Chalmers' Argument Against Materialism

[Rational Agnostic]

I made a thread about this already, but I believe I misunderstood the argument, so I thought I would examine it again. The philosopher David Chalmers has an argument that attempts to disprove a materialist approach to consciousness. It begins by considering the concept of a "philosophical zombie" which is a being that is physically and behaviorally identical to a human, with the absence of consciousness. His argument (as I understand it) is:

1. Philosophical zombies are conceivable (i.e. we can imagine them, they are not like square circles or married bachelors, etc.), and therefore logically possible.

2. If materialism is true, then philosophical zombies are not logically possible (since they would be unconscious based on how we defined them, but also conscious since they are materially identical to conscious humans, and so they are logically incoherent and thus not logically possible or conceivable).

3. Materialism is false (follows from premises 1 & 2).

It's possible that I'm still misunderstanding the argument, but I think this is the essence of it. I'm not sure what to think of it. It seems valid, but also very weird and almost trivial. I'm wondering if it is somehow a trick. I'd be interested in what you all think of this argument, particularly @Polymath257 .

 

[McBell]

1. Philosophical zombies are conceivable (i.e. we can imagine them, they are not like square circles or married bachelors, etc.), and therefore logically possible.

How does one get from "conceivable" to "logically possible"

 

[epronovost]

Even before that, the entire concept of a philosophical zombie is fraught with problems. How can you be identical to a human in behavior and NOT be conscious? If you are identical in behavior, you are conscious because our behavior is a side effect our consciousness. I think Chalmers is faced with what I would call the Outworld Paradox.

 

[Twilight Hue]

Since physicality is linked with consciousness, there must be a component or link somewhere with the argument of non-materialism to even make it work.

 

[Nakosis]

I made a thread about this already, but I believe I misunderstood the argument, so I thought I would examine it again. The philosopher David Chalmers has an argument that attempts to disprove a materialist approach to consciousness. It begins by considering the concept of a "philosophical zombie" which is a being that is physically and behaviorally identical to a human, with the absence of consciousness. His argument (as I understand it) is:

1. Philosophical zombies are conceivable (i.e. we can imagine them, they are not like square circles or married bachelors, etc.), and therefore logically possible.

2. If materialism is true, then philosophical zombies are not logically possible (since they would be unconscious based on how we defined them, but also conscious since they are materially identical to conscious humans, and so they are logically incoherent and thus not logically possible or conceivable).

3. Materialism is false (follows from premises 1 & 2).

It's possible that I'm still misunderstanding the argument, but I think this is the essence of it. I'm not sure what to think of it. It seems valid, but also very weird and almost trivial. I'm wondering if it is somehow a trick. I'd be interested in what you all think of this argument, particularly @Polymath257 .

IMO consciousness has many different levels, even among humans. It's not a either all on or all off situation. Humans are unconscious at times if you want to call them zombies.

Seems silly to argue logical possibilities when the facts present themselves.

 

[exchemist]

I made a thread about this already, but I believe I misunderstood the argument, so I thought I would examine it again. The philosopher David Chalmers has an argument that attempts to disprove a materialist approach to consciousness. It begins by considering the concept of a "philosophical zombie" which is a being that is physically and behaviorally identical to a human, with the absence of consciousness. His argument (as I understand it) is:

1. Philosophical zombies are conceivable (i.e. we can imagine them, they are not like square circles or married bachelors, etc.), and therefore logically possible.

2. If materialism is true, then philosophical zombies are not logically possible (since they would be unconscious based on how we defined them, but also conscious since they are materially identical to conscious humans, and so they are logically incoherent and thus not logically possible or conceivable).

3. Materialism is false (follows from premises 1 & 2).

It's possible that I'm still misunderstanding the argument, but I think this is the essence of it. I'm not sure what to think of it. It seems valid, but also very weird and almost trivial. I'm wondering if it is somehow a trick. I'd be interested in what you all think of this argument, particularly @Polymath257 .

If the concept of a philosophical zombie hypothesises an entity identical to a human being in all attributes and behaviour, save for being conscious, then I think it is a bogus concept that assumes at the outset that which it tries to prove. What it is assuming is that consciousness is a "thing", or at least an attribute separate from the material structure and operation of a human organism, i.e. it is a magic extra "spark" of some sort.

It seems to me that if one takes the view, as I do, that consciousness is not a "thing" but an activity of the human brain, akin to the functioning of the operating system of a computer, then it is impossible to have a philosophical zombie, because the moment you have all the structure and function of a human being you have consciousness automatically.

Cartesian dualism has a lot to answer for, it seems to me. People seem regularly to make what I would suggest is the category error of treating consciousness as an entity, a "thing" apart, when it it is an activity.

 

[ratiocinator]

1. Philosophical zombies are conceivable (i.e. we can imagine them, they are not like square circles or married bachelors, etc.), and therefore logically possible.

2. If materialism is true, then philosophical zombies are not logically possible (since they would be unconscious based on how we defined them, but also conscious since they are materially identical to conscious humans, and so they are logically incoherent and thus not logically possible or conceivable).

3. Materialism is false (follows from premises 1 & 2).

1. Being self-consistent (not contradictory) - which seems to be how 'conceivable' and 'logically possible' are being defined here - doesn't mean that something can exist in reality.
   
   
2. If materialism is true, it would mean philosophical zombies cannot actually exist, not that they are inconsistent (not 'conceivable' or 'logically impossible').
   
   
3. So this doesn't follow at all.

It is really easy to imagine multiple self-consistent ideas that cannot all exist in really (all the different versions of "God" or all the candidate hypotheses for a "theory of everything", for example) - the argument (as presented here) is obviously absurd.

 

[Rational Agnostic]

How does one get from "conceivable" to "logically possible"

Can you give an example of anything that is both logically incoherent and conceivable? I can't.

 

[Rational Agnostic]

Even before that, the entire concept of a philosophical zombie is fraught with problems. How can you be identical to a human in behavior and NOT be conscious? If you are identical in behavior, you are conscious because our behavior is a side effect our consciousness.

Yes but there is no reason such a being is logically impossible. My behavior and reactions to stimuli do not prove I am conscious. Only *I* can KNOW I am conscious.

 

[Rational Agnostic]

1. 
   
   
2. If materialism is true, it would mean philosophical zombies cannot actually exist, not that they are inconsistent (not 'conceivable' or 'logically impossible').

1. I believe they would be logically inconsistent because they would be unconscious and conscious simultaneously if materialism were true.
   

 

[PureX]

Materialists think only the brain is real: that the mind is basically just a fiction being created in the brain. If they're right about this, then their own proposition is likewise just a fiction being created in their brain. (As would be every other proposition offered.) So it renders itself moot, by default.

 

[ratiocinator]

1. I believe they would be logically inconsistent because they would be unconscious and conscious simultaneously if materialism were true.

You're confusing logical consistency with what is possible reality. Not everything that is logically self-consistent is possible in reality.

The fact is that we don't know what consciousness is or how it comes about. There are multiple conjectures about it, many of which contain no obvious logical contradictions, and, at most, only one of them can be true. Some are entirely physical and some not.

There really is nothing that logic alone can tell us about which is true (if any of them).

 

[McBell]

Can you give an example of anything that is both logically incoherent and conceivable? I can't.

What does this have to do with getting from "conceivable" to "logically possible"?

 

[Rational Agnostic]

Materialists think only the brain is real: that the mind is basically just a fiction being created in the brain. If they're right about this, then their own proposition is likewise just a fiction being created in their brain. (As would be every other proposition offered.) So it renders itself moot, by default.

Now THAT is clearly incorrect.

 

[Rational Agnostic]

What does this have to do with getting from "conceivable" to "logically possible"?

Something is conceivable if and only if it is logically possible. I don't think this is provable but it seems to be self-evident.

 

[McBell]

Something is conceivable if and only if it is logically possible.

Perhaps you are using a definition of the word "conceivable" I am not familiar with?

I don't think this is provable but it seems to be self-evident.

Apparently it is not as "self-evident" as you seem to think it is.
Especially given you are completely unable to show how to get from "conceivable" to "logically possible"

 

[exchemist]

Materialists think only the brain is real: that the mind is basically just a fiction being created in the brain. If they're right about this, then their own proposition is likewise just a fiction being created in their brain. (As would be every other proposition offered.) So it renders itself moot, by default.

Something wrong here, surely? The term "mind" is a concept. Our systems of thinking embrace both concepts regarded as factual and concepts regarded as fictions. If it is the brain that thinks, it does not follow that because this organ can conceive of fictions, then everything it conceives of is a fiction.

 

[Rational Agnostic]

Perhaps you are using a definition of the word "conceivable" I am not familiar with?


Apparently it is not as "self-evident" as you seem to think it is.
Especially given you are completely unable to show how to get from "conceivable" to "logically possible"

By conceivable I mean imaginable. How could you imagine something logically impossible? That would be absurd. We can't imagine square circles or numbers that are simultaneously positive and negative or married bachelors since they are logically impossible.

 

[McBell]

By conceivable I mean imaginable. How could you imagine something logically impossible? That would be absurd. We can't imagine square circles or numbers that are simultaneously positive and negative or married bachelors since they are logically impossible.

Why would you assume that every one else has the same limits to their imagination as you have in yours?

But that is actually off topic.
How does one get a term or name for something that can not be imagined because it is not logical?
Your square circle, for example.
What is a squared circle if not a figment of imagination?

 

[epronovost]

My behavior and reactions to stimuli do not prove I am conscious

That's precisely what consciousness is.