Twilight Hue
Twilight, not bright nor dark, good nor bad.
Wing and a prayer. Eh?
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Faith: The Basis for All Knowledge
- Thread starter Gambit
- Start date
Fair enough. However, I believe that philosophy should strive to be applicable and practical. I always leave senseless levels of skepticism at the door. One never gets anywhere in a discussion if one doesn't; one just talks oneself in circles.
I'm talking about knowing-how, not knowing-that. Knowing-that you will be able to do it again is not a knowing-how. The knowing-how is not faith-based and involves no presuppositions or assumptions. It's a state of being. You either know how to ride a bike or you don't. Whether or not you will be able to ride it right know is a knowing-that, not the knowing-how.
Something related y'all might want to take a look at:
Knowledge How (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Knowledge How (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
YmirGF
Bodhisattva in Recovery
I have faith that you really don't understand what I was saying.
lovemuffin
τὸν ἄρτον τοῦ ἔρωτος
I think there's a good argument that epistemological justification (knowledge that especially vs knowledge how) depends upon taking something as given, typically some minimal set of assumptions about the reliability of empirical observation (with caveats) and logical reasoning, for example. The attitude of being open towards those assumptions can be called "faith" in a technical sense somewhat detached from normal usage, but etymologically related to the definition of faith as "trust", and in that regard it's something constitutive of being human to have "faith" in some minimal sense. We accept what is given to us in some minimal sense because that is the only way forward.
"faith" used in this way is mostly just about acknowledging the limits of epistemic justification. It doesn't justify "faith" in a more traditional religious sense directly, and the possible conflation of usages is kind of a weakness of a polemical approach to the question, but I think it's still useful to the extent that some of the disagreement between some theistic views and naturalism has to do with epistemic justification, and it's worth keeping in mind that the naturalistic rules of justification, so to speak, are not something that are true of logical necessity. They are the result of an abductive reasoning based primarily on the success of empirical science. That is, naturalism concludes that only objectifiable empirical evidence conditioned by reason can justify knowledge because such an epistemology has been very successful at understanding the natural world.
In an analogous way, but less successfully as far as the objective probability of the conclusion being true, "faith" in a more traditional sense -- that which makes possible the mystical experience that is beyond empirical sense and rational reason -- can also be argued for abductively as the best explanation for widespread descriptions of mysticism: these kinds of experiences are nearly universal in human cultures and, allowing for a lot of variation, also have a lot in common. A naturalistic explanation for the universality of the phenomenon would just appeal to neurology and evolution. It would say that it's just a quirk of human consciousness. But keeping in mind the assumptions that are necessary to justify empirical knowledge in general, that same criticism could be leveled about all empirical observation. That is, the brain-in-a-vat argument.
The reason why the abductive argument for philosophical realism based on empirical science is stronger than an abductive argument for realism with regard to mystical experience (the experience of faith) is that the things which science investigates are more clearly objective, which makes it seem less reasonable that somehow it's all just a brain in a vat or some solipsism. At the same time though, the reliance on pure objectivity is perhaps why consciousness is mysterious. Not as an objective phenomenon, but as the subjective "what-it-is-like" of experience. The subjectivity and ineffability that is claimed for both the "hard problem of consciousness" and the experience of faith is less easy to justify epistemologically.
"faith" used in this way is mostly just about acknowledging the limits of epistemic justification. It doesn't justify "faith" in a more traditional religious sense directly, and the possible conflation of usages is kind of a weakness of a polemical approach to the question, but I think it's still useful to the extent that some of the disagreement between some theistic views and naturalism has to do with epistemic justification, and it's worth keeping in mind that the naturalistic rules of justification, so to speak, are not something that are true of logical necessity. They are the result of an abductive reasoning based primarily on the success of empirical science. That is, naturalism concludes that only objectifiable empirical evidence conditioned by reason can justify knowledge because such an epistemology has been very successful at understanding the natural world.
In an analogous way, but less successfully as far as the objective probability of the conclusion being true, "faith" in a more traditional sense -- that which makes possible the mystical experience that is beyond empirical sense and rational reason -- can also be argued for abductively as the best explanation for widespread descriptions of mysticism: these kinds of experiences are nearly universal in human cultures and, allowing for a lot of variation, also have a lot in common. A naturalistic explanation for the universality of the phenomenon would just appeal to neurology and evolution. It would say that it's just a quirk of human consciousness. But keeping in mind the assumptions that are necessary to justify empirical knowledge in general, that same criticism could be leveled about all empirical observation. That is, the brain-in-a-vat argument.
The reason why the abductive argument for philosophical realism based on empirical science is stronger than an abductive argument for realism with regard to mystical experience (the experience of faith) is that the things which science investigates are more clearly objective, which makes it seem less reasonable that somehow it's all just a brain in a vat or some solipsism. At the same time though, the reliance on pure objectivity is perhaps why consciousness is mysterious. Not as an objective phenomenon, but as the subjective "what-it-is-like" of experience. The subjectivity and ineffability that is claimed for both the "hard problem of consciousness" and the experience of faith is less easy to justify epistemologically.
No. I'm asking if you believe that what you said was so.
It's hard to refute an opinion.
Which ones?
Why does consciousness get a pass?
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nazz
Doubting Thomas
Pretty much true. We have knowledge of our experience. That's it.
nazz
Doubting Thomas
So where's the dividing line between knowledge and belief? Is it hazy?
A belief is that which one accepts to be the case. Knowledge which involves that which one accepts to be the case is also a belief, by my reckoning. But as I've been trying (possibly failing) to explain, certain types of knowledge to not involve accepting something to be the case. Knowing-how, or procedural memory, is a state of being. You either know how to ride the bike or you don't. An organism either knows how to sense its environment or it doesn't. It's more like an intrinsic property; some would use the word "instinct" to describe knowing-how.
At any rate, the words "faith," "belief," and "knowledge" are very poorly defined in the English language. Given that, it would not be possible to put any line anywhere. Not unless you define the terms in such a way to make that possible, which, in my experience, wouldn't reflect our actual usages of these words.
lovemuffin
τὸν ἄρτον τοῦ ἔρωτος
the classical definition is that knowledge is true justified belief. there are difficulties with that (see: Gettier problems), but it's a good place to start as far as investigating the history of philosophy on the subject.
The trouble is, what is and is not a justified belief seems to be a matter of opinion.
nazz
Doubting Thomas
I agree
I also agree and I think we need a narrower definition of knowledge.
Please provide an argument in support of your otherwise baseless claim.
Gambit
Well-Known Member
If you believe this thread is a waste of your time, then I suggest that you should find another one with which to amuse yourself.
This is my thread, not yours. I'm talking about a branch of philosophy known as "epistemology." which is concerned with propositional knowledge. (It's about "knowing that," not "knowing how.")
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Gambit
Well-Known Member
I have faith that you really don't understand what I was saying.
Find another thread to hijack.
Gambit
Well-Known Member
That's how I'm employing the term.
One of Merriam-Webster's definitions of the term "faith" defines it as "firm belief in something for which there is no proof." "Knowledge" has traditionally been defined in epistemology as "justified belief." I'm making the argument that a "justified belief" is ultimately justified by appealing to "something for which there is no proof." IOW, all knowledge is ultimately based on faith.
The rest of your post concerns the epistemology of science vs. the epistemology of mysticism. Although this is something with which I am interested, it is not the subject matter of this thread.
Gambit
Well-Known Member
I believe my argument is valid.
psychoslice
Veteran Member
I feel that when we have knowledge about something, we then know about that, if we didn't know about it we wouldn't have knowledge, so its either you know about it and have knowledge about it, or you don't know about it and have no knowledge about it.
Gambit
Well-Known Member
Because consciousness is axiomatic ("self-evident").