Artificial Intelligence

[freethinker44]

Even after a dreamless sleep I do not have that sensation of having ceased to exist. After anaesthetic, it is like the timeline has been edited. It seems continuous from the countdown to the wake-up, which is very disorienting and for some reason unpleasant.

I have slept like that. I hate that. I lay down and then what feels like 5 seconds later my alarm is going off. Then I have to go to work feeling like I have been awake for a day and half. Have had the exact opposite of that happen too, I fall asleep and feel like I have slept for 10 hours and it has only been 45 minutes. Those are good days.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

Ahh I see. Although one can argue that the second and third categories could easily imply mysticism. In both of those areas, consciousness is 'one' with the universe.

Not under the interpretation of most of the creators of these theories. However, as I don't really understand what being one with the universe entails, I can't judge its applicability here.

Well correct me if I'm wrong but doesn't information exist on the quantum level?

It can, but it need not.

Wouldn't time and space also have information embedded within them to create their dimensions? Unless my definition of what I consider information is completely wrong. =/

Information theory relies on the possibility of a given state of some component of physical reality to exist in other states. A bit can be either 0 or 1. The capacity for one or the other makes this medium a possible channel for communication. For the most part, theories of information do not assert that information is intrinsic to anything. Only that the possibility for information to be transmitted requires possibilities (like 0 or 1, or certain words as opposed to others, or certain quantum states vs. others, and so forth). Classical communications theory, however (the work by Shannon & Weaver) is still cited but is no longer what it was. Even those who use it have built upon it. But this is not all that central. The main idea is still there: information is the ability for some system (some organized entity) to react to certain physical interactions with it according to the possible ways in which these interactions could occur vs. did occur. So, for example, a neuron alters the flow of ions into and out in response to input from other neurons, intracellular activity, and so forth, all of which can be considered "information" in that it is possible (for example) for a certain ion channel to close, receive less influx of K+ or Na+ ions, etc. If the "information" were invariable, then the system (the cell, in this case), could have only one, single, constant reaction. What makes the various things which change the internal electrochemical properties of a neuron what we can call information is the fact that they vary. Likewise, all of these reactions result in depolarization of the neuron until an "action potential" is generated. This too counts as some sort of information because the timing of one neuron's firing along with others changes the state of the brain. Again, the capacity for "change" is key. Like a bit (and I make this comparison grudgingly) neural firing and communication in general is possible only if some system can react to "changeable" quantities/qualities in particular ways. An actual "bit" isn't really 0 or 1, or "on" or "off". In reality, the "1" corresponds to a range which the computer reads as "1" (like "0"). It turns a "fuzzy" input into a crisp one (a boolean one). If we wanted to, we could make computers read multiple different states without changing the properties of bits, but we don't. Even though the range of possible states could be read differently, ensuring the computer will read it as either 0 or 1, and only 0 or 1, makes computers vastly more reliable. However, that "all or nothing" nature is not intrinsic to the physical, electromagnetic properties of an actual bit.

IIT relies on this view of information (the capacity for a reaction to certain possibilities or range of possible states to cause certain results) as a way to define Phi, a "measure" of the capacity for some system to take possible states of whatever number of physical inputs it can and react accordingly. A photodiode incapable of sensing infrared is still bombarded by it. However, infrared is not "information" for the photodiode because it doesn't react to it. The same is true of our eyes, but not our bodies.

If you had to pick one theory from a pure intuitive feel which one would it be?

I like Stapp's book, but I'm not really that convinced by QM theories of mind. I lean towards the "emergence" models of consciousness, but which one I lean towards among these is changeable. Some nights, I wonder if we're conscious at all. Then I stop reading Sartre, En attendant Godot, or whatever similar work I was, finish my drink, and turn on The Office or something. Then I pour another drink. So far, this has ensured that I return to theories of intelligence and consciousness without completely losing all brain functioning.

 

[MD]

Not under the interpretation of most of the creators of these theories. However, as I don't really understand what being one with the universe entails, I can't judge its applicability here.

Well I always felt that IIT implied a sense of mysticism because of Koch/Tononi's views, but you have shown me otherwise. With regards to Orch OR, our minds are basically created through quantum decoherence, our consciousness is a creation of the very fundamentals of space and time. I STILL have not read anything by Stapp, but I did glance at Eccles work and he is a spiritual dualist in the strictest sense. I think that's my next project, Eccles. By one with the universe, I meant consciousness is either a fundamental property of the universe or through quantum mechanics.

Information theory relies on the possibility of a given state of some component of physical reality to exist in other states. A bit can be either 0 or 1. The capacity for one or the other makes this medium a possible channel for communication. For the most part, theories of information do not assert that information is intrinsic to anything. Only that the possibility for information to be transmitted requires possibilities (like 0 or 1, or certain words as opposed to others, or certain quantum states vs. others, and so forth). Classical communications theory, however (the work by Shannon & Weaver) is still cited but is no longer what it was. Even those who use it have built upon it. But this is not all that central. The main idea is still there: information is the ability for some system (some organized entity) to react to certain physical interactions with it according to the possible ways in which these interactions could occur vs. did occur. So, for example, a neuron alters the flow of ions into and out in response to input from other neurons, intracellular activity, and so forth, all of which can be considered "information" in that it is possible (for example) for a certain ion channel to close, receive less influx of K+ or Na+ ions, etc. If the "information" were invariable, then the system (the cell, in this case), could have only one, single, constant reaction. What makes the various things which change the internal electrochemical properties of a neuron what we can call information is the fact that they vary. Likewise, all of these reactions result in depolarization of the neuron until an "action potential" is generated. This too counts as some sort of information because the timing of one neuron's firing along with others changes the state of the brain. Again, the capacity for "change" is key. Like a bit (and I make this comparison grudgingly) neural firing and communication in general is possible only if some system can react to "changeable" quantities/qualities in particular ways. An actual "bit" isn't really 0 or 1, or "on" or "off". In reality, the "1" corresponds to a range which the computer reads as "1" (like "0"). It turns a "fuzzy" input into a crisp one (a boolean one). If we wanted to, we could make computers read multiple different states without changing the properties of bits, but we don't. Even though the range of possible states could be read differently, ensuring the computer will read it as either 0 or 1, and only 0 or 1, makes computers vastly more reliable. However, that "all or nothing" nature is not intrinsic to the physical, electromagnetic properties of an actual bit.

Oh wow. Okay I think I am finally getting the hang of this information concept. And I finally see what IIT is about. Information are the possible states of a system. The possible states of a system cause non reductive emergence aka consciousness. But the system is only receptive to certain types of information. I can also see now why quantum theories make sense, since our minds may accept more values than the 0 or 1 bit, values between 0 and I. That might possibly show how imagination works as well. It seems like IIT is much better suited theory of measurement of consciousness than actually explaining what consciousness is after all.

However (and I hate to be a thorn in your side), maybe Koch and Tononi both just don't really explain what consciousness is because they see it as a fundamental property? I mean according to IIT almost all systems have a minimal value of phi. If the information of a system results in the emergence of consciousness, then maybe consciousness exists within every system and gives rise to higher forms of consciousness when the system has more causal interactions. If information is the ability for some system to react to certain physical interactions according to the possible ways in which these interactions could occur, then why wouldn't space time have information and be conscious? Isn't it comprised of a system of quantum fluctuations which have physical interactions?

Btw phi is fibonacci sequence and gravity, w00t proof of God!! (I kid..sort of )

I like Stapp's book, but I'm not really that convinced by QM theories of mind. I lean towards the "emergence" models of consciousness, but which one I lean towards among these is changeable. Some nights, I wonder if we're conscious at all. Then I stop reading Sartre, En attendant Godot, or whatever similar work I was, finish my drink, and turn on The Office or something. Then I pour another drink. So far, this has ensured that I return to theories of intelligence and consciousness without completely losing all brain functioning.

Cool. I tend to stick to cheesy martial arts flicks when I'm trying to dumb down. They work exceptionally well, especially the one with Van Damme and Dennis Rodman.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

By one with the universe, I meant consciousness is either a fundamental property of the universe or created by the fundamental forces of the universe.

What do you mean by "fundamental"? I guess a better question (or perhaps equally important) would be "what is a non-fundamental property of the universe?" Correct me if I'm misunderstanding you, but it seems you are saying that the property which allows consciousness is somehow woven into the fabric of the cosmos in such a way that it is more basic, fundamental, and/or essential property of reality than, say, velocity or Reimannian geometry. Does this capture at least something of what you are saying (and either way, could you elaborate)? I've studied a number of religions, or religious/cultic frameworks, but I'm pretty ignorant when it comes to panpsychism and similar conceptions of reality.

Okay I think I am finally getting the hang of this information concept.

Well, I vastly simplified unfortunately. In reality, entropy is fundamental to Shannon's model, as is noise. Imagine a bit: as there are only two possible states, this limits the "amount" of information a bit can encode. A bit which could take on one hundred different states would could, by itself, encode much more. However, this potential to convey information is limited by the quality or "noise" of the channel. If a bit can take on 100 different states, but fluctuates unpredictably, than the signal can't be reliably decoded. That's why computers are built to turn what are really "ranges" into discrete 0's and 1's. The amount of information possible by the variety of states is limited because these states can't be reliably decoded using the technology we do.

However, probability theory has its own way of approaching information (an approach in which uncertainty, stochastic processes, and probability distribution functions become more prominant), as does physics, communication theory itself, and even stastistics (which, despite being the other side of the probability coin, is nonetheless different than the probability approach). All these are, of course, related, in that all concieve of "information" as fundamentally the product (or property) of variability, but how this variability is treated differs. For example, earlier I spoke of variability alongside of the ability of a system to respond to such "changes" in particular ways. This isn't shared by all models of information. It is essential to computer science, because the electromagnetic properties of bits and what reads them require either on or off. Not all approaches to information, however, are that concerned with how it is "recieved".

But as far as IIT is concerned, the important point is that certain organized, physical entities, such as cells, brains, calculators, etc., interact with physical reality outside of these systems in particular ways. Most of the electromagnetic spectrum is not "information" for our eyes. However, other systems (including other portions of the nervous system) DO react to these waves, qualifying them as information. What is information to our eyes is not to our skin, and vice versa.

Information are the possible states of a system.

Information is processed by systems, not states. Photons are not a part of your eyes. They are information which your visual system can receive and integrate.

The possible states of a system cause non reductive emergence aka consciousness.

Within IIT, any system capable of reacting to varying states of something like light, electricity, etc., in particular ways has some sort of "consciousness". But for most systems, this property isn't non-reductive or emergent in the way the terms are typically used. On the other hand, most definitions of consciousness are not consistent with the way IIT defines it.

But the system is only receptive to certain types of information.

Sort of, but I would say it a bit differently. It's not that one system is receptive to certain types compared to another, but that for some systems a, b, and c are treated as "information", while for another perhaps x, y, and z are. I can't read a a hard drive the way a computer can, so for me the information stored there isn't really information. It is only information when I use my computer in such a way that what the computer treats as information becomes something I can see (e.g., when I pull up a completely legally downloaded movie for free, as obviously I wouldn't do that illegally). Files I store are not stored in ways which constitute information for me, because if I crack open my computer I can't get anything from it.

I can also see now why quantum theories make sense, since our minds may accept more values than the 0 or 1 bit

Not only that, but there is no really defined "bit" of neural information. Intro neurosicence textbooks pretend that the all-or-nothing action potentials are meaningful, in the way that bits are. They aren't. Neurons rely on synchronized spike trains which constantly vary in terms of rate, the number of neurons involved, and which neurons are involved. There are entire books devoted just to how a single neuron might convey information. Which is why every undergrad textbook I've used or taught with is filled with lies and deceit. If they weren't, everyone would go insane or quit. As I was insane long before, I'm immune.

However (and I hate to be a thorn in your side), maybe Koch and Tononi both just don't really explain what consciousness is because they see it as a fundamental property?

They do explain what consciousness is. It's just that the way in which they do makes it fairly meaningless or at least arbitrary. It's like assigning a score of 10 to a calculator, 50 to a computer, 16 to an ant, etc. It's useful for formal reasons, but only because formalism takes away meaning and replaces it with quantification. Basically, they explain how they define consciousness, rather than what consciousness is, and although this makes it easier to treat the issue when it comes to information and information processors in genral, it actually makes it harder to deal with conscious experience.

If information is the ability for some system to react to certain physical interactions according to the possible ways in which these interactions could occur, then why wouldn't space time have information and be conscious? Isn't it comprised of a system of quantum fluctuations which have physical interactions?

Spacetime isn't a system. In order for their theory to be meaningful, they need to seperate (and did seperate) systems which have components which could theoretically have phi values if they were not components of another system. This is part of their problem (and the reason for the "main complex" proposition). The fact that much neural activity doesn't contribute directly to "consciousness" means (as far as IIT is concerned) we're dealing with multiple complexes or "systems" with phi values. However, not every neuron is a system, as all are part of some higher-order system, and as components neurons therefore do not have phi values. The problem is where and why one demarcates. An single celled organism has a phi value, but not a single cell.

Spacetime contains every system. But phi values vary according to the ways in which systems integrate information. Treating spacetime as one system means only one phi value, and only one system, and this is explictily rejected in the theory.

Cool. I tend to stick to cheesy martial arts flicks when I'm trying to dumb down. They work exceptionally well, especially the one with Van Damme and Dennis Rodman.

I used to watch a lot of such movies, until I started training in more military and combat oriented systems (e.g., krav maga, systema, USMC,SF, SoF systems, etc.). Now somehow Matt Damon in the Bourne series or Tommy Lee Jones in The Hunted have become more realistic than Jet Li, an actual martial artist. But I still enjoy a few of the "classics".

 

[1137]

... This is still going? Are we still arguing fundamental consciousness?

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

... This is still going? Are we still arguing fundamental consciousness?

Although the advent of cognitive science and computers temporarily distracted scientists and philosophers from the "hard problem" of consciousness, the failure of classical cognitive science and A.I. to simulate the "mind"focused attention back on the issue. The debate here is nothing compared to the debates on the same issue within academia. Physicists, neuroscientists, cognitive scientists, philosophers, neuropsychologists, cognitive psychologists, even psychiatrists have produced a wealth of reviews, monographs, studies, and so forth on this issue. Central to the debate is perception, actually, so it is rather ironic (given your member name) that you find the continuance of this debate odd.

 

[1137]

What's my name have to do with it. I have nothing against perception and subjective experience, I just can't believe we are still discussing if consciousness is fundamental. Besides my title is outdated from when I was a wannabe hippie reading huxely and listening to the doors haha. Those are some people you could probably convince of fundamental consciousness.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

Those are some people you could probably convince of fundamental consciousness.

I'm not trying to convince anybody about fundamental anything. I'm simply saying that the debate over consciousness takes place regardless of this forum, and I'm asserting it is an important one.

 

[MD]

What do you mean by "fundamental"? I guess a better question (or perhaps equally important) would be "what is a non-fundamental property of the universe?" Correct me if I'm misunderstanding you, but it seems you are saying that the property which allows consciousness is somehow woven into the fabric of the cosmos in such a way that it is more basic, fundamental, and/or essential property of reality than, say, velocity or Reimannian geometry. Does this capture at least something of what you are saying (and either way, could you elaborate)? I've studied a number of religions, or religious/cultic frameworks, but I'm pretty ignorant when it comes to panpsychism and similar conceptions of reality.

Sorry for my late reply, I've been busy the law few days and your posts are always quite challenging to reply to. That's a good thing .

By funadmental I mean that it is as fundamental as space and time. Actually to be honest I wonder if consciousness exists on a deeper level than that but I won't speculate any further. I am a reductionist, being in my field of study everything has a cause and effect and everything can be reduced. As such if the mind is a separate property (which I think it is) then it cannot just pop into existence. It must be reducible. I would say consciousnes is woven into the cosmos, but on a very minimal level. Nothing like what we experience. I think it's in everything, and I mean everything. Our brains channel it to create qualia, feelings, etc.

Terms like velocity are mathematical concepts we apply to the movement of a particle. I'm not sure what Reimannian geometry is except that it was involved in forming the general theory of relativity. As such they are mathematical concepts applied to fundamental objective properties, such as the movement of elementary particles or energy. Now whether these mathematical concepts exist in some sort of idealized realm or whether we derive them from our own understanding of the universe is something I really am not qualified to state, nor is it something I have a solid grasp on. If I had to choose, I'd probably go with Platonism, on a purely intuitive feel.

Well, I vastly simplified unfortunately. In reality, entropy is fundamental to Shannon's model, as is noise. Imagine a bit: as there are only two possible states, this limits the "amount" of information a bit can encode. A bit which could take on one hundred different states would could, by itself, encode much more. However, this potential to convey information is limited by the quality or "noise" of the channel. If a bit can take on 100 different states, but fluctuates unpredictably, than the signal can't be reliably decoded. That's why computers are built to turn what are really "ranges" into discrete 0's and 1's.

Trust me I appreciated the RF abridged version . So is that why quantum computers use extremely cold temperatures , to cancel out noise and entropy of the system? If so why are quantum effects being found in wet biological systems?

However, probability theory has its own way of approaching information (an approach in which uncertainty, stochastic processes, and probability distribution functions become more prominant), as does physics, communication theory itself, and even stastistics (which, despite being the other side of the probability coin, is nonetheless different than the probability approach). All these are, of course, related, in that all concieve of "information" as fundamentally the product (or property) of variability, but how this variability is treated differs. For example, earlier I spoke of variability alongside of the ability of a system to respond to such "changes" in particular ways. This isn't shared by all models of information. It is essential to computer science, because the electromagnetic properties of bits and what reads them require either on or off. Not all approaches to information, however, are that concerned with how it is "recieved".

Ohh I see, so there are other models to information. Interesting.

Within IIT, any system capable of reacting to varying states of something like light, electricity, etc., in particular ways has some sort of "consciousness". But for most systems, this property isn't non-reductive or emergent in the way the terms are typically used. On the other hand, most definitions of consciousness are not consistent with the way IIT defines it.

Okay, I see what you're saying. This stuff is interesting.

Sort of, but I would say it a bit differently. It's not that one system is receptive to certain types compared to another, but that for some systems a, b, and c are treated as "information", while for another perhaps x, y, and z are. I can't read a a hard drive the way a computer can, so for me the information stored there isn't really information. It is only information when I use my computer in such a way that what the computer treats as information becomes something I can see (e.g., when I pull up a completely legally downloaded movie for free, as obviously I wouldn't do that illegally). Files I store are not stored in ways which constitute information for me, because if I crack open my computer I can't get anything from it.

Couldn't one argue that the only entity that can really understand what information is, would be one which has consciousness to it? Only then could information be understood? You don't understand the information of your computer until the computer converts it into something you see. But human consciousness invented computers and binary, and outputs. In the end the mechanism through which the computer converts information was created by us in the first place, the computer is simply following instructions.

Not only that, but there is no really defined "bit" of neural information. Intro neurosicence textbooks pretend that the all-or-nothing action potentials are meaningful, in the way that bits are. They aren't. Neurons rely on synchronized spike trains which constantly vary in terms of rate, the number of neurons involved, and which neurons are involved. There are entire books devoted just to how a single neuron might convey information. Which is why every undergrad textbook I've used or taught with is filled with lies and deceit. If they weren't, everyone would go insane or quit. As I was insane long before, I'm immune.

I am starting to feel quite insane already from all this information (pun intended!). Not only is what I learn dense and intense, there is an implicit understanding that we have a darn good understanding of everything cells do. If one looks into consciousness you can see how convoluted reality becomes.

They do explain what consciousness is. It's just that the way in which they do makes it fairly meaningless or at least arbitrary. It's like assigning a score of 10 to a calculator, 50 to a computer, 16 to an ant, etc. It's useful for formal reasons, but only because formalism takes away meaning and replaces it with quantification. Basically, they explain how they define consciousness, rather than what consciousness is, and although this makes it easier to treat the issue when it comes to information and information processors in genral, it actually makes it harder to deal with conscious experience.

I agree they explain consciousness from a quantitative perspective. But as you have stated before their qualitative definition is lacking.

Spacetime isn't a system. In order for their theory to be meaningful, they need to seperate (and did seperate) systems which have components which could theoretically have phi values if they were not components of another system. This is part of their problem (and the reason for the "main complex" proposition). The fact that much neural activity doesn't contribute directly to "consciousness" means (as far as IIT is concerned) we're dealing with multiple complexes or "systems" with phi values. However, not every neuron is a system, as all are part of some higher-order system, and as components neurons therefore do not have phi values. The problem is where and why one demarcates. An single celled organism has a phi value, but not a single cell.

Why wouldn't every neuron be a system? Every neuron is a biological machine? Does IIT state that as soon as a neuron joins a system of neurons it loses consciousness and becomes part of a greater consciousness?

Spacetime contains every system. But phi values vary according to the ways in which systems integrate information. Treating spacetime as one system means only one phi value, and only one system, and this is explictily rejected in the theory.

Ah I see. Lol treating spacetime with one phi value would imply that the universe itself is conscious .

I used to watch a lot of such movies, until I started training in more military and combat oriented systems (e.g., krav maga, systema, USMC,SF, SoF systems, etc.). Now somehow Matt Damon in the Bourne series or Tommy Lee Jones in The Hunted have become more realistic than Jet Li, an actual martial artist. But I still enjoy a few of the "classics".

Wow that's awesome. Bourne was wicked. I watch the crappy martial arts movies to just help my mind relax. It's kind of the same reason I watch trailer park boys or seinfeld. In a way my friends and family are astounded that I like slapstick comedy and crappy martial arts films, because most of the time I'm just talking about things they do not share an interest in.

 

[LegionOnomaMoi]

I've been busy the law few days and your posts are always quite challenging to reply to.

I'm not sure if this means I should give my writers a raise or dock their pay. Probably the latter, just to be safe.

By funadmental I mean that it is as fundamental as space and time.

So fundamental in that everything which exists necessarily does so through interactions with this component/element of reality? Or more that it is a fundamental construct of all that exists? I ask because spacetime is certainly fundamental in the sense that everything exists within spacetime, but is not exactly made up of it. You seem to be saying that thing/element/aspect which allows consciousness is a part of all things, which (to me at least) is a different sort of fundamental then spacetime.

So is that why quantum computers use extremely cold temperatures , to cancel out noise and entropy of the system?

Pretty much. Or at least current implentations require extremely low temperatures in order to be robust against noise and decoherence.

If so why are quantum effects being found in wet biological systems?

Quantum processes are increasingly suspected to be at play when it comes to the macroscopic world, but just like other processes we've known about for some time (e.g., basic metabolic processes) they are "messy". Our brains, after all, are vastly superior to any computer in most ways. The exception is order. Computers are neat. Barring malfunction or damage, they store data perfectly, do exactly what they are programmed to, recall data perfectly, etc. Biosystems, on ther other hand, are chaotic systems far from thermodynamic equilibrium. Thermodynamics also comes into play in QM and "controlling" qubits. That's one reason biocomputing and quantum computing is so difficult. The big advantage of computers is the ability for a certain degree of precision (currently, a very high degree). If we could create neural networks out of actual neurons, it would certainly be an accomplishment in some ways, but not when it comes to advancing computational power. We'd be sacrificing everything which makes computers useful and creating something we have naturally. That control and precision, whether we are dealing with qubits or biocomputers, is at the same time what enables everything computers do and what prevents them from doing what we do. Those who are trying to develop computers which do not use the binary, silicon-based architecture of current computers also want their devices to be programmable. As thermodynamics governs energy states, and energy states are what drives both the atomic and molecular world, if we want reliable, structured, and stable computational systems, we can't use the mechanisms we find in nature.

Couldn't one argue that the only entity that can really understand what information is, would be one which has consciousness to it? Only then could information be understood?

Sure. In fact, most do say this in some way. IIT does not. In that theory, meaning and understanding are bypassed completely by simply treating everything as either information, or something which processes and integrates information, or irrelevant. Consciousness no longer entails understanding. Only a system with a certain level of consciousnes (i.e., a high enough phi score) might be said to understand the information it processes.

You don't understand the information of your computer until the computer converts it into something you see.

And the computer never understands it. Yet in IIT, as computers are systems which integrate information, they are conscious.

In the end the mechanism through which the computer converts information was created by us in the first place, the computer is simply following instructions.

This is true. But it doesn't matter for their theory. It doesn't matter if the system understands at all, or is artificial. It only matters if it can be said to have a phi score greater than zero.

I agree they explain consciousness from a quantitative perspective. But as you have stated before their qualitative definition is lacking.

That's my opinion, yes. For me, IIT sacrifices too much in order to formalize consciousness and related concepts. Most approaches are more capable at linguistic descriptions and some formalism when it comes to human cognition and things which we can equate to it (e.g., cognitive functioning in primates). However, as these approaches rely on loosely or intuitively defined notions, not only are they incompatable with systems modeling, they are also hard to extend to systems which are capable of processing input and adapting to it. IIT is far superior here, because they start at this level. And at this level (where everything is simple enough in the way information is processed) the phi values make more sense. Unfortunately, by the time we work our way up to mammals with cortices, things start to break down. And when we get to humans, it becomes hard to see how the theory retains much which is useful. Things are just too complex and too hard to relate to explain through phi values. If all it took were quantifying how much and in what way some system (which often involves arbitrary divisions, as even the brain has multiple systems, let alone the human body), then consciousness wouldn't be a "hard problem".

Why wouldn't every neuron be a system? Every neuron is a biological machine? Does IIT state that as soon as a neuron joins a system of neurons it loses consciousness and becomes part of a greater consciousness?

IIT states that all systems which are part of other systems are "merely parts of a larger whole", and therefore only the larger whole has a phi value. After all, any theory which treats neurons as individual systems distinct from the "mind" and indeed the brain isn't going to get very far when it comes to explaining anything about consciousness or cognition. However, as the distinction between "systems" (or complexes) isn't clear cut in the theory (at least not when we get to things like brains), it becomes difficult to draw lines. Additionally, as the whole point of any theory of consciousness is to have explanatory power when it comes to the our conscious experience, talking about phi values which the theory states does not contribute to this doesn't really help much. Hence the concept of a "main complex" in the human brain. Unfortunately, this "main complex" isn't really defined or defended, and it is the root of the entire issue: how do human brains produce conscious experiences? At this point, all we get from IIT is a vague reference to some central system in the brain (the "main complex") and an albeit useful approach to components of the nervous system which do not appear to be necessary or at least are not always involved in conscious experience. What we don't have is anything which really explains consciousness as we experience it, and in fact we get farther away.

Ah I see. Lol treating spacetime with one phi value would imply that the universe itself is conscious .

More than that. It would imply that there is only one conscious entity at all. It would mean that humans are not conscious.

In a way my friends and family are astounded that I like slapstick comedy and crappy martial arts films, because most of the time I'm just talking about things they do not share an interest in.

People don't seem to appreciate the importance of things like being able to extensively quote Shakespeare and Calvin & Hobbes, being familiar with Greek and Latin drama as well as The Simpsons and Mel Brooks movies, and other seemingly contradictory interests. During either my 3rd or 4th semester of German in college, I had to give a presentation at some point, which involved plugging my laptom into the projector systems most of the classrooms had. Unfortunately, I was so used to my desktop picture that it didn't occur to me that when I connected my computer the entire class would be looking at a screen which consisted mainly of me and a number of others in full tactical gear, m4s, pistols, and (for many of us) fixed blade tactical knives. Not exactly the kind of thing encouraged in most campuses, I'm sure, but in Boston (where even pepper spray requires a permit) I could've been Ramanujan, Gauss, Whitehead, or some other genius and I'd still be seen as some sort contract killer or something. Furthermore, as Nietzsche and a good deal of similar German philosophical and political thought (the subject of my presentation) was too much a part of Nazi ideology, trying get out of that particular awkward situation by acting as if it was intended all along would have just made things worse.

I just should have said we were a bunch of programmers getting up the avatars for a new Modern Warfare game.