syo
Well-Known Member
What's this? An example would be nice.
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Do you have any purely logical objections to Divine Command Theory?
- Thread starter Anti-Climacus
- Start date
Ouroboros
Coincidentia oppositorum
Which raises a Biblical question. One could interpret the fruit A&E ate as being the very thing that gave them knowledge about right and wrong, good and evil, in other words, they got a self-sustained function in their "soul" (or whatever) to tell them what was the moral actions. Now, that doesn't suggest that God commands laws and we have to obey them, but rather that we would know on our own what it should be. To me, the story is part about how humans (A&E) left the DCT behind (laws and rules created by God), and we entered the realm of figuring it out ourselves.
The idea of a being that doesn't make errors implies the existence of an external standard that the being's results are being measured against. OTOH, DCT implies that a divine being's actions are correct because they were done by the divine being. Not the same thing at all.
As an analogy: a perfect bowler is someone who scores 300 points in every game. A bowler who plays by a set of rules where anything he throws counts as a strike regardless of how many pins he knocks down is something else.
Weird - you said "no" like you disagreed with me, then restated what I said in slightly different terms.
Decrees that are claimed to have come from God are not necessarily actual decrees from God. Any human judgement, including the judgement of what is and isn't a genuine decree from God, is going to have to rely on some sort of fallible standard.
I didn't say that it did argue they're unwarranted; I said that it takes them as given.
Presumably, Euthyphro agreed with the things he was taking as given, but he also wasn't worried about justifying those assumptions within his argument.
If no gods exist, then DCT necessarily fails, so until the existence of a god or gods is established, DCT can't be established either. Trying to use DCT to argue for the existence of God is begging the question.
Curious George
Veteran Member
No, no we are not.
This is just throwing another wrench in the works instead of fixing the one i already pointed out.
QuestioningMind
Well-Known Member
Anti-Climacus
Member
Where have you read that that is the case? or is that just your own impression based on a shallow reading of religious texts?
Because the divine being who has done it does not err.
You don't understand what I'm saying. My point was that humans are in no position to criticise the divine command from an ethical standpoint, because humans frankly have no ability to make objective ethical judgments of themselves, whereas we can, to a degree, make objective epistemological judgments. Deciding whether a command is from God is a completely different matter from determining whether a command is just. You cannot know whether a command is from God by the command itself, because we are in no position to know moral facts of our own ability. So you cannot judge the divine command by any external ethical standard.
You don't need to believe in God to accept DCT. In that case you would just say that the only possible rational basis for morality is a divine command, and since there is no god, there is no rational basis for morality.
I suppose if you're fine with going to hell, you could say that, but by definition there is no higher moral duty than to obey the divine command, whether you agree with it or not.
What's good for society doesnt give you any more of a rational basis for morality. Why is what's good for society necessarily good? Why is societal wellbeing a moral good? DCT is more rational because it provides a purely logical basis for morality which isn't based on human desire, emotion, nature, etc., and it isn't based on unjustified "goods" like the good of society. I would have a problem with people murdering others--I'm human after all--but it would make no sense to say murder is immoral. That statement is nonsense if you don't presume objective morality. It just becomes a matter of personal preference or self interest, and just because "it works" doesn't make it rational. You're in fact basing the definition of a working society on your own moral code. If I believed murder was a moral duty, your ideal society wouldn't be working well, now would it? As for your other question, yes, if God told me to kill someone, I would do it.
Not much of a god then, now is it?
A supernatural bully, at best a mob boss. But a god? No, I don't think so.
Anti-Climacus
Member
And on what basis are you saying that? You can't apply moral criteria for determining what is and is not a god, much less human moral criteria.
Oh, I can and I do. As a matter of fact, I must.
Unless you are proposing that this hypothetical god is either unworthy, insane, stupid, incompetent or monstrous.
There is no other explanation for why a god would fail to comply with the bare basic demands of morality while many humans are at the very least somewhat competent.
Anti-Climacus
Member
The explanation is simple: because he doesn't care about abiding by what humans think is moral.
Wait... so you're saying that all we have to do is establish which religion is true and then we'll have morality sorted out?
That's no trouble at all. I'm sure that's completely achievable!
It reminds me of a scene in Dirk Gently's Holistic Detective Agency (the book, not the show):
'I think,' said Dirk, 'you will be impressed. Consider this. An intractable problem. In trying to find the solution to it I was going round and round in little circles in my mind, over and over the same maddening things. Clearly I wasn't going to be able to think of anything else until I had the answer, but equally clearly I would have to think of something else if I was ever going to get the answer. How to break this circle? Ask me how.'
'How?' said Miss Pearce obediently, but without enthusiasm.
'By writing down what the answer is!' exclaimed Dirk. 'And here it is!' He slapped the piece of paper triumphantly and sat back with a satisfied smile.
Miss Pearce looked at it dumbly.
'With the result,' continued Dirk, 'that I am now able to turn my mind to fresh and intriguing problems, like, for instance…' He took the piece of paper, covered with its aimless squiggles and doodlings, and held it up to her. 'What language,' he said in a low, dark voice, 'is this written in?'
Miss Pearce continued to look at it dumbly.
Dirk flung the piece of paper down, put his feet up on the table, and threw his head back with his hands behind it. 'You see what I have done?' he asked the ceiling, which seemed to flinch slightly at being yanked so suddenly into the conversation. 'I have transformed the problem from an intractably difficult and possibly quite insoluble conundrum into a mere linguistic puzzle. Albeit,' he muttered, after a long moment of silent pondering, 'an intractably difficult and possibly insoluble one.'
He swung back to gaze intently at Janice Pearce.
'Go on,' he urged, 'say that it's insane - but it might just work!'
Janice Pearce cleared her throat.
'It's insane,' she said, 'trust me.'
Koldo
Outstanding Member
Hey, if you are going to ask me something in return, you should at least answer my question as well.
One can not derive knowledge about Classical Theism by merely reading religious texts, as you probably know it. Such knowledge comes from reading the work of philosophers or commentary over their works.
Let's consider the concept of omnipotence. In what sense is it not true that 'potence' is understood in terms of instantied capabilities we have witnessed and thus derive what 'omnipotence' would entail from that ?
Koldo
Outstanding Member
What makes God's desire, emotion, nature,etc. any less arbitrary as a basis for morality than humans' ? Notice that the DCT is not about God knowing what is the objective morality and then telling us, but rather about God decreeing arbitrarily what is moral.
Ergo, he is a false god. If even _that_ much of a sorry excuse for an entity.
Such a "god" is less worthy than the average human, and entirely unworthy of my time.
Anti-Climacus
Member
For the most part, yes; that's exactly what I'm saying. If you think it's impossible, well then, you're left with nothing, just a vain egoistic morality.Wait... so you're saying that all we have to do is establish which religion is true and then we'll have morality sorted out?
That's no trouble at all. I'm sure that's completely achievable!
You're simply describing how we conceive of God, whereas classical theism affirms that he transcends all descriptions we could apply to him. You misunderstand what the divine attributes actually signify in the context of classical theism as opposed to that of theistic personalism. As the philosopher David Bentley Hart says, citing several primary religious texts to this effect, 'When we speak of the goodness or wisdom of God, for instance, we cannot imagine that he is good or wise in the same manner as a finite person.' Moreover, 'God, as the source of all being, is, properly speaking, not Himself a being' (The Experience of God: Being, Consciousness, Bliss, p. 107, 125). So, it is not as if he is a mere being, just a better being than us; numerous thinkers have underscored this point.
He has the epistemic authority to make such decrees, much more so than anyone or anything else, and the believer places his trust in that epistemic authority, communicated by means of revelation, to acquire divine knowledge. He is not subject to passions such as desire and emotion, so that is irrelevant. As for nature, what I meant was a naturalistic approach to morality, i.e., Sam Harris's argument in The Moral Landscape, not God's nature or our nature, i.e. ontology; that likewise fails.
What a complete non sequitur.
QuestioningMind
Well-Known Member
What's good for society doesnt give you any more of a rational basis for morality. Why is what's good for society necessarily good? Why is societal wellbeing a moral good?
I completely disagree. As a member of society it is perfectly rational for me to conclude that morality that increases the well being of society is a moral good. In fact, for me to conclude that a morality that decreases the well being of society is the morality we should follow would be completely irrational.
DCT is more rational because it provides a purely logical basis for morality which isn't based on human desire, emotion, nature, etc., and it isn't based on unjustified "goods" like the good of society.
Sorry, but you have yet to demonstrate what is rational about concluding that morality if determined by an unidentifiable god being whose rules no one can agree upon. In fact, I would say that it's completely irrational to base morality upon an unidentifiable god being whose rules no one can agree upon. That means that everyone gets to declare that whatever they personally decide is god's desires is what constitutes moral behavior. That's how you get people deluding themselves into believing that flying airplanes into buildings filled with people is a moral action.
I would have a problem with people murdering others--I'm human after all--but it would make no sense to say murder is immoral. That statement is nonsense if you don't presume objective morality. It just becomes a matter of personal preference or self interest, and just because "it works" doesn't make it rational. You're in fact basing the definition of a working society on your own moral code. If I believed murder was a moral duty, your ideal society wouldn't be working well, now would it? As for your other question, yes, if God told me to kill someone, I would do it.
That's rather scary. Even though you might personally feel that it is wrong to kill a child, if some god being told you to do it, you would. So you are willing to abandon your own moral code and accept a moral code that you find offensive, just because some authority being told you that you should. How is that in any way shape or form a rational decision?
Eh. As if.
Whatever it is that you are calling "God" is utterly useless, or worse.
Curious George
Veteran Member
Lol, who is to say that those who do not obey are going to hell. It is just as likely that if a god exists those who obey are going to hell.
But you are missing the point: it does not follow that a god beyond reason would command that which is good if what is good is dependent upon that god.
You have done nothing to dismiss the eurthyphro dilemma accept a casual nod and a hand wave. I thought we were discussing logic here.
Anti-Climacus
Member
It's perfectly natural to come to that conclusion, but it's not in any way rational to jump to the conclusion that a societal good equals a moral good.
This ultimately has no bearing on whether DCT is true. Whether people can agree on the specifics of a proposition has no bearing on whether it is rational to hold to the general form of that proposition itself. There is nothing inherently irrational about the conclusion that the only possible, rational basis for morality is a divine command.
Everyone can already declare that; only those with the right religion can truthfully declare it.
And now you're just resorting to Sam Harris's argument, which I addressed in my original post. DCT freely accepts all of its terrifying implications, none of which actually undermine it as a meta-ethical theory.
Yes, DCT calls for one to abandon their own sensibilities when the divine command is contrary to them. There is nothing irrational about setting aside your own personal feelings and acting according to the facts at hand.
Anti-Climacus
Member
If you've been following this discussion closely, you should have seen multiple reasons as to why I dismiss it, as so many people here have simply reiterated the old arguments against the idea that "the pious is pious only because it is loved by the gods." These simply cannot contend with the apophatic theology of classical theism, which is understandable, because Plato was not dealing with classical theism; he was dealing with Ancient Greek polytheism. Euthyphro is an old, solved problem which doesn't demand my interaction, and the reformulation of the dilemma which applies it to classical theism is naturally clumsy; many have pointed this out.