A correct idea and an incorrect one - how are they different?

[It Aint Necessarily So]

Doesn't it depend upon the complexity of it? If you are dealing with concrete-literal objects, such as a rock vs. a stalk of celery, the answer is easy. We easily can easily identify certain objects with language, because that's simple. But if you were to ask does the rock or stalk of celery have a sense of self anywhere in its composition, or 'does life have purpose', the questions are enormously more abstract. So simple answers are going to not be as easily possible as when the possible understandings are simple.

But what is your definition of correct? Before one calls something correct, shouldn't he have a clear idea of what he is claiming?

So the question is, whose understanding is "correct", or is there even a correct understanding to be had?

I have to say the same thing. What do you mean by the word? How can one begin to answer what is correct without definition that allows him to decide on a case by case basis whether a statement claimed to be correct meets that definition? If you can't do that, are you saying anything at all when you call an idea correct?

I have no issue using that language when it comes to limited variables, such as directions to the store being accurate or inaccurate. But saying all of life can be reduced down to such simple variables, is frankly wishful thinking. It's a bit of an illusion seeking a sense of security in a reality that is staggeringly beyond comprehension in its complexities.

I think you're implying my position, that the word is really only meaningful when discussing what you call limited variable, but which I would call the elements of observable reality, like literal streets and destinations, and clear driving directions. Lose that, and the word no longer has value. Change the directions from "go three blocks and turn left" to the less clear go a few blocks and turn and you go from a statement that can be confirmed correct to one that can't, because it lacks specificity.

The literal imagination is univocal. Words mean one thing, and one thing only. They don’t bristle with meanings and possibilities; they are bald, clean-shaven.

Yes, language can be clear and precise, or vague and poetic. Each has utility. When we want to be understood precisely with all ambiguity removed, as with directions, or a recipe, or a will, we use precise language. When we want art, we use language that encourages the audience to inset a bit of himself into the interpretation.

I saw the following this morning:

"Former President Donald Trump leads President Joe Biden by 43 points among unvaccinated voters in a potential 2024 rematch, according to a new poll, which found a partisan divide being driven by vaccine willingness."

This is statement an alleged fact that can be said to be correct or incorrect simply by examining the survey responses and confirming that that is indeed how the people polled answered. Don't confuse that with whether the prediction is correct, which cannot be determined without an election - just whether the claim that this is how people answered is correct. It can be done, but only because it is a claim that can be empirically demonstrated to be correct or not.

Now let's look at some symbolic language from Dylan's Desolation Row. Is this correct? :

Ophelia, she's 'neath the window for her I feel so afraid
On her twenty-second birthday she already is an old maid
To her, death is quite romantic she wears an iron vest
Her profession's her religion, her sin is her lifelessness
And though her eyes are fixed upon Noah's great rainbow
She spends her time peeking into Desolation Row

Do you see the problem here? It's not that some matters are too complex to be evaluated as correct or not as you suggested. It's that they're too vague or not arrived at empirically. There's no clear meaning to calling them correct, and nothing to show to defend wither position.

A better question is how are these [two definitions of atheism] both correct?

I have to return to square one. Before we can discuss the correctness of either idea, we need a clear definition of what correct means, and I would add a reliable test for deciding what meets that definition and what does not. This is not possible with ideas not determined empirically. If one wants to call any such ideas correct, what makes them that, and what makes competing ideas incorrect? Once we begin calling faith-based ideas correct or not, the word loses meaning. Does man have a soul, by which I mean a part of him that survives death? No answer can be said to be more or less correct than any other by my use of the word, and if somebody chooses one of the possible answers and calls it correct, how is that more or less useful than calling the other answer correct?

My position is that for the word to have meaning, it can only be applied to clear ideas that are demonstrably correct or not.

And if they do not clarify what they mean when they say "I believe ...", then we don't really know what they mean. Because they could mean a lot of very different things by such a vague, incomplete statement. Almost all the difficulty and disagreement around here is due to exactly this kind of vague statement-making. And a lot of it is being generated by minds that are themselves very vague and unclear. Such that to ask for clarification and better articulation, is hopeless.

Agree. As you know, I'm a big fan of clear language. I'm looking for a clear definition of correct (and by extension, truth) for myself, without which, I believe the word loses meaning. And this is the case, as you imply, with many words we see here frequently so vaguely defined as to have no clear meaning, including truth, God, spiritual, atheist, supernatural, and even exist. I opened this thread asking what the fundamental difference between a correct idea and an incorrect one was. I could just have easily asked what the fundamental difference is between something that exists and something that doesn't. Words like correct and exist are so much a part of the cognitive landscape that we rarely think about what we mean when we use them.

 

[icehorse]

Why isn't the matter of correctness as easily resolved with these two as the driving instructions? Why is it that we seldom come to consensus the way we can with the driving instructions? What exactly are we saying analogous to "I say these directions are correct because they will get you to your destination" when we say that either of these other examples is correct or not?

Not a total answer, but one aspect is to acknowledge that everyone in the conversation is operating from a set of core values.

For example, the atheist might place a high value on scientific thinking, whereas a religious person might place a high value on faith.

 

[PureX]

Agree. As you know, I'm a big fan of clear language. I'm looking for a clear definition of correct (and by extension, truth) for myself, without which, I believe the word loses meaning. And this is the case, as you imply, with many words we see here frequently so vaguely defined as to have no clear meaning, including truth, God, spiritual, atheist, supernatural, and even exist. I opened this thread asking what the fundamental difference between a correct idea and an incorrect one was. I could just have easily asked what the fundamental difference is between something that exists and something that doesn't. Words like correct and exist are so much a part of the cognitive landscape that we rarely think about what we mean when we use them.

As with many words, I think the meaning changes from person to person, and by way of context. There is no one correct, "correct". Or one "truth". Or one "reality". And certainly no one "God". Or one "belief in God". Or one "faith in God". People mean a lot of different things when they use these words and phrases. And what they mean changes with the circumstances and even by the moment, and often times is a mystery even to themselves. It's not about nailing down a unified constant, because there isn't one. It's more about gaining a vision or sense of the whole dynamic involved. I think we almost have to approach it more as an art, than as a science.

 

[F1fan]

Agree. As you know, I'm a big fan of clear language. I'm looking for a clear definition of correct (and by extension, truth) for myself, without which, I believe the word loses meaning. And this is the case, as you imply, with many words we see here frequently so vaguely defined as to have no clear meaning, including truth, God, spiritual, atheist, supernatural, and even exist. I opened this thread asking what the fundamental difference between a correct idea and an incorrect one was. I could just have easily asked what the fundamental difference is between something that exists and something that doesn't. Words like correct and exist are so much a part of the cognitive landscape that we rarely think about what we mean when we use them.

Some years ago I was writing a series of essays, and I was pretty proud of what I wrote. I gave some of them to some friends to review and critique. One said that my wording was overly complex and convoluted that it wasn't clear what I was trying to say. Upon reflection I had to admit I wasn't confident in what I was writing and I was being deliberate in writing in a way that would make the reader a bit confused, as if to blame the reader for the lack of comprehension. As a writer it is on me to be comprehensible, and form my language so others can follow along with what I think it true and correct. This is the courageous and open approach. It takes courage to be open to criticism and face the possibility of being in error.

To your point, an idea being correct and true can range from certainty to dead wrong. How we approach ideas is a process, and as much as it depends on definitions and word choice the bottom line is an ethical and open mentality.

 

[F1fan]

As with many words, I think the meaning changes from person to person, and by way of context. There is no one correct, "correct". Or one "truth". Or one "reality". And certainly no one "God". Or one "belief in God". Or one "faith in God". People mean a lot of different things when they use these words and phrases. And what they mean changes with the circumstances and even by the moment, and often times is a mystery even to themselves. It's not about nailing down a unified constant, because there isn't one. It's more about gaining a vision or sense of the whole dynamic involved. I think we almost have to approach it more as an art, than as a science.

What you describe here is a sort of sabotaging of language. We are comprehensible with each other because when I use a certain word I mean it to be understood in the context I'm using it, not your preference. If you were to change what I mean then you are guilty of refusing to listen and distorting what I'm saying. There will be a motive behind this that the listener needs to question for themselves.

The question is: do I want to be comprehensible to you?

Another is: Do I want to comprehend you?

The psychological motives is all part of communication.

 

[It Aint Necessarily So]

As with many words, I think the meaning changes from person to person, and by way of context. There is no one correct, "correct".

As I indicated, when it comes to definitions, there are none that are incorrect, just some that aren't very useful. Each person is free to define the word as he chooses. My point is that if one doesn't choose an empirical test for what is called correct and what doesn't make the cut, the word becomes applied to ideas which correctness can be claimed but nothing shown in support of the claim, and that this is a common but undesirable consequence of using vague language or a definition with no test for correctness to go with the claim.

@blü 2 , our resident ignostic, drives at this when he insists on a definition of God that refers to something demonstrable before calling a belief in that deity correct. Because of the use of vague language and the failure to define God empirically, such discussions go nowhere, and claims of correctness become meaningless when correct cannot be reliably distinguished from incorrect. Words like correct and God lose usefulness when people have no clear meaning of what they mean by them, and no test for either correctness or a deity.

an idea being correct and true can range from certainty to dead wrong. How we approach ideas is a process, and as much as it depends on definitions and word choice the bottom line is an ethical and open mentality.

Agree. I advocate using a definition of correct that doesn't suffer from that shortcoming. By the definition I have chosen for myself, if I claim that an idea is correct, I can demonstrate it to be so, or, contrariwise, if I am in error, if I have misunderstood the evidence, I can be shown that empirically.

 

[Evangelicalhumanist]

We talk about truth, fact, and knowledge. I would suggest that these all refer to what we also call correct ideas. My question is, what are the qualities of a correct idea that distinguish it from an incorrect idea and allow us to call one correct and the other incorrect?

This is a trivial question when discussing things such as what the capital of Peru is, or whether somebody is still alive or not.

It looks to me like you are taking a roundabout route to epistemology. Yes, we all believe lots of things, we have tons of ideas about all sorts of topics -- the creative more ideas than most of us.

But how about when we say that evolution or creationism is a correct (or incorrect) idea? How about when somebody says a deity exists (or doesn't)? Exactly what do we mean when say that that is correct? Does it mean more than that is what we choose to believe?

For all such notions, ideas and beliefs, the quest of whether they correspond to reality is always present. That is, are they true? But even if "true," that does not necessarily mean that they are knowledge.

It might be true, for instance, that something we call a deity does exist. But that would certainly not count as "knowledge" for the atheist, would it? How can one "know" something one doesn't even believe? And yet, it is also not "knowledge" for the theist who, while correctly believing that something called a deity exists, doesn't know one darned thing about it.

When we say that man is a spiritual animal (or not), what exactly do we mean by saying that that is correct beyond that we choose to believe that? Or when was say that man is not an animal or an ape. What exactly are we saying if we say that that statement is correct beyond that that is what we choose to believe?

It does not help to use a sort of "redefinition," as many on this forum do, for this sort of question. One, in saying "man is not an animal or an ape" is simply redefining for himself what man is -- to him. That does not change the nature of man, nor his place in the kingdom animalia, phylum: Chordata, class: Mammalia, order: Primates, family: Hominidae, genus: Homo, species: Homo sapiens.

And therefore, to say that one "knows" that "man is not an animal or an ape" is to admit that you are not, in fact, knowledgeable about the subject. (Now, it may be true that there is something else to man, but that does not make all of the rest untrue.)

One definition of correct might be the quality possessed by an idea that accurately allows us to predict outcomes. Consider directions for getting somewhere. It's pretty easy to define the difference between correct directions and incorrect ones. Any set of directions that gets one to the desired destination is correct, albeit some routes may be less efficient than others. Incorrect directions are any that don't work, that get you to an undesired destination if followed. Most people would agree after a demonstration whether a given set of directions was correct or not.

Hard to say whether this is really "knowledge" at all. The fact that one has tested it over and over again does not consider the question of, when passing that "knowledge" on to someone else (giving them directions), of whether or not part of the route has just recently (since your last trip) closed down! Thus, it is no longer "true" that it is the correct route (now), and what it is not true can surely not be considered knowledge.

Now consider two other kinds of situations:

[1] Atheists are people who don't believe in a god versus atheists are people who say that there is no deity. Which of these are correct? Which is incorrect.

[2] Man has an immortal soul that distinguishes him from the beasts. Correct or incorrect?

Why isn't the matter of correctness as easily resolved with these two as the driving instructions? Why is it that we seldom come to consensus the way we can with the driving instructions? What exactly are we saying analogous to "I say these directions are correct because they will get you to your destination" when we say that either of these other examples is correct or not?

I have opinions, but will save them until others have given theirs.

Here, we come to the hardest question of all: what would assure us that what we think, what we opine, what we believe are, in fact, knowledge -- and not just ideas, opinions and beliefs (which may all be true, false or indifferent)?

My answer is that for me to call anything "knowledge;" I must first actually believe it (as I said, I can't know what I don't believe): it must be true (which would assume some means of demonstrating that it is true), and I should have a valid reason for supposing it in the first place. So, your questions:

[1] Atheists are people who don't believe in a god versus atheists are people who say that there is no deity. Which of these are correct? Which is incorrect.

Neither is correct, nor incorrect. Some atheists don't believe in a god, and some atheists insist there is none. Others say the do not know (and think of themselves as agnostics), but since knowledge implies belief, and they lack such, they essentially fall under the atheist umbrella.

[2] Man has an immortal soul that distinguishes him from the beasts. Correct or incorrect?

How could this possibly be decided? First, what justification, what valid reason, can be given for such a belief? What does man actually do, outside of think with an enormous brain, that suggests that there is something qualitatively (not quantitatively) different from, say, a chimpazee that can learn rudimentary sign language, or can display very real feelings of injustice when given food that is less desirable than that given to the chimp in the next cage? And what evidence has ever, ever, been presented for something of a single individual that survives that individual's death, and can be shown to have some feature that was inherent to only that individual in life?

And if that wasn't enough, I suggest listening to the character Lucky "THINK" at the end of Act 1 of Beckett's play, "Waiting for Godot."

 

[Windwalker]

But what is your definition of correct? Before one calls something correct, shouldn't he have a clear idea of what he is claiming?

I was thinking to address that point first thing in the last post. I suppose in conventional use it means factual versus errant. It is correct to say the gas tank is empty, when it is factual. It is incorrect to say it is empty when in fact it is full.

When it comes to these more abstract claims of something truthfulness, I personally wouldn't use the word correct. I would not say belief that God exists is correct, while belief God does not exist is incorrect. Those are both truths as matters of perception and experience. They may or may not have empirical data supporting them, but we really can't speak of them in terms of pure objectivity. They are subjective in nature and therefore, I really wouldn't use the word "correct" in statement my beliefs about them.

I think you're implying my position, that the word is really only meaningful when discussing what you call limited variable, but which I would call the elements of observable reality, like literal streets and destinations, and clear driving directions. Lose that, and the word no longer has value.

Well yes, those are limited variables. There is only one right answer to location. If the directions said head south when you needed to head north, that would be incorrect directions.

Change the directions from "go three blocks and turn left" to the less clear go a few blocks and turn and you go from a statement that can be confirmed correct to one that can't, because it lacks specificity.

That doesn't make the directions incorrect, so long as it points you in the right direction and not the opposite direction. If the destination is not a fixed location, but a general region where you will find what you are looking for in that area, such as birch trees, then the lack of specificity may in fact be correct. "Up the road and the left for a ways", is correct. "Go back to downtown", where there are no trees, would be incorrect.

This comes to the point of metaphors, which I'll address in a bit. They are not detailed road maps. They are fingers pointing in a general direction. This is were religious symbolism differs from scientific maps. You can't create a scientific map to something that has no fixed location, whose "center is everywhere and nowhere".

Yes, language can be clear and precise, or vague and poetic. Each has utility. When we want to be understood precisely with all ambiguity removed, as with directions, or a recipe, or a will, we use precise language. When we want art, we use language that encourages the audience to inset a bit of himself into the interpretation.

I don't disagree. But I'll add that it's more than just art that I'm talking about. Rather it's things like meaning and value, hope and love, etc. I would say maybe better to call it all the non-rational, or the subtle (or the abstract as opposed to concrete), of which art and religion are both part of. While humans are rational creatures, they are non-rational creatures as well, if not moreso. We love, we dream, we sing, we dance. These are not intellectual expressions.

Do you see the problem here? It's not that some matters are too complex to be evaluated as correct or not as you suggested. It's that they're too vague or not arrived at empirically. There's no clear meaning to calling them correct, and nothing to show to defend wither position.

As we've touched upon before, when it comes to things like spiritual experience, they are in fact empirical. If you have experience, that's not simply words and ideas. It's in the defintion of the word, "based on, concerned with, or verifiable by observation or experience rather than theory or pure logic." Experience is data and evidence.

When I say complexity, I don't mean to suggest that that alone makes it beyond the grasp of the sciences. Of course not. The complexity sciences are an example of that. Systems theory, chaos theory, etc. I'm talking more about the abstract "feeling" aspects of life; love, value, hope, meaning, purpose, spirituality, God, etc. To say "where's your evidence for God", is like asking where's your evidence for meaning, or love?

So if I am wanting to point someone to an understanding of "love", do I point them to a chemistry set, or a story of love? It's like someone demanding love is an object that has mass, that's laying around somewhere in a field to be unearthed by some geologist. The whole approach would be, dare I use the word, incorrect?

I have to return to square one. Before we can discuss the correctness of either idea, we need a clear definition of what correct means, and I would add a reliable test for deciding what meets that definition and what does not. This is not possible with ideas not determined empirically.

I like factual versus unfactual, or maybe with a softer tone, valid vs. invalid. We can argue that some ideas are valid or invalid, based supporting evidences. For instance, if someone was to say, "I have had a spiritual experience, therefore Moses actually met God in the burning bush," I would call that an invalid conclusion. You can't go from the evidence of one's own personal experience, to an interpretation of scripture being factual. They would be incorrect in that case in claiming it as proof that scripture is true.

But if someone says they have experienced the transcendent, therefore they believe that God is real, that is perfectly valid for them to say that. It's empirical evidence for their own beliefs from their own experiences. It's not 'blind faith' in that case. It's not blind. They would be correct, that for them that stands as evidence of the reality of the Divine.

Once we begin calling faith-based ideas correct or not, the word loses meaning. Does man have a soul, by which I mean a part of him that survives death? No answer can be said to be more or less correct than any other by my use of the word, and if somebody chooses one of the possible answers and calls it correct, how is that more or less useful than calling the other answer correct?

I would say that those who have valid experiences have more than just faith-based ideas. But I wouldn't take how they understand or interpret those experiences to be proof of any particular faith-based ideas. It is common of course for people to translate these experiences in the context of their native religious symbol sets. A Christian sees Jesus or Mary, a buddhist sees the thousand armed avalokiteshvara, a hindu sees Krishna, and so forth.

I would say it is correct to say that these experiences are evidence of some sort of common human experiences of a transcendent aspect of life, but incorrect to say they prove one's theology. I would also add, it is also incorrect to assume it is "nothing but the brain". That too is equally a faith-based, "theological" interpretation, ascribing the source of all experiences to "nothing but the brain". We should avoid true/false correct/incorrect assessments to such things, IMO.

My position is that for the word to have meaning, it can only be applied to clear ideas that are demonstrably correct or not.

I agree. That applies as much to the theist as it does the atheist.

Agree. As you know, I'm a big fan of clear language. I'm looking for a clear definition of correct (and by extension, truth) for myself, without which, I believe the word loses meaning. And this is the case, as you imply, with many words we see here frequently so vaguely defined as to have no clear meaning, including truth, God, spiritual, atheist, supernatural, and even exist.

Some words simply can't be made concrete. That's why we use metaphors, myths, symbolism, allegories, and such. Because somethings are not too hard to define for the mind to grasp. But that doesn't make them inaccessible to us. It just means we have to think outside of the boxes. Metaphors are meant to inspire imagination. That's what art as tool is used for. That's what myths are used for. The heart can grasp, what the mind cannot. Some things in life, are quite literally, beyond belief, or beyond the mind.

This brings back to mind that favorite quote of mine from Einstein, "To know what is impenetrable to us really exists, manifesting itself as the highest wisdom and the most radiant beauty, which our dull faculties can comprehend only in their most primitive forms—this knowledge, this feeling is at the center of true religiousness.”

 

[PureX]

What you describe here is a sort of sabotaging of language. We are comprehensible with each other because when I use a certain word I mean it to be understood in the context I'm using it, not your preference. If you were to change what I mean then you are guilty of refusing to listen and distorting what I'm saying. There will be a motive behind this that the listener needs to question for themselves.

The question is: do I want to be comprehensible to you?

Another is: Do I want to comprehend you?

The psychological motives is all part of communication.

I agree. Unfortunately, comprehension is very often not the motive. Being the "correct" one, is. Which is why so often nothing gets communicated.

 

[PureX]

As I indicated, when it comes to definitions, there are none that are incorrect, just some that aren't very useful. Each person is free to define the word as he chooses. My point is that if one doesn't choose an empirical test for what is called correct and what doesn't make the cut, the word becomes applied to ideas which correctness can be claimed but nothing shown in support of the claim, and that this is a common but undesirable consequence of using vague language or a definition with no test for correctness to go with the claim.

The problem is that this is not about the "correctness" of the words. It's about communicating the idea that the words are supposed to be communicating from one person to another. So arguing over the "correctness" of the words is just going to be a useless distraction. Better to find out what idea the other people is trying to express by using the words they use.

@blü 2 , our resident ignostic, drives at this when he insists on a definition of God that refers to something demonstrable before calling a belief in that deity correct. [/QUOTE]My interest would be in finding our what "correct belief" means, here. Because such a phrase will mean some very different things to different people.

Because of the use of vague language and the failure to define God empirically, such discussions go nowhere, and claims of correctness become meaningless when correct cannot be reliably distinguished from incorrect. Words like correct and God lose usefulness when people have no clear meaning of what they mean by them, and no test for either correctness or a deity.

There are lots of different ways of thinking and different modes of 'correctness' that do not comport with empiricism. If you want to understand them, and the people that engage in them, you are going to have to set aside your insistence of empirical explanations (that you can argue with) and be willing to explore those other possibilities, and their respective value.

Agree. I advocate using a definition of correct that doesn't suffer from that shortcoming. By the definition I have chosen for myself, if I claim that an idea is correct, I can demonstrate it to be so, or, contrariwise, if I am in error, if I have misunderstood the evidence, I can be shown that empirically.

Your definition of 'correct' is not the issue. The issue is are you trying to understand the other person's? Or are you just trying to be the 'correct' one, yourself?

 

[wellwisher]

There is the truth and then there is the whole truth. Partial truth can be truthful, even if not complete. The whole truth adds even more data, so there is better context for the partial truth.

As an example, I can say that Ukrainian soldiers have killed many Russian Generals over the past two weeks. This is true. However, left to its own, without sufficient context, this partial truth can result in some people drawing the wrong overall conclusions.

You cannot tell from this partial truth, alone, if these kills were defensive or offensive. If I did not watch TV or use social media to add my own extra truth, I would not know the difference.

One can then lead their audience astray based on how you express emotions when you tell partial truth. Fake news uses this trick. Legally, the transcript will show the partial truth, but the results on others can show manipulation. Fake news can ten claim they cannot control how people think about the truth. This is different from lying, but can lead to the same end game. Legality is avoided better than lying.

In college universities, censorship and the need for free spaces is a result of students wishing their partial truth was the whole truth, since it feels good. If someone comes along and fills in other truth, that good feeling correlation, can be undermined. In another post, I discussed emotional versus rational thinking. Some students may need a buffer from the whole truth to sustain their emotional thinking.

If one is comfortable in their beliefs, based on extended data or truth, instead of sentiment, then some additional truth may not move the needle as much. They can allow more exposure to alternative truth without any major change in beliefs. The Left appears more vulnerable to extra truth, since fad thinking lacks a long term data base. Conservative means conservation of the results of more applied data; good enough to be conserved. New data will not move the needle as much.

 

[It Aint Necessarily So]

But even if "true," that does not necessarily mean that they are knowledge. It might be true, for instance, that something we call a deity does exist. But that would certainly not count as "knowledge" for the atheist, would it?

I'm asking what each individual means by the word correct. The definitions don't need to be in agreement. In fact, I wouldn't expect them to be. What I call correct, true, factual or knowledge need not be what you or any other individual calls those things. So, I'm not so much arguing about what is correct or true or constitutes knowledge, but what a person means when THEY use such words.

An strict empiricist like me will limit the meaning all of those words to the realm of the demonstrable. Others will include intuitions that they find compelling. I don't consider either of these definitions or any definition to be correct or incorrect by my empiricist epistemology. That's what the example about two competing definitions of atheist was for. It is meaningless to me to call either correct or incorrect. Definitions are arbitrary constructs. We can all agree that there are people who say that there is no god, and others who make no such pronouncement, merely that he doesn't believe. What is correct and incorrect to me is that such people exist, not what they are called.

Many of the theists use the first definition, people I would call gnostic or strong atheists. Same concept, different name, neither is correct or incorrect because unlike the existence of these kinds of people, which can be pointed at, who can be demonstrated to exist as clearly as the "correct" directions could be considered to get one to his destination, there is nothing to point to say, "See, this is what an atheist actually is."

And yet, it is also not "knowledge" for the theist who, while correctly believing that something called a deity exists, doesn't know one darned thing about it.

That's according to your (and my) definition of knowledge. I would repeat that as I define the word correct, we cannot be correct or incorrect when talking about definitions. Others might use all of these words differently. My greater point is that I find the greatest utility in confining my use of the word correct to things that I can demonstrate empirically are correct, just as I find the greatest utility in defining an atheist as an unbeliever in gods. I find that if I use any other definition for correct than the one I do, I am including ideas that I cannot demonstrate to be correct, that is, unsupported beliefs (faith), and once one crosses that line, he is in a world of imagination no longer rooted to any common reality. I decided long ago that thinking that way was a cognitive error, and generated ideas that I didn't want to include in my set of beliefs about what is correct, ideas we all rely on to navigate life.

But I am aware that others expand their definition of correct to include things they believe but cannot demonstrate to be correct, a definition that doesn't work for me. I want to distinguish between that which useful and reliable in making decisions that lead to desired outcomes, and all other kinds of ideas, which also have value, but not for this purpose.

to say that one "knows" that "man is not an animal or an ape" is to admit that you are not, in fact, knowledgeable about the subject.

Somebody commented that there is a religious definition of animal chosen to comport with the religious belief that man is God's special creation unrelated to the beasts, and a scientific definition intended to categorize like creatures. Rather than call one or the other correct, what I say, as with the definition of atheist, that one is more useful to me, since I don't consider human beings separate from the tree of life, so why use language that suggests that?

If I change my criteria for belief such that I call ideas like a god belief correct, it follows that I would consider the religious definition of animal also correct. Who is correct? Neither. All one can do is explain why one definition works better for him than another.

Hard to say whether this is really "knowledge" at all. The fact that one has tested it over and over again does not consider the question of, when passing that "knowledge" on to someone else (giving them directions), of whether or not part of the route has just recently (since your last trip) closed down! Thus, it is no longer "true" that it is the correct route (now), and what it is not true can surely not be considered knowledge.

My definition of correct refers to reality as I have experienced it and the useful inductions derived from that experience to date which allows me to make choices that facilitate desired outcomes. It is tentative when considering things that it is known can change. What was correct as I define it yesterday may be incorrect today and correct again tomorrow if yesterday and tomorrow I am amble to demonstrate the correctness of the idea, but today not. Consider the comment, "You can get fried chicken at the diner." Is it correct? Yes, but only if one can go to the diner and get fried chicken. Perhaps they were open yesterday and will be again tomorrow, but are closed today. If I say that you can get chicken at the diner, but they're closed today, this a more useful statement. I makes more predictions that can be successfully used to get fried chicken when it is available and to avoid making a wasted trip to a closed restaurant when it is closed.

There's the strictly empiricist epistemology again. By limiting my use of the word correct to things that are demonstrably correct, and accumulating a fund of such demonstrably correct ideas into a mental map of all of the things I believe are correct (what I call my knowledge, or beliefs), I can make decisions based on those ideas that are more effective that if I formulate the concepts of truth, knowledge, fact, and correctness more loosely and include unjustified beliefs.

But I don't expect others to see things that way. I know they don't. And I want to emphasize again that even though I find my way better for me than theirs would be for me (or was when I was a Christian), I can't call it correct until I can demonstrate that it more accurately maps reality. I have done that for myself, but probably cannot do it for others. I have empirical evidence from having lived ten years as a Christian and 35 more since then as a secular humanist which of these produces the desired outcome more reliably.

[1] Atheists are people who don't believe in a god versus atheists are people who say that there is no deity. Which of these are correct? Which is incorrect. Neither is correct, nor incorrect.

Agree. The words don't apply to definitions. It's a category error to think that they do, like asking what color love is. Definitions are not more or less correct. They are more or less useful. And utility is what I am looking for in an epistemology, and what I mean by saying that an idea is only correct for me if it is demonstrably correct, meaning that the idea can be used to effect desired outcomes, like directions that get you to a desired location. I want to reserve using the word correct for those kinds of ideas, and keep them segregated from ideas not discovered to be useful for making decisions.

[2] Man has an immortal soul that distinguishes him from the beasts. Correct or incorrect? How could this possibly be decided?

Agree again, and my purpose for including an example of an unfalsifiable, unscientific, not empirically demonstrable, metaphysical statement for consideration. I don't want to include such ideas with my useful ones. I don't want to include them in my beliefs, all of which must be empirically confirmed to useful before being accepted into my belief set.

 

[It Aint Necessarily So]

The problem is that this is not about the "correctness" of the words. It's about communicating the idea that the words are supposed to be communicating from one person to another. So arguing over the "correctness" of the words is just going to be a useless distraction. Better to find out what idea the other people is trying to express by using the words they use.

I don't think I'm arguing about the correctness of words. I'm asking for a intensional definition for correctness, a definition that allows one to decide whether he considers an idea is correct or not according to whether it meets the criteria the definition proposes. Right now, I 'm only interested in one idea that the other guy is trying to express when he calls an correct.

My interest would be in finding our what "correct belief" means, here. Because such a phrase will mean some very different things to different people.

That's my interest as well, and why I started the thread to ask that question.

There are lots of different ways of thinking and different modes of 'correctness' that do not comport with empiricism. If you want to understand them, and the people that engage in them, you are going to have to set aside your insistence of empirical explanations (that you can argue with) and be willing to explore those other possibilities, and their respective value.

How about we begin with a definition of what is meant by correctness to those who do not have an empirical test for it. Notice that I am not disagreeing with these other definitions.

 

[It Aint Necessarily So]

I suppose in conventional use it means factual versus errant. It is correct to say the gas tank is empty, when it is factual. It is incorrect to say it is empty when in fact it is full.

I'd like to see a definition for correct that isn't a synonym, like 'correct means true or factual.' We're still left with no clear way to decide what ideas deserve to be called any of those words. I'm looking for an intensional definition of correct, such as the one I offered. An intensional definition is a " list a set of properties such that the term applies to all things having that set of properties, and to nothing else." With such a definition, one can decide whether a given idea can be called correct according to that definition.

That doesn't make the directions incorrect, so long as it points you in the right direction and not the opposite direction. If the destination is not a fixed location, but a general region where you will find what you are looking for in that area, such as birch trees, then the lack of specificity may in fact be correct.

I call directions correct when they get one to a desired destination. Correct directions to a region will look different from correct directions to a specific location. Directions to Paris are different appearing than directions to the Louvre, but if they both get one to his desired location, I will call them both correct, and if either cannot reliably do that, I will not call them correct. This isn't the controversial part of what is meant by correctness. This is the part we can mostly agree about. It's when we get to ideas that cannot be tested this way that many of us part ways, some calling others kinds of ideas correct, others like me not, since I prefer that ideas that I call correct to be correct in the way directions that work are.

While humans are rational creatures, they are non-rational creatures as well, if not more so. We love, we dream, we sing, we dance. These are not intellectual expressions.

Agree. And I would add that the nonrational experiences such as the rapture of stirring music or the ecstasy of looking at the stars and contemplating our relationship to them and the reminder of the cosmos is paramount, the reasoning (rational faculty) being useful to manage those experiences and facilitate as many of those we desire to manifest in our conscious experience while attempting to limit the dysphoric outcomes. If we lose the ability to experience these nonrational feelings, we often seek suicide. What is the anhedonia of depression except the loss of those nonrational experiences. Such people often tell us that they don't feel bad as much as they don't feel anything, and this is worse.

My insistence on limiting what I call correct to what is demonstrably correct is to allow me to more effectively manage those nonrational experiences by accurately deciding what is true about the world and how it works, and is limited to that mental function only. It is only when doing that that I disesteem the irrational. I am often misunderstood when I do, others frequently thinking I am disesteeming all nonrational experience. I am not.

I'm talking more about the abstract "feeling" aspects of life; love, value, hope, meaning, purpose, spirituality, God, etc.

Yes, the nonrational experiences that give life purpose and meaning. The words correct and incorrect don't apply here.

if someone says they have experienced the transcendent, therefore they believe that God is real, that is perfectly valid for them to say that. It's empirical evidence for their own beliefs from their own experiences. It's not 'blind faith' in that case. It's not blind. They would be correct, that for them that stands as evidence of the reality of the Divine.

That is a different definition of correct than mine. I don't deny that people have such experiences. I do. I just don't use words like truth or correctness in those arenas.

The experiences are definitely real to the one experiencing them. They are often reproducible. How he interprets them may lead to blind faith. Calling them God is, in my opinion, a guess not supported empirically. And being a metaphysical claim, can neither be called correct nor incorrect by my definition, since the belief cannot be empirically confirmed nor disconfirmed.

I would say that those who have valid experiences have more than just faith-based ideas.

I don't know what valid or invalid experiences are. Experiences are can be misunderstood, but cannot be said to be valid or invalid as I use the words, valid meaning "having a sound basis in logic or fact; reasonable or cogent." The experiences of embarrassment and enjoying puppies, for example, are neither. They are only pleasant or unpleasant, desirable or to be avoided. Such experiences are are neither faith-based nor evidence and reason based, but beliefs about what they signify can be. Two people have the same euphoric experience of connection and belonging, of awe and mystery. One understands says that this is God. The other says if God exists, it may be due to God, but it also may just be an endogenous psychological state. The first has a faith-based belief, the second not.

Reading my own words, I've just realized that I need to expand my definition of correct to ideas that are logically valid even if not empirically (demonstrably) correct. I consider the second statement correct - the experience is either of something that exists outside of the mind or it is a creation of the mind. I think that these are the only logical possibilities, and one must be the case, so saying so is correct, but not empirically correct. I can't show you anything physical like I can with the empirically correct. This is the logically correct. All I can show you is my reasoning. So, I now define correct as empirically or logically demonstrable.

This to me is the value in examining these kinds of ideas microscopically for a time - clarifying thought and bringing latent ideas to the surface to be examined. It's also why I am a huge fan of clear, concise, intensional definitions such as truth, the quality facts and only facts possess; facts, statements that accurately map a portion of testable reality; correct, the quality of a statement that empirically (and now add logically) demonstrable, etc..

In each case, I can say whether a given idea meets those criteria or not. Why is that valuable? It helps minimize incoherent thought. It helps one see that he is not contradicting himself, and that his ideas dovetail together into a coherent whole. After close examination of the word supernatural, I realized that the concept was incoherent, an insight that doesn't come with causal use of the word. By close examination of the word exist I came to understand that saying that a deity exists outside of time is incoherent. Close scrutiny of the fine tuning argument for an omnipotent deity is incoherent. It contains latent internal contradictions that can be ferreted out with careful consideration.

I agree. That applies as much to the theist as it does the atheist.

I had said, "My position is that for the word [correct] to have meaning, it can only be applied to clear ideas that are demonstrably correct or not." I'm surprised to see that you agree. I would have expected you to say that beliefs such as god beliefs can be called correct even though not demonstrably so.

 

[PureX]

I don't think I'm arguing about the correctness of words. I'm asking for a intensional definition for correctness, a definition that allows one to decide whether he considers an idea is correct or not according to whether it meets the criteria the definition proposes. Right now, I 'm only interested in one idea that the other guy is trying to express when he calls an correct.

But "correct" compared to what? And correctness is not relevant to all ideas. For example, the idea that my dog loves me. Accepting this idea isn't about it being a "correct" idea. It's about it being a desired idea. An idea that comports with what I value in life. So when I say, "My dog loves me", what is there in that idea that requires you to seek to determine it's "correctness"?

My interest would be in finding our what "correct belief" means, here. Because such a phrase will mean some very different things to different people.

That's my interest as well, and why I started the thread to ask that question.

But you can't do that by insisting that their intended meaning comport with your concept of correctness. Which is something that you seem to do, constantly. Especially when their meaning isn't even related to the idea of 'correctness'. Like, "My dog loves me".

How about we begin with a definition of what is meant by correctness to those who do not have an empirical test for it. Notice that I am not disagreeing with these other definitions.

You're going to have to ask in each specific conversation, because the answer will be specific to the person and the subject/idea under discussion. And keep in mind that 'correctness' isn't even a relevant issue much of the time. Same goes for when people use the term "belief", and "know", and especially when they don't bother to be even that articulate, and they just post unqualified statements, like, "My dog loves me". Is that something I believe? Something I know? Is that something I just presume because I want to? And do any of these qualifications really even matter in this instance?

 

[It Aint Necessarily So]

But "correct" compared to what?

That's up to the definer. The question is what YOU mean when you use the word correct. When YOU call something correct, correct compared to what in your mind? For me, it is compared to not correct, which includes incorrect ideas (demonstrably incorrect), and references to definitions and unfalsifiable metaphysical entities, which are neither correct nor incorrect as already explained.

And correctness is not relevant to all ideas.

But it is to this one. You use the word as if you have an understanding of what correctness is to you. You must be meaning something with that sentence, with that word in it. Exactly what is not relevant to all ideas? If I were asked that, I could answer. If I were to say sentence, what I would mean is that correlation with demonstrable reality is not relevant to all ideas. How about you finish the sentence in your own words, "When I, PureX, say correctness is not relevant to all ideas, what I would mean is that [your intensional definition here] is not relevant to all ideas." This ought to be the last time I ask, right? You'll either give your answer or not, but if you don't, I'll assume that it means you're not going to, whether that's because you don't understand the question, can define what you mean, or just don't want to comply with my request and purpose.

you can't do that by insisting that their intended meaning comport with your concept of correctness. Which is something that you seem to do, constantly.

I do that constantly - insist that your meaning or that of others comports with my concept? I'd say that I've done the opposite. I've offered my definition, but have only asked others for theirs. I've been practically begging for yours with no success. I wonder why you thought otherwise.

 

[Curious George]

We talk about truth, fact, and knowledge. I would suggest that these all refer to what we also call correct ideas...

a couple thoughts.

Suppose I give directions to point y and the last step of this directions is turn right after the second birch tree. Now suppose there are actually three birch trees prior to the necessary turn and the actual second tree is somehow easily missed. If my directions lead to successful outcomes say 90% of the time, are they still “correct”?

would they be incorrect if I said after the third birch tree and this lead to unsuccessful outcomes 90% of the time?

 

[Audie]

There's rite and there's rong.
No 3rd way.

 

[It Aint Necessarily So]

Suppose I give directions to point y and the last step of this directions is turn right after the second birch tree. Now suppose there are actually three birch trees prior to the necessary turn and the actual second tree is somehow easily missed. If my directions lead to successful outcomes say 90% of the time, are they still “correct”?

They're correct if following them gets one to the desired location. If correct directions are difficult to follow, they are no less correct, just less helpful that ones that are easily followed. If the directions are so nonspecific that they can be interpreted in more than one way, then they are neither correct nor incorrect.

would they be incorrect if I said after the third birch tree and this lead to unsuccessful outcomes 90% of the time?

Same answer. Are you familiar with the correspondence theory of truth?

 

[Curious George]

They're correct if following them gets one to the desired location. If correct directions are difficult to follow, they are no less correct, just less helpful that ones that are easily followed. If the directions are so nonspecific that they can be interpreted in more than one way, then they are neither correct nor incorrect.



Same answer. Are you familiar with the correspondence theory of truth?

Yes, but that really doesn’t apply here. I think your answer suggests that the correctness depends is contingent on the person following the directions, not necessarily the directions themselves.

In the first instance the directions do not correspond with the world but lead to successful outcomes to a high degree. In the second the directions correspond with the state of the world but lead to a high degree of unsuccessful outcomes.

your answer seems to suggest that the first is correct 90% of the time but incorrect 10% of the time.