I'm old enough to recall the buzz when Rorty's Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature was published in the late 70s or very early 80s. Quite a stir. I believe Rorty did not refer to himself as a "pragmatist", but rather called himself a "new pragmatist" or "neopragmatist". GC, I think Rorty was not being entirely accurate when he said no one goes around saying every belief is as good as every other belief.
For instance, Laurie Calhoun, who is a postmodernist philosopher, was once asked if it was a fact that giraffes were taller than ants. She quite famously replied that it was not a fact, it was rather an article of faith in Western culture that giraffes were taller than ants. In other words, Calhoun was expressing epistemic relativism.
Another case in point was the time that students at the University of Cape Town famously argued that witchcraft was the epistemic equal of Newtonian physics.
I could go on. The point is that some people actually do argue that beliefs are equal.
Rorty's position does appear to be nuanced (as one would expect from any serious thinker). However the following extract from Bailey's paper is interesting:
QUOTE
Truth as Consensus
We cannot find a skyhook which lifts us out of mere coherence –mere agreement – to something like ‘correspondence with reality as it is in itself’ ... Pragmatists would like to replace the desire for objectivity – the desire to be in touch with a reality which is more than some community with which we identify ourselves – with the desire for solidarity with that community. (Rorty, 1991, pp. 38–39)
Richard Rorty’s equation of objectivity with solidarity is one form of the view that what we naïvely hold to be truth is simply an assertion of which we are subjectively persuaded. Accordingly, truth is not a property of beliefs by virtue of some relation they bear to ‘worldy’facts that stand outside of discursive practice.
UNQUOTE
This seems to me quite absurd. For instance the whole basis of scientific enquiry is a presumption that there are, objectively,
patterns in the physical world, or "nature", that enable us to predict how nature will behave, by mean of building models of it. We do not have to claim the models "are" reality, only that nature behaves very much
as if they are, enough of the time for us to use them as proxies for whatever reality "really" is.
If the patterns we perceive were merely - per Rorty - expressions of community solidarity, and there were no objective reality underlying them, then our aeroplanes would not fly. Thus I struggle to understand what Rorty is really saying.
@PureX holds a less extreme view of relativism, evidently, which I find uncontentious. It seems to me quite reasonable to say that we humans can never attain complete objectivity and thus all the things we may claim to be truth still actually retain some element of uncertainty.