would be subject to random influences that 'determine' our actions.

In order for there to 'have the ability to have done differently', that means there is more than one possible future at the point the choice was made *and* that something *I* did affected which option actually happens *and* the actual course of events in some way is determined by my choice (so, the course isn't the exact opposite of my choice).

I see no evidence that this type of 'free will' is possible physically.

 

[Skwim]

So, for example, if I fall out of an airplane, I do NOT have the 'free will' to choose to not fall.
Now, the ambiguous parts that could still work even under determinism: 'control', 'direct', 'choose'. ALL of those are problematic terms.
But, it seems to me that to have the 'ability to choose between different courses of action' is a weaker proposition that 'The ability to have done differently'.
For example, suppose I perceive there are two options that I can choose between. I ponder the choices and decide to do things one way. That seems, to me, to be compatible with determinism and and physics and to be compatible with the 'ability to choose between different possible courses of action'.
On the other hand, under determinism, I could NOT have done differently, so it would not qualify under the second definition.

Now, the place where physics comes in is the notion of 'possible courses of action'. What, exactly, does that mean? And what, precisely, does it mean to 'choose' between such?

As I see it, a "possible courses of action" implies one could choose to do A or not to do A. And "choosing between such" implies the ability to freely select a different alternative.

For example, it is possible some situations allow for quantum indeterminacy to be macroscopic.

Curious. Which ones are those?

In that case, there is 'more than one possible course'. But in what sense can I 'choose' between them? As far as we can see, absolutely none at all. So, instead of having 'free will', we would be subject to random influences that 'determine' our actions.

Yup. The notion that random quantum events somehow saves freewill falls on its face right out of the starting gate. Moreover;

"The main argument against the quantum mind proposition is that quantum states in the brain would decohere before they reached a spatial or temporal scale at which they could be useful for neural processing." According to Max Tegmark, and based on his calculations, quantum systems in the brain decohere quickly and cannot control brain function.[21][22]
Source: Wikipedia​

In order for there to 'have the ability to have done differently', that means there is more than one possible future at the point the choice was made *and* that something *I* did affected which option actually happens *and* the actual course of events in some way is determined by my choice (so, the course isn't the exact opposite of my choice).
I see no evidence that this type of 'free will' is possible physically.

No choosing: no free will.

.

 

[Polymath257]

As I see it, a "possible courses of action" implies one could choose to do A or not to do A. And "choosing between such" implies the ability to freely select a different alternative.

So, that means there have to be at least two possible futures for that to be possible, right?

Curious. Which ones are those?

Well, the most obvious ones go like this: you watch a quantum particle with a half-life of one minute for one minute. if it decays, it triggers a bomb to go off, otherwise nothing happens.

In that case the quantum indeteminacy makes it so that there is a 50/50 chance the bomb will go off, but there is no way to tell which ahead of time. And that is certainly a macroscopic effect.

Of course, much milder situations are possible, but they all involve amplification of a single quantum event to a macroscopic scale. But it is crucial that it be a *single* quantum event because having many of them leads to averages that are more deterministic.

Yup. The notion that random quantum events somehow saves freewill falls on its face right out of the starting gate. Moreover;

"The main argument against the quantum mind proposition is that quantum states in the brain would decohere before they reached a spatial or temporal scale at which they could be useful for neural processing." According to Max Tegmark, and based on his calculations, quantum systems in the brain decohere quickly and cannot control brain function.[21][22]
Source: Wikipedia​

Yep. Penrose and Hofmeyer's ideas never made any sense to me for that reason.

No choosing: no free will.
.

But if *choice* is done by a brain process, then you have 'choice', but that choice (may be) determined ahead of time.

 

[Skwim]

So, that means there have to be at least two possible futures for that to be possible, right?

No, it would only appear so. The only possible future is the one dictated by the sequence of cause/effect events leading up to the moment of action.

Well, the most obvious ones go like this: you watch a quantum particle with a half-life of one minute for one minute. if it decays, it triggers a bomb to go off, otherwise nothing happens.

In that case the quantum indeteminacy makes it so that there is a 50/50 chance the bomb will go off, but there is no way to tell which ahead of time. And that is certainly a macroscopic effect.

But that wouldn't be the indeterminacy itself---as in "some situations allow for quantum indeterminacy to be macroscopic"---It would be the effect of the indeterminacy. Just as pulling a trigger is not the cessation of life, but the effect (cause) of it.

But if *choice* is done by a brain process, then you have 'choice', but that choice (may be) determined ahead of time.

That "choice" IS determined ahead of time, and as such no longer qualifies as a choice.

 

[Polymath257]

No, it would only appear so. The only possible future is the one dictated by the sequence of cause/effect events leading up to the moment of action.

Even if there is free will? Or are you saying free will is impossible?

But that wouldn't be the indeterminacy itself---as in "some situations allow for quantum indeterminacy to be macroscopic"---It would be the effect of the indeterminacy. Just as pulling a trigger is not the cessation of life, but the effect (cause) of it.

The point is that the random aspect of quantum mechanics, which is ultimately *not* deterministic, carries over to the macroscopic realm.

In the case I gave, whether the bomb explodes or not is NOT determined by what happens before the decay.

That "choice" IS determined ahead of time, and as such no longer qualifies as a choice.

Why is that? I pondered the possibilities, I weighed the options, and I decided. I made a choice.

Even if all of this was predetermined it doesn't mean it didn't happen.

 

[Skwim]

Even if there is free will? Or are you saying free will is impossible?

I contend that free will doesn't exist.

The point is that the random aspect of quantum mechanics, which is ultimately *not* deterministic, carries over to the macroscopic realm.

I've yet to see any evidence of its utter randomness. The best that can be said is that a quantum mechanical event can't be determined, hence its indeterminacy, which, If anything, would be a failure in human ability, even if that inability is grounded in an impossibility. .

In the case I gave, whether the bomb explodes or not is NOT determined by what happens before the decay.

Then what determines it?

Why is that? I pondered the possibilities, I weighed the options, and I decided. I made a choice.

No. You did whatever that pondering and weighing led you to do. You could not have done any differently. To do so would require that something in the preceding events leading up to and affecting your action ("choice") be different. But they weren't different.

Consider:
The numbers, 2 + 78 + 343 + 56 + 9 + 3,371 + 5 = 3,864. To result in some other answer at least one in the series would have to be different. e.g. 2 + 78 + 342 + 56 + 9 + 3,371 + 5 = 3,864 = 3,863. OR 2 + 78 + 343 + 56 + 22 + 3,371 + 5 = 3,877. But suppose there was no difference in any of the numbers, then the answer would have to be 3,864 This isn't to say that there can be a difference in the numbers and never add up to 3,864, because 2 + 78 + 342 + 56 + 10 + 3,371 + 5 also = 3,864, but the fact remains the answer has to be 3,864

Now, replace the numbers with cause-effect events that lead up to and affect the moment of action. Whatever that action happens to be it could not be any different.

Even if all of this was predetermined it doesn't mean it didn't happen.

Of course not.

.

 

[Polymath257]

I contend that free will doesn't exist.

Fair enough. I was working under the assumption that it did and was trying to figure out the consequences for physics.

I've yet to see any evidence of its utter randomness. The best that can be said is that a quantum mechanical event can't be determined, hence its indeterminacy, which, If anything, would be a failure in human ability, even if that inability is grounded in an impossibility. .

No, it goes much farther than that. We *know* that any 'cause' would have to be nonlocal in the sense it would have to travel faster than light. That, of course, causes other problems, including causes being after effects in some time frame.

Then what determines it?

Well, the bomb would be caused by that quantum decay. The quantum decay is, strictly speaking, uncaused.

No. You did whatever that pondering and weighing led you to do. You could not have done any differently. To do so would require that something in the preceding events leading up to and affecting your action ("choice") be different. But they weren't different.

But I *still* chose: I pondered and decided what to do. That it was predetermined (if it was), is irrelevant to whether I made a choice.

Consider:
The numbers, 2 + 78 + 343 + 56 + 9 + 3,371 + 5 = 3,864. To result in some other answer at least one in the series would have to be different. e.g. 2 + 78 + 342 + 56 + 9 + 3,371 + 5 = 3,864 = 3,863. OR 2 + 78 + 343 + 56 + 22 + 3,371 + 5 = 3,877. But suppose there was no difference in any of the numbers, then the answer would have to be 3,864 This isn't to say that there can be a difference in the numbers and never add up to 3,864, because 2 + 78 + 342 + 56 + 10 + 3,371 + 5 also = 3,864, but the fact remains the answer has to be 3,864

Now, replace the numbers with cause-effect events that lead up to and affect the moment of action. Whatever that action happens to be it could not be any different.

Cause and effect is NOT a simple matter of addition. And, in the real world, there are situations where it simply isn't the case that an event is *determined* by previous events.