Skwim
Veteran Member
Several years ago, eight to be exact, I posted my reason for dismissing the idea of free will and adopting hard determinism. Because the topic of free will vs determinism hasn't been discussed in some time and a lot of newcomers have come on board RF I thought I'd bring it up again. The following is taken from my original post.
Discussions about free will usually center around an affirmation and/or a denunciation of it. Very interesting thoughts on both sides have come out of such conversations, many well thought out, others not so much. Whatever the case, there's frequently been a problem with what is meant by "will" and "free will," so much so that the issue can quickly become mired in misunderstanding. To avoid this I've found the following definitions to be on point and helpful.
Will is the capacity to act decisively on one's desires.
Free will is to do so undirected by controlling influences.
The notion of free will is important to many because without it would mean each of us is nothing more than an automaton, a machine that performs a function according to a predetermined set of instructions, which is anathema to the notion personal freedom. If people lack freedom of choice how can they be blamed for what they do, or be deserving of any praise laid on them? For Christians this has the added consequence of robbing the concept of sin/salvation of any meaning. So most people are loath to even entertain the idea of no free will. Free will is almost always regarded as a given.
Any exception to free will is regarded as temporary constraint. "I am free to to do this or that unless someone/thing comes and prevents it. Of course this isn't what the free will issue is about at all. Free will is about the idea that, aside from any external constraints, "I could have chosen to do differently if I wished." So I think another valid way way of looking at free will is just that: the ability to do differently if one wished. "I got a haircut yesterday, but I could just as well have had a hot dog instead."
Those who most ardently disagree with this are the hard determinists, people claiming that everything we do has a cause. And because everything we do is caused we could not have done differently---no, you could not have chosen to have a hot dog--- therefore it's absurd to place blame or praise. A pretty drastic notion, and one rejected by almost everyone. So whatever else is said about the issue of free will ultimately it must come down to this very basic question: Are we free to do other than what we chose or not? I say, No you are not. Free will is an illusion. But before going into why, we first need to get rid of the term "choice" because it assumes to be true the condition under consideration, freedom to do what we want. So no use of "choice" or any of its cognates.
Here's how I see it.
There are only two ways actions can take place; completely randomly, or caused. By "completely randomly" I mean absolutely and utterly random, not an action which, for some reason, we do not or cannot determine a cause. This excludes things such as the "random" roll of dice. Dice land as they do because of the laws of physics, and although we may not be able to identify and calculate how dice land, it doesn't mean that the end result is not caused. This is the most common notion of "random" events: those we are unable to predict and appear to come about by pure chance. The only place where true randomness, an absolutely uncaused event, has been suggested to occur is at the subatomic level, which has no effect on super-atomic events, those at which we operate. And I don't think anyone would suggest that's how we operate anyway, completely randomly: what we do is for absolutely no reason whatsoever. So that leaves non-randomness as the operative agent of our actions. We do this or that because. . . . And the "cause" in "because" is telling. It signals a deterministic operation at work. What we do is determined by something. Were it not, what we do would be absolutely random in nature: for absolutely no reason at all. But as all of us claim from time to time, we do have reasons for what we do. And these reasons are the causes that easily negate randomness.
So, because what we do obviously has a cause, could we have done differently? Not unless at least one of the causal determinants leading up to the event in question had been different. If I end up at home after going for a walk it would be impossible to end up at my neighbor's house if I took the exact same route. Of course I could take a different route and still wind up at home, but I would still be in the same position of not ending up at my neighbor's. To do that there would have had to be a different set of circumstances (causes) at work. But there weren't so I had no option but to wind up at home. The previous chain of cause/effects inexorably determined where I ended up. So to is it with our decisions. We do what we do because all the relevant preceding cause/effect events inexorably led up to that very act and no other. We HAD to do what we did. There was no freedom to do any differently.
What does this all mean then? It means that we can never do any any differently other than what we are caused to do. Our actions are caused (determined) by previous events and intervening outside events (also causes) and nothing else. Even our wishing to think we could have done otherwise is a mental event that was determined by all the cause/effect events that led to it. We think as we do because. . . . And that "because" can never be any different than what it is. We have no will to do anything other than what we're caused to do. In effect then, free will does not exist, nor does choice, etc..
This means that blame and praise come out as pretty hollow concepts. As I mentioned, if you cannot do other than what you did why should you be blamed or praised for them? To do so is like blaming or praising a rock for where it lies. It had no "choice" in the matter. Of course, we can still claim to have free will if we define the term as being free of external constraints,but that's not really addressing free will, and why free will exists as an issue. The free will issue exists because people claim "I could have done differently if I had wished." Problem is, of course, they didn't wish differently because . . . .
This, then, is my argument---a bit shortened to keep it brief---against free will as it stands in opposition to determinism.
Thoughts?
Discussions about free will usually center around an affirmation and/or a denunciation of it. Very interesting thoughts on both sides have come out of such conversations, many well thought out, others not so much. Whatever the case, there's frequently been a problem with what is meant by "will" and "free will," so much so that the issue can quickly become mired in misunderstanding. To avoid this I've found the following definitions to be on point and helpful.
Will is the capacity to act decisively on one's desires.
Free will is to do so undirected by controlling influences.
The notion of free will is important to many because without it would mean each of us is nothing more than an automaton, a machine that performs a function according to a predetermined set of instructions, which is anathema to the notion personal freedom. If people lack freedom of choice how can they be blamed for what they do, or be deserving of any praise laid on them? For Christians this has the added consequence of robbing the concept of sin/salvation of any meaning. So most people are loath to even entertain the idea of no free will. Free will is almost always regarded as a given.
Any exception to free will is regarded as temporary constraint. "I am free to to do this or that unless someone/thing comes and prevents it. Of course this isn't what the free will issue is about at all. Free will is about the idea that, aside from any external constraints, "I could have chosen to do differently if I wished." So I think another valid way way of looking at free will is just that: the ability to do differently if one wished. "I got a haircut yesterday, but I could just as well have had a hot dog instead."
Those who most ardently disagree with this are the hard determinists, people claiming that everything we do has a cause. And because everything we do is caused we could not have done differently---no, you could not have chosen to have a hot dog--- therefore it's absurd to place blame or praise. A pretty drastic notion, and one rejected by almost everyone. So whatever else is said about the issue of free will ultimately it must come down to this very basic question: Are we free to do other than what we chose or not? I say, No you are not. Free will is an illusion. But before going into why, we first need to get rid of the term "choice" because it assumes to be true the condition under consideration, freedom to do what we want. So no use of "choice" or any of its cognates.
Here's how I see it.
There are only two ways actions can take place; completely randomly, or caused. By "completely randomly" I mean absolutely and utterly random, not an action which, for some reason, we do not or cannot determine a cause. This excludes things such as the "random" roll of dice. Dice land as they do because of the laws of physics, and although we may not be able to identify and calculate how dice land, it doesn't mean that the end result is not caused. This is the most common notion of "random" events: those we are unable to predict and appear to come about by pure chance. The only place where true randomness, an absolutely uncaused event, has been suggested to occur is at the subatomic level, which has no effect on super-atomic events, those at which we operate. And I don't think anyone would suggest that's how we operate anyway, completely randomly: what we do is for absolutely no reason whatsoever. So that leaves non-randomness as the operative agent of our actions. We do this or that because. . . . And the "cause" in "because" is telling. It signals a deterministic operation at work. What we do is determined by something. Were it not, what we do would be absolutely random in nature: for absolutely no reason at all. But as all of us claim from time to time, we do have reasons for what we do. And these reasons are the causes that easily negate randomness.
So, because what we do obviously has a cause, could we have done differently? Not unless at least one of the causal determinants leading up to the event in question had been different. If I end up at home after going for a walk it would be impossible to end up at my neighbor's house if I took the exact same route. Of course I could take a different route and still wind up at home, but I would still be in the same position of not ending up at my neighbor's. To do that there would have had to be a different set of circumstances (causes) at work. But there weren't so I had no option but to wind up at home. The previous chain of cause/effects inexorably determined where I ended up. So to is it with our decisions. We do what we do because all the relevant preceding cause/effect events inexorably led up to that very act and no other. We HAD to do what we did. There was no freedom to do any differently.
What does this all mean then? It means that we can never do any any differently other than what we are caused to do. Our actions are caused (determined) by previous events and intervening outside events (also causes) and nothing else. Even our wishing to think we could have done otherwise is a mental event that was determined by all the cause/effect events that led to it. We think as we do because. . . . And that "because" can never be any different than what it is. We have no will to do anything other than what we're caused to do. In effect then, free will does not exist, nor does choice, etc..
This means that blame and praise come out as pretty hollow concepts. As I mentioned, if you cannot do other than what you did why should you be blamed or praised for them? To do so is like blaming or praising a rock for where it lies. It had no "choice" in the matter. Of course, we can still claim to have free will if we define the term as being free of external constraints,but that's not really addressing free will, and why free will exists as an issue. The free will issue exists because people claim "I could have done differently if I had wished." Problem is, of course, they didn't wish differently because . . . .
This, then, is my argument---a bit shortened to keep it brief---against free will as it stands in opposition to determinism.
Thoughts?
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