Yes.
I expect that what Dawkins means is that if a question can't be answered empirically, it can't be answered at all. The word science, which invokes images of people in white coats in laboratories, should be replaced with empiricism or experience. Most answers we have don't come from these laboratories or observatories, but from the experience of daily life. That's how we know how to get home or where to find good French cuisine.
This based in the correspondence theory of truth, which says that a correct idea is one that accurately maps some portion of testable reality. Truth, fact, knowledge, and correctness are all the same thing, and are only those things that can be shown to be correct. Ideas about why lies beyond experience are metaphysical statements, which can never be demonstrated to be either correct or incorrect.
Religion has no answers, by which I mean correct answers according to the definition of correct just given: demonstrably correct. This is because it is detached from empiricism, untethered to reality, free to say anything as long as it's not testable, which also means the comments can never be called correct (or incorrect), a condition variously referred to as unscientific statements, unfalsifiable statements, metaphysical statements, and not-even-wrong statements - all meaning the same thing.
I wouldn't agree that there is no value in considering such things, just that there will be no answers forthcoming. The value comes in recognizing that, that some questions are unanswerable not just contingently as we await the next great discovery or detector, but in principle. I think I've learned a lot considering the supernatural, for example, and coming to see the incoherence of the concept.
People believe in these realms and their alleged denizens, and they want those beliefs respected. They look for a role for religion to play in the world of learning. The concept of nonoverlapping magesteria does this by assuming that there are two magisteria, two unrelated, authoritative sources of knowledge that are equally valuable ways of deciding truth.
Not by my definition of truth there aren't. If one's definition of answers allows to call these untestable proclamations from religion answers, then there are two sources of answers: empiricism and idle speculation. But as I said, I don't consider the latter answers, because the ideas are untestable and unusable for anything apart from psychological comforting in those that can be comforted by them.
As I said, believers take umbrage in all of this, and scoffingly deride this strictly rational and empirical epistemology, contemptuously calling its adherents materialists or excessively dependent on evidence, while short-sightedly ignoring and missing the bigger picture (scientism). My answer is always the same: show me some of these useful insights you've gleaned by this other way of knowing that doesn't involve experience. They can't, because they get none, just comfort. That's fine, but many don't need comforting there. They are perfectly happy knowing that we can only know what we can experience. They have no need for or interest in metaphysical speculation.
And this angers some. I don't know why. Theistic opinions don't anger the typical humanist, and those theistic opinions are often what the unbeliever should believe or do - advice. Theists frequently ask critical thinkers to "open" their minds and let their shields against accepting false beliefs down, and to and quit being so myopic. Is this a reason to get angry at them? Of course not.
Still, if a skeptic says that it is his belief that if "science" (experience) can't answer it, it can't be answered, and that religion has no answers, just words that comfort some adherents, he will offend many of them.
