Why does my mouse have flamingos on it?
This innocuous question vexes me more than I'd like to admit, and it doesn't have anything to do with my (admittedly awesome) aesthetic taste.
I think most of us would agree that the fact that my mouse has flamingos on it is a contingent fact in that it's probably not ontologically necessary for it to have flamingos on it. (By the way, is it flamingoes?)
Ostensibly, my mouse is so fantastic because on the day I ordered a mouse online, there was a limited selection, and this one caught my eye. But if either of these explain why my mouse has flamingos on it (that it was available where I looked, and that I wanted it), it seems that those facts are also contingent, and so would require some explanation.
Ok, so why was it available when I looked? Maybe it was because birds were hot during that season, so some kind of cultural explanation. Maybe the manufacturer had extra pink dye they wanted to get rid of, I don't know. Whatever the case, it seems like that explanation will also be contingent.
Looks like it's regression time: what is the ultimate source of contingency for my mouse's hot pink birds?
If I think about it a lot, I narrow it down to a sort of trilemma; but worryingly, it seems like the PSR (Principle of Sufficient Reason) doesn't survive any of the three options.
None of these seem good for the PSR. If I start with (1), I immediately wonder if this is true: it seems to me that a necessary explanation for something is a necessary cause, and it seems to me that a necessary cause has necessary effects. But then the thing that the necessary explanation explains is also necessary, and anything that it explains is also necessary, and so on: we never arrive to any contingency at all, and we reach the (possible, I suppose; but unpalatable) conclusion that there are necessarily birds on my mouse; and nothing requires any explanation at all so the PSR is impotent!
If I move on to (2), I can't help but feel like the PSR is never satisfied. If there's an infinite regression of contingent causes, we never really satisfy why that entire infinite chain is the way that it is (a meta-contingency, if you will). That seems like a problem.
If I move on to (3), this is just an outright admission to throwing the PSR in the garbage. If there's just some random cause for a chain of contingencies that doesn't itself have a cause ("true randomness"), then obviously there's not ultimately an explanation for the meta-contingency of that chain of causes.
Where am I going with this? I really don't know. Maybe you have something to add.
This innocuous question vexes me more than I'd like to admit, and it doesn't have anything to do with my (admittedly awesome) aesthetic taste.
I think most of us would agree that the fact that my mouse has flamingos on it is a contingent fact in that it's probably not ontologically necessary for it to have flamingos on it. (By the way, is it flamingoes?)
Ostensibly, my mouse is so fantastic because on the day I ordered a mouse online, there was a limited selection, and this one caught my eye. But if either of these explain why my mouse has flamingos on it (that it was available where I looked, and that I wanted it), it seems that those facts are also contingent, and so would require some explanation.
Ok, so why was it available when I looked? Maybe it was because birds were hot during that season, so some kind of cultural explanation. Maybe the manufacturer had extra pink dye they wanted to get rid of, I don't know. Whatever the case, it seems like that explanation will also be contingent.
Looks like it's regression time: what is the ultimate source of contingency for my mouse's hot pink birds?
If I think about it a lot, I narrow it down to a sort of trilemma; but worryingly, it seems like the PSR (Principle of Sufficient Reason) doesn't survive any of the three options.
- Regressing back through a chain of contingent explanations/facts, there is some ultimate foundation of a necessary explanation/fact.
- There is just an infinite chain of contingent explanations/facts, each explaining the next, but requiring explanation from another contingent fact before it.
- There is a regression of contingent facts until we get back to some primordial fact with no explanation: true randomness.
None of these seem good for the PSR. If I start with (1), I immediately wonder if this is true: it seems to me that a necessary explanation for something is a necessary cause, and it seems to me that a necessary cause has necessary effects. But then the thing that the necessary explanation explains is also necessary, and anything that it explains is also necessary, and so on: we never arrive to any contingency at all, and we reach the (possible, I suppose; but unpalatable) conclusion that there are necessarily birds on my mouse; and nothing requires any explanation at all so the PSR is impotent!
If I move on to (2), I can't help but feel like the PSR is never satisfied. If there's an infinite regression of contingent causes, we never really satisfy why that entire infinite chain is the way that it is (a meta-contingency, if you will). That seems like a problem.
If I move on to (3), this is just an outright admission to throwing the PSR in the garbage. If there's just some random cause for a chain of contingencies that doesn't itself have a cause ("true randomness"), then obviously there's not ultimately an explanation for the meta-contingency of that chain of causes.
Where am I going with this? I really don't know. Maybe you have something to add.