atofel,
atofel said:
Hi Spinks,
I decided to answer you in one big post as the breaking it up point-by-point seemed to make it loose continuity.
So first off, I believe you are mis-characterizing religious truths. Every person ought to be humble in their beliefs and recognize their understanding has lots of room to grow and mature. This is true of the biologist and the religious scholar. This is not to say we should not be confident in our beliefs, but asserting that any knowledge is infallible is arrogant whether you are talking about which basketball player is a better dunker, or how scripture should be interpreted.
I agree with you. However, the adherents of countless religions throughout history do not. It really isn't about humility or a lack thereof, it's simply the difference between dogmatism and skepticism. Religions like Christianity, Judaism, Islam, and others have traditionally held certain beliefs as unquestionable and certain sources of authority as infallible. I was wrong earlier, however, to generalize about all religions, and indeed many peoplein today seem to acknowledge some degree of agnosticism, i.e. "I believe in Islam but I realize that I don't know for sure."
I don't want to lose track of what my original points were when I started this thread (which was a long time ago!):
- The rejection of geocentrism in favor of heliocentrism is not an example of the failure of the scientific method, but the triumph of it.
- In science, a priori "truths" are recognized as the assumptions that they are, and when they conflict with observation or fail to explain anything meaningful found in observation, they are dropped (and rightly so).
atofel said:
We should all revise our understanding of things when confronted with new information we perceive as true. There are both scientists and religious followers that violate this sort of humility.
Agreed.
atofel said:
There are two dominant philosophies of science: instrumentalism and realism. At first I thought your position was that of an instrumentalist--that is, science is useful for predicting outcomes, but it makes no claim as to what is real. Realism, on the other hand, suggests that science is revealing "truth" in a sort of platonic way.
I do not see the two as necessarily incompatible, especially when one considers two important aspects of science: experiment and theory. One could say without contradiction that facts revealed by experiment constitute reality while theories developed from those facts constitute models which only approximate reality. (I prefer 'reality' to 'truth'.
)
I definitely agree that "science" makes no claim as to what is real, because science is a method, and therefore cannot "claim" anything, real or otherwise. I certainly would not say that we should consider our scientific understanding as necessarily/absolutely "true" either. All explanations in science are approximate. What I would say is that things which are supported by observable evidence warrant
confidence which varies with the amount and significance of that evidence. It's a sliding scale of confidence which I do not believe must ever cross over into
absolute certainty or doubt. In light of my views, I find both the terms 'realist' and 'instrumentalist', as you have described them, confining.
atofel said:
So I would agree with you that there is a difference between instrumentalism and religion, in that one makes a claim as to what is true and the other does not.
Okay, I see what you're saying.
atofel said:
However, it seems that you are implying that science can disagree with religion, or contradict it.
Absolutely: when the two conflict, observation trumps a priori principles in determining what is true.
atofel said:
So it seems the point of disagreement is what we ought to consider is a reliable source of "truth". I think we both agree science is a reliable source.
Yes.
atofel said:
However, there is a problem with science. It is very efficient with regards to the kind of knowledge we need for the development of technology. However, it is not very efficient with regards to developing the kind of wisdom we can use with morality and the development of personal relationships. It seems to me if we are to have a philosophy that is strong in those areas, we will need to have a philosophy that relies on truths that come from a source other than science.
I think that science--particularly psychology, sociology, biology, and history--can be a very good tool in developing the kind of wisdom we can use with morality and the development of personal relationships. I don't think we need any source other than our own desire to be happy and our knowledge (supported by scientific study) that merely saturating the senses with pleasure does not make us happy in order to develop morality and personal relationships, and I would not think the problem could be solved anyway by
making up or otherwise choosing arbitrarily/via personal preference a source of "truth" to fill this percieved gap.
But I don't see how this is really relevant to the topic of this thread....
atofel said:
Of course, it is possible to have a moral philosophy that does not require "a priori" knowledge, however, it is my opinion that it is important to adapt ideals that you have confidence in their truth.
I have confidence in what I can directly experience. It is my experience that I want to be happy and I also want other people to be happy. It is also my experience that when I am kind and generous to others I feel good--in fact it feels so good, that I have learned to be kind and generous even when it doesn't feel good, even when it feels quite bad, because I know that if I do, later I will feel good about it. I'm oversimplifying everything, of course, but my point is that one can both have a moral philosophy that does not require a priori knowledge and have confidence in its "truth".
atofel said:
Otherwise, the adopted morality is done so with an "appreciation of the philosophy", or just "what I'm going with now", without the weight of knowing it to be true. In this case, the morality is softened and can quickly be made insignificant in stressful situations. Is it possible to have this confidence in the truth of a moral philosophy while disregarding a priori knowledge?
Yes, I think so. Of course, the opposite problem is recurrent throughout history as well: with enough confidence in a priori "knowledge" morality can often be hardened to include things like stoning adulterers and torturing heretics and killing infidels; or regarding simple things like music and dance and left-handedness and homosexuality as "evil". Suddenly, absolute confidence in one's a priori knowledge doesn't seem like such a good thing after all. In this case, an equally valid question would be is it possible to doubt a moral philosophy
without disregarding a priori knowledge?
atofel said:
I personally do not accept all claims of a priori knowledge or "revelation" as true, as Christianity is the only religion that I have placed my faith in to accepting its teachings as the truth.
Hey, I can't argue with faith.