I take issue with this. A true moral relativist would easily be able to judge another for violating their morals.
Playing devil's advocate here, why would a moral relativist judge another person for violating that relativists' morals? If you were, say, a moral relativist, why would you judge, say, Joseph Stalin for the crimes committed by the Soviet Union when he was in charge? I doubt that you could
judge him. Maybe you could disagree with what he, and others under him, did but I'm not sure how you could fairly judge. In this case, judgment implies an
ought. To judge someone like Stalin, you're effectively saying, "Well Stalin
ought to have respected all human rights but he didn't; he violated people's rights to life by having them murdered".
There's quite a bit of ground between (some articulations of?) relativism and nihilism. I can condemn others for violating human rights while also acknowledging that human rights are a category constructed within a culture and not necessarily right for all cultures.
I don't understand how you can do that
coherently. You can condemn others for violating human rights but at the same time acknowledge that the concept of human rights isn't the right concept for all cultures? How? If people in a Muslim country can be killed for apostacy, would you condemn it? But if you say that your ethics, which acknowledges human rights and the need to respect them, isn't right for all cultures, then why judge a Muslim country for violating any such human rights?
Playing devil's advocate, wouldn't it be best to say that there is one system of ethics that is you personally find the best, that all cultures
ought to agree with, that all cultures
should observe and respect? Maybe there's something about your ethics that I just don't understand but I don't see the coherency in what you're saying.
The fact that my morality is relative to my biological/ cultural/ historic/ geographic/ etc. context hardly changes the fact that it's my morality. It is still just as effective (which is really just to say affective) as if I subscribed to a system of purportedly-objective deontological ethics.
Well, if it's subjectively moral, then I don't see how you can
judge or
condemn. At best I think you can disagree with others' morals and disagree with the actions of people whose ethics you don't agree with. I don't think you can condemn murder as a relativist, just disagree with it.
First off, it's not a why question. We are moral. Barring sociopaths and the like, we feel empathy for others. We could postulate why this is (evolutionary psychology and sociology are helpful here), but the simple fact of the matter is that it is. We have an inherent inclination towards value and morality.
I disagree. We are moral but given the fact that we are moral people doesn't answer the question of why we
ought to be moral or even
care about morality. We can explain why we feel empathy for others and insist on fairness, justice, and respect our freedoms and boundaries. Just like we can explain various human behavior with evolutionary theories involving sexual selection. But explaining why we tend to be moral or act in certain ways doesn't explain why we
ought to be moral just like explaining certain human behaviors by sexual selection doesn't explain why human beings
should reproduce or even why the human species
ought to exist.
Tied to my first point, there are distinct psychological benefits to having a coherent system of morals/ values/ meaning. You've contrasted secular humanism to different deontological religious values, but there are a number of teleological religions like Buddhism that do not recognize an objective morality or meaning inscribed into the universe, but rather devote themselves to forms of values and meaning designed to be psychologically beneficial to the practitioner and the community.
I understand your point here.
Thanks for weighing in.