John D. Brey
Well-Known Member
Without unpacking all the details, John's prologue implies some extremely important things about atheism, theism, and everlasting life. Without getting into the exegesis, John's prologue implies that all mankind, atheist, or theist, is endowed with divinity, such that we're all, every one of us, whether atheist or theist, possessors of everlasting life (or at least "existence") from the get-go. This naturally makes the atheist theistically-endowed even in his atheism. It makes atheism a branch of theism.
When these truism are linked with the theological doctrine that theistic "salvation" is "non-meritorious," and that every righteous act requires what Jews call an attitude of "lishmah" (doing something strictly for its own sake), a thinking man can begin to make sense of some of the profound disagreements that arise between theists and atheist in regards to nearly every form of thought under the sun.
If every human being is divinely endowed, i.e., if human self-consciousness is itself a divine-endowment, then consciousness of that fact must be the initial, formative act of consciousness, of every sentient, self-conscious human being, who possesses a reasonable, natural, normal, intellect. In other words, if human self-consciousness is divine, then the first instance of this self-consciousness must be the moment where the conscious agent immediately enters into either theism or atheism prior to sentient empirical observations that might taint the non-meritorious decision of the self-conscious agent. This must be the case (if theistic faith/salvation is non-meritorious) since if even one conscious observation is allowed to interfere in the act of theism versus atheism then neither theistic-faith nor atheism can be non-meritorious since various empirical inputs might weigh in favor of atheism or theism in the self-conscious agent's selection of atheism versus theism. But if the selection of theism or atheism is the initial moment of self-consciousness, then faith in theism, or atheism, can be, will be, either way, non-meritorious. The atheist chooses against theism, belief in God, as the initial moment, pre-empirical observation, of his self-conscious being. The theist does the opposite; believes in God as the initial moment of pre-empirical observation thought and decision. Neither one has one iota of of empirical or factual evidence for or against belief in God at the moment of decision (the initial instance of self-conscious sentience).
Where this is understood to be the case, the die is cast for theism or atheism prior to the first empirical observation, and before the first logical, or fact based thought. This being the case, the atheist immediately, naturally, uses his initial decision of self-consciousness, disbelief in theism, God, as the prism not only for his first empirical observation, but likewise for his first logical deductive act. Ditto, in reverse, for the theist.
Part and parcel of this understanding is the fact that in order that the non-meritorious nature of theism or atheism not be contaminated after the fact of the conscious selection of one or the other (as the first self-conscious act), no temporal, natural, distinguishing factor, whatsoever, can affect the atheist different than the theist, or the theist different than the atheist. In both cases, the freewill decision that is the initial moment of self-consciousness must be insulated against meritorious gain, or loss, for the natural life of the theist or atheist. Only in this way can a righteous judgment of the life of the atheist and the theist be performed since there would then be no merit-based impetus for the atheist and or the theist to think, believe, and act, differently from one another.
Any difference in the final evaluation of the theist versus the atheist must be insulated from meritorious influence, good or bad, for the final evaluation of the life to be righteous since there isn't one iota of privilege for theism rather than atheism, nor for atheism rather than theism. The only exemption from this principle would be the fact that the atheist is naturally allowed, and may be naturally prejudiced, to use his divine endowment for his temporal enrichment, whereas the theist might believe ---based on some duty to God ---- that it's his duty not to use his divine endowment for personal gain. In this way the atheist might be one up in temporal things simply by reason of the fact that he has no reason to hold back on self-enrichment for the sake of a God he doesn't believe in.
John
When these truism are linked with the theological doctrine that theistic "salvation" is "non-meritorious," and that every righteous act requires what Jews call an attitude of "lishmah" (doing something strictly for its own sake), a thinking man can begin to make sense of some of the profound disagreements that arise between theists and atheist in regards to nearly every form of thought under the sun.
If every human being is divinely endowed, i.e., if human self-consciousness is itself a divine-endowment, then consciousness of that fact must be the initial, formative act of consciousness, of every sentient, self-conscious human being, who possesses a reasonable, natural, normal, intellect. In other words, if human self-consciousness is divine, then the first instance of this self-consciousness must be the moment where the conscious agent immediately enters into either theism or atheism prior to sentient empirical observations that might taint the non-meritorious decision of the self-conscious agent. This must be the case (if theistic faith/salvation is non-meritorious) since if even one conscious observation is allowed to interfere in the act of theism versus atheism then neither theistic-faith nor atheism can be non-meritorious since various empirical inputs might weigh in favor of atheism or theism in the self-conscious agent's selection of atheism versus theism. But if the selection of theism or atheism is the initial moment of self-consciousness, then faith in theism, or atheism, can be, will be, either way, non-meritorious. The atheist chooses against theism, belief in God, as the initial moment, pre-empirical observation, of his self-conscious being. The theist does the opposite; believes in God as the initial moment of pre-empirical observation thought and decision. Neither one has one iota of of empirical or factual evidence for or against belief in God at the moment of decision (the initial instance of self-conscious sentience).
Where this is understood to be the case, the die is cast for theism or atheism prior to the first empirical observation, and before the first logical, or fact based thought. This being the case, the atheist immediately, naturally, uses his initial decision of self-consciousness, disbelief in theism, God, as the prism not only for his first empirical observation, but likewise for his first logical deductive act. Ditto, in reverse, for the theist.
Part and parcel of this understanding is the fact that in order that the non-meritorious nature of theism or atheism not be contaminated after the fact of the conscious selection of one or the other (as the first self-conscious act), no temporal, natural, distinguishing factor, whatsoever, can affect the atheist different than the theist, or the theist different than the atheist. In both cases, the freewill decision that is the initial moment of self-consciousness must be insulated against meritorious gain, or loss, for the natural life of the theist or atheist. Only in this way can a righteous judgment of the life of the atheist and the theist be performed since there would then be no merit-based impetus for the atheist and or the theist to think, believe, and act, differently from one another.
Any difference in the final evaluation of the theist versus the atheist must be insulated from meritorious influence, good or bad, for the final evaluation of the life to be righteous since there isn't one iota of privilege for theism rather than atheism, nor for atheism rather than theism. The only exemption from this principle would be the fact that the atheist is naturally allowed, and may be naturally prejudiced, to use his divine endowment for his temporal enrichment, whereas the theist might believe ---based on some duty to God ---- that it's his duty not to use his divine endowment for personal gain. In this way the atheist might be one up in temporal things simply by reason of the fact that he has no reason to hold back on self-enrichment for the sake of a God he doesn't believe in.
John
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